I am going to speak about corruption, but I would like to juxtapose two different things. One is the large global economy, the large globalized economy, and the other one is the small, and very limited, capacity of our traditional governments and their international institutions to govern, to shape, this economy. Because there is this asymmetry, which creates, basically, failing governance. Failing governance in many areas: in the area of corruption and the area of destruction of the environment, in the area of exploitation of women and children, in the area of climate change, in all the areas in which we really need a capacity to reintroduce the primacy of politics into the economy, which is operating in a worldwide arena. And I think corruption, and the fight against corruption, and the impact of corruption, is probably one of the most interesting ways to illustrate what I mean with this failure of governance.
我將要談論腐敗的問題, 但是我想先將兩件不同的事情 放在一起說說。 其一是宏大的全球經濟, 全球化經濟, 而另外一個則是渺小的而且非常受限的 舊式政府 以及其國際組織 對經濟的監控以及改造能力。 這種不對稱性的存在, 基本上導致了 無能失策的政府。 政府的無能表現在很多方面, 例如腐敗以及環境的破壞, 對婦女和兒童的剝削, 以及氣候變化,等等。 在所有的這些領域中,我們真的很需要 重新引介政府效能 在經濟活動中的 首要地位 達成一個世界級的合作。 而我認為腐敗 和針對腐敗的反擊 以及腐敗的影響 也許是最有趣的方式 來闡明我 對政府無能失策的看法。
Let me talk about my own experience. I used to work as the director of the World Bank office in Nairobi for East Africa. At that time, I noticed that corruption, that grand corruption, that systematic corruption, was undermining everything we were trying to do. And therefore, I began to not only try to protect the work of the World Bank, our own projects, our own programs against corruption, but in general, I thought, "We need a system to protect the people in this part of the world from the ravages of corruption." And as soon as I started this work, I received a memorandum from the World Bank, from the legal department first, in which they said, "You are not allowed to do this. You are meddling in the internal affairs of our partner countries. This is forbidden by the charter of the World Bank, so I want you to stop your doings."
我來談談我的經歷吧。 我曾經擔任 世界銀行在奈洛比辦事處的總監 服務區域是東非 那時候我注意到 腐敗,那種明目張膽的腐敗, 系統性的腐敗 不斷侵蝕著我們的努力成果。 所以,我開始 竭力維護 世界銀行的工作成果, 我們的項目,我們的各項企劃 防止它們受到腐敗的侵害 但總體而言,我認為,我們需要一種制度 去保衛 該地區的人民 使他們免受腐敗的侵害。 然而,一當我展開工作時, 我就收到了世界銀行法律部門 的一封便函 函內寫道,你這樣做是不被允許的。 你這是在干預我們合作國家的內政。 這是世界銀行綱領所禁止的。 所以,我們要求你停止你的行動。
In the meantime, I was chairing donor meetings, for instance, in which the various donors, and many of them like to be in Nairobi -- it is true, it is one of the unsafest cities of the world, but they like to be there because the other cities are even less comfortable. And in these donor meetings, I noticed that many of the worst projects -- which were put forward by our clients, by the governments, by promoters, many of them representing suppliers from the North -- that the worst projects were realized first. Let me give you an example: a huge power project, 300 million dollars, to be built smack into one of the most vulnerable, and one of the most beautiful, areas of western Kenya. And we all noticed immediately that this project had no economic benefits: It had no clients, nobody would buy the electricity there, nobody was interested in irrigation projects. To the contrary, we knew that this project would destroy the environment: It would destroy riparian forests, which were the basis for the survival of nomadic groups, the Samburu and the Turkana in this area. So everybody knew this is a, not a useless project, this is an absolute damaging, a terrible project -- not to speak about the future indebtedness of the country for these hundreds of millions of dollars, and the siphoning off of the scarce resources of the economy from much more important activities like schools, like hospitals and so on. And yet, we all rejected this project, none of the donors was willing to have their name connected with it, and it was the first project to be implemented.
在那段時期,我正在主持 捐贈者會議 各類捐贈者都出席了會議 他們中的很多人喜歡待在奈洛比-- 的確,它是世界上 最不安全的城市之一, 但是他們喜歡待在這裡,因為其他城市 讓人感覺更不舒服。 在這些捐贈者回憶中,我注意到, 很多最差的專案 總是被 我們的顧客、政府、 贊助人 他們其中很多人代表 北方的供應商, 最先地 啟動進行。 讓我來給你們舉一個例子: 一個巨大的能源項目, 價值30億, 將在 世界上最脆弱、又最美麗的地域之一, 肯亞西部開始啟動。 我們都立刻發現, 這個專案沒有經濟利益。 他沒有消費者。沒人會從那裡購買電力。 沒人對灌溉項目感興趣。 相反地,我們知道這項工程 會摧毀環境, 會毀掉河岸森林, 而這些正是 那個區域的遊牧部族, 如Samburu和Tokana部族所賴以生存的。 所以,每個人都知道這不僅是個沒用的項目, 更是個絕對毀滅性的、可怕的項目。 且不說這個國家將來會因此負債累累, 虧欠億萬美元, 它還會貪婪地吞噬 本來可以花在 如學校、醫院等更重要的活動上的 稀少有限的資源。 我們都駁回了這個項目。 沒有一個捐獻者願意 讓自己的名字和這個項目扯上任何關係。 但是這個項目是最先開始執行的。
The good projects, which we as a donor community would take under our wings, they took years, you know, you had too many studies, and very often they didn't succeed. But these bad projects, which were absolutely damaging -- for the economy for many generations, for the environment, for thousands of families who had to be resettled -- they were suddenly put together by consortia of banks, of supplier agencies, of insurance agencies -- like in Germany, Hermes, and so on -- and they came back very, very quickly, driven by an unholy alliance between the powerful elites in the countries there and the suppliers from the North. Now, these suppliers were our big companies. They were the actors of this global market, which I mentioned in the beginning. They were the Siemenses of this world, coming from France, from the UK, from Japan, from Canada, from Germany, and they were systematically driven by systematic, large-scale corruption. We are not talking about 50,000 dollars here, or 100,000 dollars there, or one million dollars there. No, we are talking about 10 million, 20 million dollars on the Swiss bank accounts, on the bank accounts of Liechtenstein, of the president's ministers, the high officials in the para-statal sectors.
好的項目,那些我們捐獻者群體 願意鼎力相助的項目, 卻被拖了一年又一年 你得做很多研究, 而且通常它們都不會成功。 但是這些差勁的項目卻總一帆風順, 儘管它們我們的經濟有著絕對損害 會影響到幾代人的環境, 會讓成千上萬的家庭流離失所。 這些項目很突然地成型 幫助它們的是銀行的聯合體、 支持供應商的社團 和保險公司。 像在德國,愛馬仕公司等等就是背後的推手。 它們很快很快地捲土重來 背後的驅動力是 國家裡 強大精英間的不正義的同盟 以及北方的供應商。 現在,這些供應商 是我們的大公司。 他們是這全球市場的活躍角色, 正如我在演講之初所指出的一樣。 它們是世界上那些像西門子一樣強大的公司, 來自法國、英國、日本、 加拿大、德國, 它們被有體系的、大型的腐敗 有規則地驅動前進。 我們不是在討論 五萬美元的腐敗, 也不是十萬,或一百萬。 我們在討論的,是一千萬、兩千萬美元, 它們以賄款的形勢出現在瑞士的帳號上、 列支敦士登的銀行帳戶裡, 那些帳戶屬於總統的部長、 半國營部門的高級官員。
This was the reality which I saw, and not only one project like that: I saw, I would say, over the years I worked in Africa, I saw hundreds of projects like this. And so, I became convinced that it is this systematic corruption which is perverting economic policy-making in these countries, which is the main reason for the misery, for the poverty, for the conflicts, for the violence, for the desperation in many of these countries. That we have today more than a billion people below the absolute poverty line, that we have more than a billion people without proper drinking water in the world, twice that number, more than two billion people without sanitation and so on, and the consequent illnesses of mothers and children, still, child mortality of more than 10 million people every year, children dying before they are five years old: The cause of this is, to a large extent, grand corruption.
這就是我看到的現實, 而且這樣的情況不是個例 我敢說我在 我在非洲工作的這些年裡 看見過成百上千個這樣的項目。 因此,我相信 這種系統性的腐敗 正在使這些國家的經濟政策走向歧途, 也正是這種腐敗將這些國家推進 苦難、貧窮、 衝突、暴力、 絕望 的深淵。 現今,我們有 超過十億的人處在絕對貧窮線以下 我們有超過十億人 沒有合理處理過的清水可以飲用 更有兩倍那麼多的人, 超過二十億的人 沒有衛生設備等等, 因此女人和孩子 經常受到疾病侵襲 直至今日,每年還有 超過千萬的兒童 在五歲前死亡。 追根溯源,這些問題在很大程度上 是因為規模龐大的腐敗。
Now, why did the World Bank not let me do this work? I found out afterwards, after I left, under a big fight, the World Bank. The reason was that the members of the World Bank thought that foreign bribery was okay, including Germany. In Germany, foreign bribery was allowed. It was even tax-deductible. No wonder that most of the most important international operators in Germany, but also in France and the UK and Scandinavia, everywhere, systematically bribed. Not all of them, but most of them. And this is the phenomenon which I call failing governance, because when I then came to Germany and started this little NGO here in Berlin, at the Villa Borsig, we were told, "You cannot stop our German exporters from bribing, because we will lose our contracts. We will lose to the French, we will lose to the Swedes, we'll lose to the Japanese." And therefore, there was a indeed a prisoner's dilemma, which made it very difficult for an individual company, an individual exporting country to say, "We are not going to continue this deadly, disastrous habit of large companies to bribe."
那麼,為什麼世界銀行 不讓我對此作出反應呢? 我在一次與世界銀行的大爭執後,離開此機構 後來我才搞明白: 原因是,世界銀行的成員國 覺得對外賄賂是沒問題的, 比如德國就這麼認為。 在德國,對外行賄是被允許的。 它甚至是可免稅的。 難怪絕大多數德國、 法國、英國、斯堪地那維亞, 所有地方大多數最重要的跨國企業 都有系統地進行著賄賂 我不是說所有的,但是絕大多數的公司對此都不能問心無愧。 我把這樣一個現象 稱作治理失敗 當我來到德國 成立了這個小小的非政府組織 在柏林,在Villa Borsig, 我們被告知,我們不能阻止 德國出口商行賄, 因為我們德國會因此失去合約。 我們會輸給法國人、 瑞士人、日本人, 因此,這就形成了一個“囚徒困境” 這樣一來, 單獨的公司, 或者出口國 就很難說,我們將不再 繼續這種災難性的 行賄習慣了。
So this is what I mean with a failing governance structure, because even the powerful government, which we have in Germany, comparatively, was not able to say, "We will not allow our companies to bribe abroad." They needed help, and the large companies themselves have this dilemma. Many of them didn't want to bribe. Many of the German companies, for instance, believe that they are really producing a high-quality product at a good price, so they are very competitive. They are not as good at bribing as many of their international competitors are, but they were not allowed to show their strengths, because the world was eaten up by grand corruption.
這就是我所知的 失能的政府結構 因為即使是強大的政府, 如相對強大的德國政府, 也不能夠說, 我們將不允許我們的公司在海外行賄。 它們需要幫助 而且這些大公司本身 也身處這種兩難的境地。 其中很多公司並不想行賄。 比如,很多德國公司 相信它們確實是 能夠製造出物美價廉、 有競爭力的產品。 它們不如其他國際競爭者 善於行賄之術, 但是它們沒有機會 展現自己的長處 因為這個世界 正在被大規模的腐敗侵蝕。
And this is why I'm telling you this: Civil society rose to the occasion. We had this small NGO, Transparency International. They began to think of an escape route from this prisoner's dilemma, and we developed concepts of collective action, basically trying to bring various competitors together around the table, explaining to all of them how much it would be in their interests if they simultaneously would stop bribing, and to make a long story short, we managed to eventually get Germany to sign together with the other OECD countries and a few other exporters.
我想說的是,隨著政府的失能, 公民社會組織就應站出來。 我們有一個小型的非政府組織, 「透明國際」(Transparency International) 我們開始設想 一條從“囚徒困境”裡的逃生之路, 我們也開始闡揚 集體行動的概念, 即嘗試將不同的競爭者 集合到談判桌前, 向他們解釋 如果他們同時停止行賄 是對他們多麼有好處。 長話短說, 我們最終得以 使德國和 其他經濟合作發展組織的成員國 以及一些其他的出口國
In 1997, a convention, under the auspices of the OECD, which obliged everybody to change their laws and criminalize foreign bribery. (Applause) Well, thank you. I mean, it's interesting, in doing this, we had to sit together with the companies. We had here in Berlin, at the Aspen Institute on the Wannsee, we had sessions with about 20 captains of industry, and we discussed with them what to do about international bribery. In the first session -- we had three sessions over the course of two years. And President von Weizsäcker, by the way, chaired one of the sessions, the first one, to take the fear away from the entrepreneurs, who were not used to deal with non-governmental organizations. And in the first session, they all said, "This is not bribery, what we are doing." This is customary there. This is what these other cultures demand. They even applaud it. In fact, [unclear] still says this today. And so there are still a lot of people who are not convinced that you have to stop bribing. But in the second session, they admitted already that they would never do this, what they are doing in these other countries, here in Germany, or in the U.K., and so on. Cabinet ministers would admit this. And in the final session, at the Aspen Institute, we had them all sign an open letter to the Kohl government, at the time, requesting that they participate in the OECD convention.
在1997年的一場會議上 在經濟合作發展組織的贊助支援下, 使所有參與者 改變法律 使國際行賄犯罪化。 (觀眾掌聲) 謝謝大家,我覺得這蠻有趣的, 做這件事的時候, 我們必須跟這些公司坐在一起。 我們在柏林的山楊協會 和20個企業大首腦 開了幾次會, 我們和他們討論了 如何應對國際行賄的問題。 我們一共有三個跨時兩年的會議 在第一個會議裡 一個來自馮·魏茨澤克的主席 主持了第一個會議 以消除企業家們 的恐懼 因為他們不習慣與 非政府組織打交道。 在第一個會議裡,他們都說, 他們做的不是行賄。那是個習俗。 那是其他的文化所要求的。 他們甚至贊許這種行為。 事實上,有人 到如今還堅持這樣的觀點。 並且還有很多人 不相信別人已經停止了行賄。 但是在第二次會議裡, 他們已經承認他們再也不會這樣做了, 不會再做這些發生在其他國家, 如德國、英國等等的事了。 內閣部長們承認了這一點。 在最後一個會議裡,在山楊協會, 我們讓他們所有人都簽署了一封 給那時的科勒政府的公開信, 要求參與到 經濟合作與發展組織協定裡來。
And this is, in my opinion, an example of soft power, because we were able to convince them that they had to go with us. We had a longer-term time perspective. We had a broader, geographically much wider, constituency we were trying to defend. And that's why the law has changed. That's why Siemens is now in the trouble they are in and that's why MIN is in the trouble they are in. In some other countries, the OECD convention is not yet properly enforced. And, again, civil societies breathing down the neck of the establishment.
這在我心中 是一種軟實力的體現, 因為我們能夠讓他們確信 他們必須跟我們統一戰線。 我們有更長遠的目光。 我們要維護 區域上更寬廣的 群體利益。 這就是為什麼法律被改變了。 這就是為什麼西門子現在遇到了麻煩。 這就是為什麼MIN現在碰到了棘手的事。 在一些其他國家裡,經濟合作與發展組織協定 還沒有被真正地有力實施。 我重申,公民社會 緊盯著當局的一舉一動。
In London, for instance, where the BAE got away with a huge corruption case, which the Serious Fraud Office tried to prosecute, 100 million British pounds, every year for ten years, to one particular official of one particular friendly country, who then bought for 44 billion pounds of military equipment. This case, they are not prosecuting in the UK. Why? Because they consider this as contrary to the security interest of the people of Great Britain. Civil society is pushing, civil society is trying to get a solution to this problem, also in the U.K., and also in Japan, which is not properly enforcing, and so on.
比如在倫敦, BAE從一件 巨大的貪腐弊案中僥倖逃脫刑責 懲治詐騙辦公室曾嘗試起訴他們。 每年十億英鎊的賄款, 十年以來, 被送給了某個友好國家的某個官員 於是這個官員 買了他們440億英鎊的軍備。 在這個案例裡,他們在英國並沒有被起訴。 為什麼?因為當局認為 這與英國人民的 安全利益相衝突。 公民社會正在推動, 正在嘗試尋找一個解決方案 在英國 也在日本,那裡的對外行賄也沒有被好好控制, 等等。
In Germany, we are pushing the ratification of the UN convention, which is a subsequent convention. We are, Germany, is not ratifying. Why? Because it would make it necessary to criminalize the corruption of deputies. In Germany, we have a system where you are not allowed to bribe a civil servant, but you are allowed to bribe a deputy. This is, under German law, allowed, and the members of our parliament don't want to change this, and this is why they can't sign the U.N. convention against foreign bribery -- one of they very, very few countries which is preaching honesty and good governance everywhere in the world, but not able to ratify the convention, which we managed to get on the books with about 160 countries all over the world.
在德國,我們正在推動 簽署聯合國協定的進程。 這是一個後續的協定。 德國沒有簽認。 為什麼?因為簽署了它就相當於 使懲罰代理人受賄 成了必須的事。 在德國的系統裡, 你不能夠賄賂一位公務員, 但是可以賄賂一位代理人。 這是被德國法律所允許的。 議會成員不想改動這一點, 這就是為什麼德國不能簽署 聯合國反對外行賄協定的原因。 這是世界上極少數的 講究道德、好管理的的國度之一, 但是它不能簽署這份 通過我們努力, 有大約160個國家簽署了的協定。
I see my time is ticking. Let me just try to draw some conclusions from what has happened. I believe that what we managed to achieve in fighting corruption, one can also achieve in other areas of failing governance. By now, the United Nations is totally on our side. The World Bank has turned from Saulus to Paulus; under Wolfensohn, they became, I would say, the strongest anti-corruption agency in the world. Most of the large companies are now totally convinced that they have to put in place very strong policies against bribery and so on. And this is possible because civil society joined the companies and joined the government in the analysis of the problem, in the development of remedies, in the implementation of reforms, and then later, in the monitoring of reforms.
我看見我的時間所剩不多了, 讓我就試著 總結一下發生的事。 我相信我們在 與腐敗的鬥爭中取得的, 也可以在 政府失能的其他領域中取得。 現在,聯合國 已經完全和我們站在了一邊。 世界銀行已在Wolfensohn領導下從Saulus轉向Paulus, 也成為了,我敢說, 世界上最強的反腐敗組織。 絕大多數的大公司 現在已經完全確信 他們需要 執行很強的政策 以防腐敗等等。 這是可能做到的,因為公民社會 加入了公司 也加入了政府 一起分析問題 推出糾正方法 執行改革 並在之後,監督改革。
Of course, if civil society organizations want to play that role, they have to grow into this responsibility. Not all civil society organizations are good. The Ku Klux Klan is an NGO. So, we must be aware that civil society has to shape up itself. They have to have a much more transparent financial governance. They have to have a much more participatory governance in many civil society organizations. We also need much more competence of civil society leaders. This is why we have set up the governance school and the Center for Civil Society here in Berlin, because we believe most of our educational and research institutions in Germany and continental Europe in general, do not focus enough, yet, on empowering civil society and training the leadership of civil society.
當然,如果公民社會 想要參與進來, 就得有足夠的責任感。 不是所有的民權社會組織都是造福人類的。 3K黨也是個非政府組織呢。 所以,我們必須意識到 民權社會 要不斷改良自身。 他們有一個 透明度高得多的財政管理。 他們有一個參與度高得多的管理。 在很多公民社會組織裡都是如此。 我們也需要更勝任的公民社會領袖。 這就是為什麼我們在柏林建立了管理學校 以及公民社會中心。 因為我們相信大多數教育以及 研究協會,在德國 和歐洲大陸,從大體上來說, 都還不夠集中重視 發展和培育 公民社會的力量。
But what I'm saying from my very practical experience: If civil society does it right and joins the other actors -- in particular, governments, governments and their international institutions, but also large international actors, in particular those which have committed themselves to corporate social responsibility -- then in this magical triangle between civil society, government and private sector, there is a tremendous chance for all of us to create a better world.
但是,從我非常實際的經歷看來, 如果公民社會做得好, 並與其他成員齊心協力, 尤其是與政府, 政府和他們的國際機構, 那些活躍在國際舞臺上的成員, 尤其是那些致力於 企業社會責任感的人們, 那麼,在這個 公民社會、 政府和私營部門形成的神奇三角裡, 就會有巨大的可能性, 使我們一起創造出一個更美好的世界。
Thank you.
謝謝。
(Applause)
(掌聲)