Chris Anderson: Hello. Welcome to this TED Dialogues. It's the first of a series that's going to be done in response to the current political upheaval. I don't know about you; I've become quite concerned about the growing divisiveness in this country and in the world. No one's listening to each other. Right? They aren't. I mean, it feels like we need a different kind of conversation, one that's based on -- I don't know, on reason, listening, on understanding, on a broader context.
克里斯·安德森: 你好,欢迎来到TED对话。 这是新开始的一个系列的第一集, 为了回应现在政治的变动。 我不了解你, 我开始对这个国家和世界上 逐渐严重的分裂感到担心。 没人倾听对方,对吗? 不。 感觉我们需要一个不同的对话方式, 一个基于逻辑、倾听和理解, 基于一个更大的背景。
That's at least what we're going to try in these TED Dialogues, starting today. And we couldn't have anyone with us who I'd be more excited to kick this off. This is a mind right here that thinks pretty much like no one else on the planet, I would hasten to say. I'm serious.
这是我们在TED对话中要尝试的, 从今天开始。 我们找不到其他人开始 能让我更为此激动。 这个头脑是这个星球上独一无二的, 我不得不说。 我是认真的。
(Yuval Noah Harari laughs) I'm serious. He synthesizes history with underlying ideas in a way that kind of takes your breath away.
(尤瓦尔·赫拉利笑笑) 我是认真的。 他把历史和和潜在的意义结合在一起, 让你大开眼界。
So, some of you will know this book, "Sapiens." Has anyone here read "Sapiens"?
所以,你们可能会 知道这本书“人类简史”。 在场有人读过“人类简史”吗?
(Applause) I mean, I could not put it down. The way that he tells the story of mankind through big ideas that really make you think differently -- it's kind of amazing. And here's the follow-up, which I think is being published in the US next week.
(鼓掌) 我无法合上这本书。 他讲述人类故事的方式, 通过宏观意识形态让你换个角度思考, 真的令人赞叹。 这是接下来的一本, 我记得是下周在美国出版。
YNH: Yeah, next week.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:对的,下周。
CA: "Homo Deus." Now, this is the history of the next hundred years. I've had a chance to read it. It's extremely dramatic, and I daresay, for some people, quite alarming. It's a must-read. And honestly, we couldn't have someone better to help make sense of what on Earth is happening in the world right now. So a warm welcome, please, to Yuval Noah Harari.
克里斯·安德森:《未来简史》 这是未来百年的历史。 我有机会阅读了这本书, 非常激动人心, 而且我敢说,对一些人,这非常令人振奋。 这是一本必读书。 诚实地说,我们找不到更好的能够帮助理解 现在世界上正在发生什么的人。 所以热烈欢迎,尤瓦尔·诺亚·赫拉利。
(Applause)
(鼓掌)
It's great to be joined by our friends on Facebook and around the Web. Hello, Facebook. And all of you, as I start asking questions of Yuval, come up with your own questions, and not necessarily about the political scandal du jour, but about the broader understanding of: Where are we heading? You ready? OK, we're going to go.
很高兴能有Facebook和 网络上的朋友们加入我们。 你好,Facebook。 在我开始问尤瓦尔问题的时候, 你们可以提出自己的问题, 不一定要关于现代政治, 可以关于更广的对 “我们去向何方?”的理解。 准备好了吗?我们开始吧。
So here we are, Yuval: New York City, 2017, there's a new president in power, and shock waves rippling around the world. What on Earth is happening?
现在,尤瓦尔, 2017,纽约,新总统上台, 惊讶席卷全球。 到底在发生什么?
YNH: I think the basic thing that happened is that we have lost our story. Humans think in stories, and we try to make sense of the world by telling stories. And for the last few decades, we had a very simple and very attractive story about what's happening in the world. And the story said that, oh, what's happening is that the economy is being globalized, politics is being liberalized, and the combination of the two will create paradise on Earth, and we just need to keep on globalizing the economy and liberalizing the political system, and everything will be wonderful. And 2016 is the moment when a very large segment, even of the Western world, stopped believing in this story. For good or bad reasons -- it doesn't matter. People stopped believing in the story, and when you don't have a story, you don't understand what's happening.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:我认为基本发生的事情 就是我们失去了我们的故事。 人类在故事中思考, 我们通过讲故事来理解这个世界。 过去的几十年, 我们又一个非常简单和吸引人的故事, 关于世界上发生的事情。 故事说的是 经济正在被全球化, 政治在被自由化, 然而两者的结合会在地球上产生矛盾, 我们只需要继续全球化经济, 自由化政治系统, 一切都会变的很好。 2016年, 很大一部分的人,甚至是西方世界, 不再相信这个故事。 不管理由的好坏。 人们不再相信这个故事, 然而当你没有一个故事, 你就不会理解正在发生什么。
CA: Part of you believes that that story was actually a very effective story. It worked.
克里斯·安德森: 你部分相信那是一个非常有效的故事。 它起作用了。
YNH: To some extent, yes. According to some measurements, we are now in the best time ever for humankind. Today, for the first time in history, more people die from eating too much than from eating too little, which is an amazing achievement.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:某种角度说,是的。 根据一些预测, 我们正处在人类的巅峰时期。 今天,历史上第一次, 死于吃太多的人比死于吃太少的人要多, 这是很棒的成就。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Also for the first time in history, more people die from old age than from infectious diseases, and violence is also down. For the first time in history, more people commit suicide than are killed by crime and terrorism and war put together. Statistically, you are your own worst enemy. At least, of all the people in the world, you are most likely to be killed by yourself --
而且也是历史上第一次, 死于年老的人比死于传染病的人多, 而且暴力也减少了。 历史上第一次, 死于自杀的人比死于犯罪、恐怖袭击 和战争加在一起的人都要多。 数据上来看,你是你最大的敌人。 世界上的所有人, 你最可能被你自己杀死。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
which is, again, very good news, compared --
这是非常好的消息,相比较……
(Laughter)
(笑声)
compared to the level of violence that we saw in previous eras.
相比较我们在前几个时代所看到的暴力。
CA: But this process of connecting the world ended up with a large group of people kind of feeling left out, and they've reacted. And so we have this bombshell that's sort of ripping through the whole system. I mean, what do you make of what's happened? It feels like the old way that people thought of politics, the left-right divide, has been blown up and replaced. How should we think of this?
克里斯·安德森: 但是这个连接世界的过程, 结果排斥了一大群的人, 而且他们也做出了反应。 所以这个令人震惊的事情 似乎摧毁了整个系统。 你觉得正在发生什么? 感觉像人们看待政治的旧观念, 左右翼分明,被打消并取代。 我们该如何看待这个?
YNH: Yeah, the old 20th-century political model of left versus right is now largely irrelevant, and the real divide today is between global and national, global or local. And you see it again all over the world that this is now the main struggle. We probably need completely new political models and completely new ways of thinking about politics. In essence, what you can say is that we now have global ecology, we have a global economy but we have national politics, and this doesn't work together. This makes the political system ineffective, because it has no control over the forces that shape our life. And you have basically two solutions to this imbalance: either de-globalize the economy and turn it back into a national economy, or globalize the political system.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:是的, 旧的20世纪政治模型, 左翼右翼对抗已经无关紧要, 真正的隔阂是全球和国家之间的, 国家或者地方。 你会在世界各地看到, 这是主要的斗争。 我们可能需要一个全新的政治模型, 和全新的看待政治的方式。 重点是, 我们可以说现在我们有全球生态学, 我么有全球经济, 但是我们有国家政治, 这没办法一起运作。 这让政治系统没有效果, 因为它控制不了我们的生活。 你对这种不均衡有两个解决方案: 一是反全球化经济,回归国家经济, 或者全球化政治系统。
CA: So some, I guess many liberals out there view Trump and his government as kind of irredeemably bad, just awful in every way. Do you see any underlying narrative or political philosophy in there that is at least worth understanding? How would you articulate that philosophy? Is it just the philosophy of nationalism?
克里斯·安德森:我猜很多自由主义者 认为特朗普和他的政府 是无法挽救的恶劣, 在所有方面都是糟糕的。 你能看到任何值得参考的 潜在线索或者政治哲学吗? 你会如何阐述那个哲理? 只是国家主义的哲理吗?
YNH: I think the underlying feeling or idea is that the political system -- something is broken there. It doesn't empower the ordinary person anymore. It doesn't care so much about the ordinary person anymore, and I think this diagnosis of the political disease is correct. With regard to the answers, I am far less certain.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我认为潜在的感觉和观点 是政治系统内的一些东西垮掉了。 它不再给普通人权利了。 它不再那么关注普通人, 我认为这个对政治 存在问题的诊断是正确的。 但是对于答案,我并不确定。
I think what we are seeing is the immediate human reaction: if something doesn't work, let's go back. And you see it all over the world, that people, almost nobody in the political system today, has any future-oriented vision of where humankind is going. Almost everywhere, you see retrograde vision: "Let's make America great again," like it was great -- I don't know -- in the '50s, in the '80s, sometime, let's go back there. And you go to Russia a hundred years after Lenin, Putin's vision for the future is basically, ah, let's go back to the Tsarist empire. And in Israel, where I come from, the hottest political vision of the present is: "Let's build the temple again." So let's go back 2,000 years backwards. So people are thinking sometime in the past we've lost it, and sometimes in the past, it's like you've lost your way in the city, and you say OK, let's go back to the point where I felt secure and start again. I don't think this can work, but a lot of people, this is their gut instinct.
我认为我们正在 经历的是人类立刻的反应: 如果一些事情不再运作, 让我们回到过去。 你能在全世界看到这个现象, 在现代政治系统里几乎没有人 有任何人类未来发展的远见。 几乎世界各地,你会看到倒退的观念: “让美国再次伟大。” 像50年代、80年代的强大一样, 让我们回到过去。 在俄罗斯,列宁时代几百年后, 普京对未来的远景 基本上是让我们回到沙皇俄国。 在以色列,我来自以色列, 现在最热门的政治远景就是 “让我们重建寺庙。” 所以让我们倒退2000年。 所以人们认为在过去的某个时间, 我们失败了, 就像在过去的某个时间, 你在城市里迷了路, 你说:好,让我们 回到我们感觉安全的时候, 然后重新开始。 我不觉得这会有效果, 但是对于很多人,这是他们的直觉。
CA: But why couldn't it work? "America First" is a very appealing slogan in many ways. Patriotism is, in many ways, a very noble thing. It's played a role in promoting cooperation among large numbers of people. Why couldn't you have a world organized in countries, all of which put themselves first?
克里斯·安德森: 这为什么不会有效果? “美国优先”是一个非常吸引人的标语。 爱国主义是一个很高尚的事情。 在大群人中促进合作 很有效果。 为什么世界所有的国家都不能 把自己放在第一位?
YNH: For many centuries, even thousands of years, patriotism worked quite well. Of course, it led to wars an so forth, but we shouldn't focus too much on the bad. There are also many, many positive things about patriotism, and the ability to have a large number of people care about each other, sympathize with one another, and come together for collective action. If you go back to the first nations, so, thousands of years ago, the people who lived along the Yellow River in China -- it was many, many different tribes and they all depended on the river for survival and for prosperity, but all of them also suffered from periodical floods and periodical droughts. And no tribe could really do anything about it, because each of them controlled just a tiny section of the river.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 很多个世纪,甚至几千年, 爱国主义挺有效果的。 当然,它会带来战争等等, 但是我们不能过度关注不好的事情。 爱国主义有非常多好处, 还有能力让一大群人 关心对方, 同情他人, 并团结合作。 如果你回到第一民族的时候, 就是几千年前, 在中国,住在黄河边的人们 分成许多部落, 他们都依靠黄河来生存和繁荣, 但是他们也遭受周期性的洪水 和周期性的干旱。 没有部落可以做出一些改变, 因为每个部落只控制河的一小部分。
And then in a long and complicated process, the tribes coalesced together to form the Chinese nation, which controlled the entire Yellow River and had the ability to bring hundreds of thousands of people together to build dams and canals and regulate the river and prevent the worst floods and droughts and raise the level of prosperity for everybody. And this worked in many places around the world.
然后,通过长时间复杂的发展, 这些部落合并在一起, 形成了中华民族, 掌控了整条黄河, 并有能力团结上万人, 修建水坝和水渠来管理黄河, 预防洪水和干旱 并使整个国家繁荣。 这在世界的很多地方都有效果。
But in the 21st century, technology is changing all that in a fundamental way. We are now living -- all people in the world -- are living alongside the same cyber river, and no single nation can regulate this river by itself. We are all living together on a single planet, which is threatened by our own actions. And if you don't have some kind of global cooperation, nationalism is just not on the right level to tackle the problems, whether it's climate change or whether it's technological disruption.
但是在21世纪, 科技从根源上改变了一切, 世界上的所有人, 都住在“网络”这条河边, 没有一个国家能够单独管理这条河。 我们都住在一个星球, 被我们自己的行动威胁的星球。 如果你没有某种形式的全球合作, 国家主义不是解决这些问题的正确范畴, 不管是气候变化还是科技发展。
CA: So it was a beautiful idea in a world where most of the action, most of the issues, took place on national scale, but your argument is that the issues that matter most today no longer take place on a national scale but on a global scale.
克里斯·安德森:所以如果世界上 大多数的问题和解决方案 都是国家层面的话, 并不会产生问题, 但是你认为当今最重要的问题 不再是国家层面了,而是世界层面。
YNH: Exactly. All the major problems of the world today are global in essence, and they cannot be solved unless through some kind of global cooperation. It's not just climate change, which is, like, the most obvious example people give. I think more in terms of technological disruption. If you think about, for example, artificial intelligence, over the next 20, 30 years pushing hundreds of millions of people out of the job market -- this is a problem on a global level. It will disrupt the economy of all the countries.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 没有错,现在世界的主要问题 都是世界范围的, 除非通过某种全球合作, 它们无法被解决。 不仅仅气候变化, 气候变化是最显而易见的例子。 我认为还有科技发展带来的变化。 想想看,比如说,人工智能, 20、30年后, 使上亿人失去工作, 这是一个全球层面的问题。 这会搅乱所有国家的经济。
And similarly, if you think about, say, bioengineering and people being afraid of conducting, I don't know, genetic engineering research in humans, it won't help if just a single country, let's say the US, outlaws all genetic experiments in humans, but China or North Korea continues to do it. So the US cannot solve it by itself, and very quickly, the pressure on the US to do the same will be immense because we are talking about high-risk, high-gain technologies. If somebody else is doing it, I can't allow myself to remain behind. The only way to have regulations, effective regulations, on things like genetic engineering, is to have global regulations. If you just have national regulations, nobody would like to stay behind.
一样的道理,像生物工程, 人们害怕研究 比如,人体基因实验, 如果只有一国家并不会有很大起效, 比如说美国禁止所有人体基因实验, 但是中国或朝鲜却继续进行。 所以美国无法独自解决这个问题, 很快,美国也会逐渐动摇, 因为这是高风险高回报的科技。 如果其他人在做,我不能落后。 唯一有效管理 像基因工程这类问题的方法, 就是有全球规定。 如果你只有国家规定, 没人会愿意落后。
CA: So this is really interesting. It seems to me that this may be one key to provoking at least a constructive conversation between the different sides here, because I think everyone can agree that the start point of a lot of the anger that's propelled us to where we are is because of the legitimate concerns about job loss. Work is gone, a traditional way of life has gone, and it's no wonder that people are furious about that. And in general, they have blamed globalism, global elites, for doing this to them without asking their permission, and that seems like a legitimate complaint.
克里斯·安德森:这很有意思。 在我看来这可能是促进 双方有建设性对话的要点, 因为我认为每个人都会同意 是开始的不满让我们沦落到这个地步, 这个不满就是对失业的担忧。 没有工作,也会失去正常的生活, 所以人们对此不满并不奇怪。 所以他们责怪全球主义、 世界上的社会高层, 在没有他们允许的情况下做出这样的决定, 这看起来是个很合理的抱怨。
But what I hear you saying is that -- so a key question is: What is the real cause of job loss, both now and going forward? To the extent that it's about globalism, then the right response, yes, is to shut down borders and keep people out and change trade agreements and so forth. But you're saying, I think, that actually the bigger cause of job loss is not going to be that at all. It's going to originate in technological questions, and we have no chance of solving that unless we operate as a connected world.
但是你的意思,重要的问题的是 现在和未来的工作岗位 流失的真正原因是什么? 一部分是全球主义, 然而没错,正确的反应是关闭边界, 不让人进入并改变贸易协定等等。 但是我觉得你的意思是, 事实上工作岗位流失 最大的原因并不是这个。 这是和科技发展有关, 而我们无法解决问题, 除非我们全球化。
YNH: Yeah, I think that, I don't know about the present, but looking to the future, it's not the Mexicans or Chinese who will take the jobs from the people in Pennsylvania, it's the robots and algorithms. So unless you plan to build a big wall on the border of California --
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:我认为, 我并不知道现在,但是放眼未来, 并不是墨西哥人或者中国人抢走 宾夕法尼亚民众的工作岗位, 是机器人和计算机算法。 所以除非你计划在 加利福尼亚州边境修建一堵墙,
(Laughter)
(笑声)
the wall on the border with Mexico is going to be very ineffective. And I was struck when I watched the debates before the election, I was struck that certainly Trump did not even attempt to frighten people by saying the robots will take your jobs. Now even if it's not true, it doesn't matter. It could have been an extremely effective way of frightening people --
墨西哥州边境的墙不会有什么效果的。 我看大选前辩论时,我总是很震惊, 我很惊讶特朗普根本没有想通过说 “机器人会抢走你们的工作” 来震慑民众。 即使这不是真的,也没有关系, 这可以是一个非常有效的 震慑并激励民众的方式。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
and galvanizing people: "The robots will take your jobs!" And nobody used that line. And it made me afraid, because it meant that no matter what happens in universities and laboratories, and there, there is already an intense debate about it, but in the mainstream political system and among the general public, people are just unaware that there could be an immense technological disruption -- not in 200 years, but in 10, 20, 30 years -- and we have to do something about it now, partly because most of what we teach children today in school or in college is going to be completely irrelevant to the job market of 2040, 2050. So it's not something we'll need to think about in 2040. We need to think today what to teach the young people.
“机器人会抢走你们的工作!” 没人用这句话。 这让我担心, 因为尽管这意味着在大学和实验室里, 对此已经有激烈的讨论, 但是主流政治和公众, 人们并没有意识到 会有很大的技术变动, 不在未来200年, 而是10、20、30年, 而我们现在就需要做一些事情, 因为现在我们在学校和大学里教给孩子的, 都会在2040、2050的工作市场上毫无作用。 所以我们不应该在2040才思考这个问题, 我们要在现在思考该教给年轻人什么。
CA: Yeah, no, absolutely. You've often written about moments in history where humankind has ... entered a new era, unintentionally. Decisions have been made, technologies have been developed, and suddenly the world has changed, possibly in a way that's worse for everyone. So one of the examples you give in "Sapiens" is just the whole agricultural revolution, which, for an actual person tilling the fields, they just picked up a 12-hour backbreaking workday instead of six hours in the jungle and a much more interesting lifestyle.
克里斯·安德森:没有错。 你写过历史上人类几次无意地 进入一个新的时代。 我们需要做出决定,研究科技, 然后突然之间,世界就会改变, 可能对所有人都没有好处。 《人类简史》中的一个例子, 整个农业革命, 用人力耕田, 人们每天艰苦地劳作12个小时, 而不是花6个小时在丛林里 享受一个更有意思的生活方式。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
So are we at another possible phase change here, where we kind of sleepwalk into a future that none of us actually wants?
所以有可能我们在另一个转变期间, 我们就梦游般进入一个 我们并不希望的未来吗?
YNH: Yes, very much so. During the agricultural revolution, what happened is that immense technological and economic revolution empowered the human collective, but when you look at actual individual lives, the life of a tiny elite became much better, and the lives of the majority of people became considerably worse. And this can happen again in the 21st century. No doubt the new technologies will empower the human collective. But we may end up again with a tiny elite reaping all the benefits, taking all the fruits, and the masses of the population finding themselves worse than they were before, certainly much worse than this tiny elite.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:是的,很有可能。 在农业革命期间, 科技和经济的巨变 增强了全人类的能力, 但是对于个体的生活, 社会高层的生活质量提高了许多, 但是大多数人的生活质量降低了。 然而这在21世纪也可能会发生。 新科技没有疑问会增强全人类的能力, 但是结果可能还会是 社会高层拿走全部利益,全部果实, 然而大多数人却比以前过的更差了, 而且一定比那些社会高层的要差很多。
CA: And those elites might not even be human elites. They might be cyborgs or --
克里斯·安德森: 而且那些社会高层可能不是人类。 他们可能是半机械人……
YNH: Yeah, they could be enhanced super humans. They could be cyborgs. They could be completely nonorganic elites. They could even be non-conscious algorithms. What we see now in the world is authority shifting away from humans to algorithms. More and more decisions -- about personal lives, about economic matters, about political matters -- are actually being taken by algorithms. If you ask the bank for a loan, chances are your fate is decided by an algorithm, not by a human being. And the general impression is that maybe Homo sapiens just lost it.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 没错,他们可能会是提高过的超人类。 他们可能会是半机械人。 他们可能会是完全人造。 他们甚至可以是无意识的计算机算法。 现在世界上的权利已经从人类 转移到计算机算法上了。 越来越多的决定有关个人生活, 有关经济,有关政治, 都在被算法取代。 如果你向银行申请贷款, 有可能你的命运是被 一个算法,而不是一个人类决定。 原因可能是人类能力不够,
The world is so complicated, there is so much data, things are changing so fast, that this thing that evolved on the African savanna tens of thousands of years ago -- to cope with a particular environment, a particular volume of information and data -- it just can't handle the realities of the 21st century, and the only thing that may be able to handle it is big-data algorithms. So no wonder more and more authority is shifting from us to the algorithms.
世界过于复杂,有太多的数据, 事情变化的太快, 这个几万年前在非洲草原上 进化的东西, 为了适应一个特定的环境, 一个特定容量的信息和数据, 它就是无法承受21世纪, 唯一可能能够承受的 就是大数据算法。 所以越来越多的权力 从我们转移到算法并不奇怪。
CA: So we're in New York City for the first of a series of TED Dialogues with Yuval Harari, and there's a Facebook Live audience out there. We're excited to have you with us. We'll start coming to some of your questions and questions of people in the room in just a few minutes, so have those coming.
克里斯·安德森:我们在纽约, 这是TED对话系列的第一集, 和尤瓦尔·赫拉利, 还有Facebook的直播。 我们很高兴你们的参与。 我们会开始提出一些你们的问题, 和现场观众的问题, 在几分钟之后, 所以做好准备。
Yuval, if you're going to make the argument that we need to get past nationalism because of the coming technological ... danger, in a way, presented by so much of what's happening we've got to have a global conversation about this. Trouble is, it's hard to get people really believing that, I don't know, AI really is an imminent threat, and so forth. The things that people, some people at least, care about much more immediately, perhaps, is climate change, perhaps other issues like refugees, nuclear weapons, and so forth. Would you argue that where we are right now that somehow those issues need to be dialed up? You've talked about climate change, but Trump has said he doesn't believe in that. So in a way, your most powerful argument, you can't actually use to make this case.
尤瓦尔,你认为 我们需要放弃国家主义, 因为科技即将带来的…… 危险,某种程度上, 根据发生的事情, 我们一定要有一个与此有关全球对话。 问题是,很难让人们相信这个, 人工智能是一个很大的威胁等等。 人们,至少一些人们 当今更关注的问题可能 是气候变化, 还有其他问题像难民,核武器等等。 你认为现在 那些问题需要被强调吗? 你谈过气候变化, 但是特朗普说过他不相信气候变化。 所以,你最有力的论证, 不能用来说服公众。
YNH: Yeah, I think with climate change, at first sight, it's quite surprising that there is a very close correlation between nationalism and climate change. I mean, almost always, the people who deny climate change are nationalists. And at first sight, you think: Why? What's the connection? Why don't you have socialists denying climate change? But then, when you think about it, it's obvious -- because nationalism has no solution to climate change. If you want to be a nationalist in the 21st century, you have to deny the problem. If you accept the reality of the problem, then you must accept that, yes, there is still room in the world for patriotism, there is still room in the world for having special loyalties and obligations towards your own people, towards your own country. I don't think anybody is really thinking of abolishing that.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 对的,我认为气候变化, 刚开始,国家主义和气候变化之间 的密切关系令人惊讶。 我的意思是,几乎所有 否定气候变化的人都是国家主义者。 刚开始,你想:为什么? 联系是什么? 为什么没有社会主义者否认气候变化? 但是,仔细思考后,其实很显然, 因为国家主义对气候变化没有解决方案。 如果你想在21世纪当一个国家主义, 你一定要否定问题。 如果你认清了事实, 你就会接受 爱国主义还能存活在世界上, 世界上还能有对你的人民和你的国家 的特别的忠诚和责任。 我不认为有人真的想放弃它。
But in order to confront climate change, we need additional loyalties and commitments to a level beyond the nation. And that should not be impossible, because people can have several layers of loyalty. You can be loyal to your family and to your community and to your nation, so why can't you also be loyal to humankind as a whole? Of course, there are occasions when it becomes difficult, what to put first, but, you know, life is difficult. Handle it.
但是面对气候变化, 我们需要更多的忠心和承诺 超出国家范围。 而且这不是不可能, 因为人们可以忠诚于多样事物。 你可以忠诚于家庭, 忠诚于社区, 忠诚于你的国家, 所以为什么你不能忠诚于全人类呢? 当然,有些境况下,事情变得困难, 哪个是首要的, 但是,生活并不简单, 想方法解决。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
CA: OK, so I would love to get some questions from the audience here. We've got a microphone here. Speak into it, and Facebook, get them coming, too.
克里斯·安德森: 好的,我想让现场观众提出一些问题。 我们有一些麦克风, Facebook也可以参加。
Howard Morgan: One of the things that has clearly made a huge difference in this country and other countries is the income distribution inequality, the dramatic change in income distribution in the US from what it was 50 years ago, and around the world. Is there anything we can do to affect that? Because that gets at a lot of the underlying causes.
霍华德·摩根:这个国家和其他国家 巨大的区别, 是收入分配的不平等, 从50年前到现在, 美国收入分配巨大的改变, 在世界范围内。 我们可以做什么来改变它的吗? 因为这和潜在原因有很多联系。
YNH: So far I haven't heard a very good idea about what to do about it, again, partly because most ideas remain on the national level, and the problem is global. I mean, one idea that we hear quite a lot about now is universal basic income. But this is a problem. I mean, I think it's a good start, but it's a problematic idea because it's not clear what "universal" is and it's not clear what "basic" is. Most people when they speak about universal basic income, they actually mean national basic income. But the problem is global.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:至今我还没有 听说过一个很好的解决方案, 部分因为大多数的想法 都是在国家层面的, 但是问题是全球范围的。 一个当今比较常见的主意是 无条件基本收入。 但它是有一个问题, 虽然这是一个好的开始, 但是它之所以有问题, 是因为“无条件”的概念 和“基本”的概念不清晰, 大多数人谈论无条件基本收入时, 他们事实上说的是国家基本收入。 但是问题是全球范围的。
Let's say that you have AI and 3D printers taking away millions of jobs in Bangladesh, from all the people who make my shirts and my shoes. So what's going to happen? The US government will levy taxes on Google and Apple in California, and use that to pay basic income to unemployed Bangladeshis? If you believe that, you can just as well believe that Santa Claus will come and solve the problem. So unless we have really universal and not national basic income, the deep problems are not going to go away.
比如人工智能和3D打印机在孟加拉国 抢走上百万份工作, 从生产我的衬衫和鞋子的人手中。 然后会发生什么? 美国政府会向在加州的谷歌和苹果收税, 用那些税来付孟加拉国 失业者的基本收入? 如果你相信这个,那你会相信 圣诞老人会到来并解决这个问题。 所以除非我们有全球基本收入, 而不是国家基本收入, 深根蒂固的问题不会被解决。
And also it's not clear what basic is, because what are basic human needs? A thousand years ago, just food and shelter was enough. But today, people will say education is a basic human need, it should be part of the package. But how much? Six years? Twelve years? PhD? Similarly, with health care, let's say that in 20, 30, 40 years, you'll have expensive treatments that can extend human life to 120, I don't know. Will this be part of the basket of basic income or not? It's a very difficult problem, because in a world where people lose their ability to be employed, the only thing they are going to get is this basic income. So what's part of it is a very, very difficult ethical question.
而且我们也不清楚“基本”是什么, 因为人类的基本需求是什么? 一千年前,食物和庇护所就够了。 但是现在, 人们会说教育是人类基本需求, 它应该是其中之一。 但是,多久?6年?12年?博士? 相同,医疗保健, 比如20、30、40年, 你会有昂贵的治疗来延长人类寿命 到120岁,可能吧。 这个会是基本收入中的一部分吗? 这是一个很困难的问题, 因为当人们失去工作, 他们唯一能够拿到的就是基本收入。 所以这是一个非常困难的道德问题。
CA: There's a bunch of questions on how the world affords it as well, who pays. There's a question here from Facebook from Lisa Larson: "How does nationalism in the US now compare to that between World War I and World War II in the last century?"
克里斯·安德森: 这如何影响世界还有很多未知, 谁付钱? Facebook上的丽莎·拉森 提了一个问题, “现在美国的国家主义 和上个世纪的一战二战期间相比 是怎么样的?”
YNH: Well the good news, with regard to the dangers of nationalism, we are in a much better position than a century ago. A century ago, 1917, Europeans were killing each other by the millions. In 2016, with Brexit, as far as I remember, a single person lost their life, an MP who was murdered by some extremist. Just a single person. I mean, if Brexit was about British independence, this is the most peaceful war of independence in human history. And let's say that Scotland will now choose to leave the UK after Brexit.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 好消息是,不管国家主义的危险, 我们的情况比一世纪前好得多。 一世纪以前,1917, 几百万人欧洲人互相残杀。 2016年,英国脱欧,我所记得的, 只有一个人失去生命, 一个议员被极端主义者谋杀。 只有一个人。 如果英国脱欧意味着英国独立, 这是人类历史上最和平的独立。 如果苏格兰决定离开英国, 在英国脱欧之后。
So in the 18th century, if Scotland wanted -- and the Scots wanted several times -- to break out of the control of London, the reaction of the government in London was to send an army up north to burn down Edinburgh and massacre the highland tribes. My guess is that if, in 2018, the Scots vote for independence, the London government will not send an army up north to burn down Edinburgh. Very few people are now willing to kill or be killed for Scottish or for British independence. So for all the talk of the rise of nationalism and going back to the 1930s, to the 19th century, in the West at least, the power of national sentiments today is far, far smaller than it was a century ago.
所以在18世纪, 如果苏格兰几次尝试 脱离伦敦的控制, 伦敦政府的回应是向北派军队, 烧掉爱丁堡,并屠杀高地部落。 我的猜测是,如果2018年, 苏格兰选择独立, 伦敦政府不会向北派兵, 烧掉爱丁堡。 现在几乎没有人愿意杀人或者被杀 为了苏格兰或者英国独立。 至今国家主义的雄起, 回到20世纪30年代, 到19实际,在西方 国家主义的力量至少比一个世纪前 小了很多。
CA: Although some people now, you hear publicly worrying about whether that might be shifting, that there could actually be outbreaks of violence in the US depending on how things turn out. Should we be worried about that, or do you really think things have shifted?
克里斯·安德森:现在有些人, 担心这会不会被改变, 美国的犯罪会暴增, 根据结果来看。 我们需要担心这个吗, 或者你真的相信事情被改变了吗?
YNH: No, we should be worried. We should be aware of two things. First of all, don't be hysterical. We are not back in the First World War yet. But on the other hand, don't be complacent. We reached from 1917 to 2017, not by some divine miracle, but simply by human decisions, and if we now start making the wrong decisions, we could be back in an analogous situation to 1917 in a few years. One of the things I know as a historian is that you should never underestimate human stupidity.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 不,我们应该担心。 我们应该意识到两件事情, 第一,不要太极端, 我们还没有回到一战。 但是另一方面,不要自鸣得意。 我们从1917到2017, 不是通过奇迹, 而只是人类的选择, 如果我们现在开始作出错误的决定, 在几年之内,我们可能会 回到像1917年那样的局面。 作为历史学家,我知道的一件事情 是不要低估人类的愚蠢。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
It's one of the most powerful forces in history, human stupidity and human violence. Humans do such crazy things for no obvious reason, but again, at the same time, another very powerful force in human history is human wisdom. We have both.
这是历史上最强大的力量, 人类的愚蠢和暴力。 人们做这样疯狂的事情, 然而却并没有很明显的原因, 但是话又说回来, 人类历史上另一个 很强大的力量是人类的智慧。 我们两者都有。
CA: We have with us here moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who I think has a question.
克里斯·安德森: 道德心理学家乔纳森·海特 有一个问题。
Jonathan Haidt: Thanks, Yuval. So you seem to be a fan of global governance, but when you look at the map of the world from Transparency International, which rates the level of corruption of political institutions, it's a vast sea of red with little bits of yellow here and there for those with good institutions. So if we were to have some kind of global governance, what makes you think it would end up being more like Denmark rather than more like Russia or Honduras, and aren't there alternatives, such as we did with CFCs? There are ways to solve global problems with national governments. What would world government actually look like, and why do you think it would work?
乔纳森·海特:谢谢,尤瓦尔。 似乎你支持世界政府, 但是当你看“透明国际”的地图时, 标注政府的腐败程度, 那些作风优良的政府有 大量的红色和一点点的黄色, 所以如果我们有某种世界政府, 为什么你认为它会变成像是丹麦一样, 而不是像俄罗斯或者洪都拉斯, 或者不是其他选择, 像我们对CFC做的? 通过某种方式国家政府 是可以解决全球问题。 世界政府看起来是什么样的, 为什么你认为它能够有用?
YNH: Well, I don't know what it would look like. Nobody still has a model for that. The main reason we need it is because many of these issues are lose-lose situations. When you have a win-win situation like trade, both sides can benefit from a trade agreement, then this is something you can work out. Without some kind of global government, national governments each have an interest in doing it. But when you have a lose-lose situation like with climate change, it's much more difficult without some overarching authority, real authority.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我并不知道它会是怎么样的。 没人有一个模型。 我们需要它的主要原因 是因为这些问题都是两败的局面。 当有像交易一样的双赢局面, 两方都能从贸易协定中获益, 这才是我们能够解决的事情。 没有某种世界政府, 国家政府都有独自的利益。 但是当你有一个两败的局面, 像气候变化, 如果没有一些权利上的统治, 会变得很困难。
Now, how to get there and what would it look like, I don't know. And certainly there is no obvious reason to think that it would look like Denmark, or that it would be a democracy. Most likely it wouldn't. We don't have workable democratic models for a global government. So maybe it would look more like ancient China than like modern Denmark. But still, given the dangers that we are facing, I think the imperative of having some kind of real ability to force through difficult decisions on the global level is more important than almost anything else.
如何做到和结果是怎么样 我不知道。 而且肯定没有确切的原因, 认为会变成丹麦一样, 或者会变成民主政治。 更有可能它不会。 我们没有可行的民主政治模型 适用于世界政府。 所以可能它会更像古中国 而不是现代丹麦。 但是,因为我们面对的危险, 我认为大国们有真正的能力 在世界实施这些艰难的决定, 比其他都要重要。
CA: There's a question from Facebook here, and then we'll get the mic to Andrew. So, Kat Hebron on Facebook, calling in from Vail: "How would developed nations manage the millions of climate migrants?"
克里斯·安德森: Facebook上有一个问题, 然后我们会把麦克风给安德鲁。 Facebook上的凯特·希伯伦, 从范尔: “发展中国家如何管理 百万气候变化的移民?”
YNH: I don't know.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:我不知道。
CA: That's your answer, Kat. (Laughter)
克里斯·安德森: 这是你的答案,凯特。(笑声)
YNH: And I don't think that they know either. They'll just deny the problem, maybe.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我觉得他们也不知道。 可能他们会否认问题。
CA: But immigration, generally, is another example of a problem that's very hard to solve on a nation-by-nation basis. One nation can shut its doors, but maybe that stores up problems for the future.
克里斯·安德森: 但是移民是国家层面难以解决的问题 的另一个例子。 一个国家可以关闭边界, 但是这可能加深未来的问题。
YNH: Yes, I mean -- it's another very good case, especially because it's so much easier to migrate today than it was in the Middle Ages or in ancient times.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 没错,这是另外一个很好的例子, 特别是因为现在移民 比中世纪和古代更为简单。
CA: Yuval, there's a belief among many technologists, certainly, that political concerns are kind of overblown, that actually, political leaders don't have that much influence in the world, that the real determination of humanity at this point is by science, by invention, by companies, by many things other than political leaders, and it's actually very hard for leaders to do much, so we're actually worrying about nothing here.
克里斯·安德森: 尤瓦尔,很多科技人相信一件事情, 政治有点被夸张了, 事实上,政治领导人 在世界上没有那么大的影响力, 现在真正决定人类的是科学、 发明、公司、 除政治领导人外的很多东西, 领导人做不了很多事情, 所以我们是白担心。
YNH: Well, first, it should be emphasized that it's true that political leaders' ability to do good is very limited, but their ability to do harm is unlimited. There is a basic imbalance here. You can still press the button and blow everybody up. You have that kind of ability. But if you want, for example, to reduce inequality, that's very, very difficult. But to start a war, you can still do so very easily. So there is a built-in imbalance in the political system today which is very frustrating, where you cannot do a lot of good but you can still do a lot of harm. And this makes the political system still a very big concern.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:首先, 政治领导人做好事 的能力是非常有限的, 但是他们做坏事的能力是没有限制的。 这是基本的不平衡。 你依旧可以按下按钮,炸掉所有人。 你可以有这样的能力。 但是如果你想,比如,减轻不平等现象, 是非常,非常困难的。 但是开始一场战争, 你依旧可以轻而易举的做到。 所以现在的政治系统有 一个根深蒂固的不平衡, 这挺令人沮丧的, 你不能做很多好事, 但你依旧可以造成很多伤害。 这依旧是政治系统很大的隐患。
CA: So as you look at what's happening today, and putting your historian's hat on, do you look back in history at moments when things were going just fine and an individual leader really took the world or their country backwards?
克里斯·安德森: 所以当你看看现在发生的事情, 从一个历史学家的角度, 历史上有一切都很好, 然后一个领导人使世界 和他的国家倒退的时候吗?
YNH: There are quite a few examples, but I should emphasize, it's never an individual leader. I mean, somebody put him there, and somebody allowed him to continue to be there. So it's never really just the fault of a single individual. There are a lot of people behind every such individual.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:有几个例子, 但是我应该强调, 从来都不只是一个领导人, 有人把他推上台的, 有人允许他继续待在台上。 所以并不是单一一个人的错, 有很多人在这样的人身后。
CA: Can we have the microphone here, please, to Andrew?
克里斯·安德森: 我们能把麦克风给安德鲁吗?
Andrew Solomon: You've talked a lot about the global versus the national, but increasingly, it seems to me, the world situation is in the hands of identity groups. We look at people within the United States who have been recruited by ISIS. We look at these other groups which have formed which go outside of national bounds but still represent significant authorities. How are they to be integrated into the system, and how is a diverse set of identities to be made coherent under either national or global leadership?
安德鲁·索罗门: 你谈了很多关于世界和国家的事情, 但是在我看来, 世界还是掌握在一群一群的人手中的。 看看在美国被ISIS招募的人, 还有其他的组群, 不受国家的限制, 但是依旧代表着重要的权力。 他们该如何被融入系统? 以及如何使一个多样背景的设定团结, 在国家或者世界领导下?
YNH: Well, the problem of such diverse identities is a problem from nationalism as well. Nationalism believes in a single, monolithic identity, and exclusive or at least more extreme versions of nationalism believe in an exclusive loyalty to a single identity. And therefore, nationalism has had a lot of problems with people wanting to divide their identities between various groups. So it's not just a problem, say, for a global vision.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:多样背景的问题 在国家主义里也有。 国家主义偏爱单一背景, 更极端的国家主义 偏爱对单一背景的唯一忠诚。 因此,国家主义有了很多问题, 对想要在不同组群中 有多样背景的人。 所以这仅是全球背景下的一个问题,
And I think, again, history shows that you shouldn't necessarily think in such exclusive terms. If you think that there is just a single identity for a person, "I am just X, that's it, I can't be several things, I can be just that," that's the start of the problem. You have religions, you have nations that sometimes demand exclusive loyalty, but it's not the only option. There are many religions and many nations that enable you to have diverse identities at the same time.
我认为,历史表明 你不能片面的思考。 若果你认为每个人是单一背景的话, “我只是X,我不能是其他东西。” 这就是问题的开始。 你有宗教信仰,你有国籍, 可能需要唯一忠诚, 但是这不是唯一的选择。 有很多宗教信仰和很多国家, 能够让你同时有非常多样的背景。
CA: But is one explanation of what's happened in the last year that a group of people have got fed up with, if you like, the liberal elites, for want of a better term, obsessing over many, many different identities and them feeling, "But what about my identity? I am being completely ignored here. And by the way, I thought I was the majority"? And that that's actually sparked a lot of the anger.
克里斯·安德森: 去年发生的事情的解释 是一群人忍受不住了, 自由主义精英, 痴迷于很多很多不同的背景, 然后他们感觉, “但是我的身份呢?我被完全遗忘了。 似乎我觉得我是多数人?” 然而这只是诸多愤怒的冰山一角。
YNH: Yeah. Identity is always problematic, because identity is always based on fictional stories that sooner or later collide with reality. Almost all identities, I mean, beyond the level of the basic community of a few dozen people, are based on a fictional story. They are not the truth. They are not the reality. It's just a story that people invent and tell one another and start believing. And therefore all identities are extremely unstable. They are not a biological reality. Sometimes nationalists, for example, think that the nation is a biological entity. It's made of the combination of soil and blood, creates the nation. But this is just a fictional story.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 身份总会带来很多问题, 因为身份总是基于虚构的故事, 迟早会和现实冲突。 几乎所有的身份, 高于基本群体的级别, 和十几个人的级别, 都是基于虚构的故事。 他们都不是事实。 他们都不是真的。 这只是人们发明出来 互相告诉然后相信的故事。 所以所有的身份都是不稳定的。 他们不是生物学上的事实。 有的时候国家主义者, 认为国家是一个生物学上的物体。 由土壤和血液组成的, 形成了国家。 但是这只是一个虚构的故事。
CA: Soil and blood kind of makes a gooey mess.
克里斯·安德森: 土壤和血液和在一起是一团糟。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
YNH: It does, and also it messes with your mind when you think too much that I am a combination of soil and blood. If you look from a biological perspective, obviously none of the nations that exist today existed 5,000 years ago. Homo sapiens is a social animal, that's for sure. But for millions of years, Homo sapiens and our hominid ancestors lived in small communities of a few dozen individuals. Everybody knew everybody else. Whereas modern nations are imagined communities, in the sense that I don't even know all these people. I come from a relatively small nation, Israel, and of eight million Israelis, I never met most of them. I will never meet most of them. They basically exist here.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 没错,而且它还会搞乱你的头脑, 当你认为你是土壤和血液的组合过多。 如果从生物学的角度来看, 显而易见现在的国家没有一个 在5千年前存在。 智人无疑是一个社交的动物。 但是百万年来, 智人和我们的人类祖先 生活在几十个个体的小群体内。 所有人都知道所有人。 但是现在国家是虚构的群体, 我并不认识这些人。 我来自一个相对小的国家,以色列, 八百万以色列人中, 我从来没有见过绝大多数人。 我也不会见到绝大多数人。 他们只是简单地存在在这里。
CA: But in terms of this identity, this group who feel left out and perhaps have work taken away, I mean, in "Homo Deus," you actually speak of this group in one sense expanding, that so many people may have their jobs taken away by technology in some way that we could end up with a really large -- I think you call it a "useless class" -- a class where traditionally, as viewed by the economy, these people have no use.
克里斯·安德森:这样的身份, 这群人感觉被抛弃,可能被抢走工作, 在《未来简史》里, 你谈到这样的组群在扩大, 太多人可能会被科技 夺走工作, 然后我们可能会有一个 你称之为的很大的“无用阶层”, 一个传统上存在, 经济上无用的阶层。
YNH: Yes.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利没错。
CA: How likely a possibility is that? Is that something we should be terrified about? And can we address it in any way?
克里斯·安德森:有多大可能会发生? 我们该为此担心吗? 以及我们能够解决这个吗?
YNH: We should think about it very carefully. I mean, nobody really knows what the job market will look like in 2040, 2050. There is a chance many new jobs will appear, but it's not certain. And even if new jobs do appear, it won't necessarily be easy for a 50-year old unemployed truck driver made unemployed by self-driving vehicles, it won't be easy for an unemployed truck driver to reinvent himself or herself as a designer of virtual worlds.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我们应该非常仔细的思考这件事。 没人真的知道2040、2050年 的工作市场是怎样的。 有可能新的工作会出现, 但并不是绝对。 即使新的工作真的出现了, 一个被自动驾驶汽车 抢走工作的50岁的卡车司机 的生活也不一定简单。 一个失业卡车司机 把自己重塑成一个 虚拟世界的设计者是很难的。
Previously, if you look at the trajectory of the industrial revolution, when machines replaced humans in one type of work, the solution usually came from low-skill work in new lines of business. So you didn't need any more agricultural workers, so people moved to working in low-skill industrial jobs, and when this was taken away by more and more machines, people moved to low-skill service jobs. Now, when people say there will be new jobs in the future, that humans can do better than AI, that humans can do better than robots, they usually think about high-skill jobs, like software engineers designing virtual worlds. Now, I don't see how an unemployed cashier from Wal-Mart reinvents herself or himself at 50 as a designer of virtual worlds, and certainly I don't see how the millions of unemployed Bangladeshi textile workers will be able to do that. I mean, if they are going to do it, we need to start teaching the Bangladeshis today how to be software designers, and we are not doing it. So what will they do in 20 years?
之前,工业革命的发展史, 当在某个产业机器代替人力, 解决方式通常是 在新的生产中低技术的工作。 所以你不需要更多的农民, 人们转向低技术工业的工作, 当这些工作被 越来越多的机器抢走的时候, 人们转移到低技术的服务业。 当人们说未来会有新的职业, 那些职业人类会比人工智能做的更好, 那些职业人类能比机器人做的更好, 他们说的其实是高技术的工作, 像软件工程师设计虚拟世界。 我不认为一个失业沃尔玛收银员 能够在50岁把自己 变成一个虚拟世界的设计者, 我更不认为 孟加拉国的百万失业纺织业工人 能够做到这个。 如果他们真的想做到, 那我们现在就要开始教孟加拉国人 如何成为一个软件工程师, 但是我们并没有在做这件事。 所以他们在20年内会做什么?
CA: So it feels like you're really highlighting a question that's really been bugging me the last few months more and more. It's almost a hard question to ask in public, but if any mind has some wisdom to offer in it, maybe it's yours, so I'm going to ask you: What are humans for?
克里斯·安德森: 我感觉你很重视一个问题, 其实这前几个月就一直困扰着我, 这个问题不好在公众问, 但是如果任何人能够有智慧回答, 那就是你了, 所以问题是: 人类存在的目的是什么?
YNH: As far as we know, for nothing.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 据我们现在所知,没有任何目的。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I mean, there is no great cosmic drama, some great cosmic plan, that we have a role to play in. And we just need to discover what our role is and then play it to the best of our ability. This has been the story of all religions and ideologies and so forth, but as a scientist, the best I can say is this is not true. There is no universal drama with a role in it for Homo sapiens. So --
并没有什么宏大的宇宙戏剧, 或者宏大的宇宙计划, 人类拥有一个角色的。 我们只需要发现我们的角色, 然后尽可能做好我们的角色。 这一直是所有宗教和价值观的故事, 但是作为一个科学家, 我能说的是这不是真的。 并没有什么智人参加的宇宙戏剧。 所以……
CA: I'm going to push back on you just for a minute, just from your own book, because in "Homo Deus," you give really one of the most coherent and understandable accounts about sentience, about consciousness, and that unique sort of human skill. You point out that it's different from intelligence, the intelligence that we're building in machines, and that there's actually a lot of mystery around it. How can you be sure there's no purpose when we don't even understand what this sentience thing is? I mean, in your own thinking, isn't there a chance that what humans are for is to be the universe's sentient things, to be the centers of joy and love and happiness and hope? And maybe we can build machines that actually help amplify that, even if they're not going to become sentient themselves? Is that crazy? I kind of found myself hoping that, reading your book.
克里斯·安德森:我要打断你一下, 在你的书里, 因为在《未来简史》里, 你做出了条理清楚和易于理解的解释, 关于知觉,关于意识, 以及那种人类特别的能力。 你指出了和智力的区别, 那种我们建造机器的智力, 并没有什么神秘之处。 你是怎么知道人类没有目的, 如果我们还无法理解知觉是什么? 以你的理解,有没有可能 人类的目的是成为宇宙的知觉, 成为快乐、爱情和喜悦的中心呢? 可能我们能够建造放大那些东西的机器, 即使它们不会获得感知? 这听起来很疯狂吗? 读你的书,我似乎有点渴望这个。
YNH: Well, I certainly think that the most interesting question today in science is the question of consciousness and the mind. We are getting better and better in understanding the brain and intelligence, but we are not getting much better in understanding the mind and consciousness. People often confuse intelligence and consciousness, especially in places like Silicon Valley, which is understandable, because in humans, they go together. I mean, intelligence basically is the ability to solve problems. Consciousness is the ability to feel things, to feel joy and sadness and boredom and pain and so forth. In Homo sapiens and all other mammals as well -- it's not unique to humans -- in all mammals and birds and some other animals, intelligence and consciousness go together. We often solve problems by feeling things. So we tend to confuse them. But they are different things.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我相信现在科学最有意思的问题是 关于意识和头脑的。 我们能够越来越好的理解 大脑和智力, 但是我们并没有越来越好的 理解思维和意识。 人们经常把智力和意识混为一谈, 特别是像硅谷这样的地方, 这是可以理解的, 因为在人类身上,这两个是相似的。 智力基本上就是解决问题的能力。 意识是感受事情的能力, 感受快乐、悲伤、无聊、痛苦等等。 智人和其他哺乳动物,不仅仅人类, 所有哺乳动物和鸟类及其他一些动物, 智力和意识很相似。 我们经常通过感受事情来解决问题。 所以我们更有可能会把它们混淆。 但它们是不同的东西。
What's happening today in places like Silicon Valley is that we are creating artificial intelligence but not artificial consciousness. There has been an amazing development in computer intelligence over the last 50 years, and exactly zero development in computer consciousness, and there is no indication that computers are going to become conscious anytime soon.
现在在像硅谷一样的地方发生的事情 是我们在创造人工智能, 但是不是人工意识。 过去的50年里, 电脑智能有非常卓越的发展, 但是电脑意识完全没有进步, 也没有现象表明电脑 在不远的将来会取得意识。
So first of all, if there is some cosmic role for consciousness, it's not unique to Homo sapiens. Cows are conscious, pigs are conscious, chimpanzees are conscious, chickens are conscious, so if we go that way, first of all, we need to broaden our horizons and remember very clearly we are not the only sentient beings on Earth, and when it comes to sentience -- when it comes to intelligence, there is good reason to think we are the most intelligent of the whole bunch.
所以,第一, 意识在宇宙中扮演的角色, 它不是智人特有的。 牛是有意识的,猪是有意识的, 猩猩是有意识的,鸡是有意识的, 所以如果我们想搞清楚我们的角色, 首先,我们要扩大我们的视野, 一定要记住我们不是 地球上唯一有意识的生物, 当谈到意识, 当谈到智力, 我们有理由认为我们是整个生态系统中最聪明的。
But when it comes to sentience, to say that humans are more sentient than whales, or more sentient than baboons or more sentient than cats, I see no evidence for that. So first step is, you go in that direction, expand. And then the second question of what is it for, I would reverse it and I would say that I don't think sentience is for anything. I think we don't need to find our role in the universe. The really important thing is to liberate ourselves from suffering. What characterizes sentient beings in contrast to robots, to stones, to whatever, is that sentient beings suffer, can suffer, and what they should focus on is not finding their place in some mysterious cosmic drama. They should focus on understanding what suffering is, what causes it and how to be liberated from it.
但是谈到意识时, 说人类比鲸鱼更有意识, 或者比狒狒,或者比猫更有意识, 我找不到证据。 所以第一步是, 如果你想要搞清楚,扩大视野。 第二个问题是意识的目的是什么? 我要推翻这个问题, 我不认为意识有任何目的。 我不认为我们需要 在宇宙中找到我们的角色。 重要的事情是使我们不再痛苦。 有意识的生物 和机器人、石头或者其他东西相比 是有意识生物会感受到痛苦, 而且他们应该关注的 不是在什么神秘的 宇宙戏剧中找到他们的角色。 而应该关注痛苦是什么, 什么造成了痛苦以及如何从中解脱。
CA: I know this is a big issue for you, and that was very eloquent. We're going to have a blizzard of questions from the audience here, and maybe from Facebook as well, and maybe some comments as well. So let's go quick. There's one right here. Keep your hands held up at the back if you want the mic, and we'll get it back to you.
克里斯·安德森: 我知道这对你是一个非常重要的问题。 但是现场有很多的问题, 可能Facebook也是, 可能还有一些评论。 所以让我们开始吧。 这里就有一个问题。 如果你要麦克风,请保持手举高, 我们会递给你。
Question: In your work, you talk a lot about the fictional stories that we accept as truth, and we live our lives by it. As an individual, knowing that, how does it impact the stories that you choose to live your life, and do you confuse them with the truth, like all of us?
问题:在你的工作里, 你谈论了很多关于 我们当成现实的虚构故事, 我们的生活基于这些故事。 作为个人,知道这个, 这如何影响你的人生。 以及你会像我们一样把 这些故事和现实混在一起吗?
YNH: I try not to. I mean, for me, maybe the most important question, both as a scientist and as a person, is how to tell the difference between fiction and reality, because reality is there. I'm not saying that everything is fiction. It's just very difficult for human beings to tell the difference between fiction and reality, and it has become more and more difficult as history progressed, because the fictions that we have created -- nations and gods and money and corporations -- they now control the world. So just to even think, "Oh, this is just all fictional entities that we've created," is very difficult. But reality is there.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:我尝试不要。 对于我来说,最重要的问题, 作为一个科学家和一个人类, 是如何分辨虚构和事实的区别, 因为事实存在。 我并不是说所有的事情都是虚构的。 只是对于人类,我们很难分辨 虚构和现实的区别, 而且随着历史的发展, 这变得越来越困难, 因为我们创造的虚拟事物, 国家、神、金钱和公司, 它们现在控制着世界。 所以甚至思考 “哦,这只是我们创造的虚构的东西。” 是很困难的。 但是事实依旧存在。
For me the best ... There are several tests to tell the difference between fiction and reality. The simplest one, the best one that I can say in short, is the test of suffering. If it can suffer, it's real. If it can't suffer, it's not real. A nation cannot suffer. That's very, very clear. Even if a nation loses a war, we say, "Germany suffered a defeat in the First World War," it's a metaphor. Germany cannot suffer. Germany has no mind. Germany has no consciousness. Germans can suffer, yes, but Germany cannot. Similarly, when a bank goes bust, the bank cannot suffer. When the dollar loses its value, the dollar doesn't suffer. People can suffer. Animals can suffer. This is real. So I would start, if you really want to see reality, I would go through the door of suffering. If you can really understand what suffering is, this will give you also the key to understand what reality is.
对于我来说, 有几个能够分辨虚构和现实的方法。 最简单的,最好用的, 我能够简而言之的, 是痛苦。 如果它能够感受痛苦,它是真的。 如果它不能感受痛苦,它不是真的。 一个国家无法感受痛苦。 这非常非常显而易见。 即使一个国家输了一场战争, 我们说: “德国因为一战的失败而痛苦。” 这是一个比喻。 德国无法感受痛苦,德国没有意识。 德国没有知觉。 德国人能够感受痛苦, 没错,但是德国不可以。 相似的是,当一个银行倒闭, 那个银行无法感受痛苦。 当美元的价值降低, 美元无法感受痛苦。 人能够感受痛苦, 美国人能够感受痛苦。 这是真的。 所以如果你真的想看到现实, 我会测试其能否感受痛苦。 如果你真的能够理解什么是痛苦, 这也会让你了解什么是现实。
CA: There's a Facebook question here that connects to this, from someone around the world in a language that I cannot read.
Facebook上有一个问题, 从看不懂的语言的人。
YNH: Oh, it's Hebrew. CA: Hebrew. There you go.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:哦这是希伯来语。 克里斯·安德森:噢,希伯来语。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Can you read the name?
你能读这个名字吗?
YNH: Or Lauterbach Goren.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:……
CA: Well, thank you for writing in. The question is: "Is the post-truth era really a brand-new era, or just another climax or moment in a never-ending trend?
克里斯·安德森:谢谢你的问题, 问题是:“真相后时期 真的是一个全新的时期, 还是另一个历史长河的时刻?”
YNH: Personally, I don't connect with this idea of post-truth. My basic reaction as a historian is: If this is the era of post-truth, when the hell was the era of truth?
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:个人所见, 我不同意“真相后”这个概念。 我作为历史学家的反应是, 如果这是真相后的时期, 真相的时期是什么时候?
CA: Right.
克里斯·安德森:没错。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
YNH: Was it the 1980s, the 1950s, the Middle Ages? I mean, we have always lived in an era, in a way, of post-truth.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:是20世纪80年代, 50年代还是中世纪时期? 我们一直都生活在某种真相后的时期。
CA: But I'd push back on that, because I think what people are talking about is that there was a world where you had fewer journalistic outlets, where there were traditions, that things were fact-checked. It was incorporated into the charter of those organizations that the truth mattered. So if you believe in a reality, then what you write is information. There was a belief that that information should connect to reality in a real way, and if you wrote a headline, it was a serious, earnest attempt to reflect something that had actually happened. And people didn't always get it right.
克里斯·安德森:我要打断一下, 因为我认为人们谈论的 是有更少的记者报道, 有被验真过的现实的世界, 被那些注重真实的机构检查过的世界。 所以如果你相信一个事实, 你所写的就是信息。 有人认为信息应该真正与现实相连, 如果你写一个头条, 这是一个很严肃重要的 反映现实的事情。 然而有些人不这么认为。
But I think the concern now is you've got a technological system that's incredibly powerful that, for a while at least, massively amplified anything with no attention paid to whether it connected to reality, only to whether it connected to clicks and attention, and that that was arguably toxic. That's a reasonable concern, isn't it?
但是我认为担心是 现在的科技非常强大 在一段时间下,能够放大所有的事物, 不管其与现实的联系, 只管点击量和吸引注意, 这是非常有害的。 这会导致一个很正常的担忧,对吧?
YNH: Yeah, it is. I mean, the technology changes, and it's now easier to disseminate both truth and fiction and falsehood. It goes both ways. It's also much easier, though, to spread the truth than it was ever before. But I don't think there is anything essentially new about this disseminating fictions and errors. There is nothing that -- I don't know -- Joseph Goebbels, didn't know about all this idea of fake news and post-truth. He famously said that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will think it's the truth, and the bigger the lie, the better, because people won't even think that something so big can be a lie. I think that fake news has been with us for thousands of years. Just think of the Bible.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 没错,随着科技发展, 现在传播现实、虚构和虚假更简单了。 现实和虚构的都有。 宣传现实都比以前简单了非常多。 但是我不认为有什么非常新的东西 关于传播虚构和虚假信息。 关于虚假信息和“真实后”, 约瑟夫·戈培尔也都知道。 他经常说如果你重复一个谎言, 人们为认为那是事实, 谎越大越好, 因为人们甚至都不认为 这么夸张的事情是一个谎言。 我认为虚假新闻已经存在上千年了。 就像圣经。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
CA: But there is a concern that the fake news is associated with tyrannical regimes, and when you see an uprise in fake news that is a canary in the coal mine that there may be dark times coming.
克里斯·安德森:但是有人担心 虚假新闻和专制政权有关, 当虚假新闻上升的时候, 那是一个危险信号, 黑暗的时代可能会到来。
YNH: Yeah. I mean, the intentional use of fake news is a disturbing sign. But I'm not saying that it's not bad, I'm just saying that it's not new.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:没错,国际上 虚假新闻的使用是很令人不安的。 但是我不是说这不好。 我只是说这不是什么新鲜的东西。
CA: There's a lot of interest on Facebook on this question about global governance versus nationalism. Question here from Phil Dennis: "How do we get people, governments, to relinquish power? Is that -- is that -- actually, the text is so big I can't read the full question. But is that a necessity? Is it going to take war to get there? Sorry Phil -- I mangled your question, but I blame the text right here.
克里斯·安德森: 在Facebook上对这个问题有很多关注, 关于世界政府和国家主义。 来自菲利斯·丹尼斯的问题: “我们如何让人们,让政府放弃权利? 这个含义太宏大了 我看不到整个宏观的问题。 但是这必要吗? 这需要战争才能实现吗? 不好意思菲利斯, 我篡改了你的问题,但是我怪文字。
YNH: One option that some people talk about is that only a catastrophe can shake humankind and open the path to a real system of global governance, and they say that we can't do it before the catastrophe, but we need to start laying the foundations so that when the disaster strikes, we can react quickly. But people will just not have the motivation to do such a thing before the disaster strikes. Another thing that I would emphasize is that anybody who is really interested in global governance should always make it very, very clear that it doesn't replace or abolish local identities and communities, that it should come both as -- It should be part of a single package.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 人们谈论的一个选择, 只有灾难才能打动人类, 开始一个真正世界政府的系统, 他们说我们无法在灾难前完成, 但是我们需要开始打基础, 所以当灾难来袭时, 我们能够快速反应。 但是人们在灾难前 是不会有动机去做这样的事情的。 另外一件我要强调的事情 是任何真正相信世界政府的人, 都要澄清 它并不会取代或者取消地方户口或者社区, 它们应该共同存在, 应该都是系统中的一部分。
CA: I want to hear more on this, because the very words "global governance" are almost the epitome of evil in the mindset of a lot of people on the alt-right right now. It just seems scary, remote, distant, and it has let them down, and so globalists, global governance -- no, go away! And many view the election as the ultimate poke in the eye to anyone who believes in that. So how do we change the narrative so that it doesn't seem so scary and remote? Build more on this idea of it being compatible with local identity, local communities.
克里斯·安德森:我想多谈谈这个, 因为“世界政府”中的每一个字, 是非主流右派很多人心目中 恶魔的缩影。 它看起来很吓人,很遥远,很未来, 它还让人们失望过, 所以全球主义者,世界政府, 不要,走开! 很多人认为这次大选 就是对任何相信这个的人的鼓励。 我们如何改变叙述方式, 让它看起来不那么吓人和遥远? 基于你说的 和地方户口、地方社区的主意。
YNH: Well, I think again we should start really with the biological realities of Homo sapiens. And biology tells us two things about Homo sapiens which are very relevant to this issue: first of all, that we are completely dependent on the ecological system around us, and that today we are talking about a global system. You cannot escape that.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:我认为我们应该 以智人的生物学现实开始。 生物学告诉我们两件关于智人的事情 和这个问题非常有关: 第一,我们完全依赖于 我们身边的生态系统, 而且现在我们所谈论的是世界范围的系统。 你无法逃避这件事。
And at the same time, biology tells us about Homo sapiens that we are social animals, but that we are social on a very, very local level. It's just a simple fact of humanity that we cannot have intimate familiarity with more than about 150 individuals. The size of the natural group, the natural community of Homo sapiens, is not more than 150 individuals, and everything beyond that is really based on all kinds of imaginary stories and large-scale institutions, and I think that we can find a way, again, based on a biological understanding of our species, to weave the two together and to understand that today in the 21st century, we need both the global level and the local community.
同时,生物学告诉我们, 智人是社交动物, 但我们只在非常非常小的范围内社交。 这只是人类的简单事实, 我们无法和超过150个个体 有亲密关系。 我们社交群体的大小, 智人社交群体的大小 不超过150个个体, 一切超过那个数字的, 都是基于某种虚构故事, 和大型机构, 我认为我们能够找到一个方法, 基于生物学上对我们的理解, 为了它们编织在一起, 为了了解21世纪的现在, 我们需要世界范围和地方社区。
And I would go even further than that and say that it starts with the body itself. The feelings that people today have of alienation and loneliness and not finding their place in the world, I would think that the chief problem is not global capitalism. The chief problem is that over the last hundred years, people have been becoming disembodied, have been distancing themselves from their body. As a hunter-gatherer or even as a peasant, to survive, you need to be constantly in touch with your body and with your senses, every moment. If you go to the forest to look for mushrooms and you don't pay attention to what you hear, to what you smell, to what you taste, you're dead. So you must be very connected.
我甚至会进一步说, 我们自己才是开始。 现在人们感觉被疏远和寂寞, 和找不到在世界上的位置, 我会认为重要的问题不是世界资本主义。 重要的问题是过去的几百年里, 人们开始脱离实体, 开始和他们的身体保持距离。 作为一个依靠狩猎和 采集生活的人或者一个农民, 为了生存,你需要不断 和你的身体和感官保持联系, 每一分每一秒。 如果你去森林寻找蘑菇, 然而你不关注你听到的, 你闻到的,你尝到的, 你已经死了。 所以你一定要保持联系。
In the last hundred years, people are losing their ability to be in touch with their body and their senses, to hear, to smell, to feel. More and more attention goes to screens, to what is happening elsewhere, some other time. This, I think, is the deep reason for the feelings of alienation and loneliness and so forth, and therefore part of the solution is not to bring back some mass nationalism, but also reconnect with our own bodies, and if you are back in touch with your body, you will feel much more at home in the world also.
在过去的几百年里,人们正在失去 与他们的身体和感官的联系, 去听,去闻,去感受。 越来越多的注意力转到了屏幕上, 转到了其他地方发生的事情, 到了其他的时间。 这个,我认为, 是感觉被疏远和寂寞等等的原因, 因此,部分解决方式, 不是带回国家主义, 而是和我们的身体重新联系, 如果你和你的身体重新联系, 你也会在世界上感觉更像待在家里。
CA: Well, depending on how things go, we may all be back in the forest soon. We're going to have one more question in the room and one more on Facebook.
克里斯·安德森:取决于事情的发展, 我们可能很快会回到森林里。 我们会再提出现场的一个问题, 一个Facebook上的问题。
Ama Adi-Dako: Hello. I'm from Ghana, West Africa, and my question is: I'm wondering how do you present and justify the idea of global governance to countries that have been historically disenfranchised by the effects of globalization, and also, if we're talking about global governance, it sounds to me like it will definitely come from a very Westernized idea of what the "global" is supposed to look like. So how do we present and justify that idea of global versus wholly nationalist to people in countries like Ghana and Nigeria and Togo and other countries like that?
艾玛·艾迪达克:你好, 我来自非洲西部的加纳,我的问题是 你是如何提出并辩解世界政府对 历史上被全球化剥夺利益的国家历史上 以及我们谈论的世界政府, 在我的眼里,它一定很像西方国家 认为的“世界”的模样。 所以我们该如何表达和解释这个 全球主义和国家主义的概念, 向加纳,尼日利亚和多哥这样国家 和其他国家的人们?
YNH: I would start by saying that history is extremely unfair, and that we should realize that. Many of the countries that suffered most from the last 200 years of globalization and imperialism and industrialization are exactly the countries which are also most likely to suffer most from the next wave. And we should be very, very clear about that. If we don't have a global governance, and if we suffer from climate change, from technological disruptions, the worst suffering will not be in the US. The worst suffering will be in Ghana, will be in Sudan, will be in Syria, will be in Bangladesh, will be in those places.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我认为历史是非常不公平的, 我们应该认识到这点。 许多遭受过 持续两百年的 国际化,帝国主义和工业化的国家, 下一次也最有可能 遭受到打击。 我们应该非常非常强调这一点。 如果我们没有一个世界政府, 如果我们遭受到气候变化, 遭受到科技导致的扰乱, 最严重的打击不会发生在美国。 最严重的打击会在加纳, 会在苏丹,会在叙利亚, 会在孟加拉国,会在像这样的地方。
So I think those countries have an even greater incentive to do something about the next wave of disruption, whether it's ecological or whether it's technological. Again, if you think about technological disruption, so if AI and 3D printers and robots will take the jobs from billions of people, I worry far less about the Swedes than about the people in Ghana or in Bangladesh. And therefore, because history is so unfair and the results of a calamity will not be shared equally between everybody, as usual, the rich will be able to get away from the worst consequences of climate change in a way that the poor will not be able to.
所以我认为这些国家愿意 为下一次扰乱做出行动, 不管是生态上的,或者科技上的。 想想科技导致的扰乱, 如果人工智能、3D打印机和机器人会 抢走上十亿人的工作, 相比瑞典, 我会更担心在加纳或孟加拉国的人。 因此,因为历史如此不公平, 灾难的结果, 并不会被所有人平分, 富人们总是能够逃脱 气候变化最严重的结果, 穷人们并不能以自之力造成这个结果。
CA: And here's a great question from Cameron Taylor on Facebook: "At the end of 'Sapiens,'" you said we should be asking the question, 'What do we want to want?' Well, what do you think we should want to want?"
克里斯·安德森: Facebook上的卡梅伦·泰勒有一个好问题, 在《人类简史》的结尾, 你说我们应该问一个问题, “我们想要我们想要什么?” 你认为我们应该想要想要什么?
YNH: I think we should want to want to know the truth, to understand reality. Mostly what we want is to change reality, to fit it to our own desires, to our own wishes, and I think we should first want to understand it. If you look at the long-term trajectory of history, what you see is that for thousands of years we humans have been gaining control of the world outside us and trying to shape it to fit our own desires. And we've gained control of the other animals, of the rivers, of the forests, and reshaped them completely, causing an ecological destruction without making ourselves satisfied.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利: 我认为我们应该想要了解真相, 理解事实。 我们所想的大部分是改变现实, 来容纳我们的渴望和希望, 我认为我们首先应该想的是要去理解它。 根据历史上的长期轨迹, 你能看到上千年以来, 我们人类开始控制外界, 尝试改变它来适应我们的欲望。 我们已经控制了其他动物, 控制了河流,控制了森林, 并完全改变了它们, 造成了一个生态性的毁灭, 但并没有满足我们。
So the next step is we turn our gaze inwards, and we say OK, getting control of the world outside us did not really make us satisfied. Let's now try to gain control of the world inside us. This is the really big project of science and technology and industry in the 21st century -- to try and gain control of the world inside us, to learn how to engineer and produce bodies and brains and minds. These are likely to be the main products of the 21st century economy. When people think about the future, very often they think in terms, "Oh, I want to gain control of my body and of my brain." And I think that's very dangerous.
所以下一步我们会转向内在, 我们会说:好,掌握外在世界 其实还没有让我们满足。 现在尝试掌握内在世界。 这是一个很大的计划, 关于21世纪科学、科技和工业, 尝试取得对内在的控制, 学习如何驱动和制造身体、大脑和意识。 这些有可能是21世纪经济的主要产品。 当人们谈论未来的时候, 经常他们想的是 “哦,我想要获得 我的身体和大脑的控制权。” 然而我认为这非常危险。
If we've learned anything from our previous history, it's that yes, we gain the power to manipulate, but because we didn't really understand the complexity of the ecological system, we are now facing an ecological meltdown. And if we now try to reengineer the world inside us without really understanding it, especially without understanding the complexity of our mental system, we might cause a kind of internal ecological disaster, and we'll face a kind of mental meltdown inside us.
我们从历史中学到的一件事, 是没错,我们能够操控, 但是因为我们并不 了解生态系统的复杂性, 我们现在面临着生态系统崩溃。 如果我们现在尝试改变内在的世界, 但是并不真正了解他, 特别是没有对心理复杂程度的了解, 我们可能会造成某种内心环境灾难, 我们会面对某种内在心理崩溃。
CA: Putting all the pieces together here -- the current politics, the coming technology, concerns like the one you've just outlined -- I mean, it seems like you yourself are in quite a bleak place when you think about the future. You're pretty worried about it. Is that right? And if there was one cause for hope, how would you state that?
克里斯·安德森:总结一下, 现在的时政,现在的科技, 像你刚刚说过的担忧, 似乎你觉得未来 是一个比较黑暗的地方。 你好像很担心。 没错吗? 如果有希望,你认为是什么样的?
YNH: I focus on the most dangerous possibilities partly because this is like my job or responsibility as a historian or social critic. I mean, the industry focuses mainly on the positive sides, so it's the job of historians and philosophers and sociologists to highlight the more dangerous potential of all these new technologies. I don't think any of that is inevitable. Technology is never deterministic. You can use the same technology to create very different kinds of societies.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利:我注重最危险的可能, 因为这是我的工作和责任, 作为一个历史学家和批判家。 社会主要关注于积极的一面, 所以历史学家、哲学家和社会学家的责任 就是强调这些新科技更危险的潜能。 我不认为这些是不可避免的。 科技决定不了一切。 你可以用同样的科技, 来创造非常不同的社会。
If you look at the 20th century, so, the technologies of the Industrial Revolution, the trains and electricity and all that could be used to create a communist dictatorship or a fascist regime or a liberal democracy. The trains did not tell you what to do with them. Similarly, now, artificial intelligence and bioengineering and all of that -- they don't predetermine a single outcome. Humanity can rise up to the challenge, and the best example we have of humanity rising up to the challenge of a new technology is nuclear weapons. In the late 1940s, '50s, many people were convinced that sooner or later the Cold War will end in a nuclear catastrophe, destroying human civilization. And this did not happen. In fact, nuclear weapons prompted humans all over the world to change the way that they manage international politics to reduce violence.
看看20世纪, 工业革命时的科技, 火车和电力等等 都会被用来成立社会主义独裁, 或者一个法西斯政权,或者自由民主。 火车并不会告诉你要做什么。 相似的,人工智能和生物工程等等, 它们不会决定一个单一的未来。 人类会积极面对挑战, 人类雄起面对新科技的挑战最好的例子, 就是核武器。 在20世纪40、50年代后期, 很多人相信 冷战迟早会在一场核灾难中结束, 摧毁人类文明。 然而这没有发生, 事实上,核武器在世界上促进了 人类改变国际政治的方式, 来减少暴力。
And many countries basically took out war from their political toolkit. They no longer tried to pursue their interests with warfare. Not all countries have done so, but many countries have. And this is maybe the most important reason why international violence declined dramatically since 1945, and today, as I said, more people commit suicide than are killed in war. So this, I think, gives us a good example that even the most frightening technology, humans can rise up to the challenge and actually some good can come out of it. The problem is, we have very little margin for error. If we don't get it right, we might not have a second option to try again.
很多国家基本上把战争 从他们的战略书中移除。 它们不在尝试用战争追求利益。 不是所有的国家都做到了, 但是许多做到了。 这可能是为什么1945年后 国际冲突急剧减少的重要原因。 现在,正如我说的, 死于自杀的人其实多余死于战争的。 所以,我认为,这给我们了一个很好的例子 说明了即使最令人害怕的科技, 人类也能雄起面对挑战, 而且还会能从中获益。 问题是,留给我们犯错的余地太少了, 如果我们做的不对, 我们可能不会有第二次尝试的机会。
CA: That's a very powerful note, on which I think we should draw this to a conclusion. Before I wrap up, I just want to say one thing to people here and to the global TED community watching online, anyone watching online: help us with these dialogues. If you believe, like we do, that we need to find a different kind of conversation, now more than ever, help us do it. Reach out to other people, try and have conversations with people you disagree with, understand them, pull the pieces together, and help us figure out how to take these conversations forward so we can make a real contribution to what's happening in the world right now.
克里斯·安德森: 这是一个很有利的说服点, 我认为我们应该总结一下了。 在结束之前,我想对现场的人、 TED全球社区 和所有在网络上观看的人说: 帮助我们建立这些对话。 如果你像我们一样相信, 我们需要找到一个不同的沟通方式, 就在当下,帮助我们。 帮助其他人, 尝试和你不同意的人沟通, 理解他们, 理清思路, 并帮助我们想方法推动这个对话, 所以我们可以像世界上发生的事情 做出真正的贡献。
I think everyone feels more alive, more concerned, more engaged with the politics of the moment. The stakes do seem quite high, so help us respond to it in a wise, wise way.
我认为每一个人都感觉更清晰了, 更担忧了,更深入了, 对现在的时政。 赌注真的看似很高, 所以帮助我们把它下在一个明智的地方。
Yuval Harari, thank you.
尤瓦尔·赫拉利,谢谢。
(Applause)
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