A public, Dewey long ago observed, is constituted through discussion and debate. If we are to call the tyranny of assumptions into question, and avoid doxa, the realm of the unquestioned, then we must be willing to subject our own assumptions to debate and discussion. It is in this spirit that I join into a discussion of one of the critical issues of our time, namely, how to mobilize different forms of capital for the project of state building.
“共和”概念,正如美国哲学家杜威很久之前所观察到的, 通过辩论和讨论而成。 如果我们质疑暴政的假想, 避免不经推敲的教条, 那么我们必须愿意把自己的假想 进行讨论辨伪。 正是秉着这种精神我才来此参与讨论 这个我们时代的关键议题, 即如何调动各式各样的资本 为国家重建服务。
To put the assumptions very clearly: capitalism, after 150 years, has become acceptable, and so has democracy. If we looked in the world of 1945 and looked at the map of capitalist economies and democratic polities, they were the rare exception, not the norm. The question now, however, is both about which form of capitalism and which type of democratic participation. But we must acknowledge that this moment has brought about a rare consensus of assumptions. And that provides the ground for a type of action, because consensus of each moment allows us to act. And it is necessary, no matter how fragile or how provisional our consensus, to be able to move forward.
首先明晰我们的假设, 资本主义经过150年的发展已被广为接受, 民主亦然。 如果我们回看1945年的世界, 并且查看当时资本主义经济体系及民主政治版图, 它们只是少数,并非主流。 然而目前的问题是, 选择何种资本主义体制 及何种民主参与机制。 但我们必须承认 此刻要唤起 宝贵的共识达成一致。 及提供基础 以促成一种行动, 因为每个时刻的共识 能让我们共同行动。 而且这是必须的,不管 我们的共识如何脆弱或短暂, 共识能让我们前进。
But the majority of the world neither benefits from capitalism nor from democratic systems. Most of the globe experiences the state as repressive, as an organization that is concerned about denial of rights, about denial of justice, rather than provision of it. And in terms of experience of capitalism, there are two aspects that the rest of the globe experiences. First, extractive industry. Blood diamonds, smuggled emeralds, timber, that is cut right from under the poorest. Second is technical assistance. And technical assistance might shock you, but it's the worst form of -- today -- of the ugly face of the developed world to the developing countries. Tens of billions of dollars are supposedly spent on building capacity with people who are paid up to 1,500 dollars a day, who are incapable of thinking creatively, or organically.
但是世界大部分地区 既没有从资本主义体系获利 也没有从民主体系里获利。 全球大部分国家的经历 都是认为美国是压抑性的 作为一种 关注拒绝权利 否认正义的组织, 而不是提供权利和正义的机构。 从资本主义发展历程来看, 其全球经验 主要有两方面, 首先是资源采掘 血钻,宝石走私, 木材, 从穷国掠夺财富。 其次是技术援助。 技术援助和你想的不一样, 但它是当今最差劲的形式, 它表现出了发达国家对发展中国家 丑陋的面孔。 想象一下上百亿美元 被一些人投入能力建设 他们每天最高得到1500美元, 却不能 创造性地 独立地思考。
Next assumption -- and of course the events of July 7, I express my deep sympathy, and before that, September 11 -- have reminded us we do not live in three different worlds. We live in one world. But that's easily said. But we are not dealing with the implications of the one world that we are living in. And that is that if we want to have one world, this one world cannot be based on huge pockets of exclusion, and then inclusion for some. We must now finally come to think about the premises of a truly global world, in relationship to the regime of rights and responsibilities and accountabilities that are truly global in scope. Otherwise we will be missing this open moment in history, where we have a consensus on both the form of politics and the form of economics.
其次,当然我对 6月7日的事件 深表同情,还有911, 这些都提醒我们 我们不是生活在三个不同的世界, 而是一个。 简单点儿说 我们并不是在和 我们所生活的世界的含义打交道。 也就是说,如果我们想要拥有一个世界, 这个世界是不能建立在 先有巨大的排斥, 然后再对其中一些进行包容之上的。 我们现在终于必须来思考一下 一个真正的全球型世界 的前提是什么, 与权力政权和 责任感和可靠性之间的关系 在全球维度内是怎样的。 否则我们将会 丢失这个历史上的开放时刻, 一个我们在政治 和经济的形式 达成共识的时刻。
What is one of these organizations to pick? We have three critical terms: economy, civil society and the state. I will not deal with those first two, except to say that uncritical transfer of assumptions, from one context to another, can only make for disaster. Economics taught in most of the elite universities are practically useless in my context. My country is dominated by drug economy and a mafia. Textbook economics does not work in my context, and I have very few recommendations from anybody as to how to put together a legal economy. The poverty of our knowledge must become the first basis of moving forward, and not imposition of the framework that works on the basis of mathematical modeling, for which I have enormous respect. My colleagues at Johns Hopkins were among the best.
这三个组织中该选哪一个呢? 我们有3个很关键的术语: 经济, 公民社会 和国家。 我并不涉及前两个,只能说 不加批判的对假设的转移 从一个语境到另一个语境之下, 只可能酿成灾难。 经济学, 在最多的精英大学里都有课程 但这在我的语境中可以说是完全没有用的。 我的国家 被毒品经济和黑手党所操控 书本上的经济学并不能 在我的语境中发挥作用, 而且我几乎得不到任何建议。 我们知识的贫穷 必将成为前进的 第一块基石。 而不是作用于数学模型基础上的 框架, 当然,我对此还是深怀敬意的。 我的在约翰霍普金斯的同事是最好的。
Second, instead of debating endlessly about what is the structure of the state, why don't we simplify and say, what are a series of functions that the state in the 21st century must perform? Clare Lockhart and I are writing a book on this; we hope to share that much widely with -- and third is that we could actually construct an index to measure comparatively how well these functions that we would agree on are being performed in different places.
第二, 不要再无止境地去辩论 一个国家的结构是什么样的, 我们为什么不能将其简化, 而去讨论一个国家21世纪 必须具备的一系列功能是什么? 克莱尔 洛克哈特和我正在就此写一本书 我们希望能彼此之间能够有更多的沟通与分享。 第三,我们实际上可以建立一个指数, 来测量 相比较之下,这些功能发挥得怎么样,是否令我们满意, 并且能推广到其他的地方。
So what are these functions? We propose 10. And it's legitimate monopoly of means of violence, administrative control, management of public finances, investment in human capital, provision of citizenship rights, provision of infrastructure, management of the tangible and intangible assets of the state through regulation, creation of the market, international agreements, including public borrowing, and then, most importantly, rule of law.
那么这些功能是什么呢? 我们来举10个例子。 它们是:对暴力途径的合法化的垄断, 行政控制,公共财政管理 人力资金投资,民权保障 基础设施建设, 通过调控进行对国家有形与无形资产管理, 市场的创造, 国际合约 -- 包括公共借贷 -- 还有最重要的是,法律规范。
I won't elaborate. I hope the questions will give me an opportunity. This is a feasible goal, basically because, contrary to widespread assumption, I would argue that we know how to do this. Who would have imagined that Germany would be either united or democratic today, if you looked at it from the perspective of Oxford of 1943? But people at Oxford prepared for a democratic Germany and engaged in planning. And there are lots of other examples.
我不会进一步阐述。 我希望这些问题可以给予我一个机会。 这是一个切实的目标, 因为与广泛的假设相反 我不认为我们知道该如何处理这件事。 谁能想到德国 今天会变成联合或者民主的, 如果你从1943年的牛津的视角去看这个问题的话。 但是牛津的人民为一个民主德国做好了准备, 并积极计划着。 还有很多其他的例子。
Now in order to do this -- and this brings this group -- we have to rethink the notion of capital. The least important form of capital, in this project, is financial capital -- money. Money is not capital in most of the developing countries. It's just cash. Because it lacks the institutional, organizational, managerial forms to turn it into capital. And what is required is a combination of physical capital, institutional capital, human capital -- and security, of course, is critical, but so is information.
现在,为了做这件事, 我们必须重新思考资本的定义。 最微不足道的一种资本形式是, 是财经资本 -- 金钱。 金钱在众多发展中国家中不都不能算作是资本。 它只是现金。 因为它缺乏机制的, 组织的,管理的形式, 来将它转变为资本。 而且它所需要的是 物理资本 与体制资本,人力资本的结合。 当然,安全性是至关重要的, 信息也是。
Now, the issue that should concern us here -- and that's the challenge that I would like to pose to this group -- is again, it takes 16 years in your countries to produce somebody with a B.S. degree. It takes 20 years to produce somebody with a Ph.D. The first challenge is to rethink, fundamentally, the issue of the time. Do we need to repeat the modalities that we have inherited? Our educational systems are inherited from the 19th century. What is it that we need to do fundamentally to re-engage in a project, that capital formation is rapid? The absolute majority of the world's population are below 20, and they are growing larger and faster. They need different ways of being approached, different ways of being enfranchised, different ways of being skilled. And that's the first thing.
现在,我们应该担忧的问题, 同时也是我希望给您们这群人 带来的挑战是 你们国家需要16年 来培养一个 有学士学历的人。 20年来培养一个 有博士学位的人 第一个挑战是要 从基本上进行重新思考 当代的问题。 我们需要重复 我们所继承的方式吗? 我们的教育系统是自19世纪传承而来的。 为了从根本上重新投入到一个项目中, 什么是我们需要的呢, 在这个资本形成如此之快的当下? 世界上的绝大多数人 都在20岁以下,而且他们正在变得 更多,成长得更快。 他们需要不同的方式 不同的对待的方式。 不同的享有权利的方式。 不同的被训练的方式。 这是首要的。
Second is, you're problem solvers, but you're not engaging your global responsibility. You've stayed away from the problems of corruption. You only want clean environments in which to function. But if you don't think through the problems of corruption, who will? You stay away from design for development. You're great designers, but your designs are selfish. It's for your own immediate use. The world in which I operate operates with designs regarding roads, or dams, or provision of electricity that have not been revisited in 60 years. This is not right. It requires thinking.
第二,你们是问题的解决者, 但是你们没有尽到你们的全球性责任。 你们已经远离了 腐败问题。 你们只想看到干净的环境。 但是你们没有彻底看透腐败的问题, 谁还能呢? 你们避免为发展做规划。 你们是伟大的设计师, 但是你们的设计是自私的。 只是为了你们自己即时的用处。 在我的世界,我与 那些道路、 堤坝、或者电力供应 的设计打交道, 这些设计已经有60年没有被重温了。 这是不正确。需要我们来思考一下。
But, particularly, what we need more than anything else from this group is your imagination to be brought to bear on problems the way a meme is supposed to work. As the work on paradigms, long time ago showed -- Thomas Kuhn's work -- it's in the intersection of ideas that new developments -- true breakthroughs -- occur. And I hope that this group would be able to deal with the issue of state and development and the empowerment of the majority of the world's poor, through this means. Thank you. (Applause)
更重要的是, 我们最需要的 是你们的想象力, 用想象力来解决问题 这是米姆本应产生作用的方式。 而就范式的作用来说,在很久以前, 托马斯-坤的工作, 他的工作是 概念的内部分工中, 新的发展出现。 我希望这个组织,通过这些方式 可以有能力处理关于政府和国家的问题 以及给予这个世界占大多数的穷人 以权力。 谢谢。 (鼓掌)
Chris Anderson: So, Ashraf, until recently, you were the finance minister of Afghanistan, a country right at the middle of much of the world's agenda. Is the country gonna make it? Will democracy flourish? What scares you most?
克里斯 安德森:“那么,Ashraf先生,直到最近, 你一直是阿富汗的财政部长, 这是一个处在世界事务 中心的国家。 这个国家真的能够完成(你所说的那些)吗? 民主可否繁荣?什么使你最为生畏?
Ashraf Ghani: What scares me most is -- is you, lack of your engagement. (Laughter) You asked me. You know I always give the unconventional answer. No. But seriously, the issue of Afghanistan first has to be seen as, at least, a 10- to 20-year perspective. Today the world of globalization is on speed. Time has been compressed. And space does not exist for most people. But in my world -- you know, when I went back to Afghanistan after 23 years, space had expanded. Every conceivable form of infrastructure had broken down. I rode -- traveled -- travel between two cities that used to take three hours now took 12. So the first is when the scale is that, we need to recognize that just the simple things that are infrastructure -- it takes six years to deliver infrastructure. In our world. Any meaningful sort of thing. But the modality of attention, or what is happening today, what's happening tomorrow.
Ashraf Ghani:“最令我害怕的,是你们, 是缺乏你们的积极参与。” (笑声) 你问了我。你知道我总是给出一些非传统的答案。 不。但是说真的, 阿富汗的问题 必须首先被视作 一个至少10到20年的视角。 今天,全球化 在加速。 时间已经被压缩了。 空间对于大多数人来说也已不再存在。 但是在我的世界里, 你要知道,当我23年之后回到阿富汗的时候, 空间已经扩大了。 所有可感知的社会基础设施被毁坏了。 我旅行着, 原本需要花3个小时往返的城市 现在需要12个小时。 所以,首先,当度量标准变了, 我们必须要认识到 基础设施就是这么简单的一些东西, 而要传递基础设施需要6年的时间。 在我们的世界, 所有像这样有意义的东西。 但是注意力的情态 或者说今天发生了什么,明天将发生什么。
Second is, when a country has been subjected to one of the most immense, brutal forms of exercise of power -- we had the Red Army for 10 continuous years, 110,000 strong, literally terrorizing. The sky: every Afghan sees the sky as a source of fear. We were bombed practically out of existence. Then, tens of thousands of people were trained in terrorism -- from all sides. The United States, Great Britain, joined for instance, Egyptian intelligence service to train thousands of people in resistance and urban terrorism. How to turn a bicycle into an instrument of terror. How to turn a donkey, a carthorse, anything. And the Russians, equally. So, when violence erupts in a country like Afghanistan, it's because of that legacy. But we have to understand that we've been incredibly lucky. I mean, I really can't believe how lucky I am here, standing in front of you, speaking. When I joined as finance minister, I thought that the chances of my living more than three years would not be more than five percent. Those were the risks. They were worth it.
第二, 当一个国家 已经从属于最广泛、残忍的权力施行形式之一的时候, 我们连续10年, 拥有红军, 110,000个强壮的人 真的很吓人 天空: 每一个阿富汗人 将天空视为恐惧的来源。 我们几乎已经快被轰炸 给灭绝了。 然后,成千上万的人被训练程恐怖分子, 什么方面的都有。 美国,英国加入了 诸如埃及情报服务的组织 来训练成千上万的人 来抵御和城市恐怖主义。 如何把一辆自行车 变成一种恐怖行动的工具。 如何将一头驴子,一辆马车,任何东西,(变成恐怖行动的工具)。 俄罗斯人也是一样。 所以,当暴力在一个国家, 比如阿富汗, 是因为有那样一种传统。 但是我们必须明白 我们已经非常幸运了。 我的意思是,我真的无法相信我有多么幸运能来到这里, 站在你们面前讲话。 当我成为财政部长的时候, 我以为我能活过3年的概率 不超过5%。 危险是存在的,但是也是值得的。
I think we can make it, and the reason we can make it is because of the people. You see, because, I mean -- I give you one statistic. 91 percent of the men in Afghanistan, 86 percent of the women, listen to at least three radio stations a day. In terms of their discourse, in terms of their sophistication of knowledge of the world, I think that I would dare say, they're much more sophisticated than rural Americans with college degrees and the bulk of Europeans -- because the world matters to them. And what is their predominant concern? Abandonment. Afghans have become deeply internationalist.
我认为我可以做到, 而且我如此认为的原因, 就在于人民。 你知道,因为,我给你们一个数据好了。 在阿富汗91%的男人, 86%的女人, 每天都会听至少3个收音频道来 讲述这个世界的 复杂性。 我敢说, 他们 比美国的拥有大学文凭的人, 和大把的欧洲人都要深刻。 因为这些跟他们息息相关。 而他们的最主要的担忧是什么呢? 遗弃。 阿富汗人已经深深地成为了国际主义者了。
You know, when I went back in December of 2001, I had absolutely no desire to work with the Afghan government because I'd lived as a nationalist. And I told them -- my people, with the Americans here -- separate. Yes, I have an advisory position with the U.N. I went through 10 Afghan provinces very rapidly. And everybody was telling me it was a different world. You know, they engage. They see engagement, global engagement, as absolutely necessary to the future of the ordinary people. And the thing that the ordinary Afghan is most concerned with is -- Clare Lockhart is here, so I'll recite a discussion she had with an illiterate woman in Northern Afghanistan. And that woman said she didn't care whether she had food on her table. What she worried about was whether there was a plan for the future, where her children could really have a different life. That gives me hope. CA: How is Afghanistan going to provide alternative income to the many people who are making their living off the drugs trade?
你知道,当我在2001年12月份回国的时候, 我一点都不想与阿富汗政府合作。 因为我是一个国家主义者。 我告诉他们 - 我的人民,和美国人在这 - 是分开的 是的,我在联合国有着顾问的职位。 我快速地穿越了10个阿富汗的省份。 每个人都告诉我,这是一个不同的世界。 你知道,他们参与进来了。 他们看见了国际的介入, 这对于这些普通人的未来是至关重要的。 而普通的阿富汗人最为关心的是 克莱尔 洛克哈特在这里, 所以我讲讲述一段她 与一个阿富汗北部的未接受过教育的妇女的讨论。 那个妇女说她不关心 她的饭桌上是否有食物。 她关心的是未来是否有计划, 她的孩子们能否有个不一样的人生。 这给予了我希望。 CA:阿富汗 怎么能为那么多以毒品交易为生的人 提供 收入呢?
AG: Certainly. Well, the first is, instead of sending a billion dollars on drug eradication and paying it to a couple of security companies, they should give this hundred billion dollars to 50 of the most critically innovative companies in the world to ask them to create one million jobs. The key to the drug eradication is jobs. Look, there's a very little known fact: countries that have a legal average income per capita of 1,000 dollars don't produce drugs.
AG:当然了。首先, 不要再花费几十亿美元 在毒品根除上了, 取而代之的是,把资金给几个安全公司, 他们将上千亿美元的资金 分给50个 全球最具开创性的公司, 让他们创造一百万个工作。 根除毒品的关键在于工作。 看,这有个鲜为人知的事实: 人均合法的年收入在1000美元以上的国家 不生产毒品。
Second, textile. Trade is the key, not aid. The U.S. and Europe should give us a zero percent tariff. The textile industry is incredibly mobile. If you want us to be able to compete with China and to attract investment, we could probably attract four to six billion dollars quite easily in the textile sector, if there was zero tariffs -- would create the type of job. Cotton does not compete with opium; a t-shirt does. And we need to understand, it's the value chain. Look, the ordinary Afghan is sick and tired of hearing about microcredit. It is important, but what the ordinary women and men who engage in micro-production want is global access. They don't want to sell to the charity bazaars that are only for foreigners -- and the same bloody shirt embroidered time and again. What we want is a partnership with the Italian design firms. Yeah, we have the best embroiderers in the world! Why can't we do what was done with northern Italy? With the Put Out system? So I think economically, the critical issue really is to now think through.
第二,纺织品。 贸易是关键,而不是援助。 美国和欧洲应该 给我们零关税。 纺织品行业极具移动性。 如果你想让我们有能力与中国竞争并吸引投资, 我们可能可以很轻松地 凭借纺织品行业 吸引60亿美元, 如果零关税的话, 这也可以创造很多工作岗位。 棉花不能与鸦片相比, 但是T恤可以。 而且我们需要知道,这是一个价值链。 看,一个普通的阿富汗已经 对微贷款很厌烦了。 这很重要, 对于那些从事微生产的人 最需要的的国际的切入口。 他们不想要卖给仅针对外国人 的慈善义卖会, 而且要把同样的衬衫 一遍又一遍的绣。 我们需要 与意大利的设计公司合作。 是的,我们有全世界最好的缝纫师! 为什么我们不能做与意大利北部做的东西一样的呢? 凭着发行系统? 所以我认为,经济上, 关键问题在于如何思考。
And what I will say here is that aid doesn't work. You know, the aid system is broken. The aid system does not have the knowledge, the vision, the ability. I'm all for it; after all, I raised a lot of it. Yeah, to be exact, you know, I managed to persuade the world that they had to give my country 27.5 billion. They didn't want to give us the money.
我在这里要说援助没有用。 你知道,援助系统坏了。 它不具备只是 远见,和能力。 我是全力支持慈善的;毕竟我提倡了很多。 是的,准确的说,我试图 劝说这个世界来 给我的国家275亿。 他们不想给我们金钱。
CA: And it still didn't work?
CA:还是不起作用吗?
AG: No. It's not that it didn't work. It's that a dollar of private investment, in my judgment, is equal at least to 20 dollars of aid, in terms of the dynamic that it generates. Second is that one dollar of aid could be 10 cents; it could be 20 cents; or it could be four dollars. It depends on what form it comes, what degrees of conditionalities are attached to it. You know, the aid system, at first, was designed to benefit entrepreneurs of the developed countries, not to generate growth in the poor countries. And this is, again, one of those assumptions -- the way car seats are an assumption that we've inherited in governments, and doors. You would think that the US government would not think that American firms needed subsidizing to function in developing countries, provide advice, but they do. There's an entire weight of history vis-a-vis aid that now needs to be reexamined. If the goal is to build states that can credibly take care of themselves -- and I'm putting that proposition equally; you know I'm very harsh on my counterparts -- aid must end in each country in a definable period. And every year there must be progress on mobilization of domestic revenue and generation of the economy. Unless that kind of compact is entered into, you will not be able to sustain the consensus.
AG:不。不是不起作用。 只是,一美元的私人投资, 在我看来, 等于至少20美元的援助, 就它产生的动力来看。 第二,1美元的援助可能变成10美分 或者20美分, 或者变成4美元, 这取决于它以什么形式来的, 它附带的条件的级别是什么。 你知道,援助系统起初是为了奖励 发达国家的企业家的, 而不是为贫困国家产生财富增长。 这又是一个假设: 如同汽车座椅一样的假设, 我们从政府和门继承而来的。 你也许会想美国政府 不认为美国的公司需要 在发展中国家设立分公司,提供建议, 但他们需要。 面对面援助 有一个历史的重量 这现在需要被重新检验。 如果目标是建立能 可靠地照顾好他们自己的国家, 而我是公平地将提出这个建议的, 你知道,我对于我的对手非常严苛-- 援助必须在每一个国家, 在一定期限内停止。 每一年, 国内收入的流动 和经济的刺激生长必须获得进步。 除非那样的一种影响介入, 你们将不能够保持同一意见。