"Iran is Israel's best friend, and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran."
“伊朗是以色列最好的朋友 而且我们也不打算就德黑兰的问题 改变我们的立场。”
Believe it or not, this is a quote from an Israeli prime minister, but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir from the era of the Shah. It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin. The year is 1987. Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive, and much like Ahmadinejad today, he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel. Yet, Rabin referred to Iran as a geostrategic friend.
信不信由你,这些话 直接引述自以色列总理 这个首相不是伊朗国王时代的 班古里安或戈尔迪•梅厄森 它其实是伊扎克•拉宾说的 在1987年的时候 阿亚图拉•霍梅尼现在还在世 就像今天的艾哈迈迪内贾德一样 他对以色列用了最差的措辞 但拉宾依然把伊朗 当作地缘战略伙伴
Today, when we hear the threats of war and the high rhetoric, we're oftentimes led to believe that this is yet another one of those unsolvable Middle Eastern conflicts with roots as old as the region itself. Nothing could be further from the truth, and I hope today to show you why that is.
今天,当我们听到战争的恐吓 和花言巧语 我们时常去相信 这是另一个尚未解决的 中东争端 争端的渊源和宗教一样 有极长的历史 事实上,没有什么比这一点更加偏离事实了。 我希望今天来告诉你们 为什么会这样
The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people throughout history has actually been quite positive, starting in 539 B.C., when King Cyrus the Great of Persia liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity. A third of the Jewish population stayed in Babylonia. They're today's Iraqi Jews. A third migrated to Persia. They're today's Iranian Jews, still 25,000 of them living in Iran, making them the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel itself. And a third returned to historic Palestine, did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.
伊朗人和犹太人的关系 从古至今总体上来说是较好的 那是从公元前539年 当波斯王朝的国王 居鲁士(又译塞勒斯) 解放了被巴比伦囚禁的犹太人 三分之一的犹太人 留在了巴比伦 他们就是今天的伊拉克犹太人 三分之一移民到了波斯 他们就是今天的伊朗犹太人 仍有 25,000人生活在伊朗, 他们成为了除以色列外 中东地区最大的犹太社群 三分之一回到了历史上的巴勒斯坦 在耶路撒冷第二次重建了圣殿 顺便说一下,用的是波斯的税钱
But even in modern times, relations have been close at times. Rabin's statement was a reflection of decades of security and intelligence collaboration between the two, which in turn was born out of perception of common threats. Both states feared the Soviet Union and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq. And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery, the idea that Israel's security was best achieved by creating alliances with the non-Arab states in the periphery of the region in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity. Now, from the Shah's perspective, though, he wanted to keep this as secret as possible, so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance, traveled to Iran in the '70s, he usually wore a wig so that no one would recognize him. The Iranians built a special tarmac at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal, so that no one would notice the large number of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
不过,即使在当代 有时关系也会变得比较密切 拉宾的声明是反映了 两国间几十年来的安全和情报合作 反过来说,这样的合作 也是出于对某些共同威胁的担忧 这两个国家都害怕苏联 和一些强大的阿拉伯国家, 例如埃及和伊拉克 此外,以色列信奉的地缘政治 其理念是,以色列的国家安全目标 最好能通过与 非阿拉伯国家联盟达成 在其领土的周围 以平衡其附近的阿拉伯国家的力量 尽管现在,从伊朗国王的角度看, 他想要尽可能保守这个秘密 所以当伊扎克 · 拉宾,例如, 在七十年代,造访伊朗的时候 他通常戴着假发 这样就没有人能认出他来 伊朗人在德黑兰机场 建造了特别的停机坪 离中央航站楼很远 所以没有人会注意到 大批的以色列飞机穿梭于 特拉维夫和德黑兰之间
Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution in 1979? In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology of the new regime, the geopolitical logic for their collaboration lived on, because they still had common threats. And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Israel feared an Iraqi victory and actively helped Iran by selling it arms and providing it with spare parts for Iran's American weaponry at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable because of an American arms embargo that Israel was more than happy to violate. In fact, back in the 1980s, it was Israel that lobbied Washington to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran, and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology. And this, of course, climaxed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.
现在,所有这一切都随着伊斯兰革命 在 1979 年结束了吗? 尽管新的政权有很清晰的 反以色列意识形态 两国在地缘政治逻辑下的合作 还在继续着 因为他们仍面对共同的威胁 当1980年,伊拉克入侵伊朗的时候 以色列担心伊拉克会赢得战争 便积极行动帮助伊朗, 对其出售武器和提供备件 为伊朗提供美国武器装备 当时伊朗非常脆弱 由于美国对其实行武器禁运 以色列却非常乐意违反这条禁令 事实上,早在 20 世纪 80 年代, 是以色列游说华盛顿 与伊朗会谈,向伊朗出售武器 并不要在意伊朗的反以色列意识形态 当然,这在1980年代 伊朗反政府丑闻中 被推到风口浪尖
But with the end of the Cold War came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace. Suddenly, the two common threats that had pushed them closer together throughout decades, more or less evaporated. The Soviet Union collapsed, Iraq was defeated, and a new environment was created in the region in which both of them felt more secure, but they were also now left unchecked. Without Iraq balancing Iran, Iran could now become a threat, some in Israel argued. In fact, the current dynamic that you see between Iran and Israel has its roots more so in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region after the Cold War than in the events of 1979, because at this point, Iran and Israel emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region, and rather than viewing each other as potential security partners, they increasingly came to view each other as rivals and competitors. So Israel, who in the 1980s lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, thinking that it would come at Israel's security interests' expense, and instead sought to put Iran in increased isolation.
但随着冷战的结束 以色列和伊朗间的冷和平 也结束了 突然,那两个共同的威胁 那几十年来推动着他们互相靠近的威胁 或多或少地消失了 苏联解体了 伊拉克被打败了 一个新的环境在该区域中形成了 这个新环境让两国都更有安全感 但也使他们都无法被约束 没有伊拉克制衡伊朗 伊朗现在可被视为一种威胁, 以色列一些人这样争论到 事实上,就当前的形势 那些你所看到的发生在 伊朗与以色列之间的事 其根源开始于 冷战结束后该地区 地缘政治的结构发生了变化 而不是1979年的一系列事件 因为冷战结束后,伊朗和以色列 成为该地区两个最强大的国家 比起视对方为 潜在的安全伙伴, 他们越来越将对方 视作竞争对手 以色列那些在八十年代 为改善美国伊朗关系而游说的人 现在担心美国伊朗会和解 认为那将牺牲 以色列的安全利益 而且试图将伊朗 放在越来越被他国孤立的位置
Ironically, this was happening at a time when Iran was more interested in peacemaking with Washington than to see to Israel's destruction. Iran had put itself in isolation because of its radicalism, and after having helped the United States indirectly in the war against Iraq in 1991, the Iranians were hoping that they would be rewarded by being included in the post-war security architecture of the region. But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach, as it would a decade later in Afghanistan, and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation, and it is at this point, around 1993, '94, that Iran begins to translate its anti-Israeli ideology into operational policy. The Iranians believed that whatever they did, even if they moderated their policies, the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation, and the only way Iran could compel Washington to change its position was by imposing a cost on the U.S. if it didn't. The easiest target was the peace process, and now the Iranian ideological bark was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite, and Iran began supporting extensively Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously had shunned. In some ways, this sounds paradoxical, but according to Martin Indyk of the Clinton administration, the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong, because the more peace there would be between Israel and Palestine, the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated. The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be. So according to Indyk, and these are his words, the Iranians had an interest to do us in on the peace process in order to defeat our policy of containment. To defeat our policy of containment, not about ideology.
讽刺的是,那时 伊朗更有兴趣 与华盛顿和解 而不是去理会以色列的破坏 伊朗用激进主义 将自己放在了孤立的位置 在间接帮助美国 1991 年对伊拉克的战争后 伊朗人希望 他们会因此得到回报 从而被纳入该地区的 战后安全体系 但华盛顿选择忽略伊朗的示好 十年后在阿富汗他们也是这样, 同时加紧对伊朗的孤立 就在1993,1994年的时候 伊朗开始将 其反以色列的意识形态 化为实施方针 伊朗人相信不管他们做什么 即使他们缓和自己的政策, 美国将继续对伊朗的孤立 而伊朗唯一可能迫使华盛顿 改变其态度的方法便是 让美国如果不做出改变 就要为此付出代价 最容易的目标是和平进程, 现在的伊朗意识形态的吼叫 伴随着非惯用的手段 伊朗开始广泛支持 那些他曾回避的 巴勒斯坦伊斯兰团体 某种程度上,这听起来很荒谬 但根据克林顿政府的 马丁•安迪克(的作为) 伊朗人的策略也并不是完全错误 因为当以色列和巴勒斯坦 越发和平 美国认为,伊朗越发会被孤立 伊朗越是被孤立, 以色列和巴勒斯坦才会越和平 所以依照安迪克所说 “伊朗人的兴趣在于在和平进程中 打击我们, 以此打败我们的遏制政策。” 要打败我们的遏制政策 不是意识形态。
But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement, all sides have reached out to each other. Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996, reached out to the Iranians to see if there were any ways that the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected. Tehran was not interested. A few years later, the Iranians sent a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration, a proposal that revealed that there was some potential of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again. The Bush administration did not even respond. All sides have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
但在他们整个的纠缠中,甚至是最糟糕的时代 所有双方互相都达成共识。 当内塔尼亚胡在1996年当选总理时 他向伊朗人伸出了手 寻找有无任何 重建外围合作的可能 可德黑兰对此不感兴趣 几年后,伊朗人 向布什政府提出了全面谈判的提案 这个提案认为存在一些 使伊朗和以色列恢复关系的可能 布什政府却并没有响应 双方就这样错失了 每一个机会
But this is not an ancient conflict. This is not even an ideological conflict. The ebbs and flows of hostility have not shifted with ideological zeal, but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape. When Iran and Israel's security imperatives dictated collaboration, they did so in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other. When Iran's ideological impulses collided with its strategic interests, the strategic interests always prevailed. This is good news, because it means that neither war nor enmity is a foregone conclusion.
但这不是古老的冲突 这甚至不是意识形态的冲突 敌对状态的起起伏伏 并不会因为意识形态而变化 而是根据地缘政治格局而变化 当伊朗和以色列为了安全考量 需要合作时,他们这样做了 尽管彼此的意识形态依旧强烈反对对方 当伊朗的意识形态 与它的战略利益出现冲突时 战略利益始终占上风 这是个好消息,因为它意味着 既没有战争也没有仇怨 是注定要发生的。
But some want war. Some believe or say that it's 1938, Iran is Germany, and Ahmadinejad is Hitler. If we accept this to be true, that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany, Ahmadinejad is Hitler, then the question we have to ask ourself is, who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain? Who will risk peace? This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed at eliminating diplomacy, and when you eliminate diplomacy, you make war inevitable. In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce, no draw, no compromise, only victory or defeat.
但有些人想要战争 有些人相信甚至说 如果现在是1938 年 伊朗就是德国, 艾哈迈迪内贾德是希特勒 如果我们将此视为事实 事实上它就是1938年,伊朗就是德国, 艾哈迈迪内贾德就是希特勒, 那我们给自己出了一个问题, 谁愿意来扮演内维尔 · 张伯伦的角色? 谁将拿和平来冒险? 这个类比意在 去除外交考量 当你除去外交考量 战争将无法避免 在意识形态的冲突中, 没有休战 没有平局, 没有妥协, 只有胜利或失败
But rather than making war inevitable by viewing this as ideological, we would be wise to seek ways to make peace possible. Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon, only a few decades old in a history of 2,500 years, and precisely because its roots are geopolitical, it means that solutions can be found, compromises can be struck, however difficult it yet may be. After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said, "You don't make peace with your friends. You make it with your enemies."
然而比起将两国间矛盾 视为意识形态的冲突 进而使得战争无法避免 更明智的作法是, 积极寻求方法 创造和平的可能 伊朗和以色列的冲突是一种新现象 只是在长达2500 年的历史长河中的 几十年 而且正是因为冲突的根源在于地缘政治 这也意味着 是可以找到办法来解决的 两国可以达成和解 尽管它可能非常艰难 但是毕竟,这是拉宾自己说的 "你不需要和你的朋友讲和 而要和你的敌人和解"。
Thank you.
谢谢。
(Applause)
(掌声)