Democracy. In the West, we make a colossal mistake taking it for granted. We see democracy not as the most fragile of flowers that it really is, but we see it as part of our society's furniture. We tend to think of it as an intransigent given. We mistakenly believe that capitalism begets inevitably democracy. It doesn't.
Democracia En Occidente, cometemos un grande erro ao dala por feito. Vemos a democracia non como a máis fráxil das flores, o que é en realidade, senón como parte do mobiliario da nosa sociedade. Tendemos a pensar nela como un feito definitivo. Pensamos, de forma errada, que o capitalismo xera sempre democracia. Mais non o fai.
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and his great imitators in Beijing have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that it is perfectly possible to have a flourishing capitalism, spectacular growth, while politics remains democracy-free. Indeed, democracy is receding in our neck of the woods, here in Europe.
Lee Kuan Yew, de Singapur, e os seus grandes imitadores en Beijing, demostraron, máis alá de calquera dúbida, que é perfectamente posible ter un capitalismo vizoso, de crecemento espectacular, mentres a política permanece exenta de democracia. De feito, a democracia está en regresión no noso terreo, aquí en Europa.
Earlier this year, while I was representing Greece -- the newly elected Greek government -- in the Eurogroup as its Finance Minister, I was told in no uncertain terms that our nation's democratic process -- our elections -- could not be allowed to interfere with economic policies that were being implemented in Greece. At that moment, I felt that there could be no greater vindication of Lee Kuan Yew, or the Chinese Communist Party, indeed of some recalcitrant friends of mine who kept telling me that democracy would be banned if it ever threatened to change anything.
A comezos deste ano, cando estaba representando a Grecia -no goberno grego que acababa de ser elixido- no Eurogrupo, como ministro de Finanzas, dixéronme claramente que o proceso democrático no noso país -as nosas eleccións- non podían interferir coas políticas económicas que se estaban desenvolvendo en Grecia. Naquel momento, sentín que non podía haber maior reivindicación de Lee Kuan Yew, nin do Partido Comunista Chinés, nin dalgúns amigos meus, recalcitrantes, que estaban sempre a dicirme que se prohibiría a democracia se ameazásemos alterar algo.
Tonight, here, I want to present to you an economic case for an authentic democracy. I want to ask you to join me in believing again that Lee Kuan Yew, the Chinese Communist Party and indeed the Eurogroup are wrong in believing that we can dispense with democracy -- that we need an authentic, boisterous democracy. And without democracy, our societies will be nastier, our future bleak and our great, new technologies wasted.
Esta noite, quero presentarvos un escenario económico para unha auténtica democracia. Quero pedirvos que me acompañedes para volver a crer que Lee Kuan Yew, O Partido Comunista Chinés e o Eurogrupo tamén están errados, ao creren que podemos prescindir da democracia, que precisamos unha democracia auténtica e estrondosa. E sen democracia, as nosas sociedades serán máis ruíns, o noso futuro, escuro e as nosas grandes, novas tecnoloxías, botadas a perder.
Speaking of waste, allow me to point out an interesting paradox that is threatening our economies as we speak. I call it the twin peaks paradox. One peak you understand -- you know it, you recognize it -- is the mountain of debts that has been casting a long shadow over the United States, Europe, the whole world. We all recognize the mountain of debts. But few people discern its twin. A mountain of idle cash belonging to rich savers and to corporations, too terrified to invest it into the productive activities that can generate the incomes from which you can extinguish the mountain of debts and which can produce all those things that humanity desperately needs, like green energy.
Falando de botar a perder, permitídeme apuntar un interesante paradoxo que está ameazando as nosas economías. Eu chámolle o paradoxo dos picos xemelgos. Un dos picos, xa sabedes, ídelo recoñecer, é a montaña de débedas que proxecta unha longa sombra sobre os EE.UU., Europa, o mundo enteiro. Todos recoñecemos a montaña de débedas. Pero poucas persoas distinguen o seu xemelgo. A montaña de diñeiro improdutivo que pertence aos aforradores ricos e ás grandes empresas, demasiado aterrorizados para investilo en actividades produtivas que poidan xerar ingresos con que poidamos eliminar a montaña de débedas e que poidan producir o que a humanidade necesita desesperadamente, como a enerxía verde.
Now let me give you two numbers. Over the last three months, in the United States, in Britain and in the Eurozone, we have invested, collectively, 3.4 trillion dollars on all the wealth-producing goods -- things like industrial plants, machinery, office blocks, schools, roads, railways, machinery, and so on and so forth. $3.4 trillion sounds like a lot of money until you compare it to the $5.1 trillion that has been slushing around in the same countries, in our financial institutions, doing absolutely nothing during the same period except inflating stock exchanges and bidding up house prices.
Agora vou darvos dous números. Nos últimos tres meses, nos EE.UU., en Gran Bretaña e na Eurozona, investimos colectivamente 3,4 billóns de dólares en todos os bens que producen riqueza -cousas como instalacións industriais, maquinaria, edificios de oficinas, escolas, estradas, ferrocarrís, maquinaria, etc., etc. 3,4 billóns de dólares parecen moitos cartos ata que os comparamos cos 5,1 billóns que se esparexeron neses mesmos países, nas nosas institucións financeiras, sen facer absolutamente nada durante o mesmo período agás inflar os mercados bursátiles e encarecer os prezos da vivenda.
So a mountain of debt and a mountain of idle cash form twin peaks, failing to cancel each other out through the normal operation of the markets.
Así que temos unha montaña de débeda e unha montaña de diñeiro improdutivo que forman os picos xemelgos, sen poder anularse un ao outro a través da operación normal dos mercados.
The result is stagnant wages, more than a quarter of 25- to 54-year-olds in America, in Japan and in Europe out of work. And consequently, low aggregate demand, which in a never-ending cycle, reinforces the pessimism of the investors, who, fearing low demand, reproduce it by not investing -- exactly like Oedipus' father, who, terrified by the prophecy of the oracle that his son would grow up to kill him, unwittingly engineered the conditions that ensured that Oedipus, his son, would kill him.
O resultado é o estancamento dos salarios, o desemprego de máis dun cuarto de traballadores, dos 25 aos 54 anos, en América, Xapón e Europa. E, consecuentemente, baixa a demanda agregada nun ciclo sen fin, que reforza o pesimismo dos investidores, que, por medo á baixa demanda, responden non investindo, exactamente como o pai de Edipo que, estarrecido pola profecía do oráculo de que o seu fillo medraría para matalo, inconscientemente creou as condicións que aseguraron que Edipo, o seu fillo, o matase.
This is my quarrel with capitalism. Its gross wastefulness, all this idle cash, should be energized to improve lives, to develop human talents, and indeed to finance all these technologies, green technologies, which are absolutely essential for saving planet Earth.
Esta é a miña batalla co capitalismo. A súa grave dilapidación de cartos, todo este diñeiro improdutivo, debería ser canalizado en mellorar vidas, en desenvolver o talento humano, e en financiar todas esas tecnoloxías, tecnoloxías verdes, que son absolutamente esenciais para salvar o planeta.
Am I right in believing that democracy might be the answer? I believe so, but before we move on, what do we mean by democracy? Aristotle defined democracy as the constitution in which the free and the poor, being in the majority, control government.
¿Teño razón ao crer que a democracia podería ser a resposta? Eu penso que si, pero antes de seguir, ¿que entendemos por democracia? Aristóteles definiu a democracia como a constitución en que os libres e os pobres, ao seren a maioría, controlan o goberno.
Now, of course Athenian democracy excluded too many. Women, migrants and, of course, the slaves. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the significance of ancient Athenian democracy on the basis of whom it excluded.
Claro que a democracia ateniense excluía demasiada xente. Mulleres, migrantes e, por suposto, escravos. Pero sería un erro rexeitar o significado da antiga democracia ateniense baseándonos en quen excluía.
What was more pertinent, and continues to be so about ancient Athenian democracy, was the inclusion of the working poor, who not only acquired the right to free speech, but more importantly, crucially, they acquired the rights to political judgments that were afforded equal weight in the decision-making concerning matters of state. Now, of course, Athenian democracy didn't last long. Like a candle that burns brightly, it burned out quickly. And indeed, our liberal democracies today do not have their roots in ancient Athens. They have their roots in the Magna Carta, in the 1688 Glorious Revolution, indeed in the American constitution. Whereas Athenian democracy was focusing on the masterless citizen and empowering the working poor, our liberal democracies are founded on the Magna Carta tradition, which was, after all, a charter for masters. And indeed, liberal democracy only surfaced when it was possible to separate fully the political sphere from the economic sphere, so as to confine the democratic process fully in the political sphere, leaving the economic sphere -- the corporate world, if you want -- as a democracy-free zone.
O que era máis pertinente, e continúa séndoo na antiga democracia ateniense, era a inclusión dos traballadores pobres, os que non só adquirían o dereito da liberdade de expresión, senón que, o máis importante, crucial, adquirían os dereitos aos xuízos políticos que lles concedían igual peso no proceso de toma de decisións sobre cuestións de estado. Claro, a democracia ateniense non durou moito. Como unha candea que arde vivamente, queimouse axiña. E de feito, a nosa actual democracia liberal non ten as súas raíces na antiga Atenas. Ten as súas raíces na Carta Magna, na Revolución Gloriosa de 1688, mesmo na constitución de EE.UU. Mentres que a democracia ateniense se centrou na cidadanía sen dono e no empoderamento dos traballadores pobres, as nosas democracias liberais baséanse na tradición da Carta Magna, que era, despois de todo, unha carta para amos. E, de feito, a democracia liberal só xurdiu cando foi posible separar totalmente a esfera política da esfera económica, para restrinxir o proceso democrático totalmente á esfera política, deixando a esfera económica -o mundo empresarial, se queredes- como unha zona libre de democracia.
Now, in our democracies today, this separation of the economic from the political sphere, the moment it started happening, it gave rise to an inexorable, epic struggle between the two, with the economic sphere colonizing the political sphere, eating into its power.
Ben, na nosa democracia actual, esta separación da esfera económica e da politica, o momento en que comezou, deu lugar a unha inexorable loita épica entre as dúas, coa esfera económica colonizando a esfera política, devorando o seu poder.
Have you wondered why politicians are not what they used to be? It's not because their DNA has degenerated.
Preguntástesvos por que os políticos non son o que adoitaban ser? Non é porque o seu ADN dexenerara.
(Laughter)
(Risos)
It is rather because one can be in government today and not in power, because power has migrated from the political to the economic sphere, which is separate.
Máis ben é porque hoxe un pode estar no goberno e non ter poder, porque o poder migrou desde a esfera política á económica, que está separada.
Indeed, I spoke about my quarrel with capitalism. If you think about it, it is a little bit like a population of predators, that are so successful in decimating the prey that they must feed on, that in the end they starve.
De feito, falei da miña batalla contra o capitalismo. Se pensades niso, é un pouco como unha poboación de predadores, que teñen tanto éxito en aniquilar a presa da que se alimentan, que, á fin, morren de fame.
Similarly, the economic sphere has been colonizing and cannibalizing the political sphere to such an extent that it is undermining itself, causing economic crisis. Corporate power is increasing, political goods are devaluing, inequality is rising, aggregate demand is falling and CEOs of corporations are too scared to invest the cash of their corporations.
De igual xeito, a esfera económica foi colonizando e canibalizando a esfera política ata tal punto que se debilitou a si mesma, provocando a crise económica. O poder corporativo está aumentando, os bens políticos están desvalorizándose, a desigualdade aumenta, a demanda agregada está caendo e os CEO das empresas teñen demasiado medo de investir o diñeiro das súas empresas.
So the more capitalism succeeds in taking the demos out of democracy, the taller the twin peaks and the greater the waste of human resources and humanity's wealth.
Así que canto máis éxito ten o capitalismo en tirar o demos da democracia, máis altos son os picos xemelgos e maior é a perda de recursos humanos e de riqueza da humanidade.
Clearly, if this is right, we must reunite the political and economic spheres and better do it with a demos being in control, like in ancient Athens except without the slaves or the exclusion of women and migrants.
Claramente, se isto é así, debemos reunir as esferas política e económica e mellor facelo cun demos ao mando, como na antiga Atenas pero sen os escravos e sen a exclusión de mulleres e migrantes.
Now, this is not an original idea. The Marxist left had that idea 100 years ago and it didn't go very well, did it?
Agora ben, isto non é unha idea orixinal. A esquerda marxista tivo esa idea hai cen anos e non foi moi ben, non?
The lesson that we learned from the Soviet debacle is that only by a miracle will the working poor be reempowered, as they were in ancient Athens, without creating new forms of brutality and waste.
A lección que aprendemos do fracaso soviético é que só por un milagre os traballadores pobres volverán ter poder, como o tiñan na antiga Atenas, sen crear novas formas de brutalidade nin desproveitos.
But there is a solution: eliminate the working poor. Capitalism's doing it by replacing low-wage workers with automata, androids, robots. The problem is that as long as the economic and the political spheres are separate, automation makes the twin peaks taller, the waste loftier and the social conflicts deeper, including -- soon, I believe -- in places like China.
Pero hai unha solución: eliminar os traballadores pobres. O capitalismo estao facendo ao substituír os traballadores con baixos salarios por autómatas, androides, robots. O problema é que mentres as esferas económica e política estean separadas, a automatización fai os picos máis altos, e máis altos son os desproveitos e máis profundos os conflitos sociais, mesmo -pronto, creo- en lugares como China.
So we need to reconfigure, we need to reunite the economic and the political spheres, but we'd better do it by democratizing the reunified sphere, lest we end up with a surveillance-mad hyperautocracy that makes The Matrix, the movie, look like a documentary.
Así que necesitamos reconfigurar, necesitamos reunir as esferas económica e política, pero será mellor facelo democratizando as esferas reunificadas, para non rematar cunha hiperautocracia obsesionada coa vixilancia que fará que o filme Matrix pareza un documental.
(Laughter)
(Risos)
So the question is not whether capitalism will survive the technological innovations it is spawning. The more interesting question is whether capitalism will be succeeded by something resembling a Matrix dystopia or something much closer to a Star Trek-like society, where machines serve the humans and the humans expend their energies exploring the universe and indulging in long debates about the meaning of life in some ancient, Athenian-like, high tech agora.
Así que a pregunta non é se o capitalismo sobrevivirá as innovacións tecnolóxicas que está xerando. A pregunta máis interesante é se o capitalismo terá éxito como algo que se parece á distopía de Matrix ou algo máis achegado á sociedade de Star Trek, onde as máquinas serven os humanos e os humanos gastan as súas enerxías explorando o universo e entregándose a longos debates sobre o sentido da vida nunha antiga ágora, como a de Atenas, altamente tecnolóxica.
I think we can afford to be optimistic. But what would it take, what would it look like to have this Star Trek-like utopia, instead of the Matrix-like dystopia?
Penso que podemos permitirnos ser optimistas. Pero canto levaría, como sería ter esta utopía Star Trek, en lugar da distopía Matrix?
In practical terms, allow me to share just briefly, a couple of examples.
En termos prácticos, permitídeme compartir brevemente, un par de exemplos.
At the level of the enterprise, imagine a capital market, where you earn capital as you work, and where your capital follows you from one job to another, from one company to another, and the company -- whichever one you happen to work at at that time -- is solely owned by those who happen to work in it at that moment. Then all income stems from capital, from profits, and the very concept of wage labor becomes obsolete. No more separation between those who own but do not work in the company and those who work but do not own the company; no more tug-of-war between capital and labor; no great gap between investment and saving; indeed, no towering twin peaks.
Ao nivel empresarial, imaxinade un mercado de capitais, onde se gaña capital segundo se traballa, e onde o noso capital nos segue dun traballo a outro, dunha empresa a outra, e a empresa, calquera que for onde esteamos traballando nese momento é propiedade exclusiva daqueles que traballan alí nese momento. Entón todos os ingresos veñen do capital, dos beneficios e o concepto de traballo asalariado convértese en obsoleto. Non hai separación entre aqueles que posúen pero non traballan na empresa e aqueles que traballan pero non posúen a empresa; xa non hai tira e afrouxa entre capital e traballo; ningunha fenda entre investimento e aforro; de feito, non hai altísimos picos xemelgos.
At the level of the global political economy, imagine for a moment that our national currencies have a free-floating exchange rate, with a universal, global, digital currency, one that is issued by the International Monetary Fund, the G-20, on behalf of all humanity. And imagine further that all international trade is denominated in this currency -- let's call it "the cosmos," in units of cosmos -- with every government agreeing to be paying into a common fund a sum of cosmos units proportional to the country's trade deficit, or indeed to a country's trade surplus. And imagine that that fund is utilized to invest in green technologies, especially in parts of the world where investment funding is scarce.
Ao nivel da economía política global, imaxinade por un momento que as nosas moedas nacionais teñen un tipo de cambio flexible, cunha moeda universal, global, dixital, unha emitida polo Fondo Monetario Internacional, o G-20, en beneficio de toda a humanidade. E imaxinade, ademais, que todo o comercio internacional se produza nesa moeda, imos chamarlle "o cosmos", en unidades de cosmos con cada goberno aceptando pagar para un fondo común unha suma de unidades de cosmos proporcional ao déficit comercial do país, ou mesmo ao superávit comercial dun país. E imaxinade que ese fondo se utiliza para investir en tecnoloxías verdes, especialmente en partes do mundo onde os investimentos son escasos.
This is not a new idea. It's what, effectively, John Maynard Keynes proposed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. The problem is that back then, they didn't have the technology to implement it. Now we do, especially in the context of a reunified political-economic sphere.
Esta non é unha idea nova. É o que, eficazmente, John Maynard Keynes propuxo en 1944 na Conferencia de Bretton Woods. O problema é que daquela, non tiñan a tecnoloxía para desenvolvelo. Agora témola, especialmente no contexto dunha esfera reunificada político-económica.
The world that I am describing to you is simultaneously libertarian, in that it prioritizes empowered individuals, Marxist, since it will have confined to the dustbin of history the division between capital and labor, and Keynesian, global Keynesian. But above all else, it is a world in which we will be able to imagine an authentic democracy.
O mundo que vos estou describindo é asemade libertario, en canto prioriza o empoderamento das persoas, marxista, xa que levará á papeleira da historia a división entre capital e traballo, e keynesiano, keynesiano global. Pero sobre todo, é un mundo no que seremos quen de imaxinar unha auténtica democracia.
Will such a world dawn? Or shall we descend into a Matrix-like dystopia? The answer lies in the political choice that we shall be making collectively. It is our choice, and we'd better make it democratically.
¿Alborexerá tal mundo? ¿Ou caeremos nunha distopía como a de Matrix? A resposta está na escolla política que fagamos colectivamente. É a nosa escolla, e será mellor que a fagamos democraticamente.
Thank you.
Grazas.
(Applause)
(Aplausos)
Bruno Giussani: Yanis ... It was you who described yourself in your bios as a libertarian Marxist. What is the relevance of Marx's analysis today?
Bruno Giussani: Yanis, foi vostede quen se describiu como un marxista libertario. Cal é a relevancia da análise de Marx hoxe?
Yanis Varoufakis: Well, if there was any relevance in what I just said, then Marx is relevant. Because the whole point of reunifying the political and economic is -- if we don't do it, then technological innovation is going to create such a massive fall in aggregate demand,
Yanis Varoufakis: Ben, se hai algunha relevancia no que acabo de dicir, entón Marx é relevante. Porque o motivo de reunificar a política e a economía é que, se non o facemos, a innovación tecnolóxica vai xerar unha caída enorme na demanda agregada,
what Larry Summers refers to as secular stagnation. With this crisis migrating from one part of the world, as it is now, it will destabilize not only our democracies, but even the emerging world that is not that keen on liberal democracy. So if this analysis holds water, then Marx is absolutely relevant. But so is Hayek, that's why I'm a libertarian Marxist, and so is Keynes, so that's why I'm totally confused.
o que Larry Summers denomina como estancamento secular. Con esta crise migratoria dunha parte do mundo, como a actual, desestabilizará non só as nosas democracias, senón tamén o mundo emerxente que non é partidario da democracia liberal. Así que se esta análise é sólida entón Marx é totalmente relevante. Pero tamén o é Hayek, por iso son marxista libertario, e tamén o é Keynes, por iso estou tan confuso.
(Laughter)
(Risos)
BG: Indeed, and possibly we are too, now.
BG: Certo, e posiblemente agora nós tamén
(Laughter)
(Risos)
(Applause)
(Aplausos)
YV: If you are not confused, you are not thinking, OK?
YV: Se non estás confuso, é que non estás pensando, non?
BG: That's a very, very Greek philosopher kind of thing to say --
BG: Ese é un comentario moi de filósofo grego...
YV: That was Einstein, actually --
YV: En realidade, díxoo Einstein...
BG: During your talk you mentioned Singapore and China, and last night at the speaker dinner, you expressed a pretty strong opinion about how the West looks at China. Would you like to share that?
BG: Durante a súa charla mencionou Singapur e China, e a pasada noite na cea de relatores expresou unha firme opinión acerca de como Occidente mira a China. ¿Podería compartila?
YV: Well, there's a great degree of hypocrisy. In our liberal democracies, we have a semblance of democracy. It's because we have confined, as I was saying in my talk, democracy to the political sphere, while leaving the one sphere where all the action is -- the economic sphere -- a completely democracy-free zone.
YV: Ben, hai un enorme grao de hipocrisía. Nas nosas democracias liberais, temos unha aparencia de democracia. É porque restrinximos, como dixen na miña charla, a democracia á esfera política, mentres deixamos a esfera onde está toda a acción -a esfera económica- como unha zona totalmente libre de democracia.
In a sense, if I am allowed to be provocative, China today is closer to Britain in the 19th century. Because remember, we tend to associate liberalism with democracy -- that's a mistake, historically. Liberalism, liberal, it's like John Stuart Mill. John Stuart Mill was particularly skeptical about the democratic process. So what you are seeing now in China is a very similar process to the one that we had in Britain during the Industrial Revolution, especially the transition from the first to the second. And to be castigating China for doing that which the West did in the 19th century, smacks of hypocrisy.
Nun sentido, se se me permite ser provocador, hoxe China está máis perto de Gran Bretaña que no século XIX. Porque lembre, tendemos a asociar liberalismo con democracia, iso é un erro, historicamente. Liberalismo, liberal, é como John Stuart Mill. John Stuart Mill era particularmente escéptico sobre o proceso democrático. Así que o que vemos agora en China é un proceso moi similar ao que tivemos en Gran Bretaña durante a Revolución Industrial, especialmente durante a transición da primeira á segunda. E estar castigando a China por facer o que Occidente fixo no século XIX, soa a hipocrisía.
BG: I am sure that many people here are wondering about your experience as the Finance Minister of Greece earlier this year.
BG: Estou seguro de que moita xente aquí se preguntará pola súa experiencia como Ministro de Finanzas de Grecia a comezos deste ano.
YV: I knew this was coming.
YV: Xa o vía vir.
BG: Yes.
BG: Si.
BG: Six months after, how do you look back at the first half of the year?
BG: Seis meses despois, ¿como ve o que pasou na primeira metade do ano?
YV: Extremely exciting, from a personal point of view, and very disappointing, because we had an opportunity to reboot the Eurozone. Not just Greece, the Eurozone. To move away from the complacency and the constant denial that there was a massive -- and there is a massive architectural fault line going through the Eurozone, which is threatening, massively, the whole of the European Union process.
YV: Sumamente fascinante, desde un punto de vista persoal, e moi decepcionante, porque tiñamos unha oportunidade para reiniciar a Eurozona. Non só Grecia, a Eurozona. Para afastarse da complacencia e a constante negación de que habia unha enorme, e hai unha enorme fenda na arquitectura da Eurozona, que está ameazando a totalidade do proceso da Unión Europea.
We had an opportunity on the basis of the Greek program -- which by the way, was the first program to manifest that denial -- to put it right. And, unfortunately, the powers in the Eurozone, in the Eurogroup, chose to maintain denial.
Tivemos unha oportunidade baseada no programa grego que, por certo, foi o primeiro programa que manifestou esa negación para corrixila. E, desgrazadamente, os poderes da zona euro, no Eurogrupo, optaron por manter a negación.
But you know what happens. This is the experience of the Soviet Union. When you try to keep alive an economic system that architecturally cannot survive, through political will and through authoritarianism, you may succeed in prolonging it, but when change happens it happens very abruptly and catastrophically.
Pero xa sabe o que pasa. É a experiencia da Unión Soviética. Cando intentas manter vivo un sistema económico que estructuralmente non pode sobrevivir, a través da vontade política e a través do autoritarismo, podes ter éxito en prolongalo, pero cando se produce o cambio ocorre de xeito abrupto e catastrófico.
BG: What kind of change are you foreseeing?
BG: ¿Que tipo de cambio prevé?
YV: Well, there's no doubt that if we don't change the architecture of the Eurozone, the Eurozone has no future.
YV: Ben, non hai dúbida de que se non cambiamos a arquitectura da Eurozona, a Eurozona non ten futuro.
BG: Did you make any mistakes when you were Finance Minister?
BG: ¿Cometeu erros cando era ministro de Finanzas?
YV: Every day.
YV: Todos os días.
BG: For example? YV: Anybody who looks back --
BG: ¿Por exemplo? YV: Calquera que mira cara atrás...
(Applause)
(Aplausos)
No, but seriously. If there's any Minister of Finance, or of anything else for that matter, who tells you after six months in a job, especially in such a stressful situation, that they have made no mistake, they're dangerous people. Of course I made mistakes.
Non, pero en serio. Se hai algún ministro de Facenda ou de calquera outra cousa, que di ao cabo de seis meses nun traballo, especialmente nunha situación con tanta tensión, que non cometeu ningún erro, é unha persoa perigosa. Claro que cometín erros.
The greatest mistake was to sign the application for the extension of a loan agreement in the end of February. I was imagining that there was a genuine interest on the side of the creditors to find common ground. And there wasn't. They were simply interested in crushing our government, just because they did not want to have to deal with the architectural fault lines that were running through the Eurozone. And because they didn't want to admit that for five years they were implementing a catastrophic program in Greece. We lost one-third of our nominal GDP. This is worse than the Great Depression. And no one has come clean from the troika of lenders that have been imposing this policy to say, "This was a colossal mistake."
O erro máis grande foi asinar a petición para ampliar o acordo do préstamo a finais de febreiro. Imaxinaba que había un interese xenuíno por parte dos acredores por atopar puntos de encontro. E non o había. So lles interesaba esmagar o noso goberno, só porque non querían ter que enfrontarse coas fendas que estaban percorrendo a Eurozona. E porque non quixeron admitir que estiveran cinco anos pondo en marcha un programa catastrófico en Grecia. Perdemos un terzo do noso PIB nominal. Isto é peor cá Gran Depresión. E ninguén saiu da troika de acredores que impuxeron esta política a dicir "Isto foi un erro colosal."
BG: Despite all this, and despite the aggressiveness of the discussion, you seem to be remaining quite pro-European.
BG: A pesar de todo isto, e a pesar da agresividade da discusión, parece ser aínda bastante pro-Europa.
YV: Absolutely. Look, my criticism of the European Union and the Eurozone comes from a person who lives and breathes Europe. My greatest fear is that the Eurozone will not survive. Because if it doesn't, the centrifugal forces that will be unleashed will be demonic, and they will destroy the European Union. And that will be catastrophic not just for Europe but for the whole global economy.
YV: Totalmente. Mire, as miñas críticas da Unión Europea e a Eurozona veñen dunha persoa que vive e respira Europa. O meu maior medo é que a Eurozona non sobreviva. Porque se non o fai, as forzas centrífugas que se desencadearán serán demoníacas, e destruirán a Unión Europea. E será catastrófico non só para Europa senón para toda a economía global.
We are probably the largest economy in the world. And if we allow ourselves to fall into a route of the postmodern 1930's, which seems to me to be what we are doing, then that will be detrimental to the future of Europeans and non-Europeans alike.
Somos probablemente a maior economía do mundo. E se nos permitimos caer na vía duns posmodernos anos 30, que parece que é o que estamos facendo, entón será prexudicial para o futuro tanto de europeos como de non europeos.
BG: We definitely hope you are wrong on that point. Yanis, thank you for coming to TED.
BG: Dende logo agardamos que se equivoque nese punto. Yanis, grazas por vir ao TED.
YV: Thank you.
YV: Grazas.
(Applause)
(Aplausos)