My topic is economic growth in China and India. And the question I want to explore with you is whether or not democracy has helped or has hindered economic growth. You may say this is not fair, because I'm selecting two countries to make a case against democracy. Actually, exactly the opposite is what I'm going to do. I'm going to use these two countries to make an economic argument for democracy, rather than against democracy.
Moja današnja tema je gospodarska rast na Kitajskem in v Indiji. Vprašanje, na katerega želim danes odgovoriti, je, ali je demokracija spodbujala ali zavirala gospodarsko rast. Morda se vam ne zdi pravično, da sem izbral ti dve državi, da bi nasprotoval demokraciji. Pravzaprav bom poskušal storiti ravno nasprotno. Na primerih teh dveh držav bom poskušal z gospodarskega stališča podpreti demokracijo in ne nastopiti proti njej.
The first question there is why China has grown so much faster than India. Over the last 30 years, in terms of the GDP growth rates, China has grown at twice the rate of India. In the last five years, the two countries have begun to converge somewhat in economic growth. But over the last 30 years, China undoubtedly has done much better than India. One simple answer is China has Shanghai and India has Mumbai. Look at the skyline of Shanghai. This is the Pudong area. The picture on India is the Dharavi slum of Mumbai in India. The idea there behind these two pictures is that the Chinese government can act above rule of law. It can plan for the long-term benefits of the country and in the process, evict millions of people -- that's just a small technical issue. Whereas in India, you cannot do that, because you have to listen to the public. You're being constrained by the public's opinion. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agrees with that view. In an interview printed in the financial press of India, He said that he wants to make Mumbai another Shanghai. This is an Oxford-trained economist steeped in humanistic values, and yet he agrees with the high-pressure tactics of Shanghai.
Prvo vprašanje je, zakaj se je Kitajska razvila toliko hitreje kot Indija? Zadnjih 30 let je v smislu stopenj rasti BDP Kitajska rasla dvakrat hitreje od Indije. Zadnjih pet let pa sta se državi približevali v gospodarski rasti. A zadnjih 30 let je Kitajski vseeno šlo mnogo bolje kot Indiji. Preprost odgovor bi bil, da ima Kitajska Šanghaj, Indija pa Mumbaj. Poglejte nebo v Šanghaju. To je okrožje Pudong. Slika v Indiji prikazuje revno naselje Dharavi v Mumbaju v Indiji. Preko teh dveh slik želim prikazati, da kitajska vlada lahko deluje mimo zakona. Lahko načrtuje dolgoročne koristi za državo, pri čemer preseli milijone ljudi, kar predstavlja le majhno tehnično skrb. V Indiji to ne gre, saj je treba upoštevati javnost. Razvoj omejuje javno mnenje. Celo premier Manmohan Singh se strinja s tem. V intervjuju za nek indijski finančni časnik, je dejal, da želi iz Mumbaja narediti naslednji Šanghaj. Čeprav gre za ekonomista, šolanega na Oxfordu, ki sledi humanističnim vrednotam, kljub temu podpira agresivne metode Šanghaja.
So let me call it the Shanghai model of economic growth, that emphasizes the following features for promoting economic development: infrastructures, airports, highways, bridges, things like that. And you need a strong government to do that, because you cannot respect private property rights. You cannot be constrained by the public's opinion. You need also state ownership, especially of land assets, in order to build and roll out infrastructures very quickly. The implication of that model is that democracy is a hindrance for economic growth, rather than a facilitator of economic growth. Here's the key question. Just how important are infrastructures for economic growth? This is a key issue. If you believe that infrastructures are very important for economic growth, then you would argue a strong government is necessary to promote growth. If you believe that infrastructures are not as important as many people believe, then you will put less emphasis on strong government.
To bom poimenoval šanghajski model gospodarske rasti, ki poudarja sledeče značilnosti spodbujanja gospodarske rasti: infrastruktura, letališča, avtoceste, mostovi in podobno. Za njihovo izvedbo je potrebna močna vlada, saj spoštovanje pravice do zasebne lastnine ne pride v poštev. Mnenje ljudi ne sme biti ovira. Potrebno je tudi državno lastništvo, še posebej zemljišč, da se lahko hitro zgradijo in napeljejo povezave. Uvedba takega modela kaže, da je demokracija ovira za gospodarsko rast in ne spodbuda zanjo. V tem tiči ključno vprašanje. Kako pomembne so povezave za gospodarsko rast? To je ključnega pomena. Če ste mnenja, da so povezave za rast zelo pomembne, boste najbrž trdili, da je močna vlada nujna za spodbujanje rasti. Če pa mislite, da povezave niso tako bistvene, boste dali manj poudarka na močno vlado.
So to illustrate that question, let me give you two countries. And for the sake of brevity, I'll call one country Country 1 and the other country Country 2. Country 1 has a systematic advantage over Country 2 in infrastructures. Country 1 has more telephones, and Country 1 has a longer system of railways. So if I were to ask you, "Which is China and which is India, and which country has grown faster?" if you believe in the infrastructure view, then you will say, "Country 1 must be China. They must have done better, in terms of economic growth. And Country 2 is possibly India."
Za oris tega vprašanja je tu primer dveh držav. Da bo bolj jedrnato, naj bo prva Država 1 in druga Država 2. Država 1 je v sistematični prednosti pred Državo 2 na področju infrastrukture. Država 1 ima več telefonskih povezav in daljši železniški sistem. Če bi vas vprašal, "Katera je Kitajska, katera je Indija in katera se je razvila hitreje?", boste podporniki pomena povezav dejali, "Država 1 je gotovo Kitajska, saj ima gotovo hitrejšo gospodarsko rast, Država 2 pa je najbrž Indija."
Actually the country with more telephones is the Soviet Union, and the data referred to 1989. After the country reported very impressive statistics on telephones, the country collapsed. That's not too good. The picture there is Khrushchev. I know that in 1989 he no longer ruled the Soviet Union, but that's the best picture that I can find. (Laughter) Telephones, infrastructures do not guarantee you economic growth. Country 2, that has fewer telephones, is China. Since 1989, the country has performed at a double-digit rate every year for the last 20 years. If you know nothing about China and the Soviet Union other than the fact about their telephones, you would have made a poor prediction about their economic growth in the next two decades.
Država z obsežnejšim telefonskim omrežjem je pravzaprav Sovjetska zveza, podatki pa so iz leta 1989. Kmalu po objavi izjemnih statističnih podatkov o telefonih je država propadla. Kar ni preveč dobro. Na sliki je Hruščov. Vem, da leta 1989 ni več vodil Sovjetske zveze, a boljše slike nisem našel. (Smeh) Telefonske in ostale povezave ne zagotavljajo gospodarske rasti. Država 2, ki ima manj telefonov, je Kitajska. Od leta 1989 se je država razvijala v dvomestnih enotah vsako leto zadnjih 20 let. Če o Kitajski in Sovjetski zvezi ne veste ničesar razen podatkov o telefonskih povezavah, bi lahko napačno predvideli njuno gospodarsko rast za naslednji dve desetletji.
Country 1, that has a longer system of railways, is actually India. And Country 2 is China. This is a very little known fact about the two countries. Yes, today China has a huge infrastructure advantage over India. But for many years, until the late 1990s, China had an infrastructure disadvantage vis-a-vis India. In developing countries, the most common mode of transportation is the railways, and the British built a lot of railways in India. India is the smaller of the two countries, and yet it had a longer system of railways until the late 1990s. So clearly, infrastructure doesn't explain why China did better before the late 1990s, as compared with India.
Država 1, ki ima daljši železniški sistem, je pravzaprav Indija, Država 2 pa je Kitajska. Gre za zelo slabo poznano dejstvo o obeh državah. Danes ima Kitajska veliko boljše povezave kot Indija. A dolgo časa, do poznih devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, je Kitajska imela slabše povezave v primerjavi z Indijo. V državah v razvoju so najpogostejše prevozno sredstvo železnice, ki so se v Indiji izjemno razvile pod britansko vladavino. Indija je manjša od Kitajske, a je do poznih devetdesetih let imela daljši železniški sistem. Očitno infrastruktura ne pojasni, zakaj je pred poznimi devetdesetimi leti Kitajski šlo bolje kot Indiji.
In fact, if you look at the evidence worldwide, the evidence is more supportive of the view that the infrastructure are actually the result of economic growth. The economy grows, government accumulates more resources, and the government can invest in infrastructure -- rather than infrastructure being a cause for economic growth. And this is clearly the story of the Chinese economic growth. Let me look at this question more directly. Is democracy bad for economic growth? Now let's turn to two countries, Country A and Country B. Country A, in 1990, had about $300 per capita GDP as compared with Country B, which had $460 in per capita GDP. By 2008, Country A has surpassed Country B with $700 per capita GDP as compared with $650 per capita GDP. Both countries are in Asia.
Če pogledamo primere na svetovni ravni, ti bolj podpirajo načelo, da so povezave pravzaprav posledica gospodarske rasti. Ko gospodarstvo raste, vlada pridobi več sredstev, ki jih lahko vloži v izgradnjo infrastrukture, ki torej ni razlog za gospodarsko rast. V tem primeru gre očitno za rast kitajskega gospodarstva. Vrnimo se bolj neposredno k vprašanju. Je demokracija ovira za gospodarsko rast? Vzemimo dve državi, Državo A in Državo B. Država A je imela leta 1990 300$ BDP na prebivalca, v primerjavi z Državo B s 460$ BDP na prebivalca. Do leta 2008 je Država A prehitela Državo B, in sicer s 700$ BDP na prebivalca v primerjavi s 650$ BDP na prebivalca. Obe državi sta azijski.
If I were to ask you, "Which are the two Asian countries? And which one is a democracy?" you may argue, "Well, maybe Country A is China and Country B is India." In fact, Country A is democratic India, and Country B is Pakistan -- the country that has a long period of military rule. And it's very common that we compare India with China. That's because the two countries have about the same population size. But the more natural comparison is actually between India and Pakistan. Those two countries are geographically similar. They have a complicated, but shared common history. By that comparison, democracy looks very, very good in terms of economic growth.
Če bi vas vprašal, "Za kateri azijski državi gre in katera ima demokratični sistem?", bi morda trdili, "Država A je najbrž Kitajska, Država B pa Indija." Država A je pravzaprav demokratična Indija, Država B pa Pakistan, država z dolgoletno vojaško vladavino. Zelo pogosto primerjamo Indijo in Kitajsko. Razlog tiči v tem, da imata obe približno enako število prebivalcev. A bolj primerna je pravzaprav primerjava med Indijo in Pakistanom. Ti dve državi sta si geografsko podobni. Njuni zgodovini sta zapleteni, a se prepletata. Na podlagi te primerjave vidimo demokracijo kot zelo spodbudno za gospodarsko rast.
So why do economists fall in love with authoritarian governments? One reason is the East Asian Model. In East Asia, we have had successful economic growth stories such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Some of these economies were ruled by authoritarian governments in the 60s and 70s and 1980s. The problem with that view is like asking all the winners of lotteries, "Have you won the lottery?" And they all tell you, "Yes, we have won the lottery." And then you draw the conclusion the odds of winning the lottery are 100 percent. The reason is you never go and bother to ask the losers who also purchased lottery tickets and didn't end up winning the prize.
Zakaj so torej ekonomistom tako všeč avtoritarne vlade? Eden od razlogov je Vzhodnoazijski model. V Vzhodni Aziji poznamo zgodbe o gospodarskem uspehu, kot so Koreja, Tajvan, Hong Kong in Singapur. Nekatera od teh gospodarstev so bila pod avtoritarnimi vladami v šestdesetih, sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja. Težava pri tem je enaka, kot če bi vprašali vse dobitnike loterije, ali so kaj zadeli. Rekli bodo, da so zadeli glavni dobitek. Od tu sklepate, da so možnosti dobitka na loteriji stoodstotne. Razlog je v tem, da se nikoli ne vpraša ljudi, ki so prav tako kupili srečko, a niso zadeli ničesar.
For each of these successful authoritarian governments in East Asia, there's a matched failure. Korea succeeded, North Korea didn't. Taiwan succeeded, China under Mao Zedong didn't. Burma didn't succeed. The Philippines didn't succeed. If you look at the statistical evidence worldwide, there's really no support for the idea that authoritarian governments hold a systematic edge over democracies in terms of economic growth. So the East Asian model has this massive selection bias -- it is known as selecting on a dependent variable, something we always tell our students to avoid.
Za vsak primer uspešne avtoritarne vlade v Vzhodni Aziji obstaja primer neuspeha. Južni Koreji je uspelo, Severni ne. Tajvanu je uspelo, Kitajski pod Maovim režimom pa ne. Burmi ni uspelo, Filipinom tudi ne. Ob pregledu svetovnih statističnih podatkov ne najdemo potrditve teze, da imajo avtoritarne vlade prednost pred demokracijami na področju gospodarske rasti. Vzhodnoazijski model pa je izjemno selektivno naravnan in deluje na podlagi odvisne spremenljivke, kar odsvetujemo našim študentom.
So exactly why did China grow so much faster? I will take you to the Cultural Revolution, when China went mad, and compare that country's performance with India under Indira Gandhi. The question there is: Which country did better, China or India? China was during the Cultural Revolution. It turns out even during the Cultural Revolution, China out-perfomed India in terms of GDP growth by an average of about 2.2 percent every year in terms of per capita GDP. So that's when China was mad. The whole country went mad. It must mean that the country had something so advantageous to itself in terms of economic growth to overcome the negative effects of the Cultural Revolution. The advantage the country had was human capital -- nothing else but human capital.
Zakaj je torej Kitajska napredovala toliko hitreje? Preselimo se v čas Kulturne revolucije, ko je Kitajska pobesnela, in primerjajmo delovanje države z Indijo pod vodstvom Indire Gandhi. Vprašanje je: kateri državi je šlo bolje, Kitajski ali Indiji? Kitajsko je zaznamovala Kulturna revolucija. A kljub revoluciji je v tistem času Kitajska prehitela Indijo v rasti BDP-ja, in sicer povprečno za 2,2 odstotka letno BDP-ja na prebivalca. To je bilo, ko je Kitajska besnela. Cela država je bila na nogah. Država je torej imela nekaj tako spodbudnega za gospodarsko rast, da je premagala negativne učinke Kulturne revolucije. Prednost Kitajske je bil človeški kapital, nič drugega kot človeški kapital.
This is the world development index indicator data in the early 1990s. And this is the earliest data that I can find. The adult literacy rate in China is 77 percent as compared with 48 percent in India. The contrast in literacy rates is especially sharp between Chinese women and Indian women. I haven't told you about the definition of literacy. In China, the definition of literacy is the ability to read and write 1,500 Chinese characters. In India, the definition of literacy, operating definition of literacy, is the ability, the grand ability, to write your own name in whatever language you happen to speak. The gap between the two countries in terms of literacy is much more substantial than the data here indicated. If you go to other sources of data such as Human Development Index, that data series, go back to the early 1970s, you see exactly the same contrast. China held a huge advantage in terms of human capital vis-a-vis India.
Tu vidimo podatke o kazalcih svetovnega razvoja v zgodnjih devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja. Zgodnejših podatkov nisem našel. Stopnja pismenosti med odraslimi na Kitajskem je 77-odstotna, v Indiji pa 48-odstotna. Razlika med stopnjama je še posebej očitna med kitajskimi in indijskimi ženskami. Toda kaj pismenost pomeni? Na Kitajskem pismenost predstavlja sposobnost branja in pisanja 1500 kitajskih pismenk. V Indiji pa pismenost, praktična pismenost, pomeni izjemno sposobnost ljudi, da zapišejo svoje ime v jeziku, ki ga govorijo. Razlika med državama v pismenosti je precej znatnejša, kot je tukaj prikazano. Če pregledamo druge vire podatkov, kot je Kazalec človeškega razvoja, katerega podatki segajo do zgodnjih sedemdesetih let 20. stoletja, vidimo popolnoma enako nasprotje. Kitajska je imela izjemno prednost človeškega kapitala v primerjavi z Indijo.
Life expectancies: as early as 1965, China had a huge advantage in life expectancy. On average, as a Chinese in 1965, you lived 10 years more than an average Indian. So if you have a choice between being a Chinese and being an Indian, you would want to become a Chinese in order to live 10 years longer. If you made that decision in 1965, the down side of that is the next year we have the Cultural Revolution. So you have to always think carefully about these decisions.
Pričakovana življenjska doba je bila leta 1965 bistveno višja na Kitajskem. Na Kitajskem so leta 1965 ljudje živeli 10 let dlje kot povprečni Indijci. Če bi lahko izbirali, ali bi živeli na Kitajskem ali v Indiji, bi raje bili Kitajec in živeli 10 let dlje. Če bi se tako odločili leta 1965, bi se na žalost čez leto dni morali spopasti s Kulturno revolucijo. Take odločitve je treba vedno dobro pretehtati.
If you cannot chose your nationality, then you will want to become an Indian man. Because, as an Indian man, you have about two years of life expectancy advantage vis-a-vis Indian women. This is an extremely strange fact. It's very rare among countries to have this kind of pattern. It shows the systematic discrimination and biases in the Indian society against women. The good news is, by 2006, India has closed the gap between men and women in terms of life expectancy. Today, Indian women have a sizable life expectancy edge over Indian men. So India is reverting to the normal. But India still has a lot of work to do in terms of gender equality.
Če ne bi mogli izbirati narodnosti, bi v Indiji raje bili moški. Indijci imajo namreč dve leti daljšo pričakovano življenjsko dobo kot Indijke. Gre za izjemno nenavaden pojav. Zelo redko se zgodi, da imajo države tak vzorec. To kaže na sistematično diskriminacijo in zapostavljanje indijske družbe do svojih žensk. Na srečo je do leta 2006 Indija zapolnila vrzel med moškimi in ženskami na področju pričakovane življenjske dobe. Danes indijske ženske živijo precej dlje kot indijski moški. Indija se torej vrača v normalne okvirje. Še vedno pa jo čaka veliko dela na področju enakosti spolov.
These are the two pictures taken of garment factories in Guangdong Province and garment factories in India. In China, it's all women. 60 to 80 percent of the workforce in China is women in the coastal part of the country, whereas in India, it's all men. Financial Times printed this picture of an Indian textile factory with the title, "India Poised to Overtake China in Textile." By looking at these two pictures, I say no, it won't overtake China for a while. If you look at other East Asian countries, women there play a hugely important role in terms of economic take-off -- in terms of creating the manufacturing miracle associated with East Asia. India still has a long way to go to catch up with China.
Ti dve sliki prikazujeta tekstilni obrat v provinci Kanton ter v Indiji. Na primeru Kitajske vidimo same ženske. 60 do 80 odstotkov kitajske delovne sile na obalnem območju države so ženske, v Indiji pa so sami moški. Financial Times je objavil to sliko indijskega tekstilnega obrata in jo naslovil "Indija dohiteva kitajsko tekstilstvo". Ob pogledu na ti dve sliki menim, da Kitajske ne bo prehitela še kar nekaj časa. V drugih vzhodnoazijskih državah imajo ženske izjemno pomembno vlogo pri gospodarskem zagonu, pri ustvarjanju proizvodnega čudeža Vzhodne Azije. Indijo čaka še dolga pot, preden dohiti Kitajsko.
Then the issue is, what about the Chinese political system? You talk about human capital, you talk about education and public health. What about the political system? Isn't it true that the one-party political system has facilitated economic growth in China? Actually, the answer is more nuanced and subtle than that. It depends on a distinction that you draw between statics of the political system and the dynamics of the political system. Statically, China is a one-party system, authoritarian -- there's no question about it. Dynamically, it has changed over time to become less authoritarian and more democratic. When you explain change -- for example, economic growth; economic growth is about change -- when you explain change, you use other things that have changed to explain change, rather than using the constant to explain change. Sometimes a fixed effect can explain change, but a fixed effect only explains changes in interaction with the things that change.
Naslednje vprašanje pa je, vloga kitajskega političnega sistema? Poznamo pomen človeškega kapitala, izobraževanja in javnega zdravstva. Kaj pa politični sistem? Mar ne drži, da je enostrankarski politični sistem omogočil gospodarsko rast Kitajske? Odgovor je veliko bolj zabrisan. Temelji na razliki med statičnim političnim sistemom in dinamičnim političnim sistemom. Statično gledano ima Kitajska enostrankarski, avtoritarni sistem, o tem ni dvoma. Z dinamičnega vidika pa se je ta sčasoma spreminjal ter postal manj avtoritaren in bolj demokratičen. Ko razlagamo spremembe, na primer gospodarsko rast, ki predstavlja spremembo, ko poskušamo to razložiti, se poslužujemo primerov drugih sprememb in ne primerov stalnic. Včasih pa lahko neka stalnica pojasni spremembe, a le v kombinaciji z drugimi spremembami.
In terms of the political changes, they have introduced village elections. They have increased the security of proprietors. And they have increased the security with long-term land leases. There are also financial reforms in rural China. There is also a rural entrepreneurial revolution in China. To me, the pace of political changes is too slow, too gradual. And my own view is the country is going to face some substantial challenges, because they have not moved further and faster on political reforms. But nevertheless, the system has moved in a more liberal direction, moved in a more democratic direction.
Spremembe na političnem področju so prinesle vaške volitve. S tem so še bolj zaščitili lastnike. To so dosegli tudi z dolgoročnimi najemi zemljišč. Tu so tudi finančne reforme podeželske Kitajske in revolucija podeželskega podjetništva. Zdi se mi, da se politične spremembe odvijajo prepočasi in preveč postopoma. Prav tako se bo morala država spopasti s precejšnjimi izzivi, ker so bile reforme preskromne in prepočasne. Kljub temu pa se je sistem usmeril na bolj liberalno, bolj demokratično pot.
You can apply exactly the same dynamic perspective on India. In fact, when India was growing at a Hindu rate of growth -- about one percent, two percent a year -- that was when India was least democratic. Indira Gandhi declared emergency rule in 1975. The Indian government owned and operated all the TV stations. A little-known fact about India in the 1990s is that the country not only has undertaken economic reforms, the country has also undertaken political reforms by introducing village self-rule, privatization of media and introducing freedom of information acts. So the dynamic perspective fits both with China and in India in terms of the direction.
Enako dinamično stališče lahko uporabimo pri Indiji. Ko je Indija rasla s hindujsko stopnjo rasti za odstotek, dva na leto, je bila država najdlje od demokracije. Leta 1975 je Indira Gandhi razglasila izredne razmere. Indijska vlada si je lastila in nadzorovala vse televizijske postaje. Malo znano pa je dejstvo, da je Indija v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja izvedla ne le gospodarske reforme, pač pa tudi politične in uvedla vaško samoupravo, privatizacijo medijev in zakon o pravici do obveščenosti. Dinamični vidik torej ustreza tako Kitajski kot Indiji, in njunim usmeritvam.
Why do many people believe that India is still a growth disaster? One reason is they are always comparing India with China. But China is a superstar in terms of economic growth. If you are a NBA player and you are always being compared to Michael Jordan, you're going to look not so impressive. But that doesn't mean that you're a bad basketball player. Comparing with a superstar is the wrong benchmark. In fact, if you compare India with the average developing country, even before the more recent period of acceleration of Indian growth -- now India is growing between eight and nine percent -- even before this period, India was ranked fourth in terms of economic growth among emerging economies. This is a very impressive record indeed.
Zakaj še vedno veliko ljudi misli, da je indijska rast porazna? En od razlogov je, da Indijo vedno primerjajo s Kitajsko. Kitajska pa je superzvezda gospodarske rasti. Če ste košarkar v NBA in vas vedno primerjajo z Michaelom Jordanom, ne boste pustili velikega vtisa. Kar pa ne pomeni, da ste slab košarkar. Primerjava s superzvezdniki ni ustrezno merilo. Če namreč primerjate Indijo s povprečno državo v razvoju še pred aktualnim obdobjem pospešene rasti Indije, ki je trenutno med 8 in 9 odstotki, še pred tem pa je bila Indija na četrtem mestu po gospodarski rasti med rastočimi gospodarstvi. To je res občudovanja vreden podatek.
Let's think about the future: the dragon vis-a-vis the elephant. Which country has the growth momentum? China, I believe, still has some of the excellent raw fundamentals -- mostly the social capital, the public health, the sense of egalitarianism that you don't find in India. But I believe that India has the momentum. It has the improving fundamentals. The government has invested in basic education, has invested in basic health. I believe the government should do more, but nevertheless, the direction it is moving in is the right direction. India has the right institutional conditions for economic growth, whereas China is still struggling with political reforms.
Pomislimo na prihodnost, zmaj nasproti slona. Katera država je v zagonu rasti? Menim, da ima Kitajska še vedno nekaj izjemnih odločilnih lastnosti, predvsem družbeni kapital, javno zdravstvo, smisel za enakopravnost, česar ne najdete v Indiji. A menim, da je v pravem zagonu Indija. Njene odločilne značilnosti napredujejo. Vlada vlaga v osnovno izobraževanje, v osnovno zdravstvo. Menim, da bi lahko storila še več, a njena usmeritev je kljub temu pravilna. Indija ima prave ustanovne pogoje za gospodarsko rast, Kitajska pa se še bori s političnimi reformami.
I believe that the political reforms are a must for China to maintain its growth. And it's very important to have political reforms, to have widely shared benefits of economic growth. I don't know whether that's going to happen or not, but I'm an optimist. Hopefully, five years from now, I'm going to report to TEDGlobal that political reforms will happen in China.
Menim, da so politične reforme nujne, da Kitajska vzdržuje svojo rast. Politične reforme so zelo pomembne za splošno širjenje pridobitev gospodarske rasti. Ne vem, ali bo do tega prišlo ali ne, a ostajam optimist. Upam, da bom lahko čez pet let na dogodku TEDGlobal poročal, da so se politične reforme na Kitajskem zgodile.
Thank you very much.
Hvala lepa.
(Applause)
(Aplavz)