"Iran is Israel's best friend, and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran."
「伊朗是以色列最好的朋友, 我們並不打算因德黑蘭 而改變態度。」
Believe it or not, this is a quote from an Israeli prime minister, but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir from the era of the Shah. It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin. The year is 1987. Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive, and much like Ahmadinejad today, he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel. Yet, Rabin referred to Iran as a geostrategic friend.
你們相信嗎 這句話出自一位以色列的總理 但並不是本-古里安或戈尔迪·梅厄 在伊朗沙王治國時期的那些總理 而是伊札克·拉賓 西元1987年 伊朗最高領袖何梅尼還在世 而他就像現任總統艾馬丹加一樣 針對以色列發表很糟的言論 但拉賓還是將伊朗 稱為地理上的戰略夥伴
Today, when we hear the threats of war and the high rhetoric, we're oftentimes led to believe that this is yet another one of those unsolvable Middle Eastern conflicts with roots as old as the region itself. Nothing could be further from the truth, and I hope today to show you why that is.
今天當我們聽到那些 戰爭威脅以及情緒激昂的言論時 我們常常因此相信 這又是另一個 中東地區難解的衝突 就像當地的宗教淵源一樣古老 但是這並不是對的 我希望今天能告訴你們為何並非如此
The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people throughout history has actually been quite positive, starting in 539 B.C., when King Cyrus the Great of Persia liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity. A third of the Jewish population stayed in Babylonia. They're today's Iraqi Jews. A third migrated to Persia. They're today's Iranian Jews, still 25,000 of them living in Iran, making them the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel itself. And a third returned to historic Palestine, did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.
伊朗人和猶太人的關係 從歷史上來看其實一直很正面 西元前539年 波斯國王賽羅斯 將猶太人民從巴別塔中釋放出來 三分之一的猶太人 定居在巴比隆尼亞 他們就是今天的伊拉克猶太人 另外三分之一移民到波斯 他們是今天的伊朗猶太人 有2萬5千人還住在伊朗 是現今中東除了 以色列以外最大的猶太社群 最後三分之一 回到歷史淵遠的巴勒斯坦 二次重建耶路撒冷聖殿 順帶一提,他們用的是波斯人的納稅錢
But even in modern times, relations have been close at times. Rabin's statement was a reflection of decades of security and intelligence collaboration between the two, which in turn was born out of perception of common threats. Both states feared the Soviet Union and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq. And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery, the idea that Israel's security was best achieved by creating alliances with the non-Arab states in the periphery of the region in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity. Now, from the Shah's perspective, though, he wanted to keep this as secret as possible, so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance, traveled to Iran in the '70s, he usually wore a wig so that no one would recognize him. The Iranians built a special tarmac at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal, so that no one would notice the large number of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
但即使在今天 他們的關係曾經緊密過 拉賓的言論重新讓我們反思 過去幾十年這兩個國家的國安協防 和情報合作 其實是源於感到共同的威脅 兩個國家都害怕蘇聯 以及強大的阿拉伯國家如埃及和伊拉克 而且以色列的國土安全 是主張以色列的國家安全可以通過 與周圍的非阿拉伯國家結盟得到保障 才能在這特殊地帶 與阿拉伯國家的勢力抗衡 但從伊朗沙王的角度來看 卻希望越少人知道這件事越好 所以舉例來說,當拉賓 他在70年代到伊朗時 通常會戴頂假髮 這樣就沒有人認得出他來 伊朗還鋪了一道特殊的飛機跑道 在德黑蘭機場,離中央航廈很遠 這樣就沒人會注意到 在特拉維夫和德黑蘭之間 往來的以色列班機
Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution in 1979? In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology of the new regime, the geopolitical logic for their collaboration lived on, because they still had common threats. And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Israel feared an Iraqi victory and actively helped Iran by selling it arms and providing it with spare parts for Iran's American weaponry at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable because of an American arms embargo that Israel was more than happy to violate. In fact, back in the 1980s, it was Israel that lobbied Washington to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran, and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology. And this, of course, climaxed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.
這些互動難道在1979年的伊斯蘭革命後 就結束了嗎? 即使新政權的反以意識很強烈 地緣政治上應有的合作關係 依然存在 因為他們仍擁有相同的威脅 當伊拉克在1980入侵伊朗 以色列為阻止伊拉克勝利 還主動幫助伊朗 販售武器給伊朗 及提供伊朗美軍武器的零件 在伊朗軍力不足 因為美國軍武禁運時 以色列樂得置美國於不顧 其實在80年代 是以色列遊說華府與伊朗溝通 賣軍武給伊朗 不要在意伊朗的反以情結 而當然,這是秘密行動 隨著80年代的伊朗門事件達到高峰
But with the end of the Cold War came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace. Suddenly, the two common threats that had pushed them closer together throughout decades, more or less evaporated. The Soviet Union collapsed, Iraq was defeated, and a new environment was created in the region in which both of them felt more secure, but they were also now left unchecked. Without Iraq balancing Iran, Iran could now become a threat, some in Israel argued. In fact, the current dynamic that you see between Iran and Israel has its roots more so in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region after the Cold War than in the events of 1979, because at this point, Iran and Israel emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region, and rather than viewing each other as potential security partners, they increasingly came to view each other as rivals and competitors. So Israel, who in the 1980s lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, thinking that it would come at Israel's security interests' expense, and instead sought to put Iran in increased isolation.
不過隨著冷戰結束 以色列與伊朗之間 表面的和平也結束了 兩國之間的共同威脅 曾經迫使他們互助幾十年的威脅 就這樣消失了 蘇聯解體 伊拉克戰敗 新的秩序在這裡重新建立 他們都更有安全感 同時也更不受控制 沒有伊拉克制衡伊朗 伊朗就可能成為以色列的威脅 有些以色列人這麼認為 其實目前 伊朗和以色列間 關係的變動 是源自冷戰後 地理戰略上的重新佈局 而不是1979年發生的一連串事件 在那時伊朗和以色列 一躍成為中東地區最強大的兩個國家 他們不將對方視為國土安全上 可能的合作夥伴 反倒漸漸視對方 為敵人和競爭對象 所以當以色列在80年代 遊說並改善美國和伊朗的關係後 開始擔心美伊之間的友好 認為這將 影響以色列的國土安全利益 試著要置伊朗 於逐漸孤立的境地
Ironically, this was happening at a time when Iran was more interested in peacemaking with Washington than to see to Israel's destruction. Iran had put itself in isolation because of its radicalism, and after having helped the United States indirectly in the war against Iraq in 1991, the Iranians were hoping that they would be rewarded by being included in the post-war security architecture of the region. But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach, as it would a decade later in Afghanistan, and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation, and it is at this point, around 1993, '94, that Iran begins to translate its anti-Israeli ideology into operational policy. The Iranians believed that whatever they did, even if they moderated their policies, the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation, and the only way Iran could compel Washington to change its position was by imposing a cost on the U.S. if it didn't. The easiest target was the peace process, and now the Iranian ideological bark was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite, and Iran began supporting extensively Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously had shunned. In some ways, this sounds paradoxical, but according to Martin Indyk of the Clinton administration, the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong, because the more peace there would be between Israel and Palestine, the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated. The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be. So according to Indyk, and these are his words, the Iranians had an interest to do us in on the peace process in order to defeat our policy of containment. To defeat our policy of containment, not about ideology.
諷刺的是,那時後的 伊朗剛好更希望與 華府和平共處 而不是想要搞垮以色列 伊朗因為激進主義 使自己處於孤立狀態 伊朗曾間接地幫助過美國 在1991年美國和伊拉克的戰爭中 伊朗人希望 他們能因為幫忙而被納入 戰後該地區安全框架中 但是華府選擇忽略伊朗的示好 就像十年後對阿富汗那樣 就此更顯得伊朗的孤立無援 就在此時約1993,1994年時 伊朗開始將 反以的意識形態 成為國家方針政策的一部分 伊朗人相信不論他們做什麼 即使改變政策 美國還是會繼續孤立他們 伊朗唯一能迫使華府 改變立場的方式 就是讓美國為此付出代價 如果華府還沒有付出代價 最好的著手處就是和平進程 現在,伊朗意識形態的狂吠 不守成規地大咬了美國一口 伊朗開始大規模援助 巴勒斯坦的伊斯蘭教徒 而不像之前那樣 躲避他們 就某方面來說,這聽起來很矛盾 但是柯林頓執政時期的 駐以大使英迪克認為 伊朗這樣做並不無道理 因為以色列和巴勒斯坦之間的關係 越和平 美國相信伊朗會越孤立 伊朗越孤立,中東情勢就會越和平 所以根據英迪克,他是這樣說的 伊朗想要破壞 我們的和平計畫 為了打擊我們的遏制政策 是為了打擊我們的遏制政策 而非意識形態
But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement, all sides have reached out to each other. Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996, reached out to the Iranians to see if there were any ways that the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected. Tehran was not interested. A few years later, the Iranians sent a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration, a proposal that revealed that there was some potential of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again. The Bush administration did not even respond. All sides have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
即使在他們互相角力的最糟情勢 三方都嘗試向對方示好 內塔尼亞胡在1996年當選以色列總理時 曾試圖與伊朗溝通 看有沒有可能 重建過去守護領土的協議 德黑蘭對此毫無興趣 幾年後,伊朗向 布希政府送上全面的談判提議 裡面提到 伊朗和以色列再度和解的可能 但是布希政府根本不回應 三方都有意地 錯過談判機會
But this is not an ancient conflict. This is not even an ideological conflict. The ebbs and flows of hostility have not shifted with ideological zeal, but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape. When Iran and Israel's security imperatives dictated collaboration, they did so in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other. When Iran's ideological impulses collided with its strategic interests, the strategic interests always prevailed. This is good news, because it means that neither war nor enmity is a foregone conclusion.
但是這不是長久以來的衝突 甚至不是意識形態的衝突 敵對關係 沒有隨意識形態的狂熱而消長 而是地理上的政治版圖 當伊朗和以色列的 最高國安教條是合作 他們就合作過 即使在意識形態上水火不容 當伊朗的意識本能 與戰略利益衝突 他們永遠以戰略上的利益為主 這是一件好事 這意味著戰爭或敵意 並不是必然的結局
But some want war. Some believe or say that it's 1938, Iran is Germany, and Ahmadinejad is Hitler. If we accept this to be true, that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany, Ahmadinejad is Hitler, then the question we have to ask ourself is, who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain? Who will risk peace? This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed at eliminating diplomacy, and when you eliminate diplomacy, you make war inevitable. In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce, no draw, no compromise, only victory or defeat.
但是有些人想要戰爭 有些人相信或是表示 現在就是1938年 伊朗是德國 而總統艾瑪加就是希特勒 如果我們接受這個假設 現在的確是1938年,伊朗是德國 艾瑪加是希特勒 那麼我們需要自問的是 誰要來當張伯倫容忍納粹行徑? 誰會拿和平冒險? 這是一個比喻,是有意地 在摧毀外交關係 當外交手段行不通時 戰爭將無可避免地來臨 如果遇到意識形態上的衝突 那就不可能有停戰 沒有平手,也沒有妥協 只有勝利或戰敗
But rather than making war inevitable by viewing this as ideological, we would be wise to seek ways to make peace possible. Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon, only a few decades old in a history of 2,500 years, and precisely because its roots are geopolitical, it means that solutions can be found, compromises can be struck, however difficult it yet may be. After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said, "You don't make peace with your friends. You make it with your enemies."
但與其將戰爭視為 意識形態上的衝突 無法避免 我們應該明智地尋找一個途徑 使和平成為可能 伊以衝突是一個新的現象 在兩千五百年的歷史長河裡 不過有幾十年的歷史 而且由於它地理上的政治關係 這意味著一定找得到解決的辦法 妥協是可以達成的 即使可能相當困難 畢竟拉賓是這麼說的: 「人們不必和朋友維持和平關係, 而要跟敵人維持和平相處。」
Thank you.
謝謝大家
(Applause)
(掌聲)