"Iran is Israel's best friend, and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran."
"Iran je Izraelov najbolji prijatelj, i ne nameravamo da menjamo svoju poziciju prema Teheranu."
Believe it or not, this is a quote from an Israeli prime minister, but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir from the era of the Shah. It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin. The year is 1987. Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive, and much like Ahmadinejad today, he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel. Yet, Rabin referred to Iran as a geostrategic friend.
Verovali ili ne, ovo je izjava izraelskog predsednika Vlade, ali to nije Ben Gurio ili Golda Meir iz vremena Šaha. Već zapravo od Jicaka Rabina. Godina je 1987. Ajatolah Komeini je još uvek živ, i poput Ahamdinedžada danas, koristio je najgoru retoriku protiv Izraela. Ipak, Rabin je o Iranu govorio kao o geostrateškom prijatelju.
Today, when we hear the threats of war and the high rhetoric, we're oftentimes led to believe that this is yet another one of those unsolvable Middle Eastern conflicts with roots as old as the region itself. Nothing could be further from the truth, and I hope today to show you why that is.
Danas, kada čujemo pretnje ratom i visoku retoriku često smo vođeni verovanjem da je ovo još jedan od nerešivih bliskoistočnih konflikata sa korenima starim koliko i sama regija. Ništa ne može da bude dalje od istine, i nadam se da ću vam pokazati danas i zašto.
The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people throughout history has actually been quite positive, starting in 539 B.C., when King Cyrus the Great of Persia liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity. A third of the Jewish population stayed in Babylonia. They're today's Iraqi Jews. A third migrated to Persia. They're today's Iranian Jews, still 25,000 of them living in Iran, making them the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel itself. And a third returned to historic Palestine, did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.
Veza između iranskog i jevrejskog naroda bila je prilično pozitivna kroz istoriju, datirajući od 539. godine p.n.e; kada je Kir Veliki od Persije oslobodio jeverejski narod od svojih vavilonskih robovlasnika. Trećina jevrejske populacije ostala je u Vavilonu. Oni su današnji irački Jevreji. Trećina je migrirala u Persiju. Oni su današnji iranski Jevreji, i dalje 25 000 njih živi u Iranu, čineći najveću jevrejsku zajednicu, na Bliskom istoku van samog Izraela. I trećina se vratila u istorijsku Palestinu i izvršila drugu dogradnju hrama u Jerusalimu finanisranog, slučajno, persijskim porezom.
But even in modern times, relations have been close at times. Rabin's statement was a reflection of decades of security and intelligence collaboration between the two, which in turn was born out of perception of common threats. Both states feared the Soviet Union and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq. And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery, the idea that Israel's security was best achieved by creating alliances with the non-Arab states in the periphery of the region in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity. Now, from the Shah's perspective, though, he wanted to keep this as secret as possible, so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance, traveled to Iran in the '70s, he usually wore a wig so that no one would recognize him. The Iranians built a special tarmac at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal, so that no one would notice the large number of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
Ali čak u modernim vremenima, veze su se vremenom jačale. Rabinova izjava bila je prikaz decenija saradnje bezbednosnih i obaveštajnih službi između dve države, koja je zauzvrat stvorena zbog percepcije zajedničkih pretnji. Obe strane su strahovale od Sovjetskog saveza i jakih arapskih zemalja poput Egipta i Iraka. Kao dodatak, izraelska dokrtina oboda, ideja da je sigurnost Izraela najbolje postignuta stvaranjem saveza sa nearapskim zemljama na obodu regije u cilju balansiranja arapskih država u svom okruženju. Iz Šahove perspektive, on je želeo da zadrži ovo u što većoj tajnosti, tako da kada je Jicak Rabin, na primer, putovao za Iran '70-ih godina, uglavnom je nosio periku kako ga niko ne bi prepoznao. Iračani su napravili posebnu pistu na aerodromu u Teheranu, daleko od centralnog terminala kako niko ne bi primetio veliki broj izraelskih aviona koji preleću između Tel Aviva i Teherana.
Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution in 1979? In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology of the new regime, the geopolitical logic for their collaboration lived on, because they still had common threats. And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Israel feared an Iraqi victory and actively helped Iran by selling it arms and providing it with spare parts for Iran's American weaponry at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable because of an American arms embargo that Israel was more than happy to violate. In fact, back in the 1980s, it was Israel that lobbied Washington to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran, and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology. And this, of course, climaxed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.
Da li se sve ovo završilo islamskom revolucijom 1979. godine? Uprkos veoma jasnoj antiizraelskoj ideologiji novog režima, geopolitička logika za njihovu saradnju nastavila je da živi, jer su i dalje imali zajedničke pretnje. Kada je Irak napao Iran 1980. godine, Izrael se plašio pobede Iraka i aktivno je pomogao Iranu prodajući im oružje i dobavljajući im rezervne delove za iračko američko oružje u momentu kada je Iran bio veoma osetljiv zbog američkog oružanog embarga koji je Izrael bio i više nego srećan da zloupotrebi. Zapravo, u 1980-im, Izrael je lobirao za Vašington da razgovara sa Iranom, da proda oružje Iranu, i ne obrati pažnju na iransku antiizraelsku ideologiju. I naravno, ovo je rezultiralo iranskim Kontra skandalom 1980-ih.
But with the end of the Cold War came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace. Suddenly, the two common threats that had pushed them closer together throughout decades, more or less evaporated. The Soviet Union collapsed, Iraq was defeated, and a new environment was created in the region in which both of them felt more secure, but they were also now left unchecked. Without Iraq balancing Iran, Iran could now become a threat, some in Israel argued. In fact, the current dynamic that you see between Iran and Israel has its roots more so in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region after the Cold War than in the events of 1979, because at this point, Iran and Israel emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region, and rather than viewing each other as potential security partners, they increasingly came to view each other as rivals and competitors. So Israel, who in the 1980s lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, thinking that it would come at Israel's security interests' expense, and instead sought to put Iran in increased isolation.
Ali sa krajem Hladnog rata došao je i kraj izraelsko-iranskog hladnog mira. Odjednom su dve zajedničke pretnje koje su ih približile kroz decenije, manje ili više isparile. Sovjetski Savez se raspao, Irak je poražen, i stvoreno je novo okruženje u ovom regionu u kojem će se obe države osećati sigurnije, ali su obe završile kao neproverene. Ako Irak ne balansira Iran, Iran bi sada mogao da postane pretnja, za neke u Izraelu. Zapravo, trenutna dinamika, koju vidite između Irana i Izraela, ima svoje korene više u geopolitičkom restruktuiranju regiona nakon Hladnog rata, nego u događajima iz 1979. godine, jer su se u tom trenutku, Iran i Izrael istakli kao dve najsnažnije zemlje u regionu, i umesto da posmatraju jedna drugu kao potencijalnog partnera, sve više su počeli da posmatraju jedni druge kao rivale i konkurenciju. Izrael, koji je '80-ih lobirao i pospešio odnose Sjedinjenih Država i Irana sada se uplašio njihovog zbližavanja, misleći da bi to išlo na štetu izraelskih sigurnosnih interesa i umesto toga tražio da smesti Iran u povećanu izolaciju.
Ironically, this was happening at a time when Iran was more interested in peacemaking with Washington than to see to Israel's destruction. Iran had put itself in isolation because of its radicalism, and after having helped the United States indirectly in the war against Iraq in 1991, the Iranians were hoping that they would be rewarded by being included in the post-war security architecture of the region. But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach, as it would a decade later in Afghanistan, and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation, and it is at this point, around 1993, '94, that Iran begins to translate its anti-Israeli ideology into operational policy. The Iranians believed that whatever they did, even if they moderated their policies, the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation, and the only way Iran could compel Washington to change its position was by imposing a cost on the U.S. if it didn't. The easiest target was the peace process, and now the Iranian ideological bark was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite, and Iran began supporting extensively Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously had shunned. In some ways, this sounds paradoxical, but according to Martin Indyk of the Clinton administration, the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong, because the more peace there would be between Israel and Palestine, the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated. The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be. So according to Indyk, and these are his words, the Iranians had an interest to do us in on the peace process in order to defeat our policy of containment. To defeat our policy of containment, not about ideology.
Ironično, ovo se dešava u vreme kada je Iran bio zainteresovaniji za stvaranje mira sa Vašingtonom, nego za posmatranje raspada Izraela. Iran je smestio sebe u izolaciju zbog svog radikalizma, i nakon što su indirektno pomogle Sjedinjenim Državama, u ratu protiv Iraka 1991. godine, Iranci su se nadali da će biti nagrađeni uključivanjem u posleratnu sigurnosnu arhitekturu regiona. Ipak, Vašington je izabrao da ignoriše iranski doprinos, kao što je to uradio deceniju kasnije u Avganistanu, i umesto toga intenzivirao izolaciju Irana, i u tom trenutku, oko 1993/1994. godine, Iran je počeo da prevodi svoju antii-izraelsku ideologiju u operacionu politiku. Iranci su verovali da štagod da urade, čak i ako su obuzdali njihovu strategiju, Sjedinjene Države bi nastavile da traže izolaciju Irana, i jedini način na koji bi Iran mogao da primora Vašington da promeni svoju poziciju, bio je nametanjem troška Sjedinjenim Državama, ukoliko se to ne desi. Najlakša meta bio je mirovni proces, i sada je iranski ideološki čamac bio praćen nekonvencionalnim mamcem, i Iran je značajno počeo da podržava palestinske islamističke grupe koje je pretnodno izbegavao. Na neki način, ovo zvuči paradoksalno ali prema Martinu Indiku iz Klintonove administracije, Iranci nisu sve shvatili pogrešno, jer što je više mira između Izraela i Palestine, Sjedinjene Države su verovale da bi više Iranaca bilo izolovano. Što se više Iranaca izoluje, to će više biti mira. Prema Indiku, a ovo su njegove reči: "Iranci su imali interesa da nas napadnu u mirovnom procesu u cilju da odbrane našu strukturu od zadržavanja. Da bi odbranili svoju strukturu od zadržavanja, bez ideologije.
But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement, all sides have reached out to each other. Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996, reached out to the Iranians to see if there were any ways that the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected. Tehran was not interested. A few years later, the Iranians sent a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration, a proposal that revealed that there was some potential of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again. The Bush administration did not even respond. All sides have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
Ali i kroz najgora vremena njihovog uplitanja, sve strane su se međusobno pomogle. Kada je Netanjahu bio izabran 1996. godine, dopreo je do Iranaca da vidi da li postoji ikakav način da doktrina periferije može da oživi. Teheran nije bio zainteresovan. Nekoliko godina kasnije, Iranci su poslali obiman pregovarački predlog Bušovoj administraciji, predlog koji je otkrio da je postojao potencijal vraćanja Irana i Izraela u dobre odnose. Bušova administracija nije čak ni odgovorila. Obe strane nisu nikada propustile priliku da propuste priliku.
But this is not an ancient conflict. This is not even an ideological conflict. The ebbs and flows of hostility have not shifted with ideological zeal, but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape. When Iran and Israel's security imperatives dictated collaboration, they did so in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other. When Iran's ideological impulses collided with its strategic interests, the strategic interests always prevailed. This is good news, because it means that neither war nor enmity is a foregone conclusion.
Ali ovo nije stari sukob. Ovo nije čak ni ideološki sukob. Struje netrpeljivosti nisu se pomerile sa ideološkim žarom, već promenama u geopolitičkom okruženju. Kada su iranski i izraelski sigurnosni imperativi diktirali saradnju, oni su to i činili uprkos ubistvenoj ideološkoj opoziciji jednih prema drugima. Kada su se iranski ideološki impulsi sukobili sa svojim strateškim interesima, strateški interesi su uvek prevagnuli. Ovo su dobre vesti, jer to znači da niti rat niti neprijateljstvo ne nose prerani zaključak.
But some want war. Some believe or say that it's 1938, Iran is Germany, and Ahmadinejad is Hitler. If we accept this to be true, that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany, Ahmadinejad is Hitler, then the question we have to ask ourself is, who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain? Who will risk peace? This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed at eliminating diplomacy, and when you eliminate diplomacy, you make war inevitable. In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce, no draw, no compromise, only victory or defeat.
Ali neki žele rat. Neki veruju ili kažu da je 1938. godina, Iran je Nemačka, i Ahmadinedžad je Hitler. Ako prihvatimo ovo kao istinu, to onda znači da je 1938. godina i da je Iran Nemačka, Ahmadinedžad Hitler, a onda je pitanje koje treba da pitamo sebe: ko želi da glumi ulogu Nevila Čemberlena? Ko će rizikovati mir? Ovo je analogija koja osmišljeno cilja na eliminisanje diplomatije, i kada eliminišete diplomatiju, činite rat neizbežnim. U ideološkom sukobu ne postoji primirje, izjednačenje, niti kompromis, samo pobeda ili poraz.
But rather than making war inevitable by viewing this as ideological, we would be wise to seek ways to make peace possible. Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon, only a few decades old in a history of 2,500 years, and precisely because its roots are geopolitical, it means that solutions can be found, compromises can be struck, however difficult it yet may be. After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said, "You don't make peace with your friends. You make it with your enemies."
Ali umesto da činimo rat neizbežnim, posmatrajući ga kao ideološki, bili bismo pametniji da tražimo načine da učinimo mir mogućim. Iranski i izraelski sukob je novi fenomen, star samo nekoliko decenija u istoriji od 2500 godina, i baš zato što su njegovi koreni geopolitički, to znači da se rešenja mogu naći, ostvariti kompromisi, koliko god da je teško. Nakon svega, sam Jicak Rabin je jednom rekao: "Ne stvarate mir sa svojim prijateljima. Stvarate ga sa svojim neprijateljima."
Thank you.
Hvala vam.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)