Chris Anderson: Hello. Welcome to this TED Dialogues. It's the first of a series that's going to be done in response to the current political upheaval. I don't know about you; I've become quite concerned about the growing divisiveness in this country and in the world. No one's listening to each other. Right? They aren't. I mean, it feels like we need a different kind of conversation, one that's based on -- I don't know, on reason, listening, on understanding, on a broader context.
克里斯安德森:大家好, 歡迎參與 TED Dialogues。 這是我們將播放一系列之首集, 來回應現今的政治風暴。 我不知你如何想; 但我是十分關注在本國 和在世界各地日益分裂之社會。 大家都不能溝通,是不是? 絕對是。 我想當今局勢確需一種另類交談, 一種建立在──怎麼說呢, 在理性、聆聽、和諧意識上的, 在一種更廣闊的視野上的。
That's at least what we're going to try in these TED Dialogues, starting today. And we couldn't have anyone with us who I'd be more excited to kick this off. This is a mind right here that thinks pretty much like no one else on the planet, I would hasten to say. I'm serious.
最起碼,這是我們在 這 TED Dialogues 希望嘗試的, 從今天首集開始。 我們不可能邀請到 更能使我興奮的啟航嘉賓。 這嘉賓的思路見解是獨一無二的, 我指的是──以全球人類來說啊。 我是認真的。
(Yuval Noah Harari laughs) I'm serious. He synthesizes history with underlying ideas in a way that kind of takes your breath away.
(尤瓦爾笑笑) 我真是認真的。 他貫融歷史所用的概念, 其體大思精能使你目瞪口呆。
So, some of you will know this book, "Sapiens." Has anyone here read "Sapiens"?
我猜你們知道這本書: 《人類大歷史》。 有誰看過這本書?
(Applause) I mean, I could not put it down. The way that he tells the story of mankind through big ideas that really make you think differently -- it's kind of amazing. And here's the follow-up, which I think is being published in the US next week.
(鼓掌聲) 真的,我一讀就放不下。 他所用的那些大概念 來解說人類的故事, 真的能讓你有脫胎換骨的想法── 實在震撼。 這本書還有續集, 就我所知,下星期就會在美國發行。
YNH: Yeah, next week.
尤:對,下星期。
CA: "Homo Deus." Now, this is the history of the next hundred years. I've had a chance to read it. It's extremely dramatic, and I daresay, for some people, quite alarming. It's a must-read. And honestly, we couldn't have someone better to help make sense of what on Earth is happening in the world right now. So a warm welcome, please, to Yuval Noah Harari.
克:《人類大命運》。 這書預卜人類未來百年, 我有機會讀過它, 真的是非常精湛。 我敢說,對某些人, 或有出乎意料的顫慄, 這是本必讀的書。 說真的,我們不可得更理想的人 來幫我們理解當今地球發生的事態。 請熱烈的歡迎: 尤瓦爾 · 諾亞 · 哈拉瑞先生
(Applause)
(鼓掌聲)
It's great to be joined by our friends on Facebook and around the Web. Hello, Facebook. And all of you, as I start asking questions of Yuval, come up with your own questions, and not necessarily about the political scandal du jour, but about the broader understanding of: Where are we heading? You ready? OK, we're going to go.
我們很開心有臉書 和網路上的朋友參與。 臉書,你們好。 在我發問尤瓦爾時, 大家也想想自己的問題, 不一定是關於今日熱門的政治醜聞, 而是些宏觀的主題: 我們人類的前景? 大家準備好了嗎?我們開始。
So here we are, Yuval: New York City, 2017, there's a new president in power, and shock waves rippling around the world. What on Earth is happening?
尤瓦爾,時下今日: 紐約市,2017 年,美國新總統上任, 其震驚捲席全球, 到底發生了什麼事?
YNH: I think the basic thing that happened is that we have lost our story. Humans think in stories, and we try to make sense of the world by telling stories. And for the last few decades, we had a very simple and very attractive story about what's happening in the world. And the story said that, oh, what's happening is that the economy is being globalized, politics is being liberalized, and the combination of the two will create paradise on Earth, and we just need to keep on globalizing the economy and liberalizing the political system, and everything will be wonderful. And 2016 is the moment when a very large segment, even of the Western world, stopped believing in this story. For good or bad reasons -- it doesn't matter. People stopped believing in the story, and when you don't have a story, you don't understand what's happening.
尤:我想基本上發生的 是我們已失去了故事; 人類以故事來思考, 通過故事,我們試圖去理解這世界。 在過去數十年中, 我們有個極簡單和極動聽的故事, 解釋世界發生的一切。 這故事在說:看啊!正在發生的 是經濟邁向全球化, 而政治也同步開放化, 這兩者將使地球變為世外桃源。 只要我們不斷強化全球經濟, 同時把政治更自由化, 一切就自然美妙了。 但在 2016 年那一刻, 有非常大比例的人民, 包括西方國家的, 不再相信這故事了。 不管理由是好或是壞── 這不是關鍵, 大家不再相信這故事了。 但當你失去了一個故事, 你就不能理解一切發生的事情。
CA: Part of you believes that that story was actually a very effective story. It worked.
克:我們心底一部分 是確信這故事是有效的。 它是成功的。
YNH: To some extent, yes. According to some measurements, we are now in the best time ever for humankind. Today, for the first time in history, more people die from eating too much than from eating too little, which is an amazing achievement.
尤:就某種程度而言,是的。 依某些指標來看, 今天的人類確是活在 最輝煌的時刻: 今天,首次在歷史中, 人類死於飲食過量多於飲食缺乏, 這可是個驚人的成就。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Also for the first time in history, more people die from old age than from infectious diseases, and violence is also down. For the first time in history, more people commit suicide than are killed by crime and terrorism and war put together. Statistically, you are your own worst enemy. At least, of all the people in the world, you are most likely to be killed by yourself --
還有也是首次在歷史中, 人類死於衰老的多於疾病感染。 至於暴力,這也降低了。 首次在歷史中, 人類因自殺死亡的, 多於死於罪行或恐怖暴力 和戰爭之總和。 依據統計上來說, 你是你最大的敵人; 起碼,把全球人算起來, 你是最有可能被自己殺害的。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
which is, again, very good news, compared --
這亦可算是很好的消息──
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
compared to the level of violence that we saw in previous eras.
比起我們以往所看到的暴力程度。
CA: But this process of connecting the world ended up with a large group of people kind of feeling left out, and they've reacted. And so we have this bombshell that's sort of ripping through the whole system. I mean, what do you make of what's happened? It feels like the old way that people thought of politics, the left-right divide, has been blown up and replaced. How should we think of this?
克:但依這個方法聯繫世界, 結果很大的一群人感覺被遺棄了, 而作出反應, 所以我們遇上這炸彈, 其威力好像把整個系統撕裂了。 我想知道,您是怎樣看這一切呢? 感覺以往人民的舊有習慣, 把政黨分析 為左右派已被炸毀及撤換了。 我們該從何了解這事?
YNH: Yeah, the old 20th-century political model of left versus right is now largely irrelevant, and the real divide today is between global and national, global or local. And you see it again all over the world that this is now the main struggle. We probably need completely new political models and completely new ways of thinking about politics. In essence, what you can say is that we now have global ecology, we have a global economy but we have national politics, and this doesn't work together. This makes the political system ineffective, because it has no control over the forces that shape our life. And you have basically two solutions to this imbalance: either de-globalize the economy and turn it back into a national economy, or globalize the political system.
尤:沒錯,過往二十世紀的 左右派系之政黨模式, 到現在是毫無意義了。 而今天實質之分界是在 全球主義和國家主義, 全球性或地緣性。 而你能觀察到這是在全球, 正在進行中的掙扎。 我猜我們是需要嶄新的政治模式, 和全新的政治思維。 精簡的說,你可說現在 我們是有個全球生態環境, 我們是有個全球經濟系統, 但卻只有國家性的政體, 這不能互通。 亦使現有的政治系統不足了, 因為它已無法駕馭 我們生活的支配因素了。 而對這不平衡,你只有兩個選擇: 一者是把這個經濟系統反全球化, 退回到國家經濟; 二者是把政治系統全球化。
CA: So some, I guess many liberals out there view Trump and his government as kind of irredeemably bad, just awful in every way. Do you see any underlying narrative or political philosophy in there that is at least worth understanding? How would you articulate that philosophy? Is it just the philosophy of nationalism?
克:我猜很多自由主義者 會覺得川普和他的政府 是無藥可救的, 在各方面都很糟糕。 你能在它當中看到 任何內涵或政治觀念, 是值得我們去揣摩了解的嗎? 你如何去闡明這觀念? 是否全然只是一種國家主義嗎?
YNH: I think the underlying feeling or idea is that the political system -- something is broken there. It doesn't empower the ordinary person anymore. It doesn't care so much about the ordinary person anymore, and I think this diagnosis of the political disease is correct. With regard to the answers, I am far less certain.
尤:我想它的基本感覺或概念, 是這個政治體制當中, 某些部分是壞掉了。 它已不再賦權給平民百姓了, 它已漠視平民百姓了。 我想這政治疾病之診斷是正確的, 但對它救治的答案, 我就不敢肯定了。
I think what we are seeing is the immediate human reaction: if something doesn't work, let's go back. And you see it all over the world, that people, almost nobody in the political system today, has any future-oriented vision of where humankind is going. Almost everywhere, you see retrograde vision: "Let's make America great again," like it was great -- I don't know -- in the '50s, in the '80s, sometime, let's go back there. And you go to Russia a hundred years after Lenin, Putin's vision for the future is basically, ah, let's go back to the Tsarist empire. And in Israel, where I come from, the hottest political vision of the present is: "Let's build the temple again." So let's go back 2,000 years backwards. So people are thinking sometime in the past we've lost it, and sometimes in the past, it's like you've lost your way in the city, and you say OK, let's go back to the point where I felt secure and start again. I don't think this can work, but a lot of people, this is their gut instinct.
我想我們看見的 是人之自然反射行為: 如果有東西行不通了,就掉頭吧, 你可看到全球都這樣。 全部人,幾乎沒有一位當今執政者 持有對人類未來走向的遠見。 差不多在所有地方, 你只看到懷舊思想: 「讓美國重振雄風!」 像以前一樣偉大──我不知道── 像 50 年代,或 80年代,或其它。 咱們回到過去罷! 看看蘇聯,已是列寧時代百年後了, 而普丁的未來夢想, 基本上是,啊, 咱們回到沙皇帝國時代吧! 再說以色列,我的母國, 當下最熱門的政治夢想是: 「我們重建猶太聖殿!」 好像我們不如回到兩千年前。 所以大家的思維是: 過去某時刻,我們迷失了。 過去某時刻, 把它當是你在都市迷了路, 你說:「好罷,我們回到 之前安全熟識的地方, 再重新來過。」 我不相信這是可行的。 但很多人,這是他們之自然反應。
CA: But why couldn't it work? "America First" is a very appealing slogan in many ways. Patriotism is, in many ways, a very noble thing. It's played a role in promoting cooperation among large numbers of people. Why couldn't you have a world organized in countries, all of which put themselves first?
克:但為什麼不可行呢? 「美國第一」在多方面 是個很吸引的口號。 愛國主義,在多方面是個崇高理想; 它曾經被用來 團結很龐大數目的人。 為什麼你不可把世界分成多國, 而各國都以自利為先?
YNH: For many centuries, even thousands of years, patriotism worked quite well. Of course, it led to wars an so forth, but we shouldn't focus too much on the bad. There are also many, many positive things about patriotism, and the ability to have a large number of people care about each other, sympathize with one another, and come together for collective action. If you go back to the first nations, so, thousands of years ago, the people who lived along the Yellow River in China -- it was many, many different tribes and they all depended on the river for survival and for prosperity, but all of them also suffered from periodical floods and periodical droughts. And no tribe could really do anything about it, because each of them controlled just a tiny section of the river.
尤:很多世紀來,甚至幾千年來, 愛國主義是蠻成功的。 當然,它也引發戰爭等等, 但我們不該太注視那些不好的, 愛國主義的確有很多很多正面好處, 也能帶動很大群的人 去關懷照顧對方, 去體恤包容對方, 也團結合夥去聯合行動。 如果你看最初的國家, 就是數千年前, 住在中國黃河岸邊的居民── 有很多很多不同的部落, 他們都依靠著黃河生存和造福, 但他們也遭受周期性水災, 和周期性旱災。 但沒有任何部落能做些什麼, 因為各部落只控制很小一段的河岸。
And then in a long and complicated process, the tribes coalesced together to form the Chinese nation, which controlled the entire Yellow River and had the ability to bring hundreds of thousands of people together to build dams and canals and regulate the river and prevent the worst floods and droughts and raise the level of prosperity for everybody. And this worked in many places around the world.
但經過一個長而複雜的過程, 部落合組成為中國這國家, 有效控制了整條黃河, 同時也有能力啟動數十萬居民, 一起來建水壩和運河, 來疏導這河流, 預防了最惡劣的洪水和大旱, 提升了全人民的富裕水平: 而這模式在世界多地都成功實施了。
But in the 21st century, technology is changing all that in a fundamental way. We are now living -- all people in the world -- are living alongside the same cyber river, and no single nation can regulate this river by itself. We are all living together on a single planet, which is threatened by our own actions. And if you don't have some kind of global cooperation, nationalism is just not on the right level to tackle the problems, whether it's climate change or whether it's technological disruption.
但是在二十一世紀, 科技在根本上改變了一切。 我們現在──地球上所有的人── 都生活在同一條「網路大河」旁邊, 而沒有一個國家能單獨調控這大河。 我們全都一起活在一個地球上, 但它受到我們行為的威脅, 所以如果你不能建立某些全球合作, 國家主義不能解決這些問題, 不管對氣候變化,或對科技的衝擊。
CA: So it was a beautiful idea in a world where most of the action, most of the issues, took place on national scale, but your argument is that the issues that matter most today no longer take place on a national scale but on a global scale.
克:所以國家主義曾是個 美麗的概念, 因為多數的事務,多數的議題 都局限在國域之內。 但你的論點是,當今最重要的議題, 已不發生在國家範疇內, 而是全球性的。
YNH: Exactly. All the major problems of the world today are global in essence, and they cannot be solved unless through some kind of global cooperation. It's not just climate change, which is, like, the most obvious example people give. I think more in terms of technological disruption. If you think about, for example, artificial intelligence, over the next 20, 30 years pushing hundreds of millions of people out of the job market -- this is a problem on a global level. It will disrupt the economy of all the countries.
尤:正是這樣。 所有今天世界重大的問題 都是環球性質的, 而這些都不可能被解決, 除非在全球合作之某些前提下。 而這不僅是說氣候變化, 這是人人最常舉的明顯例子, 我倒是更關注科技衝突: 比如說,你試想人工智慧 在未來二十、三十年後, 會驅使數百千萬工人失業── 這是一個全球性問題, 這將會影響全球國家的經濟。
And similarly, if you think about, say, bioengineering and people being afraid of conducting, I don't know, genetic engineering research in humans, it won't help if just a single country, let's say the US, outlaws all genetic experiments in humans, but China or North Korea continues to do it. So the US cannot solve it by itself, and very quickly, the pressure on the US to do the same will be immense because we are talking about high-risk, high-gain technologies. If somebody else is doing it, I can't allow myself to remain behind. The only way to have regulations, effective regulations, on things like genetic engineering, is to have global regulations. If you just have national regulations, nobody would like to stay behind.
同樣的,如果你想想, 比如生物工程, 有人會顧忌做這方面的實驗, 我不知道,基因工程之人體實驗; 如果只有一個國家,比如說美國, 立法禁止一切基因工程之人體實驗, 但中國或北韓堅持繼續實驗, 那這情況並非美國單獨能決定的, 美國也很快會遭受無比的壓力 要求進行同類的實驗, 因為這牽涉高風險、高利潤的科技。 如果他人在做, 我絕不能讓自己落後。 如果要建立這方面的法令, 有效之法令, 涉及如基因工程之類的, 就只能是全球性的法令。 如果你只有國家條令, 沒人會喜歡落後的。
CA: So this is really interesting. It seems to me that this may be one key to provoking at least a constructive conversation between the different sides here, because I think everyone can agree that the start point of a lot of the anger that's propelled us to where we are is because of the legitimate concerns about job loss. Work is gone, a traditional way of life has gone, and it's no wonder that people are furious about that. And in general, they have blamed globalism, global elites, for doing this to them without asking their permission, and that seems like a legitimate complaint.
克:這個觀點很有意思。 因為我覺得這就是一個契機, 來至少推動一個有建設性的交談, 讓多方都在一起。 因為我相信大家都會同意, 這麼多的怒氣演繹至今天的局勢, 都是起源於工人對失業之合理訴求。 工作沒了,傳統生活方式也沒了, 不言而知工人必然是憤怒的; 而普遍來說,工人都怪責 全球主義和全球菁英等, 沒有先徵求工人的同意, 就要他們扛下來, 這投訴也算合情合理的。
But what I hear you saying is that -- so a key question is: What is the real cause of job loss, both now and going forward? To the extent that it's about globalism, then the right response, yes, is to shut down borders and keep people out and change trade agreements and so forth. But you're saying, I think, that actually the bigger cause of job loss is not going to be that at all. It's going to originate in technological questions, and we have no chance of solving that unless we operate as a connected world.
從我理解你所說的── 一個關鍵問題是: 失業真正的原因是什麼呢, 在今天與未來? 起碼在涉及到全球主義之部分, 那正當的回應,沒錯, 就是把國家邊境封鎖, 把外人拒絕,把貿易協議修改等等。 但依我理解你說的, 真正造成失業的更大原因不是這些, 而是源於科技有關的問題。 所以對此,我們根本不可能解決它, 除非我們能全球牽手合作。
YNH: Yeah, I think that, I don't know about the present, but looking to the future, it's not the Mexicans or Chinese who will take the jobs from the people in Pennsylvania, it's the robots and algorithms. So unless you plan to build a big wall on the border of California --
尤:對,我想是的。 現在暫且不會,但我推測未來, 並不是墨西哥人或中國人 會奪取賓夕法尼亞州人的工作, 而是機器人和電腦演算法, 除非你計劃在加州州界 豎立個大圍牆──
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
the wall on the border with Mexico is going to be very ineffective. And I was struck when I watched the debates before the election, I was struck that certainly Trump did not even attempt to frighten people by saying the robots will take your jobs. Now even if it's not true, it doesn't matter. It could have been an extremely effective way of frightening people --
在墨西哥國界的圍牆是毫無用處的。 當我聽美國選舉前的 辯論,我很驚訝: 我驚訝為什麼川普 沒有嘗試恐嚇工人說: 「機械人會奪去工作」呢? 其實就算這不是真的,但也不重要。 這可以是恐嚇人民的極有效方法──
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
and galvanizing people: "The robots will take your jobs!" And nobody used that line. And it made me afraid, because it meant that no matter what happens in universities and laboratories, and there, there is already an intense debate about it, but in the mainstream political system and among the general public, people are just unaware that there could be an immense technological disruption -- not in 200 years, but in 10, 20, 30 years -- and we have to do something about it now, partly because most of what we teach children today in school or in college is going to be completely irrelevant to the job market of 2040, 2050. So it's not something we'll need to think about in 2040. We need to think today what to teach the young people.
和刺激人民的: 「機械人會奪去你的工作!」 但沒有競選人用這口號, 這倒是使我害怕, 因為這顯示出不管 在大學和實驗室, 在那裡,這潛在危機 已經常被討論了, 但在政界主流系統和大眾媒體中, 人民好像是毫不知情的, 一個極為龐大的科技衝擊將要來臨, 不是 200 年後 而是在 10、20、30 年── 所以我們現在必須要做準備, 部份原因是, 因為學校或大學現在教的 會完全與 2040、2050 年代的 就業環境全無關連。 所以這些不能等到 2040 年才考慮, 我們今天就得考慮該教 年輕人什麼了。
CA: Yeah, no, absolutely. You've often written about moments in history where humankind has ... entered a new era, unintentionally. Decisions have been made, technologies have been developed, and suddenly the world has changed, possibly in a way that's worse for everyone. So one of the examples you give in "Sapiens" is just the whole agricultural revolution, which, for an actual person tilling the fields, they just picked up a 12-hour backbreaking workday instead of six hours in the jungle and a much more interesting lifestyle.
克:是的,絕對需要。 你常寫到,在某歷史時刻中, 人類不知然的,進入了一個新紀元。 某些政策被採納, 某些科技被發明了, 一瞬間世界就已經變了, 但可能是對大家都不利的。 其中一個例子你在 《人類大歷史》 中提過, 就是總體的農業革命: 它對一個耕種農地的人來講, 他們剛接納了 一天 12 小時的要命工作, 來取替以往在森林 更有樂趣的 6 小時生活。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
So are we at another possible phase change here, where we kind of sleepwalk into a future that none of us actually wants?
所以是否我們又可能面臨革命了, 我們就像夢遊人踏進一個 根本不想要的未來?
YNH: Yes, very much so. During the agricultural revolution, what happened is that immense technological and economic revolution empowered the human collective, but when you look at actual individual lives, the life of a tiny elite became much better, and the lives of the majority of people became considerably worse. And this can happen again in the 21st century. No doubt the new technologies will empower the human collective. But we may end up again with a tiny elite reaping all the benefits, taking all the fruits, and the masses of the population finding themselves worse than they were before, certainly much worse than this tiny elite.
尤:是的,就是這樣。 在農業革命時代, 那巨大的科技和經濟改變 賦予整體人類很大的力量。 但當你觀察人民的實質生活時, 你發現只是小部分 菁英之生活有大提升, 剩餘大部份人的生活是糟糕很多。 這可能會在 21 世紀重演。 不可置疑,新的科技會加強 人類的集體力量, 但結果有可能再度還是 只有極少之菁英 獲得所有的利益,獨享勝果, 而大部分的人民會 發現自己比以前還差多了, 生活肯定是大大低於這些少數菁英。
CA: And those elites might not even be human elites. They might be cyborgs or --
克:這些菁英可能不是人類菁英, 有可能是改造人或──
YNH: Yeah, they could be enhanced super humans. They could be cyborgs. They could be completely nonorganic elites. They could even be non-conscious algorithms. What we see now in the world is authority shifting away from humans to algorithms. More and more decisions -- about personal lives, about economic matters, about political matters -- are actually being taken by algorithms. If you ask the bank for a loan, chances are your fate is decided by an algorithm, not by a human being. And the general impression is that maybe Homo sapiens just lost it.
尤:對,他們也可能是 增強超級人類, 也可能是改造人, 也可能是非生物菁英, 也甚至是非意識的演算法。 我們可觀察到, 現今世界已經漸把權柄 從人類轉移到演算法了。 越來越多的決策── 關於個人生活, 關於經濟事項,關於政治事務── 已實質被演算法奪取了。 如果你去銀行申請貸款, 很大機會你的命運是由 演算法來決定,而非經人手了。 現在的一般看法是覺得人類 是不是已經打輸了?
The world is so complicated, there is so much data, things are changing so fast, that this thing that evolved on the African savanna tens of thousands of years ago -- to cope with a particular environment, a particular volume of information and data -- it just can't handle the realities of the 21st century, and the only thing that may be able to handle it is big-data algorithms. So no wonder more and more authority is shifting from us to the algorithms.
世界是那麼的複雜,那麼多的數據, 事物也瞬息萬變, 所以在非洲大草原進化出來的這套, 從數十萬年前── 來駕馭某特定大環境, 來處理某特定數量的資訊和數據── 這套是絕對不能應付 21 世紀的現實要求了, 而唯一有可能滿足這要求的, 就只有是大數據分析了。 所以不難理解,越來越多的決策, 已從我們轉移到演算法分析了。
CA: So we're in New York City for the first of a series of TED Dialogues with Yuval Harari, and there's a Facebook Live audience out there. We're excited to have you with us. We'll start coming to some of your questions and questions of people in the room in just a few minutes, so have those coming.
克:我們在紐約現場 舉行首場的 TED Dialogues 系列, 講員為尤瓦爾 · 哈拉瑞。 我們也有臉書直播的聽眾, 我們很高興你們的參與, 我們一會兒就開始 回答你們的一些問題, 和現場觀眾的問題。 幾分鐘即開始, 請準備好問題。
Yuval, if you're going to make the argument that we need to get past nationalism because of the coming technological ... danger, in a way, presented by so much of what's happening we've got to have a global conversation about this. Trouble is, it's hard to get people really believing that, I don't know, AI really is an imminent threat, and so forth. The things that people, some people at least, care about much more immediately, perhaps, is climate change, perhaps other issues like refugees, nuclear weapons, and so forth. Would you argue that where we are right now that somehow those issues need to be dialed up? You've talked about climate change, but Trump has said he doesn't believe in that. So in a way, your most powerful argument, you can't actually use to make this case.
尤瓦爾,如果您要辯論, 我們有必要超越國家主義, 由於即將來臨的科技── 危險,可以說, 以當今多方面發生之事情顯示, 對此我們必需要有全球性的討論。 但難題是不容易使人 真去相信,我不知道, 人工智慧真的是燃眉之急等等, 人人已注意到的,至少某些人, 可能此刻會比較重視的 就是氣候變遷, 或其它像難民潮的議題, 核武器等等。 依我們目前的情況, 你會爭辯說這些該趕快處理嗎? 你剛已談到氣候變遷, 但川普曾公開表示他不相信是真的; 因此可以說,你最有說服力的理據, 現在你卻不能實際拿出來用了。
YNH: Yeah, I think with climate change, at first sight, it's quite surprising that there is a very close correlation between nationalism and climate change. I mean, almost always, the people who deny climate change are nationalists. And at first sight, you think: Why? What's the connection? Why don't you have socialists denying climate change? But then, when you think about it, it's obvious -- because nationalism has no solution to climate change. If you want to be a nationalist in the 21st century, you have to deny the problem. If you accept the reality of the problem, then you must accept that, yes, there is still room in the world for patriotism, there is still room in the world for having special loyalties and obligations towards your own people, towards your own country. I don't think anybody is really thinking of abolishing that.
尤:對,關於氣候變遷, 初步看,這是意料不到的, 確是有個很密切的關係 連繫著國家主義和氣候變遷, 你看,幾乎總是這樣, 那些否定氣候變遷的人 都是國家主義者, 你第一反應會問:為什麼? 是有什麼關連原因? 為什麼沒有社會主義者 否定氣候變遷呢? 但只要你靜下來想想就知道── 因為國家主義 對氣候變遷提不出解方。 如果你想在 21 世紀 做個國家主義者, 你就必要否定這個問題了。 但如果你認同這問題的真相, 你也就必須接受這點, 就是在這世界中, 還是有愛國主義的空間; 在這世界中,還是有空間 表達特殊忠誠關係, 和民族情操的發輝, 和國家情懷的表達。 我想沒有人是真想毀掉這些的。
But in order to confront climate change, we need additional loyalties and commitments to a level beyond the nation. And that should not be impossible, because people can have several layers of loyalty. You can be loyal to your family and to your community and to your nation, so why can't you also be loyal to humankind as a whole? Of course, there are occasions when it becomes difficult, what to put first, but, you know, life is difficult. Handle it.
但若要有效處理氣候變遷, 我們需要更多的合作和決心, 站在超國界的基礎上。 這其實不是不可能的, 因為人本來就擁有多重的忠心: 你可以忠於你的家庭, 同時也忠於你的社區, 亦忠於你的國家, 那為什麼你不可以 也忠於人類共同體呢? 當然,是會遇上難以取捨的衝突, 該以什麼為先, 但你也清楚,人生是艱難的, 做個好決擇吧!
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
CA: OK, so I would love to get some questions from the audience here. We've got a microphone here. Speak into it, and Facebook, get them coming, too.
克:好的,我很樂意聽聽 現場聽眾的問題。 我們這裡有麥克風, 對著說就行,臉書聽眾也請準備。
Howard Morgan: One of the things that has clearly made a huge difference in this country and other countries is the income distribution inequality, the dramatic change in income distribution in the US from what it was 50 years ago, and around the world. Is there anything we can do to affect that? Because that gets at a lot of the underlying causes.
摩根:有一件很明顯的關鍵事情, 就是在這國家和其它國家 人均收入之不平衡情況。 在美國之人均收入分佈, 比起 50 年前,產生了巨變, 全世界也這樣。 我們能做些什麼去影響它嗎? 因為這是很多其它問題的根源。
YNH: So far I haven't heard a very good idea about what to do about it, again, partly because most ideas remain on the national level, and the problem is global. I mean, one idea that we hear quite a lot about now is universal basic income. But this is a problem. I mean, I think it's a good start, but it's a problematic idea because it's not clear what "universal" is and it's not clear what "basic" is. Most people when they speak about universal basic income, they actually mean national basic income. But the problem is global.
尤:到目前,我還沒聽到 任何很好的解決方案, 這也正是因為有很多想法 都還困在國家性層面上, 但問題是跨國的。 我想,有一個概念近來常聽到的 是全民基本收入。 但概念本身就含有問題: 我意思是,這是個好起點, 但這概念是有問題的, 因為不清楚「全民」是什麼意思? 也不知道什麼是「基本」? 很多提出這個全民基本收入的人, 還是想著「國家基本收入」, 但這問題是跨國的。
Let's say that you have AI and 3D printers taking away millions of jobs in Bangladesh, from all the people who make my shirts and my shoes. So what's going to happen? The US government will levy taxes on Google and Apple in California, and use that to pay basic income to unemployed Bangladeshis? If you believe that, you can just as well believe that Santa Claus will come and solve the problem. So unless we have really universal and not national basic income, the deep problems are not going to go away.
比如說,現在人工智慧和 3D 列印 奪取了孟加拉數百萬人的工作, 他們是這些製造我穿在身上的 襯衫和皮鞋的工人, 那這該怎樣辦呢? 是否美國政府要向 加州的 Google 和 Apple 徵稅, 來支付基本收入 給孟加拉國的失業者? 如果你相信這個,你不如也相信 聖誕老人會來解決這問題了。 除非我們真的有全民基本收入, 而不是國家基本收入, 這深層問題是不會消失的。
And also it's not clear what basic is, because what are basic human needs? A thousand years ago, just food and shelter was enough. But today, people will say education is a basic human need, it should be part of the package. But how much? Six years? Twelve years? PhD? Similarly, with health care, let's say that in 20, 30, 40 years, you'll have expensive treatments that can extend human life to 120, I don't know. Will this be part of the basket of basic income or not? It's a very difficult problem, because in a world where people lose their ability to be employed, the only thing they are going to get is this basic income. So what's part of it is a very, very difficult ethical question.
另外,還有「基本」是什麼呢? 因為什麼是人類基本需求呢? 一千年前,溫飽已是足夠了; 但今天大家會說 教育也是人類基本需求, 教育也該含在其中, 但至於程度呢?六年? 十二年?博士學位? 同樣的,在醫療方面, 假設在 20、30、40 年後, 你會接受昂貴的治療來延長壽命 到 120 歲?我可不確定。 那這也要包含在基本收入嗎? 這是非常困難的問題, 因為當世界的 人民失去了謀生技能時, 人民只能靠這基本收入維生, 所以這基本收入該含什麼, 是個極度困難的倫理問題。
CA: There's a bunch of questions on how the world affords it as well, who pays. There's a question here from Facebook from Lisa Larson: "How does nationalism in the US now compare to that between World War I and World War II in the last century?"
克:還有很多問題是, 這世界靠什麼來支付這筆費用? 誰來付錢? 這是臉書來的問題,麗莎拉爾森: 「現今在美國的國家主義, 和上世紀第一次 和第二次大戰之間比較, 怎樣比?」
YNH: Well the good news, with regard to the dangers of nationalism, we are in a much better position than a century ago. A century ago, 1917, Europeans were killing each other by the millions. In 2016, with Brexit, as far as I remember, a single person lost their life, an MP who was murdered by some extremist. Just a single person. I mean, if Brexit was about British independence, this is the most peaceful war of independence in human history. And let's say that Scotland will now choose to leave the UK after Brexit.
尤:在好的方面, 關於國家主義帶來的危險, 我們今天比一世紀前好多了。 一世紀前,在 1917 年當時, 歐洲人民數以百萬計的互相殘殺, 而在 2016 年,為英國脫歐之事, 依我能記得的, 只有一個人為此喪命, 一位英國國會議員被極端分子謀殺。 只一個人而已。 你看,如果視英國脫歐 為英國爭取自由, 這可算是人類歷史中, 最和平的獨立戰爭。 同時,如果蘇格蘭未來 選擇脫離英國, 在英國脫離歐盟之後,
So in the 18th century, if Scotland wanted -- and the Scots wanted several times -- to break out of the control of London, the reaction of the government in London was to send an army up north to burn down Edinburgh and massacre the highland tribes. My guess is that if, in 2018, the Scots vote for independence, the London government will not send an army up north to burn down Edinburgh. Very few people are now willing to kill or be killed for Scottish or for British independence. So for all the talk of the rise of nationalism and going back to the 1930s, to the 19th century, in the West at least, the power of national sentiments today is far, far smaller than it was a century ago.
相對在 18 世紀時, 如蘇格蘭想── 事實上蘇格蘭也有好幾次── 擺脫倫敦的控制時, 倫敦政府之回應,是派軍隊北伐, 把愛丁堡燒掉和屠殺高地部落族人; 我猜如果在 2018 年, 蘇格蘭投票要獨立的話, 倫敦政府不可能派軍隊北上 去把愛丁堡燒平。 今天絕少人數會願意去殺或被殺, 只為了蘇格蘭或英國之獨立。 所以說,不管常聽到 國家主義正崛起, 但是比 1930 年代, 或再推前至 19 世紀, 起碼在西方世界, 國家主義今天帶來的激情, 比上個世紀是少多了。
CA: Although some people now, you hear publicly worrying about whether that might be shifting, that there could actually be outbreaks of violence in the US depending on how things turn out. Should we be worried about that, or do you really think things have shifted?
克:雖然現在有些人── 你聽到他們公然的擔憂, 不知道這是否也正在改變, 就是可能在美國本土會有暴亂發生, 取決於事態之未來發展。 我們真該為這擔憂嗎? 或是你相信大局已改變了?
YNH: No, we should be worried. We should be aware of two things. First of all, don't be hysterical. We are not back in the First World War yet. But on the other hand, don't be complacent. We reached from 1917 to 2017, not by some divine miracle, but simply by human decisions, and if we now start making the wrong decisions, we could be back in an analogous situation to 1917 in a few years. One of the things I know as a historian is that you should never underestimate human stupidity.
尤:沒改變,但我們是該擔心。 我們須警惕兩件事: 首先,大家不要變得歇斯底里。 我們還沒回到第一次世界大戰, 但另一方面,亦不可躊躇滿志。 人類能從 1917 年跨到 2017年, 並不是因為神蹟, 而是因為人的正確選擇。 所以如果我們 現在開始做錯誤的抉擇, 我們是可能倒退 至類似 1917 年的情況, 就在未來數年間。 一件事我身為歷史學家清楚得很, 就是你永遠不應低估人類的愚蠢。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
It's one of the most powerful forces in history, human stupidity and human violence. Humans do such crazy things for no obvious reason, but again, at the same time, another very powerful force in human history is human wisdom. We have both.
它是歷史中最龐大力量之一: 人類的愚蠢和人類的殘暴。 人類能毫無原因地做些 極瘋狂的事情; 但卻同時,在人類歷史中 有另一個非常龐大的力量 就是人類的智慧。 兩者共存在人類中。
CA: We have with us here moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who I think has a question.
克:道德心理學家強納生海特在這裡, 他有一個問題。
Jonathan Haidt: Thanks, Yuval. So you seem to be a fan of global governance, but when you look at the map of the world from Transparency International, which rates the level of corruption of political institutions, it's a vast sea of red with little bits of yellow here and there for those with good institutions. So if we were to have some kind of global governance, what makes you think it would end up being more like Denmark rather than more like Russia or Honduras, and aren't there alternatives, such as we did with CFCs? There are ways to solve global problems with national governments. What would world government actually look like, and why do you think it would work?
海特 : 多謝,尤瓦爾。 看來您是位全球行政制之支持者, 但是如果你看到 國際透明組織的世界地圖, 它展示出政治機構的貪污程度, 它幾乎是片紅色大海, 偶爾這裡那裡有些小黃點 來標識好的政權。 所以如果我們真的有某種全球政府, 你怎麼知道它會像丹麥, 而不像蘇聯或宏都拉斯? 而且可否有其它的選擇, 像我們監控氟氯碳化物一樣? 其實是有方法通過國家機構 來解決環球問題的。 世界政府會像怎樣的呢? 同時為什麼您認為它會成功呢?
YNH: Well, I don't know what it would look like. Nobody still has a model for that. The main reason we need it is because many of these issues are lose-lose situations. When you have a win-win situation like trade, both sides can benefit from a trade agreement, then this is something you can work out. Without some kind of global government, national governments each have an interest in doing it. But when you have a lose-lose situation like with climate change, it's much more difficult without some overarching authority, real authority.
尤:哦,我不知道它會像什麼, 尚且沒有人能提出一個模式。 但我們需要它之主要原因, 就是因為很多的問題 會是雙輸的局面。 當你有個雙贏的情況時,如貿易, 雙方都能從貿易合作中取得利益, 這情況下雙方是可以找出方法的, 就算是沒有某種世界政府, 各國政府都受激勵去協調; 但是當有雙輸的局面時, 比如氣候變遷, 這就變困難多了, 如果缺乏一個 有執行實權的真正政府。
Now, how to get there and what would it look like, I don't know. And certainly there is no obvious reason to think that it would look like Denmark, or that it would be a democracy. Most likely it wouldn't. We don't have workable democratic models for a global government. So maybe it would look more like ancient China than like modern Denmark. But still, given the dangers that we are facing, I think the imperative of having some kind of real ability to force through difficult decisions on the global level is more important than almost anything else.
至於如何能建立它和它會是怎樣的, 我不知道。 但是可以說的確沒有明顯理由 去預想它會像丹麥一樣, 或一定是民主的, 很可能它不會是。 我們還沒有一個能實施的民主制體 套用在世界政府。 所以它可能會像古中國 多於像現代丹麥。 但是,考量到我們當前的危機, 我想這個迫切性, 去協調某些實質能力, 去強性通過一些 全球層面的艱難決策, 幾乎比任何一切都更重要。
CA: There's a question from Facebook here, and then we'll get the mic to Andrew. So, Kat Hebron on Facebook, calling in from Vail: "How would developed nations manage the millions of climate migrants?"
克:臉書觀眾有一個問題, 然後我們會遞麥克風給安德魯。 這是臉書的凱特, 從科羅拉多州韋爾打來的: 「這些已發展國家,如何能妥善安排 數以百萬的氣候移民?」
YNH: I don't know.
尤:我不知道。
CA: That's your answer, Kat. (Laughter)
克:這是你的答案,凱特。 (笑聲)。
YNH: And I don't think that they know either. They'll just deny the problem, maybe.
尤:同時我相信他們也不曉得。 他們可能只會逃避這問題。
CA: But immigration, generally, is another example of a problem that's very hard to solve on a nation-by-nation basis. One nation can shut its doors, but maybe that stores up problems for the future.
克:其實移民,一般來說, 也是一個很好的難題例子, 若想在國與國的層面上解決, 它是很難處理的。 一個國家可以把門關上, 但這只是把問題留到未來。
YNH: Yes, I mean -- it's another very good case, especially because it's so much easier to migrate today than it was in the Middle Ages or in ancient times.
尤:是的,我同意── 這是一個很好的例子, 尤其今天是那麼容易去移民, 比起在中世紀,或是在上古時候。
CA: Yuval, there's a belief among many technologists, certainly, that political concerns are kind of overblown, that actually, political leaders don't have that much influence in the world, that the real determination of humanity at this point is by science, by invention, by companies, by many things other than political leaders, and it's actually very hard for leaders to do much, so we're actually worrying about nothing here.
克:尤瓦爾,現在有個信念, 尤其在技術專家中, 說那些政治問題,是誇大其詞而已, 其實政治領袖在這世界中 沒有那麼大的影響力, 在這個時代,真正能導航 人類未來的是科學, 科技發明,或企業, 或是很多其它的東西, 但決不是政治領袖, 其實政府領袖是很難做些什麼的: 我們只是杞人憂天。
YNH: Well, first, it should be emphasized that it's true that political leaders' ability to do good is very limited, but their ability to do harm is unlimited. There is a basic imbalance here. You can still press the button and blow everybody up. You have that kind of ability. But if you want, for example, to reduce inequality, that's very, very difficult. But to start a war, you can still do so very easily. So there is a built-in imbalance in the political system today which is very frustrating, where you cannot do a lot of good but you can still do a lot of harm. And this makes the political system still a very big concern.
尤:要明白,第一,我們需強調: 政治領袖做好事之能力, 確實是很有限的, 但他們破壞之能力,是無限的。 這裡有個根本不平衡的地方: 你還是可以按一按扭, 去毀滅全人類。 你真的有這種能力。 但如果你想,比如說, 減低社會不平等, 這是非常,非常艱難的, 但要開戰的話, 這你很容易就可做到。 所以,這是個 當今政治之結構性不平衡, 也讓人非常沮喪。 因你雖不能做很多好事, 但卻能作出極大傷害。 這就是為什麼政治系統, 必然還是一個很大的議題。
CA: So as you look at what's happening today, and putting your historian's hat on, do you look back in history at moments when things were going just fine and an individual leader really took the world or their country backwards?
克:依您觀察現在世界事態, 從歷史學家的角度評斷, 在過去歷史中, 曾否有過雖是太平盛世, 但亦有因一個領袖 而陷全世界或國家後退嗎?
YNH: There are quite a few examples, but I should emphasize, it's never an individual leader. I mean, somebody put him there, and somebody allowed him to continue to be there. So it's never really just the fault of a single individual. There are a lot of people behind every such individual.
尤:有好幾個案例。 但我必須強調, 從不會因為一個領袖而已; 我的意思是,當事人也是 某些人推選他的, 而某些人也容許當事人繼續留著; 所以客觀說, 這從來不是一個人的錯, 這人背後都是有很多人支持著的。
CA: Can we have the microphone here, please, to Andrew?
克:請把麥克風遞給安德魯。
Andrew Solomon: You've talked a lot about the global versus the national, but increasingly, it seems to me, the world situation is in the hands of identity groups. We look at people within the United States who have been recruited by ISIS. We look at these other groups which have formed which go outside of national bounds but still represent significant authorities. How are they to be integrated into the system, and how is a diverse set of identities to be made coherent under either national or global leadership?
安德魯索羅門:您談了很多 全球主義和國家主義的比較, 但依我來看,日漸明顯的是, 世界局勢已經落在某些 擁有共同理想之團體組織中了。 我們看到在美國境內的居民, 竟然被伊斯蘭國恐怖組織招攬入會; 我們同時也看看其它的團體, 它們不局限於某些國界, 但也表現出相當程度的勢力。 該如何把這些團體融入 傳統政治框架, 這類團體又如何能順利調合, 受制於國家或全球行政管理中?
YNH: Well, the problem of such diverse identities is a problem from nationalism as well. Nationalism believes in a single, monolithic identity, and exclusive or at least more extreme versions of nationalism believe in an exclusive loyalty to a single identity. And therefore, nationalism has had a lot of problems with people wanting to divide their identities between various groups. So it's not just a problem, say, for a global vision.
尤:其實這些不同主義的組織, 其實也是從國家主義衍生出來的。 國家主義相信單一、統一的概念, 它是獨尊的,或是說那些 比較偏激的國家主義份子, 只會獨忠於一個團體。 所以說,國家主義歷來 都遇上很多困難, 去處理那些想自我分割 為忠於多個不同主義的團體。 所以這問題不僅是 全球主義者要面對的。
And I think, again, history shows that you shouldn't necessarily think in such exclusive terms. If you think that there is just a single identity for a person, "I am just X, that's it, I can't be several things, I can be just that," that's the start of the problem. You have religions, you have nations that sometimes demand exclusive loyalty, but it's not the only option. There are many religions and many nations that enable you to have diverse identities at the same time.
但我想歷史再一次教導, 我們不該堅守著這種排外的視野; 如果你的思路是 一個人只能擁有一個身份, 「我就是某某,就這樣! 我不能有多重身份, 我只有一個身份」, 這就正是問題的開端了。 某些宗教,某些國家, 有時候是要求你獨忠不二的, 但這些不是唯一的選擇。 世界上有很多宗教和很多國家, 容許你同時有多重身份的。
CA: But is one explanation of what's happened in the last year that a group of people have got fed up with, if you like, the liberal elites, for want of a better term, obsessing over many, many different identities and them feeling, "But what about my identity? I am being completely ignored here. And by the way, I thought I was the majority"? And that that's actually sparked a lot of the anger.
克:如要試圖解釋去年發生的事情, 某一階層的民眾受夠了 這些所謂自由派精英, 希望有更好的說法, 著迷於很多很多不同的身份認同; 但這階層的人想, 「那我的身份又怎樣? 我已經被完全忽略掉了。 可不要忘記,我還以為 我們是主流呢?」 這想法正是構成很大的民憤之原因。
YNH: Yeah. Identity is always problematic, because identity is always based on fictional stories that sooner or later collide with reality. Almost all identities, I mean, beyond the level of the basic community of a few dozen people, are based on a fictional story. They are not the truth. They are not the reality. It's just a story that people invent and tell one another and start believing. And therefore all identities are extremely unstable. They are not a biological reality. Sometimes nationalists, for example, think that the nation is a biological entity. It's made of the combination of soil and blood, creates the nation. But this is just a fictional story.
尤:對,身份認知總是大問題, 因為這認知是建立在虛構的故事上, 而故事遲早會與現實相撞。 幾乎所有的身份認知, 我指的是,任何超越 那些基本生活圈子內的, 大概人數也不過是數十人, 都建立在一個虛構的故事上。 這故事不是真理, 更不是實際的狀況: 故事只是某些人虛構出來, 而大家互傳,之後大家就相信了。 因為這樣,所有的身份都非常脆弱, 這些身份都沒有 生物上的事實支撐著: 有些國家主義者,舉例說, 會想國家是個生物單元, 是大地泥土和血的混成物, 再團聚為一個國家, 但這純粹是一個虛構故事。
CA: Soil and blood kind of makes a gooey mess.
克:泥土和血是一團糟啊。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
YNH: It does, and also it messes with your mind when you think too much that I am a combination of soil and blood. If you look from a biological perspective, obviously none of the nations that exist today existed 5,000 years ago. Homo sapiens is a social animal, that's for sure. But for millions of years, Homo sapiens and our hominid ancestors lived in small communities of a few dozen individuals. Everybody knew everybody else. Whereas modern nations are imagined communities, in the sense that I don't even know all these people. I come from a relatively small nation, Israel, and of eight million Israelis, I never met most of them. I will never meet most of them. They basically exist here.
尤:是的,它也能混亂你的思想, 如果你常想自己是土和血的混成物。 如果你是從生物角度的立場來想, 那明顯的是,沒有一個現今的國家, 5000 年之前是存在的。 人類是一個社會動物,這是肯定的, 但是幾百萬年來, 人類和原始人類祖先都住在小社團, 才不過幾十人, 每人都認識每個人。 但是現代的國家 只是個構思出來的團體, 因為我根本不認識全國的人。 我來自以色列,一個小國家, 約八百萬以色列人民; 絕大部分人我從來沒接觸過, 我也永遠都不會認識他們, 他們只是存在著。
CA: But in terms of this identity, this group who feel left out and perhaps have work taken away, I mean, in "Homo Deus," you actually speak of this group in one sense expanding, that so many people may have their jobs taken away by technology in some way that we could end up with a really large -- I think you call it a "useless class" -- a class where traditionally, as viewed by the economy, these people have no use.
克:依這種身分認同角度來看, 感覺被遺棄、很可能 連工作也被奪去的這個階層, 我是指,在《人類大命運》書中, 你有指出這群人正在擴大, 因為有很多人的工作將被奪走, 被科技取代;最後我們可能會剩下 非常龐大的──記得你稱它為 「無用的階層」── 這階層傳統以來, 是以經濟生產而建立的, 現在就都沒用了。
YNH: Yes.
尤:對。
CA: How likely a possibility is that? Is that something we should be terrified about? And can we address it in any way?
克:這有多大的可能性呢? 我們應該對此驚恐嗎? 還有我們能有方法應對它嗎?
YNH: We should think about it very carefully. I mean, nobody really knows what the job market will look like in 2040, 2050. There is a chance many new jobs will appear, but it's not certain. And even if new jobs do appear, it won't necessarily be easy for a 50-year old unemployed truck driver made unemployed by self-driving vehicles, it won't be easy for an unemployed truck driver to reinvent himself or herself as a designer of virtual worlds.
尤:我們要非常謹慎思考這問題。 我是說,沒有人真的知道 我們在 2040、2050 年的就業情況, 是有可能會有很多新的就業機會, 但這不可肯定。 就算是有新的行業出來, 它不一定是一個 50 歲的 失業卡車司機容易勝任的, 失業之原因是被無人駕車取代了; 一個失業卡車司機是不容易 去重塑自己為虛擬世界的設計師。
Previously, if you look at the trajectory of the industrial revolution, when machines replaced humans in one type of work, the solution usually came from low-skill work in new lines of business. So you didn't need any more agricultural workers, so people moved to working in low-skill industrial jobs, and when this was taken away by more and more machines, people moved to low-skill service jobs. Now, when people say there will be new jobs in the future, that humans can do better than AI, that humans can do better than robots, they usually think about high-skill jobs, like software engineers designing virtual worlds. Now, I don't see how an unemployed cashier from Wal-Mart reinvents herself or himself at 50 as a designer of virtual worlds, and certainly I don't see how the millions of unemployed Bangladeshi textile workers will be able to do that. I mean, if they are going to do it, we need to start teaching the Bangladeshis today how to be software designers, and we are not doing it. So what will they do in 20 years?
依過去來看,如果 你觀察工業革命的走勢, 當機器在某行業取代了人類, 解緩方法就是 在新的行業裡找到低技能的工作: 比如你不需要農業勞工, 這些人就去低技術的 工業生產線就業; 而當這些又被更多的機器取替後, 這些人就遷到低技術的服務性行業。 但現在,有人說未來會有新的工作, 而且人類會比人工智慧做得更好, 人類會比機械人做得更好, 他們想的都是高技術的工作, 像軟體工程師設計虛擬世界。 可是,我無法想像, 一位失業的沃爾瑪大賣場出納員, 能在 50 歲時轉行為 虛擬世界設計師; 我更不能想像, 這數百萬孟加拉國籍的 失業紡織工人, 如何能夠做得到。 我是說,如果我們真要做到, 我們今天就要教導這些 孟加拉國籍工人, 如何成為軟體設計師。 但是我們現在沒這樣做, 20 年後這群人能做什麼?
CA: So it feels like you're really highlighting a question that's really been bugging me the last few months more and more. It's almost a hard question to ask in public, but if any mind has some wisdom to offer in it, maybe it's yours, so I'm going to ask you: What are humans for?
克:我感到你真的突顯了一個問題, 也真的是這數月來, 越來越困擾我的, 這幾乎是一個在大眾前忌諱的問題, 但是如果有人能作出有智慧的回應, 這人可能是你, 所以我現在請問你: 「人類有什麼意義?」
YNH: As far as we know, for nothing.
尤:據我們所知的,毫無意義。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I mean, there is no great cosmic drama, some great cosmic plan, that we have a role to play in. And we just need to discover what our role is and then play it to the best of our ability. This has been the story of all religions and ideologies and so forth, but as a scientist, the best I can say is this is not true. There is no universal drama with a role in it for Homo sapiens. So --
我是指,沒有偉大的神曲, 偉大的神的計劃, 等待著我們去參與。 我們只需要發掘自我的角色, 然後演繹得盡善盡美就是了。 這是所有宗教 和思想體系的共同故事。 但身為一個科學家, 我只能說,這不是事實; 沒有什麼偉大的神曲, 盼望我們人類參與。 所以──
CA: I'm going to push back on you just for a minute, just from your own book, because in "Homo Deus," you give really one of the most coherent and understandable accounts about sentience, about consciousness, and that unique sort of human skill. You point out that it's different from intelligence, the intelligence that we're building in machines, and that there's actually a lot of mystery around it. How can you be sure there's no purpose when we don't even understand what this sentience thing is? I mean, in your own thinking, isn't there a chance that what humans are for is to be the universe's sentient things, to be the centers of joy and love and happiness and hope? And maybe we can build machines that actually help amplify that, even if they're not going to become sentient themselves? Is that crazy? I kind of found myself hoping that, reading your book.
克:我要追問你。 在你的書中, 因為在《人類大命運》中, 你作了一個最緊密和能理解的訴說, 關於感知性,關於自覺性, 和那人類獨一無二的技能。 你也說這智慧, 和我們設計在機器中的 智慧是不同的。 其實關於這一點, 還是有很多的奧秘: 你怎樣確定是沒有意義的呢? 當我們還不全明白這感知性是什麼? 我是想,在你的思路範疇中, 會不會有一個可能性, 人類的意義就是要 成就宇宙的感知性代表物, 成為宇宙中的 喜悅和愛和快樂和希望? 我們同時也許可以設計一些 擴大這方面的機器, 就算這些機器本身 不會真的有感知性的? 這是狂想嗎? 當我在閱讀你的書時, 我心底有著這寄望。
YNH: Well, I certainly think that the most interesting question today in science is the question of consciousness and the mind. We are getting better and better in understanding the brain and intelligence, but we are not getting much better in understanding the mind and consciousness. People often confuse intelligence and consciousness, especially in places like Silicon Valley, which is understandable, because in humans, they go together. I mean, intelligence basically is the ability to solve problems. Consciousness is the ability to feel things, to feel joy and sadness and boredom and pain and so forth. In Homo sapiens and all other mammals as well -- it's not unique to humans -- in all mammals and birds and some other animals, intelligence and consciousness go together. We often solve problems by feeling things. So we tend to confuse them. But they are different things.
尤:是的,我想當今科學中 最有趣的問題, 就是關於自覺性和人的思想。 我們對頭腦機能越來越了解, 還有智力, 但我們沒有多大的進步, 對思想和自覺性之了解。 一般人容易混淆智力和自覺性, 尤其是在矽谷這類地方, 這也是可以理解的, 因為在人類,這兩者是共存的。 我的意思是,智力基本上是 解決問題的能力; 自覺性是能感知事物, 能感知喜悅和悲哀, 無聊和痛楚等等; 這些是人類和所有哺乳動物 都能的──不是人類獨能的── 所有哺乳動物和鳥類 和其它一些動物, 智力和自覺性是並行的。 我們常依賴我們的感覺去解決問題, 所以我們常把它們混同了, 但其實它們是不同的事物。
What's happening today in places like Silicon Valley is that we are creating artificial intelligence but not artificial consciousness. There has been an amazing development in computer intelligence over the last 50 years, and exactly zero development in computer consciousness, and there is no indication that computers are going to become conscious anytime soon.
目前在矽谷這類地方進行的, 是研發人工智慧, 但不是人工自覺性。 可以說在電腦智能方面, 過往 50 年來真是有驚人的進步, 但是在電腦自覺性只有零進步。 同時也沒有跡象顯示 電腦有一天會有自覺性, 起碼不在可想像的未來當中。
So first of all, if there is some cosmic role for consciousness, it's not unique to Homo sapiens. Cows are conscious, pigs are conscious, chimpanzees are conscious, chickens are conscious, so if we go that way, first of all, we need to broaden our horizons and remember very clearly we are not the only sentient beings on Earth, and when it comes to sentience -- when it comes to intelligence, there is good reason to think we are the most intelligent of the whole bunch.
所以說,首先,如果自覺性 在宇宙中有特殊角色, 這不是人類獨有的。 牛也自覺,豬也自覺, 黑猩猩也自覺,雞也自覺, 所以如果要向這方探索, 首先我們必要開闊我們的視野; 而且要非常清楚記得,我們不是 地球上唯一有感知性的生物。 依感知性來說── 依智力來說, 我們確是有很好理由去相信 我們是這群最聰明的;
But when it comes to sentience, to say that humans are more sentient than whales, or more sentient than baboons or more sentient than cats, I see no evidence for that. So first step is, you go in that direction, expand. And then the second question of what is it for, I would reverse it and I would say that I don't think sentience is for anything. I think we don't need to find our role in the universe. The really important thing is to liberate ourselves from suffering. What characterizes sentient beings in contrast to robots, to stones, to whatever, is that sentient beings suffer, can suffer, and what they should focus on is not finding their place in some mysterious cosmic drama. They should focus on understanding what suffering is, what causes it and how to be liberated from it.
但是依感知性來說, 如果我們說人類的感知勝於鯨魚, 或感知勝於狒狒,或感知勝於貓, 我是沒看到證據的。 所以第一步,如你想走這方向, 首先擴大範圍。 跟著的第二問題是: 「為了什麼目的?」 我會反問, 我會說:「我不知道 感知性有任何目的。」 我想我們不需要 找我們在宇宙的角色, 真正重要的事情, 是要使我們脫離痛苦。 感知生物的特徵, 相對於機械人,或石頭, 或任何其它的, 就是感知生物感覺到苦,會受苦。 所以他們需要注意的是, 並不是在神秘的神曲中找個位子, 而是該致力去了解痛苦是什麼, 它怎樣產生的, 和如何能解脫遠離痛苦。
CA: I know this is a big issue for you, and that was very eloquent. We're going to have a blizzard of questions from the audience here, and maybe from Facebook as well, and maybe some comments as well. So let's go quick. There's one right here. Keep your hands held up at the back if you want the mic, and we'll get it back to you.
克:我知道這對你是一個重要的問題, 而您的回答也是極精闢。 我們現場聽眾有非常多的問題, 臉書的聽眾也有, 同時也可能有些評語。 好! 這邊有一位, 坐後面的,如果要麥克風 請把手舉高, 我們會有安排。
Question: In your work, you talk a lot about the fictional stories that we accept as truth, and we live our lives by it. As an individual, knowing that, how does it impact the stories that you choose to live your life, and do you confuse them with the truth, like all of us?
問題:你的著作中, 多處談及到虛構的故事, 我們卻認作為事實, 而且更依它為生活指引。 對您個人來說,明白到這一點後, 這對你已選擇的虛構故事 有怎樣影響嗎? 你會像很多人, 將故事與真實混淆嗎?
YNH: I try not to. I mean, for me, maybe the most important question, both as a scientist and as a person, is how to tell the difference between fiction and reality, because reality is there. I'm not saying that everything is fiction. It's just very difficult for human beings to tell the difference between fiction and reality, and it has become more and more difficult as history progressed, because the fictions that we have created -- nations and gods and money and corporations -- they now control the world. So just to even think, "Oh, this is just all fictional entities that we've created," is very difficult. But reality is there.
尤:我試著防備。 對我來說,最重要的問題, 不論是以科學家身份或是個人身份, 是能夠清楚分辨虛構和現實, 因為現實是存在的。 我不是說所有一切都是虛構的, 只是對人類來說,是很難去分辨 虛構和現實。 而且隨著歷史的累積, 也變得越來越扭曲, 因為我們創造出來的這些故事── 國家和神明,金錢和企業── 它們已支配著這世界。 所以就算要去反思: 「啊!這些都是 我們創造的故事而已,」 就已經會感到吃力了。 但現實是存在的。
For me the best ... There are several tests to tell the difference between fiction and reality. The simplest one, the best one that I can say in short, is the test of suffering. If it can suffer, it's real. If it can't suffer, it's not real. A nation cannot suffer. That's very, very clear. Even if a nation loses a war, we say, "Germany suffered a defeat in the First World War," it's a metaphor. Germany cannot suffer. Germany has no mind. Germany has no consciousness. Germans can suffer, yes, but Germany cannot. Similarly, when a bank goes bust, the bank cannot suffer. When the dollar loses its value, the dollar doesn't suffer. People can suffer. Animals can suffer. This is real. So I would start, if you really want to see reality, I would go through the door of suffering. If you can really understand what suffering is, this will give you also the key to understand what reality is.
對我個人,最好的…… 有好幾個測試 可用來分辨故事和現實。 最簡單的,最易講解的, 就是痛苦的測試。 如果能感到痛苦的,是存在的。 如果不能感到痛苦的, 便是不存在的。 一個國家是不能感到痛苦的, 這應是非常,非常明顯的。 就算是一個國家打敗戰時, 我們說:「德國在第一次 世界大戰受敗戰之苦,」 這只是個比喻, 德國不可能感到痛苦, 德國沒有思想, 德國沒有自覺性。 德國人民可受苦了,這沒錯, 但德國是不可能的。 同樣,當一個銀行倒閉時, 銀行是不可能受苦的。 當貨幣貶值,貨幣不可能受苦的。 人民會苦。動物會苦。 這是真實存在的。 所以如果你想體悟存在, 我建議初步嘗試, 我會走進痛苦的大門, 如果你真的能體悟什麼是痛苦, 這也會讓你能夠 明白什麼是存在。
CA: There's a Facebook question here that connects to this, from someone around the world in a language that I cannot read.
克:這裡有個來自臉書的問題, 也是關於同一點的。 這從哪國來我不知道, 我不會讀這文字。
YNH: Oh, it's Hebrew. CA: Hebrew. There you go.
尤:啊,是希伯來語。 克:希伯來語。你的。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Can you read the name?
你能讀這名字嗎?
YNH: Or Lauterbach Goren.
尤:Or Lauterbach Goren.
CA: Well, thank you for writing in. The question is: "Is the post-truth era really a brand-new era, or just another climax or moment in a never-ending trend?
克:謝謝你的問題。 問題是:「這個後真相政治時代 真的是一個全新時代嗎? 或只不過是一個高潮, 或邁向永無止境之一刻而已?」
YNH: Personally, I don't connect with this idea of post-truth. My basic reaction as a historian is: If this is the era of post-truth, when the hell was the era of truth?
尤:我個人而言,我對這個 後真相政治概念毫無共鳴。 我身為歷史學家的反應是: 如果今天是後真相政治時代, 請問曾幾何時是真相政治時代?
CA: Right.
克:對。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
YNH: Was it the 1980s, the 1950s, the Middle Ages? I mean, we have always lived in an era, in a way, of post-truth.
尤:是在 1980 年代, 1950 年代,或中世紀? 我認為,我們一路來 都像是活在後真相時代。
CA: But I'd push back on that, because I think what people are talking about is that there was a world where you had fewer journalistic outlets, where there were traditions, that things were fact-checked. It was incorporated into the charter of those organizations that the truth mattered. So if you believe in a reality, then what you write is information. There was a belief that that information should connect to reality in a real way, and if you wrote a headline, it was a serious, earnest attempt to reflect something that had actually happened. And people didn't always get it right.
克:這一點我們緩下來。 因為我想大家在談論的, 是以往在世界上, 還沒有那麼多的媒體渠道, 而那時候的傳統, 資訊都是會經過考證查核的。 這自律精神也宣明在 媒體組織的憲章中, 事實真相是重要的。 所以如果你真的重視事實, 那你所寫的就是資訊, 而且有個信念是要求 這資訊要與事實有關連; 所以當你寫報章頭條時, 你的心態是慎重誠懇的, 來傳遞一些已發生的事物, 雖然不一定能百分百之正確。
But I think the concern now is you've got a technological system that's incredibly powerful that, for a while at least, massively amplified anything with no attention paid to whether it connected to reality, only to whether it connected to clicks and attention, and that that was arguably toxic. That's a reasonable concern, isn't it?
而我想現在人人關注的 是因為有了一個超強的科技系統, 它能夠,雖然只是片刻, 極大量氾濫地傳遞資訊, 但毫不注重資訊 是否與事實真的相關, 卻只重視觀聽人數和熱門度。 這種情況:確是有人視之為污染, 這是合理的顧慮,是不是?
YNH: Yeah, it is. I mean, the technology changes, and it's now easier to disseminate both truth and fiction and falsehood. It goes both ways. It's also much easier, though, to spread the truth than it was ever before. But I don't think there is anything essentially new about this disseminating fictions and errors. There is nothing that -- I don't know -- Joseph Goebbels, didn't know about all this idea of fake news and post-truth. He famously said that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will think it's the truth, and the bigger the lie, the better, because people won't even think that something so big can be a lie. I think that fake news has been with us for thousands of years. Just think of the Bible.
尤:是的,是合理, 這是因為科技之改變, 現在是很容易傳播 事實和虛構故事和謬誤。 但是這改變可以是雙向的。 同樣,今時也是比往時 更容易傳播事實真相。 但我不認為在根本上, 有什麼嶄新的變化, 在傳播幻想和謊言方面。 我猜想沒有什麼是納粹宣傳長 約瑟夫·戈培爾不知情的, 關於這假新聞和後真相時代的問題。 他說過一名句: 「如果你不斷重複一個謊言, 人人就會信它是真的, 而越大的謊言,越是可信, 因為人們絕對不敢相信, 這麼大的事情竟然是個謊言。」 我相信假新聞, 已陪伴著人類幾千年了。 聖經就是一個。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
CA: But there is a concern that the fake news is associated with tyrannical regimes, and when you see an uprise in fake news that is a canary in the coal mine that there may be dark times coming.
克:但這裡有個疑慮, 就是當假新聞是從獨裁政府出來的, 而當你也看到假新聞上升時, 大家都會知道黑暗可能會來臨了。
YNH: Yeah. I mean, the intentional use of fake news is a disturbing sign. But I'm not saying that it's not bad, I'm just saying that it's not new.
尤:對,我也知道,故意散佈 假新聞是個令人不安的跡象。 不過我不是說這是對的, 我是說這不是現今才有的。
CA: There's a lot of interest on Facebook on this question about global governance versus nationalism. Question here from Phil Dennis: "How do we get people, governments, to relinquish power? Is that -- is that -- actually, the text is so big I can't read the full question. But is that a necessity? Is it going to take war to get there? Sorry Phil -- I mangled your question, but I blame the text right here.
克:在臉書聽眾中有 很多有興趣知道關於 環球管理和國家主義這議題。 這是菲爾·丹尼思的問題: 「我們怎能使人民, 政權放棄權力呢?」 這——這那字體非常大啊。 我看不清整條問題。 「這是否不可避免, 真的要以戰爭來達到目標嗎?」 對不起菲爾,我搞錯您的問題, 不過我卸責於這文檔。
YNH: One option that some people talk about is that only a catastrophe can shake humankind and open the path to a real system of global governance, and they say that we can't do it before the catastrophe, but we need to start laying the foundations so that when the disaster strikes, we can react quickly. But people will just not have the motivation to do such a thing before the disaster strikes. Another thing that I would emphasize is that anybody who is really interested in global governance should always make it very, very clear that it doesn't replace or abolish local identities and communities, that it should come both as -- It should be part of a single package.
尤:有一些人在討論一個可能性, 就是只有浩劫能警醒人類, 才能開展一條全球治理系統之道路。 他們說我們絕不能在浩劫前做到, 但我們要開始打下基礎, 以便浩劫來臨時, 我們能很快回應; 可是人民不會有動力做這些, 在浩劫發生之前。 另外一件事我必要強調的, 就是任何真正對 全球治理有興趣的人, 必要使人人都時時清楚知道, 原有的本地身份和社區團體, 是不會被取代或廢除的。 全球治理應該要融匯兩者, 要全部納為同一整體方案。
CA: I want to hear more on this, because the very words "global governance" are almost the epitome of evil in the mindset of a lot of people on the alt-right right now. It just seems scary, remote, distant, and it has let them down, and so globalists, global governance -- no, go away! And many view the election as the ultimate poke in the eye to anyone who believes in that. So how do we change the narrative so that it doesn't seem so scary and remote? Build more on this idea of it being compatible with local identity, local communities.
克:我想多聽些這方面的, 因為「全球治理」這個字眼本身, 在很多人腦海中,差不多 是意味著邪惡的頂峰, 尤其在另類右派之眼中: 它讓人覺得可怕、冷漠、遙遠; 因為曾經讓他們失望過, 所以對全球治理主義者, 或全球治理──不要,走開! 同時很多人對這次選舉結果, 視之為對全球治理主義者 終極之打擊。 但是,我們該如何改變我們的訴求, 使它不那麼可怕與冷漠呢? 可否在概念上更多的演繹, 全球治理主義為何能兼容 本地身份和社區團體等。
YNH: Well, I think again we should start really with the biological realities of Homo sapiens. And biology tells us two things about Homo sapiens which are very relevant to this issue: first of all, that we are completely dependent on the ecological system around us, and that today we are talking about a global system. You cannot escape that.
尤:我想,我們還是需要 確實的回到 我們人類的生理實況。 生物學告訴我們關於人類的兩點, 對這論點有很大關連的: 第一點,人類完全依賴 我們身邊的生態環境系統, 依時下說來,我們談的 是一個全球系統, 你不可逃避這一點。
And at the same time, biology tells us about Homo sapiens that we are social animals, but that we are social on a very, very local level. It's just a simple fact of humanity that we cannot have intimate familiarity with more than about 150 individuals. The size of the natural group, the natural community of Homo sapiens, is not more than 150 individuals, and everything beyond that is really based on all kinds of imaginary stories and large-scale institutions, and I think that we can find a way, again, based on a biological understanding of our species, to weave the two together and to understand that today in the 21st century, we need both the global level and the local community.
同時,生物學也告訴我們, 人類是一種社會動物。 但我們社交建立在一個 非常、非常地方性的層面; 這是一個易見的人類實況, 我們能建立親近關係之人數 也多不多 150 個人。 這是一個自然的團體人數, 一個自然聚集之社區 應不會超過150 人。 任何大於這個數字的人際網絡, 都是建立在各類虛構故事 和大型組織裡。 我想我們是能夠找出一條路, 當然,這是要建立在對人類 生理學上之了解, 把這兩點融貫一起, 和清楚了解在 21 世紀的今天, 我們同時需要全球性和社區性。
And I would go even further than that and say that it starts with the body itself. The feelings that people today have of alienation and loneliness and not finding their place in the world, I would think that the chief problem is not global capitalism. The chief problem is that over the last hundred years, people have been becoming disembodied, have been distancing themselves from their body. As a hunter-gatherer or even as a peasant, to survive, you need to be constantly in touch with your body and with your senses, every moment. If you go to the forest to look for mushrooms and you don't pay attention to what you hear, to what you smell, to what you taste, you're dead. So you must be very connected.
還有,我會更深一層地詮釋, 說我們要從身體開始: 人類今天有疏離感和孤獨感, 和不能在世界找到自己的定位, 據我的看法這主要原因 不是在於全球資本主義。 主要問題是在於近一百年來, 人類日漸蒙受到心身隔離, 開始與自己的身體疏遠, 一個狩獵採集者, 或就算一位農民而言, 要能活下去,你必須經常與 自己的身體和感官聯繫, 每一個時刻都要。 如果你走進森林去尋找蕈類, 但你不留心你所聽到的, 所嗅到的,嚐到的, 那你就沒命了。 所以你必需身心合一。
In the last hundred years, people are losing their ability to be in touch with their body and their senses, to hear, to smell, to feel. More and more attention goes to screens, to what is happening elsewhere, some other time. This, I think, is the deep reason for the feelings of alienation and loneliness and so forth, and therefore part of the solution is not to bring back some mass nationalism, but also reconnect with our own bodies, and if you are back in touch with your body, you will feel much more at home in the world also.
但在近一百年來, 人類已漸漸失去了這能力, 與自己身體和感官合一, 去聽,去嗅,去觸覺; 越來越多的精神是費在看螢幕, 在其它地方發生的事物, 在其它的時代。 我相信這個就是一個深層理由, 人類有疏離感和孤單感等等。 所以解決問題一部份方法, 並不在復興國家主義, 而是要身心合一, 如果你能身心合一, 你自然會在世界中有自在安全感。
CA: Well, depending on how things go, we may all be back in the forest soon. We're going to have one more question in the room and one more on Facebook.
克:是的,看世局如何走, 我們亦可以很快的回到森林。 我們將接受現場最後一個問題, 和一個臉書的問題。
Ama Adi-Dako: Hello. I'm from Ghana, West Africa, and my question is: I'm wondering how do you present and justify the idea of global governance to countries that have been historically disenfranchised by the effects of globalization, and also, if we're talking about global governance, it sounds to me like it will definitely come from a very Westernized idea of what the "global" is supposed to look like. So how do we present and justify that idea of global versus wholly nationalist to people in countries like Ghana and Nigeria and Togo and other countries like that?
阿馬:你好,我來自 西非加納,我的問題是: 我想知道你會怎樣推行 和辯解全球治理, 面對著那些歷來 都是被剝奪權力的國家, 而其原因正是全球化引發的。 還有,當我們談到全球治理, 我看來這個概念必定是從一個 極西方國家角度 對「全球」來定義的, 所以我們如何說明和比較 這個全球概念 與國家主義, 對加納,奈及利亞和多哥的人民, 以及類似的國家呢?
YNH: I would start by saying that history is extremely unfair, and that we should realize that. Many of the countries that suffered most from the last 200 years of globalization and imperialism and industrialization are exactly the countries which are also most likely to suffer most from the next wave. And we should be very, very clear about that. If we don't have a global governance, and if we suffer from climate change, from technological disruptions, the worst suffering will not be in the US. The worst suffering will be in Ghana, will be in Sudan, will be in Syria, will be in Bangladesh, will be in those places.
尤:首先我會說歷史非常不公平, 那是我們需要了解的, 很多受傷害最大的國家, 在過往 200 年的全球化發展下, 和大英帝國主義和工業革命下, 將會再次受到最大的傷害, 在下一個浪頭來臨時。 我們必須非常、非常明確的指出, 如果我們沒有建立全球治理, 當我們受到氣候變遷災害, 或科技衝擊時, 最苦的不會是在美國, 最苦的會發生在加納, 在蘇丹,在敘利亞, 在孟加拉國,在這些地方。
So I think those countries have an even greater incentive to do something about the next wave of disruption, whether it's ecological or whether it's technological. Again, if you think about technological disruption, so if AI and 3D printers and robots will take the jobs from billions of people, I worry far less about the Swedes than about the people in Ghana or in Bangladesh. And therefore, because history is so unfair and the results of a calamity will not be shared equally between everybody, as usual, the rich will be able to get away from the worst consequences of climate change in a way that the poor will not be able to.
所以,我相信這些國家 應該更受激勵, 去做些準備來面對下一波的衝擊, 不管是生態環境方面, 或是在科學技術方面。 再重覆,如果你考慮到 科技上的衝擊, 如果說人工智慧,3D 列印和機械人, 會奪去數以億計的工作, 我比較不擔心瑞典人民, 而比較擔心在加納, 或在孟加拉國的人民。 因此,因為歷史曾是那麼不公平, 而浩劫的後果, 將不會平均分攤到每個人。 而且照慣例,這些富裕的人能逃避 氣候變遷帶來的最嚴重災害, 但相對貧窮的人就不能夠了。
CA: And here's a great question from Cameron Taylor on Facebook: "At the end of 'Sapiens,'" you said we should be asking the question, 'What do we want to want?' Well, what do you think we should want to want?"
克:臉書聽眾泰勒有個很好的問題: 「在《人類大歷史》的結尾, 你說我們應該問: 『我們想要要什麼呢?』 請問你認為我們應該 想要要什麼呢?」
YNH: I think we should want to want to know the truth, to understand reality. Mostly what we want is to change reality, to fit it to our own desires, to our own wishes, and I think we should first want to understand it. If you look at the long-term trajectory of history, what you see is that for thousands of years we humans have been gaining control of the world outside us and trying to shape it to fit our own desires. And we've gained control of the other animals, of the rivers, of the forests, and reshaped them completely, causing an ecological destruction without making ourselves satisfied.
尤:我認為我們應該是想要 想知道真相, 想明白現實真相。 一般來說,我們想要的 只是去改變現實, 來迎合我們自己的慾望, 迎合我們的需求, 我想我們該先去了解這些。 如果你以長期角度來覽觀歷史, 你看到幾千年來, 我們人類能不斷掌控 我們外在的世界, 而且試圖改造它來滿足我們的欲望; 同時我們也控制了其它的動物, 控制河流,控制森林, 而且更截然的把它們改頭換面, 引發出生態環境的破壞, 但卻不能滿足我們。
So the next step is we turn our gaze inwards, and we say OK, getting control of the world outside us did not really make us satisfied. Let's now try to gain control of the world inside us. This is the really big project of science and technology and industry in the 21st century -- to try and gain control of the world inside us, to learn how to engineer and produce bodies and brains and minds. These are likely to be the main products of the 21st century economy. When people think about the future, very often they think in terms, "Oh, I want to gain control of my body and of my brain." And I think that's very dangerous.
所以下一步, 就是要把我們目光向內廻轉, 而且告訴自己: 好,控制了外面世界 不能真的滿足我們。 我們現在該嘗試降服內在的世界。 這是一個真正大的項目, 一個在 21 世紀的科學和科技 和工業的項目── 試圖把我們內心世界馴服, 研究如何去建造和生產 身體和大腦和思想。 這些很可能就是 21 世紀 主要經濟產物。 當人想到未來,很多時候會這樣想: 「啊!我想要能夠控制 我的身體和我的大腦。」 但我想這會是非常危險的。
If we've learned anything from our previous history, it's that yes, we gain the power to manipulate, but because we didn't really understand the complexity of the ecological system, we are now facing an ecological meltdown. And if we now try to reengineer the world inside us without really understanding it, especially without understanding the complexity of our mental system, we might cause a kind of internal ecological disaster, and we'll face a kind of mental meltdown inside us.
如果我們有從過去 歷史中學到一點教訓, 就是,沒錯,我們是有了操控力, 但是因為我們並不確實了解 我們生態系統的複雜性, 所以我們今天正要面對 生態環境的崩潰。 同樣如果我們現在就想操控 我們內心世界, 在沒有真的了解的情況下, 尤其是沒能真正了解 我們思想系統之複雜性之前, 我們有可能會造成 類似內在的生態崩潰, 結果就是我們未來將要面對 一種思想系統的崩潰。
CA: Putting all the pieces together here -- the current politics, the coming technology, concerns like the one you've just outlined -- I mean, it seems like you yourself are in quite a bleak place when you think about the future. You're pretty worried about it. Is that right? And if there was one cause for hope, how would you state that?
克:我把所談的做個結論── 現今政治,未來的科技, 你剛才提出需要關注的事項── 我的直覺,好像你本人不太樂觀。 當你想到未來的時候, 你好像很擔心的, 是不是? 但是如果個中真有一線希望,
YNH: I focus on the most dangerous possibilities
你說是什麼?
partly because this is like my job or responsibility as a historian or social critic. I mean, the industry focuses mainly on the positive sides, so it's the job of historians and philosophers and sociologists to highlight the more dangerous potential of all these new technologies. I don't think any of that is inevitable. Technology is never deterministic. You can use the same technology to create very different kinds of societies.
尤:我專注在最危險的可能性, 一部分是因為這是我的工作或責任, 身為一個歷史學家或社會評論人。 我是說,工業界只會談正面的, 所以歷史學家、 哲學家和社會學家的責任, 是把這些新科技的潛在危險提出來。 我所談的沒有一項是必定要發生的, 科技本身並無既定性, 你可以用同一樣的科技, 來營造很不一樣的社會。
If you look at the 20th century, so, the technologies of the Industrial Revolution, the trains and electricity and all that could be used to create a communist dictatorship or a fascist regime or a liberal democracy. The trains did not tell you what to do with them. Similarly, now, artificial intelligence and bioengineering and all of that -- they don't predetermine a single outcome. Humanity can rise up to the challenge, and the best example we have of humanity rising up to the challenge of a new technology is nuclear weapons. In the late 1940s, '50s, many people were convinced that sooner or later the Cold War will end in a nuclear catastrophe, destroying human civilization. And this did not happen. In fact, nuclear weapons prompted humans all over the world to change the way that they manage international politics to reduce violence.
如果你看 20 世紀, 工業革命的科技發明, 火車、電力和其它一切, 可用來創造一個共產獨裁主義, 或一個法西斯政權, 或一個自由民主政黨。 火車沒有叫你用它來做什麼。 同樣的,今天的人工智慧, 生物工程和一切其它的── 它們不會預定任何一個結果。 人類可以面對挑戰。 而我們最好的例子, 人類能戰勝科技帶來的挑戰 就是核武器。 在 1940 年代後期,1950 年代, 很多人都相信 冷戰遲早會引發一場核武大災難, 毀滅全人類文明。 這沒有發生。 反過來,核武驅使世界各地民族 改變了手法去協調國際政治問題, 為了去減低暴力發生。
And many countries basically took out war from their political toolkit. They no longer tried to pursue their interests with warfare. Not all countries have done so, but many countries have. And this is maybe the most important reason why international violence declined dramatically since 1945, and today, as I said, more people commit suicide than are killed in war. So this, I think, gives us a good example that even the most frightening technology, humans can rise up to the challenge and actually some good can come out of it. The problem is, we have very little margin for error. If we don't get it right, we might not have a second option to try again.
更有很多國家基本上已把戰爭 從他們的政治工具包中拿掉了。 這些國家已選擇不用戰爭手段 來追求它們的利益。 不是全部國家, 但是很多已經是這樣了; 這可能就是最主要原因, 為什麼國際暴力 從 1945 年來急劇降低了。 在今天,我早前也說過, 自殺的人之數字 多於在戰爭死亡的。 所以我想這是個好的例子, 就算面對著使人最駭怕的科技, 人類也是能戰勝的, 而且最終也能在其中挖出些寶。 難題是,我們只有 極微小的誤差餘地, 如果我們出了錯, 我們可能再沒有第二次機會了。
CA: That's a very powerful note, on which I think we should draw this to a conclusion. Before I wrap up, I just want to say one thing to people here and to the global TED community watching online, anyone watching online: help us with these dialogues. If you believe, like we do, that we need to find a different kind of conversation, now more than ever, help us do it. Reach out to other people, try and have conversations with people you disagree with, understand them, pull the pieces together, and help us figure out how to take these conversations forward so we can make a real contribution to what's happening in the world right now.
克:這是很震撼的呼籲, 我想我們也在這裡結束。 在結束前,我想對在場聽眾 和全球的 TED 社團, 及網上的觀眾說: 支持這系列的 TED Dialogues。 如果你相信,像我們一樣的相信, 我們需要尋找另類的交談, 此時此刻比過往更迫切, 請協助我們完成這事。 向其他人伸出手, 嘗試跟你意見不同的人對話, 了解他們, 綜合多方意見, 幫助我們找出最好的方法 去推展這論壇, 使我們能對今天正在世界 發生的一切做出真實的貢獻。
I think everyone feels more alive, more concerned, more engaged with the politics of the moment. The stakes do seem quite high, so help us respond to it in a wise, wise way.
我相信每個人能活得更真實, 更誠懇,更有參與感, 對當今這些政治議題。 這次成敗之差異是非常大的, 所以幫助我們以 非常智慧來回應這些。
Yuval Harari, thank you.
尤瓦爾 · 哈拉瑞先生,謝謝。
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