You know, there's a small country nestled in the Himalayan Mountains, far from these beautiful mountains, where the people of the Kingdom of Bhutan have decided to do something different, which is to measure their gross national happiness rather than their gross national product. And why not? After all, happiness is not just a privilege for the lucky few, but a fundamental human right for all. And what is happiness? Happiness is the freedom of choice. The freedom to chose where to live, what to do, what to buy, what to sell, from whom, to whom, when and how. Where does choice come from? And who gets to express it, and how do we express it?
妳们知道,有一个小国坐落在在喜马拉雅山脉上, 在这些美丽山脉的远处,不丹王国的人们 决定做一件与众不同的事。 那就是测量他们国家的快乐指数 而不是他们的国民生产总值。 那为什么不呢? 毕竟,快乐不仅是小部分幸运者的特权, 而是所有人的基本人权。 那什么是快乐? 快乐是能自由地选择。 自由选择住在哪里, 做什么,买什么,卖什么 向谁买,卖给谁,什么时候做买卖,怎样做买卖。 选择从哪里来? 谁有权去表达它?而我们怎样体现它?
Well, one way to express choice is through the market. Well-functioning markets provide choices, and ultimately, the ability to express one's pursuit for happiness. The great Indian economist, Amartya Sen, was awarded the Nobel prize for demonstrating that famine is not so much about the availability of food supply, but rather the ability to acquire or entitle oneself to that food through the market. In 1984, in what can only be considered one of the greatest crimes of humanity, nearly one million people died of starvation in my country of birth, Ethiopia. Not because there was not enough food -- because there was actually a surplus of food in the fertile regions of the south parts of the country -- but because in the north, people could not access or entitle themselves to that food. That was a turning point for my life.
体现选择的其中一个方法就是通过市场。 运作良好的市场提供多种选择,而且最终 让人们能够体现他们“追求幸福”。 伟大的印度经济学家,Amartya Sen,曾获得诺贝尔奖, 因为他证明了饥荒和食物的供给量关系不大, 但是和获取食物的能力 或者和一个人有权通过市场获取食物的能力息息相关。 在1984年发生了一件只能被看作是 人类最大的犯罪的事,将近一百万人死于饥饿 就在我出生的国家,埃塞俄比亚。 并不是因为当时没有足够的食物 而是因为 在国家南部的富饶地区实际上食物过剩了, 但是在北部的人们却无法获取 或者没有权利获得那些过剩的食物。 这是我生命的一个转折点。
Most Africans today, by far, are farmers. And most of Africa's farmers are, by and large, small farmers in terms of land that they operate, and very, very small farmers in terms of the capital they have at their disposal. African agriculture today is among, or is, the most under-capitalized in the world. Only seven percent of arable land in Africa is irrigated, compared to 40 percent in Asia. African farmers only use some 22 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare, compared to 144 in Asia. Road density is six times greater in Asia than it is in rural Africa. There are eight times more tractors in Latin America, and three times more tractors in Asia, than in Africa. The small farmer in Africa today lives a life without much choice, and therefore without much freedom. His livelihood is predetermined by the conditions of grinding poverty. He comes to the market when prices are lowest, with the meager fruits of his hard labor, just after the harvest, because he has no choice. She comes back to the market some months later, when prices are highest, in what we call the lean season -- when food is scarce -- because she has to feed her family and has no choice.
到目前为止的今天,大多数的非洲人都是农民。 而且总的来说,大多非洲农民 按他们所种土地面积而言算是小农民, 按他们能自由支配的资金数目而言,还有非常非常小的农民,。 如今的非洲是全球农业资金最为不足的国家之一,甚至之最。 在非洲,只有7%的耕地面积得到灌溉。 和亚洲相比,他们有40%。 非洲的农民每公顷地只用22公斤的肥料, 和亚洲相比,他们是144公斤。 亚洲的公路密度比非洲农村地区的要大六倍。 拉丁美洲的拖拉机比非洲多八倍, 亚洲的拖拉机也比非洲多三倍。 如今生活在非洲的小农民们没有多少选择, 也就因此没有多少自由可言。 他的生活早已被 无休止的贫穷注定。 正当他收割完,带着辛苦劳作换来的少得可怜的农作物来到市场时, 却正值物价最低, 因为他没有选择。 几个月后她再来到市场, 这时物价是最高的,也就是我们所称的 淡季——这时食物匮乏—— 但是因为她要给家人买吃的,她没有选择。
The real question is, how can markets be developed in rural Africa to harness the power of innovation and entrepreneurship that we know exists? Another notable economist, Theodore Schultz, in 1974 won the Nobel prize for demonstrating that farmers are efficient, but poor. Meaning, in fact, that farmers are rational and profit-minded just like everybody else. Well, we don't need, now, any more Nobel prizes to know that farmers want a fair shake at the market and want to make money, just like everyone else. And one thing is clear, which is at least now we know that Africa is open for business. And that business is agriculture. Over two decades ago, the world insisted to Africa that markets must be liberalized, that economies must be structurally adjusted. This meant that governments were to remove themselves from the business of buying and selling -- which they did rather inefficiently -- and let the private market do its magic. Well, what happened over the last 25 years? Did Africa feed itself? Did our farmers turn into highly productive commercial actors?
这里面真正的问题是,非洲农村地区的市场应该如何发展 才能驾驭创新和创业力量? 而我们知道这样的力量是确实存在的。 另一位著名的经济学家,Theodore Schultz, 在1974年赢得诺贝尔奖,因为她论证了农民 尽管有效率,却依然贫困。 这意味着,实际上,农民是理智的, 而且正如其他任何人一样,他们也想赚钱。 现在,我们不需要 更多的诺贝尔奖也能明白,农民想要获得 市场中他们应得的一份,他们也想赚钱,正如其他任何人一样。 有一件事是很清楚的:至少我们现在都知道 非洲对买卖是开放的, 而这里所说的买卖就是农业。 二十多年前,世界坚持对非洲说 市场必须自由化,经济必须进行结构调整。 这就意味着政府要 从买卖生意中退出。 而政府确实相当低效地退出了市场, 让自由市场施展自己的魔法。 那么过去的25年发生了什么变化呢? 非洲能自给自足吗? 我们的农民变成了高产的商人吗?
I think we're all in this room, probably, because we know that, in fact, Africa is the only region in the world where hunger and malnutrition are projected to go up over the next 10 years, where the food import bill is now double what it was 20 years ago, where food production per capita has stagnated, and where fertilizer use has declined rather than increased. So why didn't agriculture markets perform to expectations? The market reforms prompted by the West -- and I've spent some 15 years traveling around the continent doing research on agricultural markets, and have interviewed traders in 10 to 15 countries in this continent, hundreds of traders -- trying to understand what went wrong with our market reform. And it seems to me that the reforms might have thrown the baby out with the bath water.
我想,我们都聚在这里, 很可能是因为我们都知道,事实上,非洲是全球唯一一个 预计在未来十年饥饿和营养不良人口 将继续上升的地区。 现在食品进口的账单比起20年前 已经翻了一倍。 人均粮食产量 停滞不前,而且肥料的使用不但没有增多,反而减少了。 为什么农业市场没有像我们预期的那样运作呢? 西方国家推崇的这种市场改革到底哪里出错了? 而我用了15年在非州游历考察, 对农业市场进行研究,并访问了 来自10到15个非洲国家的上百个商人, 试图去理解我们的市场改革到底哪里出错了。 对于我来说,这个改革似乎 漏掉了最重要的东西。
Like its agriculture, Africa's markets are highly under-capitalized and inefficient. We know from our work around the continent that transaction costs of reaching the market, and the risks of transacting in rural, agriculture markets, are extremely high. In fact, only one third of agricultural output produced in Africa even reaches the market. Africa's markets are weak not only because of weak infrastructure in terms of roads and telecommunications, but also because of the virtual absence of necessary market institutions, such as market information, grades and standards, and reliable ways to connect buyers and sellers. Because of this, commodity buyers and sellers typically transact in small circles, in narrow networks of people they know and trust. And because of that, as grain changes hands -- and I've measured that it changes hands four, five times in its trajectory from the farmer to the consumer -- every time it changes hands -- and I've seen this all over rural Africa -- it also changes sacks.
比如说它的农业, 非洲的市场是极度资金不足并却毫无效率可言的。 我们从我们在非州做的调查得知, 到达市场之前的转手费 和农村农业市场的交易风险 是非常高的。 实际上,甚至只有三分之一的产自非洲的农产品 能到达市场。 非洲市场的不发达不仅是因为基础建设 如公路和电信,不完备,更因为 其缺乏所需的市场组织,比如 市场信息,评级和标准, 以及联系买卖双方的可靠方式。 正因此,商品买卖双方往往只能在小范围内做交易, 在由他们认识和信任的人形成的人际网内做交易。 而且正因此,随着谷物转手—— 而我已经计算过从农民到消费者这一路 需要转手4,5次。 每次转手——而我看到这样的事情发生在整个非洲农村地区—— 它还要换包装。
And I thought that was incredibly peculiar. And really realized that that was because -- as traders would tell me over and over -- that's the only way people know what they're getting in terms of the quantity and the product quality. And that actually has huge implications for the ability of markets to quickly respond to price signals, and situations where there are deficits, for example. It also has very high cost implications. I have measured that 26 percent of the marketing margin is simply due to the fact that, because of the absence of grades and standards and market information, sacks have to be constantly changed. And this leads to very high handling costs. For their part, small farmers, who produce the bulk of our agricultural output in Africa, come to the market with virtually no information at all -- blind -- trusting that they're going to have some sort of demand for their produce, and completely at the mercy of the merchants in the only market, the nearest local market they know -- where they're unable to negotiate better prices or reduce their risk.
我当时觉得这很奇怪。 后来商人们对我说了一遍又一遍,我才真正明白只有这样, 人们才知道他们拿到的货物 的数量和质量。 这里面实际上强烈暗示了 比方说,市场对价格信号 以及供应不足的情况快速反应的能力。 这同时也暗示了这一做法的费用之高。 我计算出26%的工业企业规定的商业加成 仅仅是因为没有 等级和标准制度,和市场消息 所以包装要不停地更换。 这就导致了非常高昂的处理费。 对于生产出非洲大部分农业产品的小农民这部分人来说, 他们来到市场几乎是盲目地,一点信息都没有。 他们相信 他们的产品肯定会有一定的需求。 而让自己任由唯一一个市场 或者他们所知的最近的本地市场的商人任意摆布 他们讨不到更好的价钱,也降低不了风险。
Speaking of risk, we have seen that price volatility of food crops in Africa is the highest in the world. In Africa, small farmers bear the brunt of this risk. In fact, in my view, there is no region of the world and no period in history that farmers have been expected to bear the kind of market risk that Africa's farmers have to bear. And in my view, there is simply no place in the world that has grown its agriculture on the kind of risk that our farmers in Africa today face. In Ethiopia, for example, the variation in maize prices from year to year is as much as 50 percent annually. This kind of market risk is mind-boggling, and has direct implications for not only the incentives of farmers to invest in higher productivity technology, such as modern seeds and fertilizers, but also direct implications for food security.
说到风险,我们已经看到非洲粮食价格的 是全球最为反复无常的。 在非洲,小农民们是首当其冲地承受着这种风险。 实际上,在我看来,世界上,历史上没有任何一个地区 会指望农民来承受如非洲农民所承受的 这种市场风险。 在我看来,世界上也没有任何地方的农业 是建立在如今我们非洲农民 所面临的这种风险之上。 在埃塞俄比亚,打个比方,每年玉米价格的变化 高达五毛钱。 这种市场风险令人瞠目结舌,而且 这不仅对打算直接投资 高生产力技术的农民的鼓励政策有直接影响,比方说现代种子和肥料, 而且对食品安全有直接影响。
To give you an example, between 2001 and 2002, Ethiopian maize farmers produced two years of bumper harvest. That in turn, because of the weak marketing system, led to an 80 percent collapse in maize prices in the country. This made it unprofitable for some farmers to even harvest the grain from the fields. And we calculated that some 300,000 tons of grain was left in the fields to rot in early 2002. Not six months later, in July 2002, Ethiopia announced a major food crisis, to the same proportions as 1984: 14 million people at risk of starvation. What also happened that year is in the areas where there were good rains, and where farmers had previously produced surplus grain, farmers had decided to withdraw from the fertilizer market, not use fertilizer and actually had dropped their use of fertilizer by 27 percent. This is a tragic example of arrested development, or a budding green revolution stopped in its tracks. And this is not just specific to Ethiopia, but happens over and over, all over Africa.
给你们举一个例子来说,在2001-2002这两年间, 埃塞俄比亚种玉米的农民有特大丰收。 然而相应地,因为市场系统薄弱 导致本国的玉米价格下点了80%。 这使得光是收割谷物的农民来说都毫无利润可言。 我们可以算一算,快到2002年的时候,30万吨的谷物 被留在田野里烂掉。 不到6个月,也就是2002年的7月,埃塞俄比亚宣布进入了一个严重的食品危机, 规模接近1984年的——那一年1400万人口面临饿死的威胁。 那一年还发生了一件事。 在雨水充沛, 过去谷物生产过剩的地区,农民们决定 退出肥料市场,不再使用肥料。 实际上肥料的使用量减少了27%。 这是发展延滞的一个可悲例子, 或者是一个初露头角的绿色革命被扼杀的例子。 然而这不仅仅只发生在埃塞俄比亚。 而是在整个非洲一次又一次地重演。
Well, I'm not here today to lament about the situation, or wring my hands. I am here to tell you that change is in the air. Africa today is not the Africa waiting for aid solutions, or cookie-cutter foreign expert policy prescriptions. Africa has learned, or is learning somewhat slowly, that markets don't happen by themselves. In the 1980s, it was very fashionable to talk about getting prices right. There was a very influential book about that, which was mainly about getting governments out of the market. We now recognize that getting markets right is about not just price incentives, but also investing in the right infrastructure and the appropriate and necessary institutions to create the conditions to unleash the power of innovation in the market. When conditions are right, we know and see that that innovation is ready to explode in rural Africa, just like anywhere else.
我今天来这里不是为了哀悼这个可悲的情况,也不是来抱怨什么。 我来到这里是要告诉妳们,改变已经在悄然进行。 今天的非洲已经不是等待别人施舍救援的非洲, 也不是采用千篇一律的外国专家政策的非洲了。 非洲已经学会了,或者还正在学——尽管进程缓慢—— 市场不会自己形成和发展。 在20世纪80年代,人们都很流行 说要把价格拿准。 当时有本很有影响力的书就是关于这个的, 主要说要把政府赶出市场。 我们现在意识到,要把市场拿准,不仅仅是 价格刺激,还要投资在正确的基础建设 和合适且必要的机构来创造 释放市场创新力的条件。 当条件对了,我们就知道并且能能够看到 非洲农村的创新力已经准备好爆发了, 正如其他任何地方一样。
Nearly three years ago, I decided to leave my comfortable job as a World Bank senior economist in Washington and come back to my country of birth, Ethiopia, after nearly 30 years abroad. I did so for a simple reason. After having spent more than a decade understanding, studying, and trying to convince policymakers and donors about what was wrong with Africa's agricultural markets, I decided it was time to do something about it. I currently lead, in Ethiopia, an exciting new initiative to establish the first Ethiopia Commodity Exchange, or ECX. Now, the commodity exchange itself, that concept, is not new to the world. In fact, in 1848, 82 grain merchants and farmers got together in a small town at the crossroads of the Illinois River and Lake Michigan to establish a way to trade better amongst themselves.
大概3年前,我决定离开我舒适的工作, 不再做世界银行的驻华盛顿的高级经济学家, 而是回到我出生的地方,埃塞俄比亚, 结束了我将近30年的国外生活, 我这样做的原因很简单。 通过二十多年的 理解,学习和尝试说服决策人和捐赠者 非洲的农业市场到底哪里出错了, 我认为是时候坐言起行。 我最近在埃塞俄比亚倡议并领导着一个激动人心的新活动, 就是建立第一个埃塞俄比亚商品交易所,简称ECX。 如今商品交易所这个概念本身 对大家来说并不新鲜。 实际上,在1848,82名谷物商人和农民聚集在 伊利诺斯河和密歇根湖交界处的小镇, 试图建立一个更好的交易方法。
That was, of course, the birth of the Chicago Board of Trade, which is the most famous commodity exchange in the world. The Chicago Board of Trade was established then for precisely the same reasons that our farmers today would benefit from a commodity exchange. In the American Midwest, farmers used to load grain onto barges and send it upriver to the Chicago market. But once it arrived, if no buyer was to be found, or if prices suddenly dropped, farmers would incur tremendous losses. And in fact, would even dump the grain in Lake Michigan, rather than spend more money transporting it back to their farms. Well, the need to avoid these huge risks and tremendous losses led to the birth of the futures market, and the underlying system of grading grain and receipting -- issuing warehouse receipts on the basis of which trade could be done.
芝加哥交易所也就是这样诞生的, 它现在是全球最著名的商品交易所。 当时芝加哥交易所的建立 也是为了同样的原因, 希望今天我们的农民也能从商品交易所当中受益。 在美国的中西部,过去农民往往把谷物装运到大船上, 然后送往上游的芝加哥市场。 然而一旦货物抵港,如果没有买家, 或者价格突然暴跌,农民就要承受重大的损失。 实际上,农民甚至会把谷物都倒进密歇根湖里, 也不愿花再多的钱把货物运回农场。 人民需要避免这种极高的风险和重大的损失 催生出了期货市场, 而谷物的分级和验收的根本制度——签发仓库收据 建立在完成交易的基础至上。
From there, the greatest innovation of all came about in this market, which is that buyers and sellers could transact grain without actually having to physically or visually inspect the grain. That meant that grain could be traded across tremendous distances, and even across time -- as far forward as 18 months into the future. This innovation is at the heart of the transformation of American agriculture, and the rise of Chicago to a global market, agricultural market, superpower from where it was, a small regional town. Now, over the last century, we tend to think of commodity exchanges as the purview of Western industrialized countries, and that the reference prices for cotton, coffee, cocoa -- products produced mainly in the south -- are actually a reference price, or a price discovered in these organized commodity exchanges in the northern countries. But that is actually changing.
从这里开始,市场最伟大的创新出现了, 买家和卖家不需要亲身出现,不需要亲眼监督, 也能够进行谷物买卖。 这就意味着谷物的交易能穿越很长的距离进行, 或者甚至穿越时间——能提前做18个月后的买卖。 这个活动就是美国农业转变的核心, 也是芝加哥从一个本地小镇上升至国际市场, 农业市场,超级大国的主因。 如今,回顾上个世纪, 我们趋向于认为商品交易所是 西方工业国家的特权。 而棉,咖啡,可可的参考价格, 这些主要产于南部的产品, 实际上是在北方国家这些有组织的商品交易所 定的参考价格,或者价格。 但是情况正在改变。
And we're seeing a shift -- powered mainly because of information technology -- a shift in market dominance towards the emerging markets. And over the last decade, you see that the share of Western exchanges -- and this is the U.S. share of exchanges in the world -- has gone down by nearly half in just the last decade. Similarly, there's been explosive growth in India, for example, where rural farmers are using exchanges -- growing here over the last three years by 270 percent a year. This is powered by low-cost VSAT technology, aggressively trying to reach farmers to bring them into the market. China's Dalian Commodity Exchange, three years ago, 2004, overtook the Chicago Board of Trade to become the second largest commodity exchange in the world. Now, in Ethiopia, we're in the process of designing the first organized Ethiopia Commodity Exchange. We're not trying to cut and paste the Chicago model or the India model, but creating a system uniquely tailored to Ethiopia's needs and realities, Ethiopia's small farmers.
而我们也正亲眼目睹着, 这个改变主要是由信息科技来推动, 是一个由市场支配到新兴市场的转变。 上个世纪,你们可以看到了西方交易所的份额 也就是美国占全球的交易所的份额 仅在过去的二十年就下跌了将近一半。 同样的,这在印度却得到了骤增,比方说, 使用交易所的农村农民 在过去三年里每年激增2.7倍。 这是由廉价的甚小口径终端技术(VSAT)推动的, 它们积极地联系农民,带领他们进入市场。 中国的大连商品交易所,三年前—— 也就是2004年,取代了芝加哥交易所,成为 全球第二大的商品交易所。 如今,在埃塞俄比亚,我们也正在设计 第一个有组织的埃塞俄比亚商品交易所。 我们并不打算照搬芝加哥或者是 印度的模式, 而是根据埃塞额比亚的需求,实际情况和小农民 来特别量身定做。
So, the ECX is an Ethiopian exchange for Ethiopia. We're creating a system that serves all market actors, that creates integrity, trust, efficiency, transparency and enables small farmers to manage the risks that I have described. In the design of our commodity exchange in Ethiopia, we've done something rather unique, which is to take the approach of an integrated perspective, or what we call the ECX Edge. The ECX Edge pretty much creates the entire ecosystem in which the market will develop itself. And this is because one of the things we've learned over the last decade of studying market development in Africa is that the piecemeal approach does not work. You've got one donor trying to develop market information, another trying to work on or sponsor grades and standards, another ICT, and yet another on warehousing, or warehouse receipts.
因此“ECX”就是为埃塞俄比亚而专设的埃塞俄比亚的交易所。 我们正在创建的系统适合所有市场参与者。 它产生的诚实,信任,高效,透明 更使得小农民们能处理我所说到的那些风险。 埃塞俄比亚商品交易所的设计 被我们注入了独特的元素。 我们采用了综合法, 或者是被我们称作“ECX优势法”。 ECX优势法基本建立了整个生态系统, 使得市场能在其中自行发展。 这也是我们 在过去二十年研究非洲市场发展中学到的其中一点—— 那就是“部分法”是没有用的: 一个捐赠者打算发展市场信息, 另一个人打算支助或者继续完善等级和标准制度, 再有的人要做信息与通信技术,然而另外的人投资仓库,或者是仓库收据。
In our approach in Ethiopia, we've decided to put together the entire ecosystem, or environment, in which trade takes place. That means that the exchange will operate a trading system, which will initially start as an open outcry, because we don't think the country's ready for full electronic trading. But at the same time, we'll do something which I think no exchange in the world has ever done, which is itself to operate something like an Internet cafe in the rural areas. So that farmers and small traders can actually come to a terminal center -- what we call the remote access terminal centers -- and actually, without having to buy a computer or figure out how to dial up or any of those things, simply see the trading that's happening on the Addis Ababa trading floor.
而我们决定在埃塞俄比亚采取的方法, 是要把整个生态系统 或是整个贸易发生的环境纳入一起考虑。 这就意味着交易所会经营一个贸易系统, 这在一开始会引起一片公然反对的声音。 因为我们认为,这个国家对全面电子贸易还没有准备好。 然而同时,我们将做一些 全球没有任何一家交易所做过的事,那就是在农村 开一些类似咖啡网吧的场所。 这样一来,农民和小商客 就能来我们的终端中心,我们称为 远程接入终端中心。 人们无需购买电脑或者弄明白怎样拨号上网 或者这样那样的的问题,他们只需要看着 发生在亚的斯亚贝巴交易所的交易场地就可以了。
At the same time, what's very fundamental to this market is that -- and again, an innovation that we've designed for our exchange -- is that the exchange will operate warehouses around the country, in which grade certification and warehouse receipting will be done. And in turn, we'll operate an in-house clearing system, to assure that payment is done appropriately, in the right amount and at the right time, so that basically, we create trust and integrity in the system. Obviously, we work with exchange actors, and as we're developing the exchange market itself, we're also developing the regulatory infrastructure and legal framework, the overarching legal framework for making this market work.
同时,对这个市场来说相当重要的一点, 也是我们设计这个交易所很有创新性的一点, 就是这个交易所会在全国各地经营仓库, 让等级证书和仓库收据能在内完成。 相应的,我们将经营一个内部的清算系统 来保证支付能正常地 按时按量完成。 因此,基本上,我们是在这个系统当中建立信任和诚实。 显然我们是和交易的参与者打交道, 而当我们发展这个交易市场本身的时候, 我们也同样在发展监管和法律的基础构架—— 一个能使整个市场良好运作的全面的法律架构。
So, in fact, our proclamation is going to parliament next month. What's really important is that the ECX will operate a market information system to disseminate prices in real time to farmers around the country, using VSAT technology to bring an electronic price dissemination directly to farmers. What this does is transforms, fundamentally, the farmers' relationship to the market. Whereas before the farmer used to think local -- meaning that he or she would go to the nearest local market, eight to 10 kilometers away on average, and sell whatever they happened to have, without any idea of what the price premium or anything else was -- now farmers come with knowledge of what prices are at the national market. And they start to think national, and even global. They start to make not only commercial marketing decisions, but also planting decisions, on the basis of information coming from the futures price market. And they come to the market knowing what grades their products will achieve in terms of a price premium.
因此实际上,我们的宣言 下个月就会递交给议会。 真正重要的是ECX将会经营一个市场信息系统, 向全国各地的农民们传达实时价格, 使用甚小口径终端技术直接给农民 转达电子报价。 根本上来说,这改变了 农民和市场之间的关系。 以往的农民往往只能想到本地, 也就是说他或者她只会去最近的那个本地市场, 平均8到10公里以外, 并出售任何碰巧他们手头有的东西, 他们完全不懂附加值或其他任何的概念—— 如今的农民知道全国市场的价格。 而他们开始想到全国,甚至国际市场。 他们不但开始做商业市场的决定, 也做种植决定,根据来自期货价格市场 的信息。 而且他们来到市场,知道什么等级的产品 能获取多少的附加值。
So all of this will transform farmers. It will also transform the way traders do business. It will stop them from doing simple, back-to-back, limited arbitrage to really thinking strategically about how to move grain across long distances from [surplus regions] to [deficit areas]. Can Ethiopia do this? It seems very ambitious. But it will create new opportunities. We believe that this initiative requires great political will, and we'll have to align the financial sector, as well as the ICT sector, and really even the underlying legal framework. We believe that the winds of change are here, and that we can do it. ECX is the market for Ethiopia's new millennium, which starts in about eight months.
因此,所有的这些都改变了农民。 这还会改变商人做生意的方式。 这会阻止他们做简单连续的,有限套利的交易, 使得他们真正战略性地考虑如何把谷物 从供应过剩的地区通过长距离运输到供应不足的地区。 埃塞俄比亚能做到这样吗? 这似乎过于野心。 但是这将创造新的机会。 我们相信,这个倡议需要有强大的政治决心, 而我们将会和财政部门,还有信息与通信技术部联合起来, 并且切实地平衡基本的法律构架。 我们相信改变的春风已经吹到了这里,而我们完全能够做到。 ECX是埃塞俄比亚新千年的市场, 将在未来八个月后启动。
The last parliament of our century opened with our president announcing to the country that this was the most important economic initiative for the country today. We believe that the stakes are high, but that the returns will be even greater. ECX, moreover, can become a trading platform for a pan-African market in agricultural commodities. Ethiopia's domestic market is about one billion dollars of value. And we feel that over the next five years, if Ethiopia can capture even 40 percent, just 40 percent, of the domestic market, and add just 25 percent value to that market, the value of the market doubles. Ethiopia's agricultural market is 30 percent higher than South Africa's grain production, and, in fact, Ethiopia is the second largest maize producer in Africa. So the potential is there. The will is there. The commitment is there. So we feel that we have a winning value proposition to transform farmers' choices, to grow our agriculture, and to change Africa. So, we are in the business of finding our happiness. Thank you very much.
我们世纪最后一届议会会议的开场白就是我们总统 向全国宣布这个 如今对本国最为重要的经济动议。 我们相信风险是很高的, 但回报会更高。 ECX还能成为泛非市场的 农业商品的交易平台。 埃塞俄比亚的国内市场价值约十亿美元。 而且我们预期在接下来的五年里, 如果埃塞俄比亚能掌握哪怕是40%,只是40%的国内市场, 并仅仅增加市场价值的25%,市场的价值就会翻一倍。 埃塞俄比亚的农业市场比 南非的谷物产量高出30%—— 而且实际上,埃塞俄比亚是非洲第二大的玉米生产国。 因此,潜力我们是有的。 决心我们是有的。 承诺我们是有的。 我们认为我们有成功的价值定位 来改变农民的选择,来壮大我们的农业, 并来改变非洲。 因此我们在事业当中找到我们的快乐与幸福。 谢谢大家。
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