"Iran is Israel's best friend, and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran."
"Irani eshte miku i ngushte i Izraelit, dhe nuk kemi ndermend te ndryshojme poziten tone ne lidhje me Teheranin."
Believe it or not, this is a quote from an Israeli prime minister, but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir from the era of the Shah. It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin. The year is 1987. Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive, and much like Ahmadinejad today, he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel. Yet, Rabin referred to Iran as a geostrategic friend.
Besojeni apo jo, ky eshte nje citat nga nje kryeminister i Israelit, por nuk eshte Ben-Gurion apo Golda Meir nga epoka e Shah-ut. Eshte faktikisht nga Yitzhak Rabin. Eshte viti 1987. Ayatollah Khomeini jeton ende, dhe pak a shume si Ahmadinejad sot, ai po perdor retoriken me te keqe kundrejt Israelit. Sidoqofte, Rabin i rreferohet Iranit si nje mik gjeostrategjik.
Today, when we hear the threats of war and the high rhetoric, we're oftentimes led to believe that this is yet another one of those unsolvable Middle Eastern conflicts with roots as old as the region itself. Nothing could be further from the truth, and I hope today to show you why that is.
Sot, kur degjojme per kercenimet e luftes dhe retoriken e larte, shpesh perpiqemi te besojme se ky eshte ende nje nga ato konfliktet e pazgjidhura te Lindjes se Mesme me rrenjet aq te vjetra sa dhe rajoni vete. Asgje nuk mund te jete me larg te vertetes, dhe shpresoj sot t'ju tregoj pse-ne.
The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people throughout history has actually been quite positive, starting in 539 B.C., when King Cyrus the Great of Persia liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity. A third of the Jewish population stayed in Babylonia. They're today's Iraqi Jews. A third migrated to Persia. They're today's Iranian Jews, still 25,000 of them living in Iran, making them the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel itself. And a third returned to historic Palestine, did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.
Lidhjet midis njerezve te Iranit dhe Israelit gjate historise kane qene realisht pozitive, duke filluar ne 539 P.K, kur mbreti Cyrus i Persise se Madhe cliroi njerezit Hebre nga roberia e Babilonise. Nje e treta e popullsise hebre qendroi ne Babiloni. Ata jane sot hebrenjte e Irakut. Nje e treta emigroi ne Persi. Ata jane sot Hebrenjte e Iranit, ende 25.000 nga ata jetojne ne Iran, duke i bere ata komuniteti me i madh hebre ne Lindjen e Mesme jashte Israelit. Dhe nje e treta u kthye ne Palestinen historike, kryen rindertimin e dyte te Tempullit ne Jerusalem, te financuar, rastesisht, nga parate e taksave persiane.
But even in modern times, relations have been close at times. Rabin's statement was a reflection of decades of security and intelligence collaboration between the two, which in turn was born out of perception of common threats. Both states feared the Soviet Union and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq. And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery, the idea that Israel's security was best achieved by creating alliances with the non-Arab states in the periphery of the region in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity. Now, from the Shah's perspective, though, he wanted to keep this as secret as possible, so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance, traveled to Iran in the '70s, he usually wore a wig so that no one would recognize him. The Iranians built a special tarmac at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal, so that no one would notice the large number of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
Por edhe ne kohet moderne, lidhjet kane qene te aferta. Deklarata e Rabin ishte nje reflektim i dekadave te bashkepunimit te sigurise dhe inteligjences ndermjet tyre, e cila sic duket lindi nga perceptimi i kercenimeve te zakonshme. Te dy shtetet frikesoheshin nga Bashkimi Sovjetik dhe shtetet Arabe te fuqishme si Egjipti dhe Iraku. Dhe, vec kesaj, dogmes izraelite te periferise, idese se siguria e Izraelit ishte e arritur me mire duke krijuar aleanca me shtete jo-Arabike ne periferi te rajonit ne menyre qe te balancoje shtetet Arabe ne fqinjesine e saj. Tani, nga perspektiva e Shah-ut, ndonese, ai donte ta mbante kete sa me te fshehte, dhe kur Yitzhak Rabin, per shembull, udhetonte ne Iran ne vitet 70 zakonisht perdorte nje paruke ne menyre qe mos ta njihte askush. Iranianet ndertuan nje piste speciale ne aeroportin e Teheranit, shume larg nga terminali qendror, qe askush mos dallonte numrin e madh te avioneve israelite ndermjet Tel Aviv-it dhe Teheran-it.
Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution in 1979? In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology of the new regime, the geopolitical logic for their collaboration lived on, because they still had common threats. And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Israel feared an Iraqi victory and actively helped Iran by selling it arms and providing it with spare parts for Iran's American weaponry at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable because of an American arms embargo that Israel was more than happy to violate. In fact, back in the 1980s, it was Israel that lobbied Washington to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran, and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology. And this, of course, climaxed in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.
A perfunduan keto me revolucionin Islamik ne 1979? Pavaresisht ideologjise shume te qarte kunder-izraelite te regjimit te ri, logjika gjeopolitike per bashkepunimin e tyre, vazhdoi, sepse ata kishin ende kercenime te perbashketa. Dhe kur Iraku pushtoi Iranin ne 1980, Izraeli pati frike nga nje fitore e Irakut dhe ndihmoi aktivisht Iranin duke i shitur arme dhe duke e pajisur me pjese rezerve per armatimet amerikane te Iranit ne nje moment ku Irani ishte shume i prekshem per shkak te nje embargoje amerikane ndaj armeve qe Israeli e shkeli me shume deshire. Ne fakt, pas ne vitet 1980, ishte Israeli qe loboi ne Washington te flase me Iran, ti shese arme Iranit, dhe te mos i jape rendesi ideologjise kunder-izraelite te Iranit. Dhe kjo, sigurisht, arriti kulmin ne skandalin e Iran-Contra ne vitet 80.
But with the end of the Cold War came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace. Suddenly, the two common threats that had pushed them closer together throughout decades, more or less evaporated. The Soviet Union collapsed, Iraq was defeated, and a new environment was created in the region in which both of them felt more secure, but they were also now left unchecked. Without Iraq balancing Iran, Iran could now become a threat, some in Israel argued. In fact, the current dynamic that you see between Iran and Israel has its roots more so in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region after the Cold War than in the events of 1979, because at this point, Iran and Israel emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region, and rather than viewing each other as potential security partners, they increasingly came to view each other as rivals and competitors. So Israel, who in the 1980s lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, thinking that it would come at Israel's security interests' expense, and instead sought to put Iran in increased isolation.
Por me fundin e Luftes se Ftohte erdhi gjithashtu edhe fundi i paqes se ftohte Izrael-Iran. Papritur, dy kercenimet e perbashketa qe i kishin afruar permes dekadave, pak a shume u zhduken. Bashkimi Sovjetik u shemb, Iraku u mund dhe nje mjedis i ri u krijua ne rajon ne te cilin te dy ata ndjeheshin me te sigurte, por gjithashtu ishin lene tashme te pakontrolluar. Pa Irakun qe balanconte Iranin, Irani tashme mund te kthehej ne nje kercenim, argumentonin disa ne Izrael. Ne fakt, dinamika aktuale qe mund te shihni ndermjet Iranit dhe Israelit i ka rrenjet me te thella ne rikofingurimin gjeopolitik te rajonit pas Luftes se Ftohte sesa ne ngjarjet e 1979, sepse ne kete pike, Irani dhe Izraeli shfaqeshin si dy nga shtetet me te fuqishme ne rajon, dhe ne vend qe te shiheshin ndermjet tyre si partnere te mundshem sigurie, ata gjithnje e me shume nisen te shiheshin si kundershtare dhe konkurues. Pra Izraeli, i cili ne 1980 loboi per dhe permiresoi lidhjet Sh.B.A - Iran tashme frikesohej nga nje rivendosje e raporteve miqesore ndermjet Sh.B.A dhe Iranit, duke menduar se mund te perfundonte te varej nga Izraeli per sigurine, dhe ne vend te kesaj kerkoi te vendosi Iranin ne izolim te madh.
Ironically, this was happening at a time when Iran was more interested in peacemaking with Washington than to see to Israel's destruction. Iran had put itself in isolation because of its radicalism, and after having helped the United States indirectly in the war against Iraq in 1991, the Iranians were hoping that they would be rewarded by being included in the post-war security architecture of the region. But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach, as it would a decade later in Afghanistan, and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation, and it is at this point, around 1993, '94, that Iran begins to translate its anti-Israeli ideology into operational policy. The Iranians believed that whatever they did, even if they moderated their policies, the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation, and the only way Iran could compel Washington to change its position was by imposing a cost on the U.S. if it didn't. The easiest target was the peace process, and now the Iranian ideological bark was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite, and Iran began supporting extensively Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously had shunned. In some ways, this sounds paradoxical, but according to Martin Indyk of the Clinton administration, the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong, because the more peace there would be between Israel and Palestine, the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated. The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be. So according to Indyk, and these are his words, the Iranians had an interest to do us in on the peace process in order to defeat our policy of containment. To defeat our policy of containment, not about ideology.
Ironikisht, kjo po ndodhte ne nje kohe qe Irani ishte me shume i interesuar ne paqeberje me Washingtonin se sa te shikonte shkaterrimin e Izraelit. Irani e kishte vendosur veten ne izolim per shkak te radikalizmit te vet, dhe pasi kishte ndihmuar Shtetet e Bashkuara terthorazi ne luften kundrejt Irakut ne 1991, iranianet po shpresonin se ata do te shperbleheshin duke u perfshire ne arkitekturen e sigurise pas luftes ne rajon. Por Washingtoni zgjodhi te injoroje shpresen e Iranit, sic do bente pas nje dekate ne Afganistan, dhe nderkohe zhvilloi rritjen e izolimit te Iranit, dhe ne kete kohe, rreth 1993, '94, Irani filloi te perkthente ideologjine e saj kundra-izraelite ne politike operacionale. Iranianet besonin se cfaredo qe te benin, edhe sikur te ndryshonin politikat e tyre, Sh.B.A do te vazhdonte te kerkonte izolimin e Iranit, dhe e vetmja menyre qe Irani te detyronte Washingtonin te ndryshonte pozicionin e tij ishte duke i imponuar nje kosto Sh.B.A nese nuk do ta ndryshonin. Objektivi me i lehte ishte procesi i paqes dhe ne kete moment befas ideologjia Iraniane duhet te ishte e mbeshtjelle nga nje problem jo tradicional, dhe Irani filloi te mbeshtese gjeresisht grupet Islamiste Palestineze qe me pare ishin shmangur. Ne disa menyre, kjo dukej paradoksale, por sipas Martin Indyk te administrates Clinton, Iranianet nuk e kishin kuptuar totalisht gabim sepse sa me shume paqe do te ekzistonte midis Izraelit dhe Palestines, sipas Sh.B.A, aq me shume do izolohej Irani. Sa me shume te izolohej Irani, aq me shume paqe do kishte. Pra sipas Indyk, dhe keto jane fjalet e tij, Iranianet kishin nje interes te na fusnin ne procesin e paqes ne menyre qe te mposhte politiken e kontrollit. Per te mposhtur politiken tone te kontrollit, jo per ideologjine.
But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement, all sides have reached out to each other. Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996, reached out to the Iranians to see if there were any ways that the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected. Tehran was not interested. A few years later, the Iranians sent a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration, a proposal that revealed that there was some potential of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again. The Bush administration did not even respond. All sides have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
Por gjate kesaj edhe ne kohet me te keqija te ngaterresave, te gjitha anet zgjasnin doren tek njera tjetra. Netanyahu, kur u zgjodh ne 1996, i zgjati doren Iranianeve per te pare nese do kishte ndonje menyre qe dogma e periferise mund te ringjallej. Teherani nuk ishte i interesuar. Disa vite me pas, Iranianet derguan nje propozim negociate gjitheperfshires ne administraten e Bush-it, nje propozim i cili u zbulua se mund te kishte potencial per te futur Iranin dhe Izraelin ne terma perseri. Administrata e Bush-it nuk u pergjigj fare. Te gjitha anet nuk kishin humbur kurre nje mundesi per ta humbur nje tani.
But this is not an ancient conflict. This is not even an ideological conflict. The ebbs and flows of hostility have not shifted with ideological zeal, but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape. When Iran and Israel's security imperatives dictated collaboration, they did so in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other. When Iran's ideological impulses collided with its strategic interests, the strategic interests always prevailed. This is good news, because it means that neither war nor enmity is a foregone conclusion.
Por ky nuk eshte nje konflikt i lashte. Ky nuk eshte as nje konflikt ideologjik. Ngritjet dhe uljet e armiqesise nuk kane ndryshuar me zell ideologjik, por me ndryshimet e tablose gjeopolitike. Kur siguria e Iranit dhe Izraelit u be thelbesore dhe diktoi bashkepunim, ata e bene pavaresisht opozites vdekjeprurese ideologjike mbi njeri tjetrin. Kur impulset ideologjike te Iranit u perplasen me interesat e tyre strategjike, interesat strategjike gjithmone mbizoteruan. Ky eshte lajm i mire, sepse tregon se as lufta as armiqesia nuk eshte nje perfundim i pashmangshem.
But some want war. Some believe or say that it's 1938, Iran is Germany, and Ahmadinejad is Hitler. If we accept this to be true, that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany, Ahmadinejad is Hitler, then the question we have to ask ourself is, who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain? Who will risk peace? This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed at eliminating diplomacy, and when you eliminate diplomacy, you make war inevitable. In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce, no draw, no compromise, only victory or defeat.
Por disa donin lufte. Disa besonin ose thonin se eshte 1938, Irani eshte Gjermani, dhe Ahmadinejad eshte Hitleri. Nese e pranojme kete te jete e vertete, se ne te vertete eshte 1938, Irani eshte Gjermani, Ahmadinejadi eshte Hitleri, atehere pyetja qe duhet ti bejme vetes eshte, kush deshiron te luaje rolin e Neville Chamberlain? Kush do rrezikoje paqen? Kjo eshte nje analogji e cila me qellim kerkon te eliminoje diplomacine, dhe kur diplomacia eliminohet, atehere lufta behet e pashmangshme. Ne nje konflikt ideologjik, nuk mund te kete armepushim, nuk mund te kete terheqje, as kompromise, vetem fitore ose humbje.
But rather than making war inevitable by viewing this as ideological, we would be wise to seek ways to make peace possible. Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon, only a few decades old in a history of 2,500 years, and precisely because its roots are geopolitical, it means that solutions can be found, compromises can be struck, however difficult it yet may be. After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said, "You don't make peace with your friends. You make it with your enemies."
Por ne vend qe ta bejme luften te pashmangshme duke e pare kete si ideologjike, do tregoheshim te mencur duke kerkuar menyra per te bere paqen te mundshme. Konflikti i Iranint dhe Izraelit eshte nje fenomen i ri, vetem pak dekadash i vjeter ne nje histori prej 2.500 vitesh, dhe pikerisht sepse rrenjet e tij jane gjeopolitike, do te thote se zgjidhje mund te gjehen, kompromiset mund te kerkohen, sa do te veshtira te jene ato. Ne fund te fundit, ishte Yitzhak Rabin qe tha, "Ti nuk e ben paqen me miqte e tu. Por me armiqte."
Thank you.
Faleminderit.
(Applause)
(Duartrokitje)