In the spring of 1979, a lab worker in Sverdlovsk, USSR removed a clogged air filter in the ventilation system and didn’t replace it. His note to the supervisor was never transferred to the official logbook, so when the next shift rolled in, workers simply started production as usual. Now, in most labs, this would have been a minor mistake. But this lab was a biological weapons facility producing huge quantities of anthrax— which, if inhaled, can kill up to 90% of those it infects. This deadly anthrax powder floated out into the sky for hours, causing the largest documented outbreak of inhalation anthrax on record and resulting in at least 64 deaths.
西元 1979 年春天,一名 蘇聯凱薩琳堡實驗室的工人 移除通風系統的空氣濾芯 沒有更換新品 他留了一張便條紙給主管 卻沒有記錄在工作日誌 因此,當接班的工人們接替工作時 他們一如既往地開啟生產線 在大多數實驗室中 這僅是一個小錯誤 但這是一個研究生化武器的實驗室 製造大量炭疽桿菌 如果吸入,可以殺死 高達 90% 的被感染者 數小時間,致命的炭疽桿菌粉塵 順著煙囪排放到戶外 爆發了有紀錄以來最嚴重的 一起炭疽桿菌感染事件 導致至少 64 個居民死亡
What happened at Sverdlovsk was a tragedy, and the Soviet bioweapons program was a violation of international law. But these days, it’s not just state-sponsored bioweapons programs that keep biosecurity experts up at night. Nor is anthrax their largest concern. They’re worried about an even more dangerous kind of lab leak.
凱撒琳堡發生的這起悲劇事件 聯合國判定蘇聯的生物武器計劃 違反了國際法 如今,不僅國家資助生化武器 讓生化武器專家們畏懼而徹夜難眠 炭疽病也不是他們最擔心的問題 他們更擔心更為危險的 「實驗室洩漏病毒」
Since the 1970s, researchers have been manipulating the DNA of microbes to give them abilities they didn’t have before. This is called “gain of function” work and it includes a huge body of scientific research. The majority of this work helps humanity with very little risk, for example, engineered viruses are used in vaccine production, gene therapy, and cancer treatments. But within the gain of function realm lies an intensely debated sub-field where scientists engineer superbugs. Officially known as “enhanced potential pandemic pathogens,” these ePPPs are typically variants of well-known viruses, such as Ebola or avian influenza that have been engineered to be, say, more transmissible or more deadly. The stakes of this kind of work are much higher: if even one unusually dangerous virus escaped a lab, it could cause a global pandemic.
自西元 1970 年代以來 研究人員持續嘗試操縱微生物的 DNA 讓人類可以做到從前無法完成的事情 他們稱之為「增益實驗」 它包含是大量科學研究數據的集大成 大部分有助於人類而風險極小 比如,改良的病毒可以用於疫苗注射 基因治療及癌症療法 但「增益實驗」中,有一部分的 實驗行為備受爭議 那就是超級細菌的研製 正式名稱為「增強的潛在 流行性感冒病原體(ePPPs)」 這些 ePPPs 通常是為人熟知的病毒變種 如:伊波拉、禽流感等的人造變種 使其更具傳染力、更致死 這類工作的賭注要高得多 即使從實驗室逃逸了 僅僅「一隻」罕見的危險病毒 也可能會導致疫情全球大爆發
Virologists developing ePPPs argue this research could help us prepare for future pandemics, allowing us to jump start treatments and potentially save lives. For example, in the early 2010s, several research teams created a deadly strain of bird flu with the novel ability to spread through the air between mammals. Advocates of the project argued that by creating this ePPP, we could learn crucial information about a worst-case-scenario virus under controlled conditions. But many critics argued that it’s unclear whether bird flu would ever evolve in the wild as it did in the lab. Consequently, they believed the knowledge gained by studying this dangerous virus wasn’t remotely worth the risk of creating it in the first place.
病毒學家辯稱 研究致命的病毒是為了預防 未來的傳染病 讓我們可以先一步 預備好療法並可能拯救生命 舉例來說,在西元 2010 年代前期 一些研究員開發了一個致命的禽鳥病毒 具有更新穎,透過空氣傳輸 哺乳動物病毒的能力 提倡者宣稱經由創造這種 ePPP 人類可以學到關鍵的訊息 連最嚴重的病毒都可能 在科學家的可掌控範圍中 然而許多批判者駁斥,不確定 在野外環境條件下能否進化出 可透過空氣傳播的禽流感的病毒 如同在實驗室裡那樣 因此,他們相信透過 研發致命病毒取得的先輩知識 並不值得我們冒著風險去創造它
Both sides of this ongoing debate are trying to save lives; they just disagree on the best way to do it. However, everyone agrees that an ePPP lab leak could be catastrophic. Labs that work with dangerous pathogens are designed with numerous safety features to protect the scientists who work there, as well as the outside world, such as ventilation systems that decontaminate air and airtight “spacesuits” with dedicated oxygen. Sometimes buildings are even nested inside each other to prevent natural disasters from breaching the closed environment. But this technology is expensive to build and maintain. And even when our tech doesn't fail, there’s still room for the most common kind of mistake: human error.
激辯雙方的最終目的都是拯救生命 但是對最好作法為何的意見相左 然而所有人都同意實驗室 洩漏 ePPP 會是可怕的災難 處理危險病原體的實驗室 設有繁複的安全機制 保護實驗室裡頭的科學家 以及外頭的世界 比如,有空氣淨化功能的通風系統應 和有專用氧氣系統的密閉「太空衣」 有時實驗大樓內部的隔間 形成一個個巢狀的獨立空間 預防天然災害破壞封閉的實驗環境 但這些技術昂貴且難維持 即使技術並沒有失誤 仍有一部分可能性的風險因子 那就是人為疏失
Many human errors are inconsequential: a researcher spills a sample, but quickly disinfects the otherwise well-controlled environment. Other incidents, however, are much more concerning. In 2009, a researcher accidentally stuck themselves with an Ebola-contaminated needle, endangering their life and the lives of those treating them. In 2014, six vials containing the virus that causes smallpox were found in an unsecured storage room where they’d been forgotten for decades. That same year, a CDC scientist unknowingly contaminated a sample of relatively harmless bird flu with a deadly lab-grown variant, and then shipped the contaminated sample to the USDA.
許多人為疏失無關緊要 研究員不小心撒了實驗樣品 必須即時消毒 否則將破壞良好的實驗環境 然而一些曾經發生的案例 還是很令人擔憂 2009 年,研究人員意外 被伊波拉病毒污染的針扎到 危及自己以及施予治療者的生命 西元 2014 年,6 個 存有天花病毒的瓶子被發現 存放在一個不安全的空間 且早已被遺忘數十年 同年,疾病預防控制中心的 一位科學家無意中讓樣品污染了 實驗室研發的致命禽流感病毒 然後將受污染的 樣本送到美國農業部
While these incidents did not lead to larger crises, the potentially catastrophic consequences of an ePPP leak have convinced many scientists that we should stop this kind of research altogether. But if that doesn’t happen, what can we do to minimize risk? Well, first, we can work to reduce human error by examining past mistakes. Some experts have suggested creating an international database of leaks, near-misses, and fixes taken that would help labs adapt their protocols to minimize human errors. And a robust, well-funded pandemic early warning system would help protect us from any disease outbreak— whether it comes from a lab leak or a natural spillover.
儘管上述案例並未帶來嚴重的危害 潛在洩漏 ePPP 的可能性 說服許多科學家 我們應該停止所有的相關實驗 但如果科學家不停止病毒研發的實驗 我們該如何降低風險? 首先,我們應該詳審過去的錯誤 來降低人為疏失 一些專家建議創建一個國際 洩漏、幾乎發生事故 以及採取的修復措施的資料庫 將有助於各實驗室訂定工作規章 減少人為疏失 一個強大的、資金充足的 流行病毒預警系統 將防止大型傳染病蔓延 不論病毒變種來自實驗室或自然演化
Developing the kind of global standards and databases necessary for these changes would be difficult— requiring unprecedented international collaboration and transparency. But we need to overcome these hurdles because pandemics don't care about borders or politics.
制定全球化的數據庫 應對各種變化是非常困難的 需要空前的國際合作及資料透明化 但我們必須跨越障礙 因為傳染病傳播 是不分國界及政治立場的