Chris Anderson: Hello. Welcome to this TED Dialogues. It's the first of a series that's going to be done in response to the current political upheaval. I don't know about you; I've become quite concerned about the growing divisiveness in this country and in the world. No one's listening to each other. Right? They aren't. I mean, it feels like we need a different kind of conversation, one that's based on -- I don't know, on reason, listening, on understanding, on a broader context.
Kris Anderson: Zdravo. Dobro došli u TED dijaloge. Ovo je prvi u nizu koje ćemo da uradimo kao odgovor na trenutni politički preokret. Ne znam za vas; postao sam prilično zabrinut zbog rastućih podela u ovoj državi i u svetu. Ne slušamo jedni druge. Je li tako? Zaista je tako. Mislim, utisak je da nam je potreban različit vid razgovora, razgovor koji je zasnovan - ne znam, na razumu, slušanju, razumevanju, na širem kontekstu.
That's at least what we're going to try in these TED Dialogues, starting today. And we couldn't have anyone with us who I'd be more excited to kick this off. This is a mind right here that thinks pretty much like no one else on the planet, I would hasten to say. I'm serious.
To ćemo bar da pokušamo u ovim TED dijalozima, počevši od danas. I nije nam se mogao pridružiti bilo ko drugi zbog koga bih bio uzbuđeniji da otpočnemo s ovim. Ovde imamo um koji razmišlja prilično različito od svih drugih na planeti, ishitreno bih zaključio. Ozbiljan sam.
(Yuval Noah Harari laughs) I'm serious. He synthesizes history with underlying ideas in a way that kind of takes your breath away.
(Juval Noa Harari se smeje) Ozbiljan sam. Spaja istoriju sa idejama koje je prožimaju, tako da vam to nekako oduzima dah.
So, some of you will know this book, "Sapiens." Has anyone here read "Sapiens"?
Dakle, nekima od vas je poznata ova knjiga: "Sapijens". Da li je neko pročitao "Sapijensa"?
(Applause) I mean, I could not put it down. The way that he tells the story of mankind through big ideas that really make you think differently -- it's kind of amazing. And here's the follow-up, which I think is being published in the US next week.
(Aplauz) Mislim, nisam mogao da je odložim. Način na koji pripoveda o čovečanstvu putem velikih ideja, zaista vas tera da razmišljate drugačije - nekako je divno. A ovde imamo nastavak, koji mislim da će da bude objavljen u SAD-u sledeće nedelje.
YNH: Yeah, next week.
JNH: Da, sledeće nedelje.
CA: "Homo Deus." Now, this is the history of the next hundred years. I've had a chance to read it. It's extremely dramatic, and I daresay, for some people, quite alarming. It's a must-read. And honestly, we couldn't have someone better to help make sense of what on Earth is happening in the world right now. So a warm welcome, please, to Yuval Noah Harari.
KA: "Homo deus". Sad, ovo je istorija narednih stotinu godina. Imao sam priliku da je pročitam. Izuzetno je dramatična, i usudio bih se da kažem, za neke ljude, prilično alarmantna. To je obavezno štivo. I, iskreno, nismo mogli dovesti nekog boljeg da nam pomogne da razumemo šta se, za ime boga, dešava trenutno u svetu. Dakle, poželite toplu dobordošlicu, molim vas, Juvalu Noi Harari.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)
It's great to be joined by our friends on Facebook and around the Web. Hello, Facebook. And all of you, as I start asking questions of Yuval, come up with your own questions, and not necessarily about the political scandal du jour, but about the broader understanding of: Where are we heading? You ready? OK, we're going to go.
Sjajno je što su sa nama naši prijatelji sa Fejsbuka i širom interneta. Zdravo, Fejsbuk. I svi vi, kako počnem da postavljam pitanja Juvalu, vi smislite sopstvena pitanja i to ne nužno o gorućem političkom skandalu, već o širem razumevanju toga: kuda smo se zaputili? Da li ste spremni? U redu, počinjemo.
So here we are, Yuval: New York City, 2017, there's a new president in power, and shock waves rippling around the world. What on Earth is happening?
Dakle, evo nas, Juval: grad Njujork 2017, imamo novog predsednika na vlasti i seizmičke talase širom sveta. Šta se, za ime boga, dešava?
YNH: I think the basic thing that happened is that we have lost our story. Humans think in stories, and we try to make sense of the world by telling stories. And for the last few decades, we had a very simple and very attractive story about what's happening in the world. And the story said that, oh, what's happening is that the economy is being globalized, politics is being liberalized, and the combination of the two will create paradise on Earth, and we just need to keep on globalizing the economy and liberalizing the political system, and everything will be wonderful. And 2016 is the moment when a very large segment, even of the Western world, stopped believing in this story. For good or bad reasons -- it doesn't matter. People stopped believing in the story, and when you don't have a story, you don't understand what's happening.
JNH: Mislim da je osnovno što se desilo to da smo izgubili našu priču. Ljudska bića misle kroz priče i pokušavamo da osmislimo svet tako što pričamo priče. A u poslednjih par decenija imali smo veoma jednostavnu i veoma privlačnu priču o tome šta se dešava u svetu. A priča je glasila: oh, dešava se to da ekonomija postaje globalizovana, politika postaje liberalizovana, a kombinacija ovo dvoje će da stvori raj na zemlji, te mi prosto moramo da nastavimo da globalizujemo ekonomiju i da liberalizujemo politički sistem i sve će da bude bajno. A 2016. je treunutak kada je veoma veliki segment, čak i zapadnog sveta, prestao da veruje u tu priču. Zbog valjanih ili loših razloga - nije važno. Ljudi su prestali da veruju u priču, a kada nemate priču, ne razumete šta se dešava.
CA: Part of you believes that that story was actually a very effective story. It worked.
KA: Deo tebe veruje da je ta priča zapravo bila veoma efikasna. Funkcionisala je.
YNH: To some extent, yes. According to some measurements, we are now in the best time ever for humankind. Today, for the first time in history, more people die from eating too much than from eating too little, which is an amazing achievement.
JNH: Do određene mere jeste. Prema nekim merenjima, trenutno živimo u najboljem periodu za čovečanstvo. Danas, prvi put u istoriji, više ljudi umire od prejedavanja nego od neuhranjenosti, a to je neverovatno dostignuće.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
Also for the first time in history, more people die from old age than from infectious diseases, and violence is also down. For the first time in history, more people commit suicide than are killed by crime and terrorism and war put together. Statistically, you are your own worst enemy. At least, of all the people in the world, you are most likely to be killed by yourself --
Takođe, prvi put u istoriji, više ljudi umire od starosti nego od zaraznih bolesti, i nasilje je takođe u padu. Prvi put u istoriji, više ljudi izvrši samoubistvo nego što pogine od zločina, terorizma i rata, sveukupno. Statistički, sami ste svoj najveći neprijatelj. Bar od svih ljudi na svetu, najveće su šanse da sami sebe ubijete -
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
which is, again, very good news, compared --
što su, opet, veoma dobre vesti, u poređenju -
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
compared to the level of violence that we saw in previous eras.
u poređenju sa stepenom nasilja koje smo gledali prethodnih era.
CA: But this process of connecting the world ended up with a large group of people kind of feeling left out, and they've reacted. And so we have this bombshell that's sort of ripping through the whole system. I mean, what do you make of what's happened? It feels like the old way that people thought of politics, the left-right divide, has been blown up and replaced. How should we think of this?
KA: Ali ovaj proces povezivanja sveta je završen tako što su se velike grupe ljudi osećale nekako izostavljenim i reagovale su. Stoga imamo tu eksploziju koja nekako cepa čitav ovaj sistem. Mislim, kako da razumemo to što se dogodilo? Čini se da je stari način na koji su ljudi razmišljali o politici, podela na levo i desno, da je razbijena i zamenjena. Kako da gledamo na ovo?
YNH: Yeah, the old 20th-century political model of left versus right is now largely irrelevant, and the real divide today is between global and national, global or local. And you see it again all over the world that this is now the main struggle. We probably need completely new political models and completely new ways of thinking about politics. In essence, what you can say is that we now have global ecology, we have a global economy but we have national politics, and this doesn't work together. This makes the political system ineffective, because it has no control over the forces that shape our life. And you have basically two solutions to this imbalance: either de-globalize the economy and turn it back into a national economy, or globalize the political system.
JNH: Da, stari politički model iz XX veka, levica protiv desnice, je trenutno većim delom nevažan, a danas je stvarna podela između globalizma i nacionalizma, globalno ili lokalno. I vidite ponovo širom sveta da je ovo trenutno glavno previranje. Verovatno su nam potrebni potpuno novi politički modeli i potpuno novi načini razmišljanja o politici. U suštini, moglo bi se reći da trenutno imamo globalnu ekologiju, imamo globalnu ekonomiju, ali nam je politika nacionalna, a to ne ide jedno s drugim. Zbog ovoga je politički sistem neefikasan jer nema kontrolu nad silama koje oblikuju naš život. I u suštini imate dva rešenja za ovaj disbalans: deglobalizujte ekonomiju i vratite je nazad u nacionalnu ekonomiju ili globalizujte politički sistem.
CA: So some, I guess many liberals out there view Trump and his government as kind of irredeemably bad, just awful in every way. Do you see any underlying narrative or political philosophy in there that is at least worth understanding? How would you articulate that philosophy? Is it just the philosophy of nationalism?
KA: Dakle, neki, pretpostavljam mnogi liberali tamo negde vide Trampa i njegovu vladu kao nepopravljivo loše, prosto grozne na sve načine. Da li vidiš neki prožimajući narativ ili političku filozofiju tu, barem koje vredi razumeti? Kako bi artikulisao tu filozofiju? Da li je to samo filozofija nacionalizma?
YNH: I think the underlying feeling or idea is that the political system -- something is broken there. It doesn't empower the ordinary person anymore. It doesn't care so much about the ordinary person anymore, and I think this diagnosis of the political disease is correct. With regard to the answers, I am far less certain.
JNH: Mislim da je prožimajuće osećanje ili ideja ta da je politički sistem - da je nešto tu pokvareno. Više ne osnažuje obične ljude. Više naročito ne mari za obične ljude i mislim da je ova dijagnoza političkog oboljenja tačna. Što se tiče odgovora, daleko manje sam ubeđen.
I think what we are seeing is the immediate human reaction: if something doesn't work, let's go back. And you see it all over the world, that people, almost nobody in the political system today, has any future-oriented vision of where humankind is going. Almost everywhere, you see retrograde vision: "Let's make America great again," like it was great -- I don't know -- in the '50s, in the '80s, sometime, let's go back there. And you go to Russia a hundred years after Lenin, Putin's vision for the future is basically, ah, let's go back to the Tsarist empire. And in Israel, where I come from, the hottest political vision of the present is: "Let's build the temple again." So let's go back 2,000 years backwards. So people are thinking sometime in the past we've lost it, and sometimes in the past, it's like you've lost your way in the city, and you say OK, let's go back to the point where I felt secure and start again. I don't think this can work, but a lot of people, this is their gut instinct.
Mislim da gledamo trenutnu ljudsku reakciju: ako nešto ne funkcioniše, vratimo se na staro. A vidite to širom sveta da ljudi, skoro da niko u današnjem političkom sistemu, nema nekakvu viziju okrenutu ka budućnosti o tome kuda ide čovečanstvo. Skoro svuda vidite retrogradnu viziju: "Učinimo Ameriku velikom ponovo", kao da je bila velika - ne znam - 50-ih, 80-ih nekad tad, vratimo se tamo. I pođete u Rusiju, 100 godina nakon Lenjina, Putinova vizija za budućnost je u suštini, ah, vratimo se u carsku imperiju. A u Izraelu, odakle potičem, najnovija politička vizija današnjice glasi: "Sagradimo ponovo hram." Zato vratimo se 2000 godina unazad. Dakle, ljudi smatraju da nam je nekad nešto u prošlosti izmaklo a ponekad u prošlosti, to je kao kad se izgubite u gradu i kažete, u redu, vratimo se do tačke u kojoj smo se osećali bezbedno i počnimo ponovo. Mislim da ovo ne može da deluje, ali za mnoge ljude ovo je instinktivni osećaj.
CA: But why couldn't it work? "America First" is a very appealing slogan in many ways. Patriotism is, in many ways, a very noble thing. It's played a role in promoting cooperation among large numbers of people. Why couldn't you have a world organized in countries, all of which put themselves first?
KA: Ali zašto ne bi delovalo? "Amerika na prvom mestu" je na razne načine veoma privlačan slogan. Patriotizam je na razne načine veoma plemenita stvar. Odigrao je ulogu u unapređenju saradnje među velikim brojem ljudi. Zašto ne možemo da imamo svet organizovan u države, a da sve one sebe stavljaju na prvo mesto.
YNH: For many centuries, even thousands of years, patriotism worked quite well. Of course, it led to wars an so forth, but we shouldn't focus too much on the bad. There are also many, many positive things about patriotism, and the ability to have a large number of people care about each other, sympathize with one another, and come together for collective action. If you go back to the first nations, so, thousands of years ago, the people who lived along the Yellow River in China -- it was many, many different tribes and they all depended on the river for survival and for prosperity, but all of them also suffered from periodical floods and periodical droughts. And no tribe could really do anything about it, because each of them controlled just a tiny section of the river.
JNH: Mnogo vekova, čak hiljadama godina, patriotizam je funkcionisao prilično dobro. Naravno, uzrokovao je ratove itd, ali ne bi trebalo da se previše usredsređujemo na loše strane. Takođe postoje mnoge, mnoge pozitivne stvari kod patriotizma i mogućnosti da imate veliki broj ljudi koji mare jedni za druge, saosećaju jedni s drugima i okupljaju se radi kolektivnog delanja. Ako se vratite do prvih nacija, dakle, hiljadama godina unazad, ljudi koji su živeli duž reke Huanghe u Kini - bilo je tu mnogo, mnogo različitih plemena i opstanak i prosperitet svih njih je zavisio od reke, ali svi oni su takođe ispaštali od sporadičnih poplava i periodičnih suša. I nijedno pleme zaista nije moglo da uradi bilo šta povodom toga jer je svako od njih kontrolisalo samo sićušni deo reke.
And then in a long and complicated process, the tribes coalesced together to form the Chinese nation, which controlled the entire Yellow River and had the ability to bring hundreds of thousands of people together to build dams and canals and regulate the river and prevent the worst floods and droughts and raise the level of prosperity for everybody. And this worked in many places around the world.
A potom, tokom dugog i složenog procesa, plemena su se ujedinila kako bi osnovala kinesku naciju, koja je kontrolisala čitavu reku Huanghe i imala je sposobnost da ujedini na stotine hiljada ljudi kako bi sagradili brane i kanale i da bi regulisali reku i sprečili najgore poplave i suše i podigli nivo napretka za sve. A to je funkcionisalo na mnogim mestima širom sveta.
But in the 21st century, technology is changing all that in a fundamental way. We are now living -- all people in the world -- are living alongside the same cyber river, and no single nation can regulate this river by itself. We are all living together on a single planet, which is threatened by our own actions. And if you don't have some kind of global cooperation, nationalism is just not on the right level to tackle the problems, whether it's climate change or whether it's technological disruption.
Međutim, u XXI veku, tehnologija sve to menja na temeljan način. Trenutno živimo - svi ljudi na svetu - živimo duž iste sajber reke i nijedna nacija samostalno ne može da reguliše ovu reku. Svi živimo zajedno na jednoj planeti, koja je ugrožena našim sopstvenim postupcima. A ako nemate nekakav vid globalne saradnje, nacionalizam prosto nije na odgovarajućem nivou da se izbori s problemima, bilo da se radi o klimatskim promenama ili tehnološkom raskolu.
CA: So it was a beautiful idea in a world where most of the action, most of the issues, took place on national scale, but your argument is that the issues that matter most today no longer take place on a national scale but on a global scale.
KA: Dakle, bila je to prelepa ideja u svetu u kom se većina postupaka, većina pitanja odigravalo u nacionalnim razmerama, ali tvoj argument je da pitanja, koja su danas najvažnija, više se ne odigravaju u nacionalnim razmerama, već u globalnim.
YNH: Exactly. All the major problems of the world today are global in essence, and they cannot be solved unless through some kind of global cooperation. It's not just climate change, which is, like, the most obvious example people give. I think more in terms of technological disruption. If you think about, for example, artificial intelligence, over the next 20, 30 years pushing hundreds of millions of people out of the job market -- this is a problem on a global level. It will disrupt the economy of all the countries.
JNH: Baš tako. Svi veći problemi današnjeg sveta su u srži globalni i ne mogu da se reše bez nekog vida globalne saradnje. Nisu to samo klimatske promene, a to je nekako najočigledniji primer koji ljudi navode. Ja razmišljam više u smeru tehnološkog raskola. Ako razmišljate, na primer, o veštačkoj inteligenciji, u narednih 20, 30 godina će da izgura stotine miliona ljudi sa tržišta rada - ovo je problem na globalnom nivou. Poremetiće ekonomiju svih država.
And similarly, if you think about, say, bioengineering and people being afraid of conducting, I don't know, genetic engineering research in humans, it won't help if just a single country, let's say the US, outlaws all genetic experiments in humans, but China or North Korea continues to do it. So the US cannot solve it by itself, and very quickly, the pressure on the US to do the same will be immense because we are talking about high-risk, high-gain technologies. If somebody else is doing it, I can't allow myself to remain behind. The only way to have regulations, effective regulations, on things like genetic engineering, is to have global regulations. If you just have national regulations, nobody would like to stay behind.
I slično, ako razmišljate, recimo, o bioinženjeringu i o ljudskom strahu sprovođenja, ne znam, istraživanja genetskog inženjeringa na ljudima, neće pomoći, ako samo jedna država, recimo SAD, stavi van zakona sve genetske eksperimente na ljudima, ali Kina ili Severna Koreja nastave to da rade. Dakle, SAD to ne mogu same rešiti i veoma brzo, pritisak na SAD da učini isto će da bude ogroman jer govorimo o tehnologiji visokog rizika i visokih dobitaka. Ako neko drugi to radi, ne mogu sebi da dozvolim zaostajanje. Jedini način da imamo propise, efikasne propise, za stvari, poput genetskog inženjeringa, je da imamo globalne propise. Ako samo budete imali nacionalne propise, nikome se neće zaostajati.
CA: So this is really interesting. It seems to me that this may be one key to provoking at least a constructive conversation between the different sides here, because I think everyone can agree that the start point of a lot of the anger that's propelled us to where we are is because of the legitimate concerns about job loss. Work is gone, a traditional way of life has gone, and it's no wonder that people are furious about that. And in general, they have blamed globalism, global elites, for doing this to them without asking their permission, and that seems like a legitimate complaint.
KA: Dakle, ovo je zaista zanimljivo. Čini mi se da bi ovo mogao da bude uzrok bar izazivanja konstruktivnog razgovora između različitih strana ovde jer smatram da će se svi složiti da je početna tačka za veći deo besa koji nas je doveo tu gde jesmo je zbog osnovane zabrinutosti zbog gubitka poslova. Poslova više nema, tradicionalni način života je za nama i ne čudi što su ljudi besni zbog toga. A uopšteno su krivili globalizam, globalističke elite što su im to uradili, a da ih nisu pitali za dozvolu i to se čini kao osnovana žalba.
But what I hear you saying is that -- so a key question is: What is the real cause of job loss, both now and going forward? To the extent that it's about globalism, then the right response, yes, is to shut down borders and keep people out and change trade agreements and so forth. But you're saying, I think, that actually the bigger cause of job loss is not going to be that at all. It's going to originate in technological questions, and we have no chance of solving that unless we operate as a connected world.
Međutim, razumem da ti govoriš da - dakle, ključno pitanje je: šta je istinski uzrok gubitka poslova, kako sada, tako i u budućnosti? U slučaju da se radi o globalizmu, onda je ispravan odgovor, naravno, da zatvorimo granice i držimo ljude podalje i da izmenimo trgovinske sporazume itd. Ali ti, verujem, govoriš da zapravo veći uzrok gubitka poslova neće uopšte da bude taj. Nastaće kod tehnoloških pitanja i nemamo načina da to rešimo, ukoliko ne sarađujemo kao povezan svet.
YNH: Yeah, I think that, I don't know about the present, but looking to the future, it's not the Mexicans or Chinese who will take the jobs from the people in Pennsylvania, it's the robots and algorithms. So unless you plan to build a big wall on the border of California --
JNH: Da, tako razmišljam. Ne znam za sadašnjost, ali gledajući u budućnost, neće biti Meksikanci ili Kinezi ti koji će oduzeti poslove ljudima iz Pensilvanije, već roboti i algoritmi. Pa, osim ako planirate da sagradite veliki zid na granici s Kalifornijom -
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
the wall on the border with Mexico is going to be very ineffective. And I was struck when I watched the debates before the election, I was struck that certainly Trump did not even attempt to frighten people by saying the robots will take your jobs. Now even if it's not true, it doesn't matter. It could have been an extremely effective way of frightening people --
zid na granici s Meksikom će da bude veoma neefikasan. I bio sam zatečen kad sam posmatrao debate pre izbora, bio sam zatečen da izvesno Tramp nije čak ni pokušao da zastraši ljude, govoreći da će im roboti uzeti poslove. Sad, čak i da nije istina, nije važno. Mogao je to da bude izuzetno efikasan način plašenja ljudi -
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
and galvanizing people: "The robots will take your jobs!" And nobody used that line. And it made me afraid, because it meant that no matter what happens in universities and laboratories, and there, there is already an intense debate about it, but in the mainstream political system and among the general public, people are just unaware that there could be an immense technological disruption -- not in 200 years, but in 10, 20, 30 years -- and we have to do something about it now, partly because most of what we teach children today in school or in college is going to be completely irrelevant to the job market of 2040, 2050. So it's not something we'll need to think about in 2040. We need to think today what to teach the young people.
i podsticanja ljudi: "Roboti će da vam uzmu poslove!" A niko nije koristio tu rečenicu. A to me je uplašilo jer je značilo da šta god da se desi na univerzitetima i u laboratorijama, a tu, tu se već vodi intenzivna debata o tome, ali u mejnstrim političkom sistemu i među javnošću, ljudi su prosto nesvesni da bi moglo da dođe do ogromnog tehnološkog raskola - ne za 200 godina, već za 10, 20, 30 godina - i moramo nešto da poduzmemo odmah, delom jer će većina onoga što podučavamo današnju decu u školi ili na fakultetu biti potpuno nevažno za tržište rada u 2040, 2050. Dakle, ne radi se o nečemu o čemu ćemo morati da mislimo 2040. Moramo da razmišljamo danas šta da podučavamo mlade ljude.
CA: Yeah, no, absolutely. You've often written about moments in history where humankind has ... entered a new era, unintentionally. Decisions have been made, technologies have been developed, and suddenly the world has changed, possibly in a way that's worse for everyone. So one of the examples you give in "Sapiens" is just the whole agricultural revolution, which, for an actual person tilling the fields, they just picked up a 12-hour backbreaking workday instead of six hours in the jungle and a much more interesting lifestyle.
KA: Da, ne, apsolutno. Često si pisao o trenucima u istoriji u kojima je čovečanstvo... ušlo u novu eru, nenamerno. Odluke su donesene, razvijena je tehnologija i iznenada se svet promenio, moguće na način koji je gori za sve. Dakle, jedan od primera navedenih "Sapijensu" je čitava zemljoradnička revlucija, koja, za stvarnu osobu koja obrađuje polja, prosto su odabrali 12-očasovni iscrpljujući radni dan, umesto šestočasovnog rada u džungli i daleko zanimljivijeg načina života.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
So are we at another possible phase change here, where we kind of sleepwalk into a future that none of us actually wants?
Dakle, jesmo li kod još jedne moguće faze promena ovde, gde nekako mesečarimo u budućnost koju zapravo niko od nas ne želi?
YNH: Yes, very much so. During the agricultural revolution, what happened is that immense technological and economic revolution empowered the human collective, but when you look at actual individual lives, the life of a tiny elite became much better, and the lives of the majority of people became considerably worse. And this can happen again in the 21st century. No doubt the new technologies will empower the human collective. But we may end up again with a tiny elite reaping all the benefits, taking all the fruits, and the masses of the population finding themselves worse than they were before, certainly much worse than this tiny elite.
JNH: Da, poprilično je tako. Tokom zemljoradničke revolucije, desilo se to da je ogromna tehnološka i ekonomska revolucija osnažila ljudski kolektiv, ali ako pogledate u stvarne živote pojedinaca, život uske elite je postao mnogo bolji, a životi većine ljudi su postali značajno gori. A to može ponovo da se desi u XXI veku. Nesumnjivo će nova tehnologija da osnaži ljudski kolektiv. Ali možda ponovo završimo tako što malobrojna elita požanje sve prednosti, pobere sve plodove, a narodne mase se zateknu u gorem stanju nego što im je bilo pre, sigurno mnogo gorem od ove malobrojne elite.
CA: And those elites might not even be human elites. They might be cyborgs or --
KA: A ta elita možda čak neće biti ljudska elita. Mogli bi da budu kiborzi ili -
YNH: Yeah, they could be enhanced super humans. They could be cyborgs. They could be completely nonorganic elites. They could even be non-conscious algorithms. What we see now in the world is authority shifting away from humans to algorithms. More and more decisions -- about personal lives, about economic matters, about political matters -- are actually being taken by algorithms. If you ask the bank for a loan, chances are your fate is decided by an algorithm, not by a human being. And the general impression is that maybe Homo sapiens just lost it.
JNH: Da, mogli bi da budu unapređeni superljudi. Mogli bi da budu kiborzi. Mogli bi da budu u potpunosti neorganska elita. Mogli bi čak da budu nesvesni algoritmi. Trenutno gledamo kako autoritet u svetu prelazi sa ljudi na algoritme. Sve više odluka - o ličnim životima, o ekonomskim pitanjima, o političkim pitanjima - donose algoritmi. Ako zatražite zajam od banke, sve su prilike da će o vašoj sudbini odlučivati algoritam, a ne ljudsko biće. A opšti utisak je da je možda Homo sapijens prosto izgubio kontrolu.
The world is so complicated, there is so much data, things are changing so fast, that this thing that evolved on the African savanna tens of thousands of years ago -- to cope with a particular environment, a particular volume of information and data -- it just can't handle the realities of the 21st century, and the only thing that may be able to handle it is big-data algorithms. So no wonder more and more authority is shifting from us to the algorithms.
Svet je toliko komplikovan, ima previše podataka, stvari se menjaju suviše brzo, da je ovo biće koje je evoluiralo u afričkim savanama pre više desetina hiljada godina - da se nosi sa određenim sredinama, određenom količinom informacija i podataka - da prosto ne može da izađe na kraj sa stvarnošću XXI veka, a jedino što može da izađe na kraj s tim su algoritmi za velike podatke. Te ne čudi što se autoritet sve više prebacuje s nas na algoritme.
CA: So we're in New York City for the first of a series of TED Dialogues with Yuval Harari, and there's a Facebook Live audience out there. We're excited to have you with us. We'll start coming to some of your questions and questions of people in the room in just a few minutes, so have those coming.
KA: Dakle, u Njujorku smo radi prvog u nizu TED dijaloga sa Juvalom Hararijem i uživo nas prati publika na Fejsbuku. Uzbuđeni smo što ste sa nama. Počećemo da se bavimo nekim vašim pitanjima i pitanjima ljudi u prostoriji za svega nekoliko minuta, pa neka stižu pitanja.
Yuval, if you're going to make the argument that we need to get past nationalism because of the coming technological ... danger, in a way, presented by so much of what's happening we've got to have a global conversation about this. Trouble is, it's hard to get people really believing that, I don't know, AI really is an imminent threat, and so forth. The things that people, some people at least, care about much more immediately, perhaps, is climate change, perhaps other issues like refugees, nuclear weapons, and so forth. Would you argue that where we are right now that somehow those issues need to be dialed up? You've talked about climate change, but Trump has said he doesn't believe in that. So in a way, your most powerful argument, you can't actually use to make this case.
Juval, ako ćeš da argumentuješ da moramo da prevaziđemo nacionalizam zbog predstojeće tehnološke... opasnosti, na neki način, koja je prikazana kroz razna dešavanja, moramo da imamo globalnu raspravu o ovome. Problem je što je teško uveriti ljude da, pojma nemam, da je VI zaista trenutna opasnost itd. Da stvari koje su ljudima, bar nekim ljudima, daleko hitnije za zabrinutost su klimatske promene, možda druga pitanja poput izbeglica, nuklearnog oružja itd. Da li bi tvrdio sa pozicije u kojoj smo trenutno da nekako treba naglasiti ta pitanja? Govorio si o klimatskim promenama, ali Tramp kaže da ne veruje u to. Pa, na neki način, tvoj najsnažniji argument, zapravo ga ne možeš koristiti ovde za ubeđivanje.
YNH: Yeah, I think with climate change, at first sight, it's quite surprising that there is a very close correlation between nationalism and climate change. I mean, almost always, the people who deny climate change are nationalists. And at first sight, you think: Why? What's the connection? Why don't you have socialists denying climate change? But then, when you think about it, it's obvious -- because nationalism has no solution to climate change. If you want to be a nationalist in the 21st century, you have to deny the problem. If you accept the reality of the problem, then you must accept that, yes, there is still room in the world for patriotism, there is still room in the world for having special loyalties and obligations towards your own people, towards your own country. I don't think anybody is really thinking of abolishing that.
JNH: Da, smatram da kod klimatskih promena, na prvi pogled, prilično je iznenađujuće da postoji veoma prisna veza između nacionalizma i klimatskih promena. Mislim, skoro uvek, ljudi koji poriču klimatske promene su nacionalisti. A, na prvi pogled, mislite: zašto? Gde je veza? Zašto socijalisti ne poriču klimatske promene? Ali onda, ako razmislite o tome, očigledno je - jer nacionalizam nema rešenje za klimatske promene. Ako želite da budete nacionalista u XXI veku, morate da poričete problem. Ako prihvatite da je problem stvaran, onda morate da prihvatite, da, i dalje ima mesta u svetu za patriotizam, i dalje ima mesta u svetu za iskazivanje naročite lojalnosti i obaveza prema svom narodu, prema sopstvenoj državi. Ne smatram da iko razmišlja da to ukine.
But in order to confront climate change, we need additional loyalties and commitments to a level beyond the nation. And that should not be impossible, because people can have several layers of loyalty. You can be loyal to your family and to your community and to your nation, so why can't you also be loyal to humankind as a whole? Of course, there are occasions when it becomes difficult, what to put first, but, you know, life is difficult. Handle it.
Međutim, da biste se suprotstavili klimatskim promenama, potrebna nam je dodatna lojalnost i posvećenost na nivou većem od nacionalnog. A to ne bi trebalo da bude nemoguće jer ljudi mogu da imaju više slojeva lojalnosti. Možete da budete lojalni svojoj porodici i svojoj zajednici i svojoj naciji, pa zašto ne biste bili takođe lojalni celokupnom čovečanstvu? Naravno, postoje situacije kada to postane teško, šta da stavite na prvo mesto, ali, znate, život je težak. Nosite se s tim.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
CA: OK, so I would love to get some questions from the audience here. We've got a microphone here. Speak into it, and Facebook, get them coming, too.
KA: U redu. Voleo bih da publika ovde postavi neko pitanje. Imamo mikrofon ovde. Govorite u njega, a Fejsbuk, neka i oni šalju pitanja.
Howard Morgan: One of the things that has clearly made a huge difference in this country and other countries is the income distribution inequality, the dramatic change in income distribution in the US from what it was 50 years ago, and around the world. Is there anything we can do to affect that? Because that gets at a lot of the underlying causes.
Hauard Morgan: Jedna od stvari koja je očito imala veliki uticaj u ovoj državi i drugim državama je nejednaka raspodela prihoda, drastična promena u raspodeli prihoda u SAD-u od onoga što je bilo pre 50 godina, kao i širom sveta. Postoji li nešto što možemo da uradimo da bismo uticali na to? Jer to nas vodi mnogim sveprožimajućim uzrocima.
YNH: So far I haven't heard a very good idea about what to do about it, again, partly because most ideas remain on the national level, and the problem is global. I mean, one idea that we hear quite a lot about now is universal basic income. But this is a problem. I mean, I think it's a good start, but it's a problematic idea because it's not clear what "universal" is and it's not clear what "basic" is. Most people when they speak about universal basic income, they actually mean national basic income. But the problem is global.
JNH: Do sad nisam čuo naročito dobru zamisao šta da radimo povodom toga, opet, delimično jer većina ideja ostaje na nacionalnom nivou, a problem je globalan. Jedna zamisao koju trenutno mnogo slušamo je o univerzalnom osnovnom prihodu. Međutim, to je problem. Mislim, smatram to dobrim početkom, ali je zamisao problematična jer nije jasno šta je "univerzalno" i nije jasno šta je "osnovno". Mnogi ljudi kada govore o univerzalnom osnovnom prihodu, zapravo misle na nacionalni osnovni prihod. Međutim, problem je globalan.
Let's say that you have AI and 3D printers taking away millions of jobs in Bangladesh, from all the people who make my shirts and my shoes. So what's going to happen? The US government will levy taxes on Google and Apple in California, and use that to pay basic income to unemployed Bangladeshis? If you believe that, you can just as well believe that Santa Claus will come and solve the problem. So unless we have really universal and not national basic income, the deep problems are not going to go away.
Recimo da vam VI i 3D štampači oduzimaju milione poslova u Bangladešu, svim tim ljudima koji mi prave košulje i cipele. Pa, šta će da se desi? Vlada SAD-a će da nametne poreze Guglu i Eplu u Kaliforniji, i koristiće to da plaćaju osnovni prihod nezaposlenim Bangladešanima? Ako verujete u to, možete slobodno da verujete da će doći Deda Mraz i rešiti problem. Ako ne budemo imali zaista univerzalan, a ne nacionalni osnovni prihod, veliki problemi neće nestati.
And also it's not clear what basic is, because what are basic human needs? A thousand years ago, just food and shelter was enough. But today, people will say education is a basic human need, it should be part of the package. But how much? Six years? Twelve years? PhD? Similarly, with health care, let's say that in 20, 30, 40 years, you'll have expensive treatments that can extend human life to 120, I don't know. Will this be part of the basket of basic income or not? It's a very difficult problem, because in a world where people lose their ability to be employed, the only thing they are going to get is this basic income. So what's part of it is a very, very difficult ethical question.
A takođe nije jasno šta je osnovno, jer šta su osnovne ljudske potrebe? Pre hiljadu godina, samo hrana i smeštaj su bili dovoljni. Međutim, danas će ljudi da kažu da je obrazovanje osnovna ljudska potreba, trebalo bi da bude u paketu s tim. Međutim, koliko? Šest godina? Dvanaest godina? Doktorat? Slično je i sa zdravstvenom zaštitom, recimo da ćete za 20, 30, 40 godina imati skupe tretmane koji će moći da produže ljudski život do 120 godina, pojma nemam. Hoće li ovo da bude deo paketa osnovnog prihoda ili neće? To je veoma težak problem jer u svetu u kom ljudi gube mogućnost zapošljavanja, jedino što će da primaju je ovaj osnovni prihod. Pa, šta spada u to je veoma teško etičko pitanje.
CA: There's a bunch of questions on how the world affords it as well, who pays. There's a question here from Facebook from Lisa Larson: "How does nationalism in the US now compare to that between World War I and World War II in the last century?"
KA: Takođe imamo gomilu pitanja o tome kako će to svet da priušti, ko će da plati. Imamo pitanje sa Fejsbuka od Lise Larson: "Kako se trenutni nacionalizam u SAD-u može porediti sa onim između Prvog i Drugog svetskog rata u prošlom veku?"
YNH: Well the good news, with regard to the dangers of nationalism, we are in a much better position than a century ago. A century ago, 1917, Europeans were killing each other by the millions. In 2016, with Brexit, as far as I remember, a single person lost their life, an MP who was murdered by some extremist. Just a single person. I mean, if Brexit was about British independence, this is the most peaceful war of independence in human history. And let's say that Scotland will now choose to leave the UK after Brexit.
JNH: Pa, dobre vesti su, kod opasnosti od nacionalizma, da smo u mnogo boljoj situaciji nego pre jednog veka. Pre jednog veka, 1917, Evropljani su se međusobno ubijali na milione. U 2016, kod Bregzita, koliko se sećam, jedna osoba je izgubila život, poslanika skupštine su ubili ekstremisti. Samo jedna osoba. Mislim, ako je Bregzit bio o britanskoj nezavisnosti, ovo je najmirniji rat za nezavisnost u ljudskoj istoriji. I recimo da Škotska sad odluči da napusti Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nakon Bregzita.
So in the 18th century, if Scotland wanted -- and the Scots wanted several times -- to break out of the control of London, the reaction of the government in London was to send an army up north to burn down Edinburgh and massacre the highland tribes. My guess is that if, in 2018, the Scots vote for independence, the London government will not send an army up north to burn down Edinburgh. Very few people are now willing to kill or be killed for Scottish or for British independence. So for all the talk of the rise of nationalism and going back to the 1930s, to the 19th century, in the West at least, the power of national sentiments today is far, far smaller than it was a century ago.
Dakle, u XVIII veku, ako je Škotska želela - a Škoti jesu želeli nekoliko puta - da se oslobodi kontrole Londona, reakcija vlade iz Londona bila je da pošalje vojsku na sever da spali Edinburg i masakrira plemena na visoravnima. Moja pretpostavka je da ako u 2018. Škoti izglasaju nezavisnost, vlada iz Londona neće slati armiju na sever da spali Edinburg. Veoma je malo ljudi danas voljno da ubija i bude ubijeno za škotsku ili britansku nezavisnost. Pa, povodom svih rasprava o usponu nacionalizma i vraćanju u 1930-te, u XIX vek, bar na Zapadu, danas je moć nacionalnog osećanja daleko, daleko manja nego što je bila pre jednog veka.
CA: Although some people now, you hear publicly worrying about whether that might be shifting, that there could actually be outbreaks of violence in the US depending on how things turn out. Should we be worried about that, or do you really think things have shifted?
KA: Iako čujemo da se neki ljudi trenutno brinu zbog toga da bi se to moglo promeniti, da bi zapravo moglo da dođe do izbijanja nasilja u SAD-u, u zavisnosti od toga kako sve ispadne. Da li treba da brinemo oko toga ili zaista smatraš da su se stvari promenile?
YNH: No, we should be worried. We should be aware of two things. First of all, don't be hysterical. We are not back in the First World War yet. But on the other hand, don't be complacent. We reached from 1917 to 2017, not by some divine miracle, but simply by human decisions, and if we now start making the wrong decisions, we could be back in an analogous situation to 1917 in a few years. One of the things I know as a historian is that you should never underestimate human stupidity.
JNH: Ne, treba brinuti. Treba da smo svesni dve stvari. Pre svega, ne budite histerični. Još uvek se nismo vratili u Prvi svetski rat. Međutim, s druge strane, ne budite samozadovoljni. Stigli smo od 1917. do 2017. ne nekim božanskim čudom, već prosto ljudskim odlukama, a ako sad počnemo da donosimo pogrešne odluke, mogli bismo da se vratimo u situaciju analognu onoj iz 1917, za nekoliko godina. Kao istoričar, znam jedno a to je da nikad ne bi trebalo potcenjivati ljudsku glupost.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
It's one of the most powerful forces in history, human stupidity and human violence. Humans do such crazy things for no obvious reason, but again, at the same time, another very powerful force in human history is human wisdom. We have both.
To je jedna od najmoćnijih sila u istoriji, ljudska glupost i ljudsko nasilje. Ljudi rade tako sulude stvari bez vidljivog razloga, ali opet, istovremeno, još jedna snažna sila u ljudskoj istoriji je ljudska mudrost. Posedujemo obe.
CA: We have with us here moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who I think has a question.
KA: Sa nama je ovde psiholog morala, Džonatan Hajt, mislim da ima pitanje.
Jonathan Haidt: Thanks, Yuval. So you seem to be a fan of global governance, but when you look at the map of the world from Transparency International, which rates the level of corruption of political institutions, it's a vast sea of red with little bits of yellow here and there for those with good institutions. So if we were to have some kind of global governance, what makes you think it would end up being more like Denmark rather than more like Russia or Honduras, and aren't there alternatives, such as we did with CFCs? There are ways to solve global problems with national governments. What would world government actually look like, and why do you think it would work?
Džonatan Hajt: Hvala Juval. Dakle, čini se da si pristalica globalne vladavine, ali ako pogledaš kartu sveta Transparensi internešnala, koja ocenjuje nivo korupcije u političkim institucijama, to je ogromno more crvene sa komadićima žute tu i tamo kod onih sa dobrim institucijama. Pa, ukoliko bismo imali neki vid globalne vladavine, zbog čega smatraš da će ona na kraju više ličiti na Dansku nego na Rusiju ili Honduras, i zar nemamo alternative, kao što smo imali kod hlorofluorougljenika? Ima načina da se reše globalni problemi sa nacionalnim vladama. Kako bi svetska vlada zapravo izgledala i zašto smatraš da bi funkcionisala?
YNH: Well, I don't know what it would look like. Nobody still has a model for that. The main reason we need it is because many of these issues are lose-lose situations. When you have a win-win situation like trade, both sides can benefit from a trade agreement, then this is something you can work out. Without some kind of global government, national governments each have an interest in doing it. But when you have a lose-lose situation like with climate change, it's much more difficult without some overarching authority, real authority.
JNH: Pa, ne znam kako bi izgledala. Niko i dalje nema obrazac za to. Glavni razlog zašto nam je potrebna je jer su mnoga ova pitanja situacije bez pobednika. Kada imate situaciju gde svi pobeđuju, poput trgovine, obe strane mogu da imaju korist od trgovinskog sporazuma, onda je to nešto oko čega možete da se dogovorite. Bez nekog vida globalne vlade, nacionalne vlade pojedinačno imaju interes da se time bave. Ali kad imate situaciju bez pobednika, kao u slučaju klimatskih promena, daleko je teže bez nekog sveobuhvatnog autoriteta, stvarnog autoriteta.
Now, how to get there and what would it look like, I don't know. And certainly there is no obvious reason to think that it would look like Denmark, or that it would be a democracy. Most likely it wouldn't. We don't have workable democratic models for a global government. So maybe it would look more like ancient China than like modern Denmark. But still, given the dangers that we are facing, I think the imperative of having some kind of real ability to force through difficult decisions on the global level is more important than almost anything else.
Sad, kako da to postignete i kako bi to izgledalo, ne znam. I zasigurno da ne postoji vidljiv razlog da bi ličilo na Dansku ili da bi se radilo o demokratiji. Verovatno ne bi. Nemamo funkcionalne demokratske obrasce za globalnu vladu. Dakle, možda bi više ličila na drevnu Kinu nego na savremenu Dansku. Ali, ipak, s obzirom na opasnosti s kojima se suočavamo, mislim da je imperativ posedovanja nekog vida stvarne sposobnosti da se poguraju teške odluke na globalnom nivou daleko važniji gotovo od bilo čega drugog.
CA: There's a question from Facebook here, and then we'll get the mic to Andrew. So, Kat Hebron on Facebook, calling in from Vail: "How would developed nations manage the millions of climate migrants?"
KA: Ovde imamo pitanje sa Fejsbuka, a onda ćemo dati mikrofon Endruu. Dakle, Ket Hebron sa Fejsbuka, javlja se iz Vejla: "Kako bi se razvijene nacije snašle sa milionima klimatskih migranata?"
YNH: I don't know.
JNH: Ne znam.
CA: That's your answer, Kat. (Laughter)
KA: To vam je odgovor, Ket. (Smeh)
YNH: And I don't think that they know either. They'll just deny the problem, maybe.
JNH: I mislim da ni one ne znaju. Prosto će da poriču problem, možda.
CA: But immigration, generally, is another example of a problem that's very hard to solve on a nation-by-nation basis. One nation can shut its doors, but maybe that stores up problems for the future.
KA: Ali imigracija je generalno još jedan primer problema koji je veoma teško rešiti na nacionalnoj osnovi. Jedan narod može da zatvori vrata, ali možda to gomila probleme u budućnosti.
YNH: Yes, I mean -- it's another very good case, especially because it's so much easier to migrate today than it was in the Middle Ages or in ancient times.
JNH: Da, mislim - to je još jedan dobar primer, naročito jer je danas daleko lakše migrirati nego što je bilo u Srednjem veku ili u drevna vremena.
CA: Yuval, there's a belief among many technologists, certainly, that political concerns are kind of overblown, that actually, political leaders don't have that much influence in the world, that the real determination of humanity at this point is by science, by invention, by companies, by many things other than political leaders, and it's actually very hard for leaders to do much, so we're actually worrying about nothing here.
KA: Juval, postoji verovanje među mnogim tehničarima, zasigurno, da je politička zabrinutost nekako preuveličana, da političke vođe zapravo nemaju toliki uticaj u svetu, da je nauka ta koja u ovom trenutku odlučuje o čovečanstvu, izumima, firmama, mnogim stvarima mimo političkih vođa i zapravo je veoma teško za vođe da mnogo urade, pa se zapravo brinemo bez razloga.
YNH: Well, first, it should be emphasized that it's true that political leaders' ability to do good is very limited, but their ability to do harm is unlimited. There is a basic imbalance here. You can still press the button and blow everybody up. You have that kind of ability. But if you want, for example, to reduce inequality, that's very, very difficult. But to start a war, you can still do so very easily. So there is a built-in imbalance in the political system today which is very frustrating, where you cannot do a lot of good but you can still do a lot of harm. And this makes the political system still a very big concern.
JNH: Pa, prvo treba naglasiti da je istina da je ograničena mogućnost političkih vođa da urade nešto dobro, ali je njihova mogućnost da nanesu zlo neograničena. Tu počiva osnovna neravnoteža. Još uvek možete da pritisnete dugme i da sve raznesete. Imate mogućnost za to. Ali ako želite, na primer, da umanjite nejednakost, to je veoma, veoma teško. Ali da započnete rat, i dalje to možete veoma lako. Dakle, imamo ugrađenu neravnotežu u današnjem političkom sistemu koja je veoma frustrirajuća, gde ne možete mnogo dobrog da uradite, ali i dalje možete da nanesete mnogo zla. A zbog toga je politički sistem i dalje veoma velika briga.
CA: So as you look at what's happening today, and putting your historian's hat on, do you look back in history at moments when things were going just fine and an individual leader really took the world or their country backwards?
KA: Dakle, kad pogledaš šta se trenutno dešava i staviš šešir istoričara, da li se osvrneš u istoriju, na momente kada je sve išlo sasvim dobro, a pojedinačni vođa je zaista vratio svet ili svoju državu unazad?
YNH: There are quite a few examples, but I should emphasize, it's never an individual leader. I mean, somebody put him there, and somebody allowed him to continue to be there. So it's never really just the fault of a single individual. There are a lot of people behind every such individual.
JNH: Ima mnogo primera, ali ću da naglasim, nikad se ne radi o pojedinačnom vođi. Mislim, neko ga je smestio tu, i neko mu je dozvolio da nastavi da bude tu. Stoga nikad zaista nije krivica samo na pojedincu. Postoji mnogo ljudi iza svakog sličnog pojedinca.
CA: Can we have the microphone here, please, to Andrew?
KA: Možemo li da dodamo mikrofon ovde, molim vas, do Endrua?
Andrew Solomon: You've talked a lot about the global versus the national, but increasingly, it seems to me, the world situation is in the hands of identity groups. We look at people within the United States who have been recruited by ISIS. We look at these other groups which have formed which go outside of national bounds but still represent significant authorities. How are they to be integrated into the system, and how is a diverse set of identities to be made coherent under either national or global leadership?
Endru Solomon: Mnogo si govorio o globalnom protiv nacionalnog, ali čini mi se da je sve više situacija u svetu u rukama identitetskih grupa. Gledamo ljude u Sjedinjenim Državama koje je ISIS regrutovala. Vidimo formiranje drugih grupa koje prevazilaze nacionalne granice, ali i dalje predstavljaju značajne autoritete. Kako da ih integrišemo u sistem i kako da učinimo koherentnim različit skup identiteta pod bilo nacionalnim ili globalnim vođstvom?
YNH: Well, the problem of such diverse identities is a problem from nationalism as well. Nationalism believes in a single, monolithic identity, and exclusive or at least more extreme versions of nationalism believe in an exclusive loyalty to a single identity. And therefore, nationalism has had a lot of problems with people wanting to divide their identities between various groups. So it's not just a problem, say, for a global vision.
JNH: Pa, problem sa sličnim različitim identitetima je takođe problem nastao iz nacionalizma. Nacionalizam veruje u jedan, monolitan identitet, a isključujuća ili bar ekstremnija verzija nacionalizma veruje u isključivu lojalnost jednom identitetu. I stoga je nacionalizam imao mnogo problema sa ljudima koji su želeli da podele svoje identitete između različitih grupa. Dakle, to nije samo problem, recimo, za globalnu viziju.
And I think, again, history shows that you shouldn't necessarily think in such exclusive terms. If you think that there is just a single identity for a person, "I am just X, that's it, I can't be several things, I can be just that," that's the start of the problem. You have religions, you have nations that sometimes demand exclusive loyalty, but it's not the only option. There are many religions and many nations that enable you to have diverse identities at the same time.
I, opet, mislim, istorija pokazuje da ne bi nužno trebalo razmišljati u sličnom isključivom smislu. Ako smatrate da postoji samo jedan identitet za osobu: "Ja sam samo X, to je to, ne mogu da budem više stvari, mogu da budem samo to", to je početak problema. Imate religije, imate nacije koje ponekad zahtevaju isključivu lojalnost, ali to nije jedina opcija. Ima mnogo religija i mnogo nacija koje vam istovremeno omogućuju da imate raznolike identitete.
CA: But is one explanation of what's happened in the last year that a group of people have got fed up with, if you like, the liberal elites, for want of a better term, obsessing over many, many different identities and them feeling, "But what about my identity? I am being completely ignored here. And by the way, I thought I was the majority"? And that that's actually sparked a lot of the anger.
KA: Ali to je jedno od objašnjenja za to što se desilo prošle godine da je grupi ljudi dozlogrdila, ako hoćeš, liberalna elita, u nedostatku boljeg termina, koja je opsednuta mnogim, mnogim različitim identitetima i oni se osećaju: "Ali šta je s mojim identitetom? Potpuno me ignorišete. I, usput, mislio sam da sam ja većina?" I da je to zapravo pokrenulo mnogo besa.
YNH: Yeah. Identity is always problematic, because identity is always based on fictional stories that sooner or later collide with reality. Almost all identities, I mean, beyond the level of the basic community of a few dozen people, are based on a fictional story. They are not the truth. They are not the reality. It's just a story that people invent and tell one another and start believing. And therefore all identities are extremely unstable. They are not a biological reality. Sometimes nationalists, for example, think that the nation is a biological entity. It's made of the combination of soil and blood, creates the nation. But this is just a fictional story.
JNH: Da. Identitet je uvek problematičan jer je identitet uvek zasnovan na fiktivnim pričama koje se kad-tad sudare sa stvarnošću. Skoro svi identiteti, mislim, mimo nivoa osnovne zajednice od nekoliko desetina ljudi, su zasnovani na fiktivnim pričama. Nisu istiniti. Nisu stvarni. To je prosto priča koju ljudi izmišljaju i pričaju jedni drugima i počinju u nju da veruju. I stoga su svi identiteti izuzetno nestabilni. Nisu biološka stvarnost. Ponekad nacionalisti, na primer, misle da je nacija biološki entitet. Kombinacija zemlje i krvi stvara naciju. Ali to je samo fiktivna priča.
CA: Soil and blood kind of makes a gooey mess.
KA: Zemlja i krv čine nekakvu gnjecavu masu.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
YNH: It does, and also it messes with your mind when you think too much that I am a combination of soil and blood. If you look from a biological perspective, obviously none of the nations that exist today existed 5,000 years ago. Homo sapiens is a social animal, that's for sure. But for millions of years, Homo sapiens and our hominid ancestors lived in small communities of a few dozen individuals. Everybody knew everybody else. Whereas modern nations are imagined communities, in the sense that I don't even know all these people. I come from a relatively small nation, Israel, and of eight million Israelis, I never met most of them. I will never meet most of them. They basically exist here.
JNH: Tako je, a takođe vam remeti um kada suviše razmišljate da ste spoj zemlje i krvi. Ako pogledate iz biološke perspektive, očigledno da nijedna nacija koja danas postoji nije postojala pre 5000 godina. Homo sapijens je društvena životinja, to je izvesno. Međutim, milionima godina, Homo sapijens i naši preci hominidi su živeli u malim zajednicama od nekoliko desetina pojedinaca. Svako je znao sve ostale. Dok su savremene nacije zamišljene zajednice, u smislu da ja čak ni ne znam sve te ljude. Potičem iz relativno male nacije, Izraela, a od osam miliona Izraelaca, većinu nikad nisam upoznao. Nikada neću upoznati većinu njih. Oni u suštini postoje ovde.
CA: But in terms of this identity, this group who feel left out and perhaps have work taken away, I mean, in "Homo Deus," you actually speak of this group in one sense expanding, that so many people may have their jobs taken away by technology in some way that we could end up with a really large -- I think you call it a "useless class" -- a class where traditionally, as viewed by the economy, these people have no use.
KA: Ali u smislu tog identiteta, ova grupa koja se oseća izostavljeno i možda su im oduzeli poslove, mislim, u "Homo deusu", ti zapravo govoriš o ovoj grupi kako se na neki način širi, da će mnogim ljudima tehnologija možda oduzeti poslove i da bismo na neki način mogli da završimo sa zaista velikom - mislim da to nazivaš "beskorisnom klasom" - klasom koja tradicionalno, gledano iz ugla ekonomije, ovi ljudi nemaju svrhu.
YNH: Yes.
JNH: Da.
CA: How likely a possibility is that? Is that something we should be terrified about? And can we address it in any way?
KA: Koliko je verovatna ta mogućnost? Da li je to nešto što bi trebalo da nas plaši? I možemo li time nekako da se bavimo?
YNH: We should think about it very carefully. I mean, nobody really knows what the job market will look like in 2040, 2050. There is a chance many new jobs will appear, but it's not certain. And even if new jobs do appear, it won't necessarily be easy for a 50-year old unemployed truck driver made unemployed by self-driving vehicles, it won't be easy for an unemployed truck driver to reinvent himself or herself as a designer of virtual worlds.
JNH: Trebalo bi veoma pažljivo o tome da razmislimo. Mislim, niko zaista ne zna kako će tržište rada da izgleda u 2040, 2050. Postoji mogućnost da će se pojaviti mnogi poslovi, ali to nije izvesno. A čak i da se novi poslovi pojave, neće nužno da bude lako za 50-ogodišnjeg nezaposlenog kamiondžiju, koji je ostao bez posla zbog samoupravljajućih vozila, neće da bude lako nezaposlenom kamiondžiji da se prekvalifikuje u tvorca virtuelnih svetova.
Previously, if you look at the trajectory of the industrial revolution, when machines replaced humans in one type of work, the solution usually came from low-skill work in new lines of business. So you didn't need any more agricultural workers, so people moved to working in low-skill industrial jobs, and when this was taken away by more and more machines, people moved to low-skill service jobs. Now, when people say there will be new jobs in the future, that humans can do better than AI, that humans can do better than robots, they usually think about high-skill jobs, like software engineers designing virtual worlds. Now, I don't see how an unemployed cashier from Wal-Mart reinvents herself or himself at 50 as a designer of virtual worlds, and certainly I don't see how the millions of unemployed Bangladeshi textile workers will be able to do that. I mean, if they are going to do it, we need to start teaching the Bangladeshis today how to be software designers, and we are not doing it. So what will they do in 20 years?
Ranije, ako pogledate putanju industrijske revolucije, kad bi mašine zamenile ljude u jednoj oblasti rada, rešenje je obično došlo u vidu nekvalifikovanog rada u novoj liniji poslovanja. Dakle, nije vam potrebno više zemljoradnika, pa su ljudi prešli da se bave nekvalifikovanim industrijskim poslovima, a kad su mašine sve više preuzimale ove poslove, ljudi su prešli na nekvalifikovane uslužne poslove. Sad, kad ljudi kažu da će se u budućnosti pojaviti novi poslovi, da su ljudi bolji od veštačke inteligencije, da ljudi bolje rade od robota, obično misle na visokokvalifikovane poslove, poput softverskih inženjera koji dizajniraju virtuelne svetove. Sad, ne vidim kako će se nezaposlena kasirka iz Vol-Marta prekvalifikovati u 50. godini u tvorca virtuelnih svetova, a zasigurno ne vidim kako će milioni nezaposlenih tekstilnih radnika iz Bangladeša biti u stanju da to urade. Mislim, ako će to da urade, moramo već danas početi da podučavamo Bangladešane kako da budu softverski dizajneri, a mi to ne radimo. Pa, šta će oni da rade za 20 godina?
CA: So it feels like you're really highlighting a question that's really been bugging me the last few months more and more. It's almost a hard question to ask in public, but if any mind has some wisdom to offer in it, maybe it's yours, so I'm going to ask you: What are humans for?
KA: Utisak je da ti zaista naglašavaš pitanje koje me uistinu sve više kopka proteklih nekoliko meseci. Skoro da je teško pitanje da bi se postavilo u javnosti, ali ako neki um ima malo mudrosti da je ponudi, možda je to tvoj, pa ću da te pitam: čemu služe ljudi?
YNH: As far as we know, for nothing.
JNH: Koliko nam je poznato ničemu.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
I mean, there is no great cosmic drama, some great cosmic plan, that we have a role to play in. And we just need to discover what our role is and then play it to the best of our ability. This has been the story of all religions and ideologies and so forth, but as a scientist, the best I can say is this is not true. There is no universal drama with a role in it for Homo sapiens. So --
Mislim, ne postoji velika kosmička drama, neki veliki kosmički plan u kom imamo da odigramo ulogu. A mi prosto treba da otkrijemo koja je naša uloga i da je odigramo najbolje što možemo. Ovo je bila priča svih religija i ideologija i tako dalje, ali kao naučnik, sve što mogu da kažem je da nije tačna. Ne postoji univerzalna drama u kojoj Homo sapijens ima ulogu. Dakle -
CA: I'm going to push back on you just for a minute, just from your own book, because in "Homo Deus," you give really one of the most coherent and understandable accounts about sentience, about consciousness, and that unique sort of human skill. You point out that it's different from intelligence, the intelligence that we're building in machines, and that there's actually a lot of mystery around it. How can you be sure there's no purpose when we don't even understand what this sentience thing is? I mean, in your own thinking, isn't there a chance that what humans are for is to be the universe's sentient things, to be the centers of joy and love and happiness and hope? And maybe we can build machines that actually help amplify that, even if they're not going to become sentient themselves? Is that crazy? I kind of found myself hoping that, reading your book.
KA: Malo ću da ti protivrečim, samo na minut, samo na osnovu tvoje knjige jer u "Homo deusu", daješ jedan od najkoherentnijih i najrazumljivijih objašnjenja svesti, svesnosti i tih nekih jedinstveno ljudskih veština. Ističeš da se to razlikuje od inteligencije, inteligencije koju ugrađujemo u mašine i da zapravo postoji mnogo tajnovitosti oko toga. Kako možeš da budeš siguran da nemamo svrhu kad čak ni ne razumemo šta je to svesnost? Mislim, prema tvom razumevanju, zar ne postoji mogućnost da je svrha ljudi da budu univerzumska svesna bića, da budu središta užitka i ljubavi i sreće i nade? I možda možemo da sagradimo mašine koje zapravo to mogu da pojačaju, čak iako one same neće postati svesne? Da li je to sumanuto? Nekako sam se ponadao tome, čitajući tvoju knjigu,
YNH: Well, I certainly think that the most interesting question today in science is the question of consciousness and the mind. We are getting better and better in understanding the brain and intelligence, but we are not getting much better in understanding the mind and consciousness. People often confuse intelligence and consciousness, especially in places like Silicon Valley, which is understandable, because in humans, they go together. I mean, intelligence basically is the ability to solve problems. Consciousness is the ability to feel things, to feel joy and sadness and boredom and pain and so forth. In Homo sapiens and all other mammals as well -- it's not unique to humans -- in all mammals and birds and some other animals, intelligence and consciousness go together. We often solve problems by feeling things. So we tend to confuse them. But they are different things.
JNH: Pa, svakako smatram da je trenutno najzanimljivije pitanje u nauci pitanje o svesnosti i umu. Sve smo bolji u razumevanju mozga i inteligencije, ali nismo mnogo bolji u razumevanju uma i svesnosti. Ljudi često mešaju inteligenciju i svesnost, naročito na mestima poput Silicijumske doline, što je razumljivo jer kod ljudi one idu zajedno. Mislim, inteligencija je u suštini sposobnost rešavanja problema. Svesnost je sposobnost osećanja, osećati užitak i tugu i dosadu i bol itd. Kod Homo sapijensa i svih ostalih sisara - nije to jedinstveno za ljude - kod svih sisara i ptica i nekih drugih životinja, inteligencija i svesnost idu zajedno. Mi često rešavamo probleme osećajući. Pa ih ponekad mešamo. Ali to su različite stvari.
What's happening today in places like Silicon Valley is that we are creating artificial intelligence but not artificial consciousness. There has been an amazing development in computer intelligence over the last 50 years, and exactly zero development in computer consciousness, and there is no indication that computers are going to become conscious anytime soon.
Danas se na mestima, poput Silicijumske doline, dešava to da stvaramo veštačku inteligenciju, ali ne i veštačku svesnost. Došlo je do neverovatnog napretka u kompjuterskoj inteligenciji u proteklih 50 godina i tačno nula napretka u kompjuterskoj svesnosti, i nema nagoveštaja da će kompjuteri postati svesni u skorije vreme.
So first of all, if there is some cosmic role for consciousness, it's not unique to Homo sapiens. Cows are conscious, pigs are conscious, chimpanzees are conscious, chickens are conscious, so if we go that way, first of all, we need to broaden our horizons and remember very clearly we are not the only sentient beings on Earth, and when it comes to sentience -- when it comes to intelligence, there is good reason to think we are the most intelligent of the whole bunch.
Zato, pre svega, ako postoji nekakva kosmička uloga za svesnost, nije jedinstvena za Homo sapijensa. Krave su svesne, svinje su svesne, šimpanze su svesne, kokoške su svesne, pa ako krenemo tim putem, pre svega, moramo da proširimo vidike i da se jasno prisetimo da nismo jedina svesna bića na Zemlji, a kad se radi o svesti - kad se radi o inteligenciji, postoji dobar razlog da smatramo kako smo najinteligentniji od svih.
But when it comes to sentience, to say that humans are more sentient than whales, or more sentient than baboons or more sentient than cats, I see no evidence for that. So first step is, you go in that direction, expand. And then the second question of what is it for, I would reverse it and I would say that I don't think sentience is for anything. I think we don't need to find our role in the universe. The really important thing is to liberate ourselves from suffering. What characterizes sentient beings in contrast to robots, to stones, to whatever, is that sentient beings suffer, can suffer, and what they should focus on is not finding their place in some mysterious cosmic drama. They should focus on understanding what suffering is, what causes it and how to be liberated from it.
Međutim, kad se radi o svesti, reći da su ljudi svesniji od kitova ili svesniji od babuna ili svesniji od mačaka, ne vidim dokaze za to. Dakle, prvi korak je ići u tom smeru, proširiti to. A potom je drugo pitanje šta je svrha toga, ja bih ga preokrenuo i rekao bih kako smatram da svesnost nema svrhu. Mislim da ne moramo da otkrijemo našu ulogu u univerzumu. Istinski važna stvar je da se oslobodimo patnje. Ono što karakteriše svesna bića nasuprot robotima, kamenju, bilo čemu je da svesna bića pate, mogu da pate, a trebalo bi da se usredsrede, ne na traženje svog mesta u nekakvoj tajanstvenoj kosmičkoj drami. Trebalo bi da se usredsrede na razumevanje patnje, šta je uzrokuje i kako da je se oslobode.
CA: I know this is a big issue for you, and that was very eloquent. We're going to have a blizzard of questions from the audience here, and maybe from Facebook as well, and maybe some comments as well. So let's go quick. There's one right here. Keep your hands held up at the back if you want the mic, and we'll get it back to you.
KA: Znam da je ovo za tebe veliko pitanje i bio si veoma rečit. Imaćemo navalu pitanja od prisutne publike, a možda i sa Fejsbuka, a možda i neke komentare. Pa požurimo. Imamo jedno baš ovde. Vi iza, držite ruke podignute, ako želite mikrofon i mi ćemo vam ga dodati.
Question: In your work, you talk a lot about the fictional stories that we accept as truth, and we live our lives by it. As an individual, knowing that, how does it impact the stories that you choose to live your life, and do you confuse them with the truth, like all of us?
Pitanje: U svom radu, mnogo govorite o fiktivnim pričama koje prihvatamo kao istinu, a po njima živimo naše živote. Kao pojedinac, znajući to, kako to utiče na vaše priče prema kojima živite svoj život, i da li ih mešate sa istinom, poput svih nas?
YNH: I try not to. I mean, for me, maybe the most important question, both as a scientist and as a person, is how to tell the difference between fiction and reality, because reality is there. I'm not saying that everything is fiction. It's just very difficult for human beings to tell the difference between fiction and reality, and it has become more and more difficult as history progressed, because the fictions that we have created -- nations and gods and money and corporations -- they now control the world. So just to even think, "Oh, this is just all fictional entities that we've created," is very difficult. But reality is there.
JNH: Trudim se da ne mešam. Mislim, za mene je najvažnije pitanje, kao za naučnika i osobu, jeste kako razlikovati fikciju od stvarnosti jer stvarnost postoji. Ne govorim da je sve fikcija. Samo je veoma teško za ljudska bića da vide razliku između fikcije i stvarnosti, i bivalo je sve teže i teže kako je istorija napredovala jer su fikcije koje smo stvorili - nacije, bogovi, novac i korporacije - one sada upravljaju svetom. Pa je sama pomisao: "Eh, to su samo fiktivni entiteti koje smo stvorili", je veoma komplikovana. Međutim, stvarnost postoji.
For me the best ... There are several tests to tell the difference between fiction and reality. The simplest one, the best one that I can say in short, is the test of suffering. If it can suffer, it's real. If it can't suffer, it's not real. A nation cannot suffer. That's very, very clear. Even if a nation loses a war, we say, "Germany suffered a defeat in the First World War," it's a metaphor. Germany cannot suffer. Germany has no mind. Germany has no consciousness. Germans can suffer, yes, but Germany cannot. Similarly, when a bank goes bust, the bank cannot suffer. When the dollar loses its value, the dollar doesn't suffer. People can suffer. Animals can suffer. This is real. So I would start, if you really want to see reality, I would go through the door of suffering. If you can really understand what suffering is, this will give you also the key to understand what reality is.
Za mene najbolji... Postoji nekoliko testova za razlikovanje fikcije od stvarnosti. Najjednostavniji, najbolji koji mogu ukratko da sročim je test patnje. Ako može da pati, stvarno je. Ako ne može da pati, nije stvarno. Nacija ne može da pati. To je veoma, veoma jasno. Čak iako nacija izgubi rat, kažemo: "Nemačka je pretrpela poraz u Prvom svetskom ratu", to je metafora. Nemačka ne može da pati. Nemačka nema razum. Nemačka nema svesnost. Nemci mogu da pate, da, ali Nemačka ne može. Slično, kada banka bankrotira, banka ne može da pati. Kada dolar izgubi vrednost, dolar ne pati. Ljudi mogu da pate. Životinje mogu da pate. To je stvarno. Pa bih počeo, ako zaista želite da vidite stvarnost, prošao bih kroz vrata patnje. Ako zaista možete da razumete šta je patnja, to će vam takođe dati ključ za razumevanje stvarnosti.
CA: There's a Facebook question here that connects to this, from someone around the world in a language that I cannot read.
KA: Imamo pitanje sa Fejsbuka koje je s tim u vezi od nekoga iz sveta na jeziku koji ne mogu da čitam.
YNH: Oh, it's Hebrew. CA: Hebrew. There you go.
JNH: Oh, na hebrejskom je. KA: Hebrejski. Ti pročitaj.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
Can you read the name?
Možeš li da pročitaš ime?
YNH: Or Lauterbach Goren.
JNH: Or Lauterbah Goren.
CA: Well, thank you for writing in. The question is: "Is the post-truth era really a brand-new era, or just another climax or moment in a never-ending trend?
KA: Pa, hvala što ste pisali. Pitanje glasi: "Da li je postčinjenična era zaista sasvim nova era ili samo još jedan klimaks ili trenutak u beskrajnom trendu?
YNH: Personally, I don't connect with this idea of post-truth. My basic reaction as a historian is: If this is the era of post-truth, when the hell was the era of truth?
JNH: Iskreno, ne mogu da se saživim sa tom idejom postčinjeničnosti. Moja osnovna reakcija kao istoričara glasi: ako je ovo postčinjenična era, kad je, dovraga, bila era istine?
CA: Right.
KA: Baš tako.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
YNH: Was it the 1980s, the 1950s, the Middle Ages? I mean, we have always lived in an era, in a way, of post-truth.
JNH: Da li je to bilo 1980-ih, 1950-ih, u srednjem veku? Mislim, uvek smo živeli u eri, koja je na neki način postčinjenična.
CA: But I'd push back on that, because I think what people are talking about is that there was a world where you had fewer journalistic outlets, where there were traditions, that things were fact-checked. It was incorporated into the charter of those organizations that the truth mattered. So if you believe in a reality, then what you write is information. There was a belief that that information should connect to reality in a real way, and if you wrote a headline, it was a serious, earnest attempt to reflect something that had actually happened. And people didn't always get it right.
KA: Tome bih protivrečio jer mislim da ljudi govore kako smo imali svet u kom smo imali manje novinskih listova, u kom smo imali tradiciju, gde su činjenice proveravane. U povelji tih organizacija je bilo ugrađeno to da je istina važna. Zato, ako verujete u stvarnost, onda pišete informacije. Imali smo verovanje da informacije treba da su pravilno povezane sa stvarnošću, a ako biste napisali naslov, to je bio ozbiljan, iskren pokušaj da se predstavi nešto što se stvarno desilo. A ljudi nisu uvek uspevali u tome.
But I think the concern now is you've got a technological system that's incredibly powerful that, for a while at least, massively amplified anything with no attention paid to whether it connected to reality, only to whether it connected to clicks and attention, and that that was arguably toxic. That's a reasonable concern, isn't it?
No mislim da je trenutno problem to što imamo tehnološki sistem koji je neverovatno moćan da, bar neko vreme, uveliko naglašava bilo šta bez obraćanja pažnje da li ima veze sa stvarnošću, samo je važno da ima veze sa klikovima i pažnjom, a pretpostavlja se da je to zarazno. To je briga s razlogom, zar ne?
YNH: Yeah, it is. I mean, the technology changes, and it's now easier to disseminate both truth and fiction and falsehood. It goes both ways. It's also much easier, though, to spread the truth than it was ever before. But I don't think there is anything essentially new about this disseminating fictions and errors. There is nothing that -- I don't know -- Joseph Goebbels, didn't know about all this idea of fake news and post-truth. He famously said that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will think it's the truth, and the bigger the lie, the better, because people won't even think that something so big can be a lie. I think that fake news has been with us for thousands of years. Just think of the Bible.
JNH: Da, jeste. Mislim, tehnologija se menja i danas je lakše širiti i istinu i fikciju i neistine. Ide u oba smera. Takođe je mnogo lakše, pak, širiti istinu nego što je bilo ikad pre. Ali mislim da se ništa suštinski novo nije desilo kod širenja fikcija i zabluda. Nema tu ništa što - ne znam - Jozef Gebels nije znao o svim tim zamislima lažnih vesti i post-činjenica. Čuvena je njegova misao da ako ponovljate laž dovoljno često, ljudi će da misle da je istinita, a što je veća laž, to je bolje jer ljudi neće čak ni da pomisle da nešto toliko veliko može da bude laž. Mislim da su lažne vesti sa nama već hilljadama godina. Samo se setite Biblije.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
CA: But there is a concern that the fake news is associated with tyrannical regimes, and when you see an uprise in fake news that is a canary in the coal mine that there may be dark times coming.
KA: Ali postoji zabrinutost da su lažne vesti povezane sa tiranskim režimima i kada primetite uspon lažnih vesti da je to kanarinac u rudniku koji nagoveštava dolazak mračnih vremena.
YNH: Yeah. I mean, the intentional use of fake news is a disturbing sign. But I'm not saying that it's not bad, I'm just saying that it's not new.
JNH: Da. Mislim, namerno korišćenje lažnih vesti je uznemirujući znak. Međutim, ne govorim da to nije loše, samo govorim da nije novo.
CA: There's a lot of interest on Facebook on this question about global governance versus nationalism. Question here from Phil Dennis: "How do we get people, governments, to relinquish power? Is that -- is that -- actually, the text is so big I can't read the full question. But is that a necessity? Is it going to take war to get there? Sorry Phil -- I mangled your question, but I blame the text right here.
KA: Vlada veliko interesovanje na Fejsbuku za ovo pitanje o globalnoj vladavini nasuprot nacionalizmu. Pitanje od Fila Denisa: "Kako da navedemo ljude, vlade da se odreknu moći? Da li je to - da li je to - zapravo, tekst je predugačak, ne mogu da pročitam celo pitanje. Ali da li je to nužnost? Da li je potreban rat da se stigne dotle? Izvini, File - iskasapio sam ti pitanje, ali krivim tekst koji je ovde.
YNH: One option that some people talk about is that only a catastrophe can shake humankind and open the path to a real system of global governance, and they say that we can't do it before the catastrophe, but we need to start laying the foundations so that when the disaster strikes, we can react quickly. But people will just not have the motivation to do such a thing before the disaster strikes. Another thing that I would emphasize is that anybody who is really interested in global governance should always make it very, very clear that it doesn't replace or abolish local identities and communities, that it should come both as -- It should be part of a single package.
JNH: Jedna mogućnost, koju neki ljudi pominju je da samo katastrofa može da uzdrma ljudski rod i da prokrči stazu istinskom sistemu globalne vladavine i kažu da ne možemo to da uradimo pre katastrofe, ali moramo da počnemo da izlivamo temelje kako bi kad se desi nedaća mogli brzo da reagujemo. Međutim, ljudi prosto neće imati motivaciju da urade nešto tako pre nego što se desi katastrofa. Naglasio bih još jednu stvar, a to da bilo ko, ko je zaista zainteresovan za globalnu vladavinu, bi trebalo da uvek bude veoma, veoma jasan da ona ne menja, niti ukida lokalne identitete i zajednice, da bi trebalo da dolazi i kao - trebalo bi da dolazi u jednom paketu.
CA: I want to hear more on this, because the very words "global governance" are almost the epitome of evil in the mindset of a lot of people on the alt-right right now. It just seems scary, remote, distant, and it has let them down, and so globalists, global governance -- no, go away! And many view the election as the ultimate poke in the eye to anyone who believes in that. So how do we change the narrative so that it doesn't seem so scary and remote? Build more on this idea of it being compatible with local identity, local communities.
KA: Želim da čujem više o tome jer same reči "globalna vladavina" su trenutno skoro ovaploćenje zla u mentalnom sklopu mnogih ljudi sa alternativne desnice. Prosto se čine strašnim, udaljenim, dalekim i izneverilo ih je, stoga globalisti, globalna vladavina - ne, neka nestanu! A mnogi vide izbore kao krajnji šamar u lice svima koji veruju u to. Pa, kako da promenimo narativ kako ne bi izgledao tako zastrašujući i dalek? Da nadogradimo ovu zamisao o njegovoj kompatibilnosti sa lokalnim identitetima, lokalnim zajendicama.
YNH: Well, I think again we should start really with the biological realities of Homo sapiens. And biology tells us two things about Homo sapiens which are very relevant to this issue: first of all, that we are completely dependent on the ecological system around us, and that today we are talking about a global system. You cannot escape that.
JNH: Pa, mislim da bi ponovo trebalo da počnemo zaista sa biološkom stvarnošću Homo sapijensa. A biologija nam govori dve stvari o Homo sapijensu koje su veoma bitne za ovo pitanje: pre svega, da smo potpuno zavisni od ekološkog sistema oko nas i da danas govorimo o globalnom sistemu. Ne možete to da izbegnete.
And at the same time, biology tells us about Homo sapiens that we are social animals, but that we are social on a very, very local level. It's just a simple fact of humanity that we cannot have intimate familiarity with more than about 150 individuals. The size of the natural group, the natural community of Homo sapiens, is not more than 150 individuals, and everything beyond that is really based on all kinds of imaginary stories and large-scale institutions, and I think that we can find a way, again, based on a biological understanding of our species, to weave the two together and to understand that today in the 21st century, we need both the global level and the local community.
A istovremeno, biologija nam govori o Homo sapijensu da smo društvene životinje, ali da smo društveni na veoma, veoma lokalnom nivou. To je prosta činjenica o čovečanstvu da ne možemo da imamo prisnost sa više od oko 150 pojedinaca. Veličina prirodne grupe, prirodne zajednice Homo sapijensa nije veća od 150 pojedinaca, a sve mimo toga je zaista zasnovano na raznim vrstama izmišljenih priča i institucija velikih razmera i mislim da možemo da pronađemo način, opet, na osnovu biološkog razumevanja naše vrste, da upletemo to dvoje zajedno i da razumemo da nam je danas u XXI veku potreban i globalni nivo i lokalna zajednica.
And I would go even further than that and say that it starts with the body itself. The feelings that people today have of alienation and loneliness and not finding their place in the world, I would think that the chief problem is not global capitalism. The chief problem is that over the last hundred years, people have been becoming disembodied, have been distancing themselves from their body. As a hunter-gatherer or even as a peasant, to survive, you need to be constantly in touch with your body and with your senses, every moment. If you go to the forest to look for mushrooms and you don't pay attention to what you hear, to what you smell, to what you taste, you're dead. So you must be very connected.
A išao bih i dalje od toga i rekao bih da počinje sa samim telom. Osećanja otuđenosti i usamljenosti, koja današnji ljudi imaju i nemogućnost pronalaženja mesta u svetu, mišljenja sam da glavni problem nije globalni kapitalizam. Glavni problem je da su tokom poslednjih stotinu godina ljudi se sve više odvajali od tela, udaljavali su se od svog tela. Kao lovac i sakupljač ili čak kao seljak, kako biste preživeli, morali ste stalno da budete u dodiru sa svojim telom i svojim čulima, svakog trena. Ako pođete u šumu da tražite pečurke i ne obratite pažnju na ono što čujete, ono što namirišete, ono što okusite, mrtvi ste. Pa ste morali da budete veoma povezani.
In the last hundred years, people are losing their ability to be in touch with their body and their senses, to hear, to smell, to feel. More and more attention goes to screens, to what is happening elsewhere, some other time. This, I think, is the deep reason for the feelings of alienation and loneliness and so forth, and therefore part of the solution is not to bring back some mass nationalism, but also reconnect with our own bodies, and if you are back in touch with your body, you will feel much more at home in the world also.
U poslednjih stotinu godina, ljudi gube svoju sposobnost da budu u dodiru sa svojim telom i svojim čulima, sa sluhom, mirisom, osećanjima. Sve više pažnje se usmerava na ekrane, na ono što se dešava drugde, u nekom drugom vremenu. Ovo je, mislim, suštinski razlog za osećanja otuđenosti, usamljenosti i tako dalje, i stoga deo rešenja nije u vraćanju nekakvog masovnog nacionalizma, već u povezivanju sa našim telima, a ako ste ponovo u dodiru sa svojim telom, takođe ćete se osećati daleko prijatnije u svetu.
CA: Well, depending on how things go, we may all be back in the forest soon. We're going to have one more question in the room and one more on Facebook.
KA: Pa, u zavisnosti kako sve bude išlo, možda se uskoro svi vratimo u šume. Imaćmo još jedno pitanje iz prostorije i još jedno sa Fejsbuka.
Ama Adi-Dako: Hello. I'm from Ghana, West Africa, and my question is: I'm wondering how do you present and justify the idea of global governance to countries that have been historically disenfranchised by the effects of globalization, and also, if we're talking about global governance, it sounds to me like it will definitely come from a very Westernized idea of what the "global" is supposed to look like. So how do we present and justify that idea of global versus wholly nationalist to people in countries like Ghana and Nigeria and Togo and other countries like that?
Ama Adi-Dako: Zdravo. Ja sam iz Gane, Zapadna Afrika, i moje pitanje je: pitam se kako da predstavite i opravdate ideju globalne vladavine zemljama koje su istorijski bile obespravljene zbog efekata globalizacije kao i, ako govorimo o globalnoj vladavini, meni zvuči kao da će definitivno da potiče iz krajnje zapadne ideje toga kako bi "globalno" trebalo da izgleda. Pa, kako predstaviti i opravdati ideju globalnog nasuprot krajnjem nacionalizmu ljudima u zemljama, poput Gane, Nigerije i Togoa i drugim sličnim zemljama?
YNH: I would start by saying that history is extremely unfair, and that we should realize that. Many of the countries that suffered most from the last 200 years of globalization and imperialism and industrialization are exactly the countries which are also most likely to suffer most from the next wave. And we should be very, very clear about that. If we don't have a global governance, and if we suffer from climate change, from technological disruptions, the worst suffering will not be in the US. The worst suffering will be in Ghana, will be in Sudan, will be in Syria, will be in Bangladesh, will be in those places.
JNH: Započeću rečima da je istorija izuzetno nepravedna i da bi trebalo to da shvatimo. Mnoge od zemalja koje su najviše ispaštale u poslednjih 200 godina globalizacije, imperijalizma i industrijalizacije su upravo one zemlje koje će najverovatnije najviše ispaštati u sledećem talasu. I trebalo bi to da nam bude veoma, veoma jasno. Ako nemamo globalnu vladavinu, a ispaštamo zbog klimatskih promena, tehnološkog raskola, neće SAD najviše da ispašta. Najviše će da ispašta Gana, Sudan, Sirija, Bangladeš i takva mesta.
So I think those countries have an even greater incentive to do something about the next wave of disruption, whether it's ecological or whether it's technological. Again, if you think about technological disruption, so if AI and 3D printers and robots will take the jobs from billions of people, I worry far less about the Swedes than about the people in Ghana or in Bangladesh. And therefore, because history is so unfair and the results of a calamity will not be shared equally between everybody, as usual, the rich will be able to get away from the worst consequences of climate change in a way that the poor will not be able to.
Zato smatram da te države imaju čak i veći podsticaj da urade nešto povodom sledećeg talasa raskola, bilo da se radi o ekološkom ili tehnološkom. Opet, ako razmišljate o tehnološkom raskolu, dakle, ako će VI i 3D štampači i roboti da oduzmu poslove milijardama ljudi, daleko sam manje zabrinut za Šveđane nego za ljude u Gani ili u Bangladešu. I, stoga, zato što je istorija nepravedna i posledice bede neće podjednako snositi svi, kao i obično, bogati će uspeti da se izvuku od najgorih posledica klimatskih promena na način na koji siromašni neće moći.
CA: And here's a great question from Cameron Taylor on Facebook: "At the end of 'Sapiens,'" you said we should be asking the question, 'What do we want to want?' Well, what do you think we should want to want?"
KA: Evo sjajnog pitanja sa Fejsbuka od Kamerona Tejlora: "Na kraju knjige 'Sapijens', rekli ste da bi trebalo da se zapitamo: 'Šta želimo da želimo?' Pa, šta vi smatrate da bi trebalo da želimo da želimo?"
YNH: I think we should want to want to know the truth, to understand reality. Mostly what we want is to change reality, to fit it to our own desires, to our own wishes, and I think we should first want to understand it. If you look at the long-term trajectory of history, what you see is that for thousands of years we humans have been gaining control of the world outside us and trying to shape it to fit our own desires. And we've gained control of the other animals, of the rivers, of the forests, and reshaped them completely, causing an ecological destruction without making ourselves satisfied.
JNH: Mislim da bi trebalo da želimo da želimo da znamo istinu, da razumemo stvarnost. Mi uglavnom želimo da promenimo stvarnost, kako bi se uklopila u naše žudnje, u naše sopstvene želje, a ja mislim da bi prvo trebalo da želimo da je razumemo. Ako pogledate dugoročnu putanju istorije, vidite da smo hiljadama godina mi ljudi sticali kontrolu nad svetom oko nas i pokušavali smo da ga oblikujemo kako bi se uklopio s našim žudnjama. I stekli smo kontrolu nad drugim životinjama, rekama, šumama i potpuno ih preoblikovali, uzrokujući ekološku katastrofu, a da pritom nismo sebe zadovoljili.
So the next step is we turn our gaze inwards, and we say OK, getting control of the world outside us did not really make us satisfied. Let's now try to gain control of the world inside us. This is the really big project of science and technology and industry in the 21st century -- to try and gain control of the world inside us, to learn how to engineer and produce bodies and brains and minds. These are likely to be the main products of the 21st century economy. When people think about the future, very often they think in terms, "Oh, I want to gain control of my body and of my brain." And I think that's very dangerous.
Pa bi sledeći korak bio da okrenemo pogled ka unutra i kažemo, u redu, ovladavanje svetom izvan nas nas zaista nije zadovoljilo. Hajde da sad pokušamo da ovladamo svetom unutar nas. Ovo je uistinu veliki projekat nauke i tehnologije i industrije u XXI veku - pokušaj ovladavanja svetom unutar nas, spoznaja kako da izgradimo i proizvedemo tela i mozgove i umove. To će najverovatnije da budu glavni proizvodi ekonomije XXI veka. Kad ljudi razmišljaju o budućnosti prečesto razmišljaju u smislu: "Oh, želim da ovladam telom i mozgom." A ja smatram da je to veoma opasno.
If we've learned anything from our previous history, it's that yes, we gain the power to manipulate, but because we didn't really understand the complexity of the ecological system, we are now facing an ecological meltdown. And if we now try to reengineer the world inside us without really understanding it, especially without understanding the complexity of our mental system, we might cause a kind of internal ecological disaster, and we'll face a kind of mental meltdown inside us.
Ako smo nešto naučili iz istorije to je da, da, stekli smo kontrolu zarad manipulisanja, međutim kako zaista nismo razumeli složenost ekološkog sistema, trenutno se suočavamo sa ekološkom tragedijom. A ako sada pokušamo da nanovo izgradimo svet unutar nas a da ga u potpunosti ne razumemo, naročito bez razumevanja složenosti našeg mentalnog sistema, mogli bismo da uzrokujemo nekakvu unutrašnju ekološku katastrofu i suočićemo se sa nekakvim mentalnim slomom unutar nas.
CA: Putting all the pieces together here -- the current politics, the coming technology, concerns like the one you've just outlined -- I mean, it seems like you yourself are in quite a bleak place when you think about the future. You're pretty worried about it. Is that right? And if there was one cause for hope, how would you state that?
KA: Da sklopimo sve delove ovde - trenutna politika, nadolazeća tehnologija, brige poput ove koju si upravo istakao - mislim, izgleda da si ti sam na prilično mračnom mestu kad razmišljaš o budućnosti. Veoma si zabrinut zbog nje. Je li tako? A ako bi postojao jedan razlog za nadu, kako bi ga formulisao?
YNH: I focus on the most dangerous possibilities partly because this is like my job or responsibility as a historian or social critic. I mean, the industry focuses mainly on the positive sides, so it's the job of historians and philosophers and sociologists to highlight the more dangerous potential of all these new technologies. I don't think any of that is inevitable. Technology is never deterministic. You can use the same technology to create very different kinds of societies.
JNH: Usredsređujem se na najopasnije mogućnosti, delimično jer mi je to u opisu posla ili odgovornosti kao istoričara i društvenog kritičara. Mislim, industrija se uglavnom usredsređuje na pozitivne strane, te je posao istoričara i filozofa i sociologa da istaknu opasniji potencijal sve te nove tehnologije. Ne smatram da je bilo šta od ovoga neizbežno. Tehnologija nikad nije deterministična. Možete da koristite istu tehnologiju da stvorite veoma različite tipove društva.
If you look at the 20th century, so, the technologies of the Industrial Revolution, the trains and electricity and all that could be used to create a communist dictatorship or a fascist regime or a liberal democracy. The trains did not tell you what to do with them. Similarly, now, artificial intelligence and bioengineering and all of that -- they don't predetermine a single outcome. Humanity can rise up to the challenge, and the best example we have of humanity rising up to the challenge of a new technology is nuclear weapons. In the late 1940s, '50s, many people were convinced that sooner or later the Cold War will end in a nuclear catastrophe, destroying human civilization. And this did not happen. In fact, nuclear weapons prompted humans all over the world to change the way that they manage international politics to reduce violence.
Ako pogledate XX vek, dakle, tehnologiju Industrijske revolucije, vozove i struju i sve to je moglo da se iskoristi da se stvori komunistička diktatura ili fašistički režim ili liberalna demokratija. Vozovi vam ne govore šta da radite s njima. Slično, sada, veštačka inteligencija i bioinženjering i sve to - oni unapred ne određuju samo jedan ishod. Čovečanstvo može da doraste izazovu, a najbolji primer kada je čovečanstvo doraslo izazovu nove tehnologije je nuklearno oružje. Kasnih 1940-ih, '50-ih, mnogi ljudi su bili ubeđeni da će se pre ili kasnije Hladni rat završiti nukleranom katastrofom, koja će da uništi ljudsku civilizaciju. A to se nije desilo. Zapravo, nuklearno oružje je navelo ljude širom sveta da promene to kako vode međunarodnu politiku kako bi umanjili nasilje.
And many countries basically took out war from their political toolkit. They no longer tried to pursue their interests with warfare. Not all countries have done so, but many countries have. And this is maybe the most important reason why international violence declined dramatically since 1945, and today, as I said, more people commit suicide than are killed in war. So this, I think, gives us a good example that even the most frightening technology, humans can rise up to the challenge and actually some good can come out of it. The problem is, we have very little margin for error. If we don't get it right, we might not have a second option to try again.
I mnoge države su u suštini uklonile rat iz svog političkog alata. Više nisu pokušavali da ostvaruju svoje interese putem rata. Nisu sve države tako uradile, ali mnoge jesu. A to je možda najvažniji razlog zašto je međunarodno nasilje drastično opalo od 1945. i, danas, kao što sam rekao, više ljudi izvrši samoubistvo nego što pogine u ratu. Pa nam ovo, mislim, daje dobar primer da čak i kod najstrašnije tehnologije ljudi mogu da dorastu izazovu i da zapravo nešto dobro može da proizađe iz toga. Problem je što imamo veoma malo prostora za grešku. Ako ne postupimo kako treba, možda nećemo imati drugu priliku da pokušamo ponovo.
CA: That's a very powerful note, on which I think we should draw this to a conclusion. Before I wrap up, I just want to say one thing to people here and to the global TED community watching online, anyone watching online: help us with these dialogues. If you believe, like we do, that we need to find a different kind of conversation, now more than ever, help us do it. Reach out to other people, try and have conversations with people you disagree with, understand them, pull the pieces together, and help us figure out how to take these conversations forward so we can make a real contribution to what's happening in the world right now.
KA: To je veoma snažna poruka kojom ćemo ovo da privedemo kraju. Pre nego što sve sumiram, samo želim jedno da kažem ljudima ovde i globalnoj TED zajednici, gledaocima na internetu, bilo kome ko nas gleda: pomozite nam s ovim dijalozima. Ako verujete, poput nas, da moramo da pronađemo drugačiji vid razgovora, sad više nego bilo kad pre, pomozite nam u tome. Posegnite ka drugim ljudima, pokušajte da razgovarate s ljudima s kojima se ne slažete, da ih razumete, da sklopite kocke i pomognete nama da shvatimo kako da iskoraknemo s ovim razgovorima kako bi napravili istinski doprinos onome što se dešava trenutno u svetu.
I think everyone feels more alive, more concerned, more engaged with the politics of the moment. The stakes do seem quite high, so help us respond to it in a wise, wise way.
Mislim da se svako oseća življe, zabrinutije, angažovanije kada je trenutna politika u pitanju. Ulog se čini prilično visokim, zato nam pomozite da odgovorimo na mudar, mudar način.
Yuval Harari, thank you.
Juval Harari, hvala ti.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)