In the spring of 1979, a lab worker in Sverdlovsk, USSR removed a clogged air filter in the ventilation system and didn’t replace it. His note to the supervisor was never transferred to the official logbook, so when the next shift rolled in, workers simply started production as usual. Now, in most labs, this would have been a minor mistake. But this lab was a biological weapons facility producing huge quantities of anthrax— which, if inhaled, can kill up to 90% of those it infects. This deadly anthrax powder floated out into the sky for hours, causing the largest documented outbreak of inhalation anthrax on record and resulting in at least 64 deaths.
1979 年春,苏联斯维尔德洛夫斯克的 一名实验室工作人员 拆除了通风系统中 堵塞的空气过滤器, 但没有替换它。 他写给主管的笔记 没有被抄到主日志上, 所以在换班之后, 工人们只是像往常一样开始工作。 在大多数实验室里, 这只会是一个小错误。 但这个实验室 是一个生产大量炭疽的生物武器设施; 炭疽如果吸入 将杀死高达 90% 的感染者。 这种致命的炭疽粉末 几个小时内飘至大气中, 导致有史以来最大的炭疽吸入爆发, 并造成至少 64 人死亡。
What happened at Sverdlovsk was a tragedy, and the Soviet bioweapons program was a violation of international law. But these days, it’s not just state-sponsored bioweapons programs that keep biosecurity experts up at night. Nor is anthrax their largest concern. They’re worried about an even more dangerous kind of lab leak.
在斯维尔德洛夫斯克所发生的 是一场悲剧, 而且苏联的生物武器 项目违背了国际法。 但如今,让生物安全专家焦虑的 不仅仅是国家支持的生物武器项目。 而炭疽病也不是他们最大的担忧。 他们担心的是一种 更为危险的实验室泄漏。
Since the 1970s, researchers have been manipulating the DNA of microbes to give them abilities they didn’t have before. This is called “gain of function” work and it includes a huge body of scientific research. The majority of this work helps humanity with very little risk, for example, engineered viruses are used in vaccine production, gene therapy, and cancer treatments. But within the gain of function realm lies an intensely debated sub-field where scientists engineer superbugs. Officially known as “enhanced potential pandemic pathogens,” these ePPPs are typically variants of well-known viruses, such as Ebola or avian influenza that have been engineered to be, say, more transmissible or more deadly. The stakes of this kind of work are much higher: if even one unusually dangerous virus escaped a lab, it could cause a global pandemic.
自 20 世纪 70 年代以来,研究人员 一直在操控微生物的DNA 以赋予它们前所未有的能力。 这就是所谓的“功能获得”工作, 它涉及大量的科学研究。 这项工作中的大部分 助益人类而且风险很低, 例如,病毒改良被用于疫苗生产、 基因治疗和癌症治疗。 但在功能获得的领域中, 存在着一个备受争议的子领域, 即科学家研发超级细菌的领域。 官方名称为 “增强作用流行病原体”(ePPP) 这些 ePPP 通常是众所周知的病毒的变种, 例如埃博拉或禽流感, 但被改造得更易传播或更为致命。 这类工作的风险要高得多: 即使只有一个 异常危险的病毒逃出了实验室, 也可能导致一场全球大流行。
Virologists developing ePPPs argue this research could help us prepare for future pandemics, allowing us to jump start treatments and potentially save lives. For example, in the early 2010s, several research teams created a deadly strain of bird flu with the novel ability to spread through the air between mammals. Advocates of the project argued that by creating this ePPP, we could learn crucial information about a worst-case-scenario virus under controlled conditions. But many critics argued that it’s unclear whether bird flu would ever evolve in the wild as it did in the lab. Consequently, they believed the knowledge gained by studying this dangerous virus wasn’t remotely worth the risk of creating it in the first place.
开发 ePPP 的病毒学家认为 这项研究可以帮助我们 为未来的大流行做好准备, 使我们能够迅速开展治疗 从而尝试挽救生命。 例如,在 2010 年初, 几个研究团队制成了 一种致命的禽流感病毒。 这种病毒具有在哺乳动物之间 通过空气传播的新能力。 该项目的倡导者们认为, 通过创建这个 ePPP, 我们可以在受控条件下 了解有关最危险病毒的核心信息。 但许多批评人士认为, 目前还不清楚禽流感 是否会在野外像实验室内一般演化。 因此,他们认为, 研究这种危险的病毒以获得知识, 完全不值得人们去冒此风险。
Both sides of this ongoing debate are trying to save lives; they just disagree on the best way to do it. However, everyone agrees that an ePPP lab leak could be catastrophic. Labs that work with dangerous pathogens are designed with numerous safety features to protect the scientists who work there, as well as the outside world, such as ventilation systems that decontaminate air and airtight “spacesuits” with dedicated oxygen. Sometimes buildings are even nested inside each other to prevent natural disasters from breaching the closed environment. But this technology is expensive to build and maintain. And even when our tech doesn't fail, there’s still room for the most common kind of mistake: human error.
这场持续辩论的两方 都在试图拯救生命; 他们只是在最佳的方式上存在分歧。 然而,每个人都同意,一场 ePPP 实验室泄漏将是灾难性的。 研究危险病原体的实验室 设计有许多安全功能 以保护在那里工作的科学家和外部世界, 例如净化空气的通风系统 和带有专用氧气的密闭“太空服”。 有时,建筑物甚至相互嵌套, 以防止自然灾害破坏封闭的环境。 但这些技术的建造和维护成本很高。 而即使我们的技术并未失败, 也会有最常见的错误: 人为错误。
Many human errors are inconsequential: a researcher spills a sample, but quickly disinfects the otherwise well-controlled environment. Other incidents, however, are much more concerning. In 2009, a researcher accidentally stuck themselves with an Ebola-contaminated needle, endangering their life and the lives of those treating them. In 2014, six vials containing the virus that causes smallpox were found in an unsecured storage room where they’d been forgotten for decades. That same year, a CDC scientist unknowingly contaminated a sample of relatively harmless bird flu with a deadly lab-grown variant, and then shipped the contaminated sample to the USDA.
许多人为错误是无关紧要的: 一名研究人员打翻了样本, 但很快就对原本控制良好的环境 进行了消毒。 然而,其他事件却要令人担忧得多。 2009 年,一名研究人员意外地 将受到埃博拉病毒污染的针头 戳到了自己的手里, 危及到了自己, 以及为其救治的人的生命。 2014 年,六只 装有天花病毒的试管 在一间被遗忘几十年的 储藏室里被发现。 同年,疾控中心的一名科学家 在不知情的情况下, 用一种致命的,实验室培育的变种 污染了相对无害的禽流感样本, 然后将受到了污染的样本 运往了美国农业部。
While these incidents did not lead to larger crises, the potentially catastrophic consequences of an ePPP leak have convinced many scientists that we should stop this kind of research altogether. But if that doesn’t happen, what can we do to minimize risk? Well, first, we can work to reduce human error by examining past mistakes. Some experts have suggested creating an international database of leaks, near-misses, and fixes taken that would help labs adapt their protocols to minimize human errors. And a robust, well-funded pandemic early warning system would help protect us from any disease outbreak— whether it comes from a lab leak or a natural spillover.
虽然这些事件没有导致更大的危机, 但 ePPP 泄漏的潜在灾难性后果 让许多科学家相信, 我们应该完全停止这种研究。 但如果这种情况没有发生, 我们能做些什么来将风险降到最低呢? 首先,我们可以通过分析过去的失误 来减少人为错误。 一些专家建议建立一个 国际数据库,涵盖泄露、 差点发生的灾难和采取的修复措施, 以帮助实验室改善其规范, 从而将人为错误降至最低。 而一个强力的、资金足够的 大流行早期预警系统 将有助于保护我们 免受任何疾病爆发的影响 ——无论其来自实验室泄漏或自然溢出。
Developing the kind of global standards and databases necessary for these changes would be difficult— requiring unprecedented international collaboration and transparency. But we need to overcome these hurdles because pandemics don't care about borders or politics.
开发这些变化所需的那种全球标准 和数据库将是困难的 ——需要前所未有的国际合作和透明度。 但我们需要克服这些障碍, 因流行病不分国界与政治。