It's very nice to be here tonight.
Veoma je lepo biti ovde večeras.
So I've been working on the history of income and wealth distribution for the past 15 years, and one of the interesting lessons coming from this historical evidence is indeed that, in the long run, there is a tendency for the rate of return of capital to exceed the economy's growth rate, and this tends to lead to high concentration of wealth. Not infinite concentration of wealth, but the higher the gap between r and g, the higher the level of inequality of wealth towards which society tends to converge.
Izučavao sam istoriju prihoda i raspodelu bogatstva, u poslednjih 15 godina, i jedna zanimljiva lekcija zasnovana na istorijskim podacima jeste da, zapravo, na duže staze, postoji tendencija da stopa povratka kapitala nadmaši stopu rasta ekonomije i ovo dovodi do gomilanja imovine. Ne gomilanja u nedogled, ali što je veća razdaljina između r i g, to je veći stepen nejednakosti među imovinama, ka čemu društvo, izgleda, stremi.
So this is a key force that I'm going to talk about today, but let me say right away that this is not the only important force in the dynamics of income and wealth distribution, and there are many other forces that play an important role in the long-run dynamics of income and wealth distribution. Also there is a lot of data that still needs to be collected. We know a little bit more today than we used to know, but we still know too little, and certainly there are many different processes — economic, social, political — that need to be studied more. And so I'm going to focus today on this simple force, but that doesn't mean that other important forces do not exist.
Tako da, to je glavna sila o kojoj ću da govorim danas, ali samo da kažem odmah da ovo nije i jedina sila, u dinamici prihoda i raspodele bogatstva, i da ima mnogih drugih sila koje igraju važne uloge u dugoročnoj dinamici prihoda i raspodeli bogatstva. Takođe, postoji pregršt podataka koje bi trebalo prikupiti. Znamo malo više danas, nego što smo znali pre, ali, i dalje, suviše malo, i sigurno ima puno različitih procesa - ekonomskih, društvenih, političkih - koje bi trebalo više izučavati. Tako da ću ja danas da se držim ove jednostavne sile, što ne znači da druge bitne sile ne postoje.
So most of the data I'm going to present comes from this database that's available online: the World Top Incomes Database. So this is the largest existing historical database on inequality, and this comes from the effort of over 30 scholars from several dozen countries. So let me show you a couple of facts coming from this database, and then we'll return to r bigger than g. So fact number one is that there has been a big reversal in the ordering of income inequality between the United States and Europe over the past century. So back in 1900, 1910, income inequality was actually much higher in Europe than in the United States, whereas today, it is a lot higher in the United States. So let me be very clear: The main explanation for this is not r bigger than g. It has more to do with changing supply and demand for skill, the race between education and technology, globalization, probably more unequal access to skills in the U.S., where you have very good, very top universities but where the bottom part of the educational system is not as good, so very unequal access to skills, and also an unprecedented rise of top managerial compensation of the United States, which is difficult to account for just on the basis of education. So there is more going on here, but I'm not going to talk too much about this today, because I want to focus on wealth inequality.
Većina informacija koje ću izneti dolazi iz baze podataka koja je dostpuna onlajn: svetska baza podataka o prihodima. Ovo je najveća postojeća istorijska baza podataka o nejednakosti, i ovo dolazi od truda preko 30 učenjaka iz nekoliko desetina zemalja. Dozvolite mi da vam pokažem par činjenica iz ove baze podataka, a onda se vraćamo na r koje je veće od g. Prva činjenica je da je bio veliki preokret koji je otpočeo nastajanje nejednakosti u prihodima između Sjedinjenih Država i Evrope u proteklom veku. Između 1900. i 1910. nejednakost prihoda je bila veća u Evropi nego u Sjedinjenim Državama, dok je danas, mnogo veća u Sjedinjenim Državama. Dopustite da razjasnim. Glavno objašnjenje za ovo nije r je veće od g. Više je u vezi sa promenom zaliha i potražnje za veštinom, trkom između obrazovanja i tehnologije, globalizacijom, verovatno više nejednakih pristupa veštinama u SAD-u, gde postoje vrlo dobre, visoke škole ali gde niži obrazovni sistem nije tako dobar, time vidite, izuzetno nejednak pristup veštinama. I neprikosnoven rast vrhunskih menadžerskih kompenzacija u Sjedinjenim Državama, o kojima je teže govoriti, samo sa stanovišta obrazovanja. Tu se mnogo više dešava, ali neću puno govoriti o tome danas,
So let me just show you a very simple indicator about the income inequality part. So this is the share of total income going to the top 10 percent. So you can see that one century ago, it was between 45 and 50 percent in Europe and a little bit above 40 percent in the U.S., so there was more inequality in Europe. Then there was a sharp decline during the first half of the 20th century, and in the recent decade, you can see that the U.S. has become more unequal than Europe, and this is the first fact I just talked about. Now, the second fact is more about wealth inequality, and here the central fact is that wealth inequality is always a lot higher than income inequality, and also that wealth inequality, although it has also increased in recent decades, is still less extreme today than what it was a century ago, although the total quantity of wealth relative to income has now recovered from the very large shocks caused by World War I, the Great Depression, World War II.
jer želim da se skoncentrišem na imovinsku nejednakost. Dopustite da vam pokažem veoma jednostavan indikator o imovinskoj nejednakosti. Ovaj deo je udeo ukupnog prihoda koji ide u gornjih 10 procenata. Tako da možete videti da je jedan vek ranije, bilo između 45 i 50 procenata u Evropi, i malo više od 40 procenata u SAD-u, tako da je bilo više nejednakosti u Evropi. Onda je došlo do naglog pada tokom prve polovine 20. veka, a u skorijoj deceniji, možete videti da su SAD imale veću nejednakost od Evrope, i ovo je prva činjenica o kojoj sam pričao. Sledeća činjenica se više tiče imovinske nejednakosti, a glavna činjenica je da je imovinska nejednakost, znatno veća od nejednakosti u prihodima, takođe da imovinska nejednakost, iako raste proteklih decenija, nije mnogo ekstremnija danas, nego što je bila vek ranije. Iako je ukupna količina imovine relevantne za prihod, sada obnovljena od velikih šokova Prvog svetskog rata, ekonomske krize,
So let me show you two graphs illustrating fact number two and fact number three. So first, if you look at the level of wealth inequality, this is the share of total wealth going to the top 10 percent of wealth holders, so you can see the same kind of reversal between the U.S. and Europe that we had before for income inequality. So wealth concentration was higher in Europe than in the U.S. a century ago, and now it is the opposite. But you can also show two things: First, the general level of wealth inequality is always higher than income inequality. So remember, for income inequality, the share going to the top 10 percent was between 30 and 50 percent of total income, whereas for wealth, the share is always between 60 and 90 percent. Okay, so that's fact number one, and that's very important for what follows. Wealth concentration is always a lot higher than income concentration.
Drugog svetskog rata. Pokazaću vam dva grafika koja prikazuju činjenicu broj dva i činjenicu broj tri. Ako pogledate nivo imovinske nejednakosti, ovo je udeo ukupne imovine koji ide u gornjih 10 procenata imovinskih vlasnika. Time možete primetiti istu vrstu preokreta između SAD-a i Evrope, koju smo i ranije imali kod nejednakosti prihoda. Gomilanje imovine je bilo veće u Evropi nego u SAD-u, vek ranije, a sada je obratno. Ali možemo pokazati još dve stvari: prvo, nivo imovinske nejednakosti, generalno uvek biva veći od nejednakosti u prihodima. Zapamtite, za nejednakost u prihodima, udeo koji ide u gornjih 10 procenata je bio između 30 i 50 procenata ukupnih prihoda, dok je kod imovine, udeo uvek između 60 i 90 procenata. Okej, to je činjenica broj jedan koja je jako važna zbog onog što sledi. Gomilanje imovine je uvek
Fact number two is that the rise in wealth inequality in recent decades is still not enough to get us back to 1910. So the big difference today, wealth inequality is still very large, with 60, 70 percent of total wealth for the top 10, but the good news is that it's actually better than one century ago, where you had 90 percent in Europe going to the top 10. So today what you have is what I call the middle 40 percent, the people who are not in the top 10 and who are not in the bottom 50, and what you can view as the wealth middle class that owns 20 to 30 percent of total wealth, national wealth, whereas they used to be poor, a century ago, when there was basically no wealth middle class. So this is an important change, and it's interesting to see that wealth inequality has not fully recovered to pre-World War I levels, although the total quantity of wealth has recovered. Okay? So this is the total value of wealth relative to income, and you can see that in particular in Europe, we are almost back to the pre-World War I level. So there are really two different parts of the story here. One has to do with the total quantity of wealth that we accumulate, and there is nothing bad per se, of course, in accumulating a lot of wealth, and in particular if it is more diffuse and less concentrated. So what we really want to focus on is the long-run evolution of wealth inequality, and what's going to happen in the future. How can we account for the fact that until World War I, wealth inequality was so high and, if anything, was rising to even higher levels, and how can we think about the future?
mnogo veće od gomilanja prihoda. Činjenica broj dva je da je porast imovinske nejednakosti proteklih decenija nedovoljan da nas vrati u 1910. Tako da, danas postoji velika razlika, imovinska nejednakost je, opet, pozamašna sa 60, 70 procenata od ukupne imovine u top 10 procenata, ali su zapravo dobre vesti da je bolje nego vek ranije, gde 90 procenata, u Evropi, odlazi u top 10. Danas imamo, ono što ja nazivam srednjih 40 procenata, ljudi koji nisu u top 10 i koji nisu u poslednjih 50, koje možete gledati kao imovinsku srednju klasu koja ima 20 do 30 procenata ukupne imovine, državne imovine, a bili su siromašni vek ranije, praktično je bila srednja klasa bez imovine. Ovo je bitna promena, i zanimljivo je videti da imovinska nejednakost nije potpuno povraćena u stanje pre Prvog svetskog rata, iako je ukupna količina imovine povraćena. Okej? Ovo je ukupna vrednost imovine u odnosu na prihode, i možete primetiti da smo, naročito u Evropi, blizu perioda pre Prvog svetskog rata. Tako da, zapravo, postoje dva različita dela priče. Jedan ima veze sa ukupnom količinom imovine koju akumuliramo, i nema ničeg izričito lošeg u tome da se imovina akumulira, pogotovo ako je rasprostranjena, a ne nagomilavana. Ono na šta ćemo se stvarno skoncentrisati je dugoročna evolucija imovinske nejednakosti, i ono što će se u budućnosti dešavati. Kako možemo objasniti činjenicu da je u periodu Prvog svetskog rata, nejednakost bila toliko velika i, ako ništa drugo, rasla je do veće nejednakosti,
So let me come to some of the explanations and speculations about the future. Let me first say that probably the best model to explain why wealth is so much more concentrated than income is a dynamic, dynastic model where individuals have a long horizon and accumulate wealth for all sorts of reasons. If people were accumulating wealth only for life cycle reasons, you know, to be able to consume when they are old, then the level of wealth inequality should be more or less in line with the level of income inequality. But it will be very difficult to explain why you have so much more wealth inequality than income inequality with a pure life cycle model, so you need a story where people also care about wealth accumulation for other reasons. So typically, they want to transmit wealth to the next generation, to their children, or sometimes they want to accumulate wealth because of the prestige, the power that goes with wealth. So there must be other reasons for accumulating wealth than just life cycle to explain what we see in the data. Now, in a large class of dynamic models of wealth accumulation with such dynastic motive for accumulating wealth, you will have all sorts of random, multiplicative shocks. So for instance, some families have a very large number of children, so the wealth will be divided. Some families have fewer children. You also have shocks to rates of return. Some families make huge capital gains. Some made bad investments. So you will always have some mobility in the wealth process. Some people will move up, some people will move down. The important point is that, in any such model, for a given variance of such shocks, the equilibrium level of wealth inequality will be a steeply rising function of r minus g. And intuitively, the reason why the difference between the rate of return to wealth and the growth rate is important is that initial wealth inequalities will be amplified at a faster pace with a bigger r minus g. So take a simple example, with r equals five percent and g equals one percent, wealth holders only need to reinvest one fifth of their capital income to ensure that their wealth rises as fast as the size of the economy. So this makes it easier to build and perpetuate large fortunes because you can consume four fifths, assuming zero tax, and you can just reinvest one fifth. So of course some families will consume more than that, some will consume less, so there will be some mobility in the distribution, but on average, they only need to reinvest one fifth, so this allows high wealth inequalities to be sustained.
i kako možemo razmišljati o budućnosti? Dopustite da dođem do nekih objašnjenja i nagađanja, vezanih za budućnost. Prvo, da samo kažem da je verovatno najbolji primer toga zašto je imovina toliko nagomilavana u odnosu na prihode, zapravo dinamičan, dinastijski primer gde pojedinac ima širok vidokrug i gomila imovinu iz raznih razloga. Da ljudi gomilaju imovinu, samo zbog životnog veka, razumete, da mogu da uživaju imovinu i kad ostare, onda bi nivo imovinske nejednakosti trebalo da bude manje više jednak nivou nejednakosti u prihodima. Ali bi bilo jako teško objasniti zašto postoji više imovinske nejednakosti od nejednakosti u prihodima, primerom životnog veka. Prema tome, treba vam priča gde je ljudima takođe stalo do akumulacije imovine, ali iz drugih razloga. Obično žele preneti imovinu sledećoj generaciji, svojoj deci, ponekad žele akumulirati imovinu zbog prestiža i moći koja dolazi uz to. Moraju postojati drugi razlozi za akumulaciju imovine van životnog veka kako bismo objasnili to što vidimo u podacima. E sada, u velikoj klasi dinamičkih primera akumulacije imovine sa takvim dinastijskim razlozima za akumulaciju imovine, imaćete razne uvećavane šokove. Na primer, neke porodice imaju velik broj dece, pa će imovina biti podeljena. Neke porodice imaju manji broj dece. Postoji i šok na stopu povraćaja. Neke porodice imaju ogroman priliv kapitala. Neke su imale loša ulaganja. Uvek ćete imati neku vrstu mobilnosti u tom imovinskom procesu. Neki ljudi će se uzdići, neki će se spustiti. Značajna poenta jeste da u kom god primeru, za datu varijaciju tih šokova, balans nivoa imovinske nejednakosti će biti visoko rastuća funkcija r minus g. Intuitivno, razlog za razlike između stope povraćaja imovine i razvojne stope, koja je značajna, je da će prvobitne imovinske nejednakosti biti uvećavane bržim tempom sa većim r minus g. Uzmite jednostavan primer, kada je r jednako 5 procenata, a g je jednako 1 procenat, imovinski vlasnici samo moraju opet uložiti jednu petinu svog kapitala da bi osigurali da će im imovina rasti istom brzinom kojom raste i ekonomija. Ovo olakšava građenje i očuvanje velikih imućstava, jer možete koristiti četiri petine, sa pretpostavkom - bez poreza, i nanovo uložite preostalu petinu. Naravno, neke porodice će iskoristiti više od toga, a neke manje, pa će biti neke mobilnosti u distribuciji, ali, u proseku, samo moraju uložiti jednu petinu, što omogućava održavanje velike imovinske nejednakosti.
Now, you should not be surprised by the statement that r can be bigger than g forever, because, in fact, this is what happened during most of the history of mankind. And this was in a way very obvious to everybody for a simple reason, which is that growth was close to zero percent during most of the history of mankind. Growth was maybe 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 percent, but very slow growth of population and output per capita, whereas the rate of return on capital of course was not zero percent. It was, for land assets, which was the traditional form of assets in preindustrial societies, it was typically five percent. Any reader of Jane Austen would know that. If you want an annual income of 1,000 pounds, you should have a capital value of 20,000 pounds so that five percent of 20,000 is 1,000. And in a way, this was the very foundation of society, because r bigger than g was what allowed holders of wealth and assets to live off their capital income and to do something else in life than just to care about their own survival.
Nemojte biti iznenađeni izjavom da r može biti veće od g zauvek, jer se upravo to dešavalo tokom istorije čovečanstva. I ovo je, na neki način, bilo svima očito, iz prostog razloga, što je rast bio približno nula procenata kroz veći deo istorije čovečanstva. Rast je možda bio 0,1 - 0,2 - 0,3 procenata, zbog sporog rasta populacije i učinka po glavi, dok stopa povraćaja kapitala, naravno, nije bila nula procenata. Za zemljišna dobra, koja su bila tradicionalni oblik dobara u društvima pre industrijalizacije, obično je bilo 5 procenata. Svaka osoba koja je čitala Džejn Ostin će ovo znati. Ako želite godišnji prihod od 1000 funti bila bi vam potrebna vrednost kapitala od 20 000 funti, tako bi pet procenata od 20 000 bilo 1000. Na neki način, ovo je bila sama osnova društva, jer kad je r veće od g, onda su vlasnici imovine i dobara mogli da žive od prihoda od kapitala i da rade nešto drugo u životu nego da samo brinu o sopstvenom preživljavanju.
Now, one important conclusion of my historical research is that modern industrial growth did not change this basic fact as much as one might have expected. Of course, the growth rate following the Industrial Revolution rose, typically from zero to one to two percent, but at the same time, the rate of return to capital also rose so that the gap between the two did not really change. So during the 20th century, you had a very unique combination of events. First, a very low rate of return due to the 1914 and 1945 war shocks, destruction of wealth, inflation, bankruptcy during the Great Depression, and all of this reduced the private rate of return to wealth to unusually low levels between 1914 and 1945. And then, in the postwar period, you had unusually high growth rate, partly due to the reconstruction. You know, in Germany, in France, in Japan, you had five percent growth rate between 1950 and 1980 largely due to reconstruction, and also due to very large demographic growth, the Baby Boom Cohort effect. Now, apparently that's not going to last for very long, or at least the population growth is supposed to decline in the future, and the best projections we have is that the long-run growth is going to be closer to one to two percent rather than four to five percent. So if you look at this, these are the best estimates we have of world GDP growth and rate of return on capital, average rates of return on capital, so you can see that during most of the history of mankind, the growth rate was very small, much lower than the rate of return, and then during the 20th century, it is really the population growth, very high in the postwar period, and the reconstruction process that brought growth to a smaller gap with the rate of return. Here I use the United Nations population projections, so of course they are uncertain. It could be that we all start having a lot of children in the future, and the growth rates are going to be higher, but from now on, these are the best projections we have, and this will make global growth decline and the gap between the rate of return go up.
Bitan zaključak mog istorijskog istraživanja je da savremeni rast industrije ne menja osnovnu činjenicu, kako bi neki očekivali. Naravno, stopa rasta je nakon industrijske revolucije porasla, obično, od nula do dva procenta, ali je istovremeno, stopa povraćaja kapitala, je takođe rasla tako da se razlika između dve stope nije mnogo menjala. Tokom 20. veka imali smo vrlo specifičan tok dešavanja. Prvo, vrlo niska stopa povraćaja uzrokovana šokovima iz ratova 1914. i 1945. uništavanje imovine, inflacija, bankrot tokom ekonomske krize, sve ovo je svelo privatnu stopu povraćaja imovine na začuđujuće nizak nivo između 1914. i 1945. I onda, u posleratnom periodu, postojala je začuđujuće visoka stopa rasta, uzrokovana, delom, zbog rekonstrukcije. Znate, u Nemačkoj, Francuskoj, Japanu, stopa rasta je bila 5 procenata između 1950. i 1980, većim delom zbog rekonstrukcije, takođe, zbog vrlo visokog rasta populacije, efekta Bebi-bum generacija. Danas, to neće moći dugo da potraje ili bi rast populacije trebalo da opadne u budućnosti, i najbolja predviđanja koja možemo imati, na duže staze, jeste da rast bude bliže jednom ili dva procenta pre nego četiri ili pet procenata. Ako pogledate ovo, ovo su najbolje procene koje imamo rasta svetskog BDP i stope povraćaja imovine, prosečnu stopu povraćaja imovine, možete videti da je dugo u istoriji čovečanstva stopa rasta bila veoma niska, mnogo niža od stope povraćaja, i onda, tokom 20. veka, rast populacije je bio taj, izuzetno velik u posleratnom dobu, pored procesa rekonstrukcije, koji je doneo porast smanjivši razliku u odnosu na stopu povraćaja. Tu je predstava Ujedinjenih nacija o populaciji, stoga znamo da je nesigurna. Može se desiti da svi počnemo da imamo puno dece u budućnosti te će stope rasta biti mnogo veće, ali od sada pa nadalje, to su najbliže predstave koje imamo, koje će uzrokovati da svetski porast opadne i razlika u odnosu na stopu povraćaja poraste.
Now, the other unusual event during the 20th century was, as I said, destruction, taxation of capital, so this is the pre-tax rate of return. This is the after-tax rate of return, and after destruction, and this is what brought the average rate of return after tax, after destruction, below the growth rate during a long time period. But without the destruction, without the taxation, this would not have happened. So let me say that the balance between returns on capital and growth depends on many different factors that are very difficult to predict: technology and the development of capital-intensive techniques. So right now, the most capital-intensive sectors in the economy are the real estate sector, housing, the energy sector, but it could be in the future that we have a lot more robots in a number of sectors and that this would be a bigger share of the total capital stock that it is today. Well, we are very far from this, and from now, what's going on in the real estate sector, the energy sector, is much more important for the total capital stock and capital share.
Sada, drugi neobični događaj u 20. veku, je bio, kao što sam pomenuo destrukcija, oporezivanje kapitala, ovo je stopa povraćaja pre poreza. Ovo je stopa povraćaja posle poreza, i posle destrukcije, i to je ono što dovodi prosečnu stopu povraćaja posle poreza, posle destrukcije na nivo ispod stope rasta na duži period. Ali bez destrukcije, bez oporezivanja, ovo se ne bi ni desilo. Želim da kažem da, ravnoteža između povraćaja kapitala i rasta zavisi od različitih faktora koje je teško predvideti: tehnologija i razvoj tehnika povećanja intenziteta kapitala. Trenutno, sektori sa najvećim kapitalnim intenzitetom u ekonomiji su: nekretnine, stambena izgradnja, električna energija, ali može biti da u budućnosti imamo znatno više robota u većini sektora i da bi to predstavljalo velik udeo u ukupnim zalihama kapitala, danas. Vrlo smo daleko od ovoga, i trenutno, ono što se dešava sektoru za nekretnine, električnu energiju je mnogo važnije za ukupne zalihe kapitala
The other important issue is that there are scale effects in portfolio management, together with financial complexity, financial deregulation, that make it easier to get higher rates of return for a large portfolio, and this seems to be particularly strong for billionaires, large capital endowments. Just to give you one example, this comes from the Forbes billionaire rankings over the 1987-2013 period, and you can see the very top wealth holders have been going up at six, seven percent per year in real terms above inflation, whereas average income in the world, average wealth in the world, have increased at only two percent per year. And you find the same for large university endowments — the bigger the initial endowments, the bigger the rate of return.
i za udeo kapitala. Još jedna važna činjenica je reciprocitet zarade u odnosu na poslovanje, zajedno sa finansijskom kompleksnošću, finansijskom nesređenošću koja je olakšala rast stope povraćaja za širok spektar ulaganja, i ovo deluje naročito tačno za milijardere sa izuzetnim kapitalom. Da vam dam jedan primer koji dolazi iz Forbsovog poretka milijardera u periodu od 1987. do 2013. pa možete videti u vrhu imovinske vlasnike koji idu godišnje ka šest, sedam procenata realnih procenata, van inflacije, dok je prosek prihoda u svetu, prosek imovine u svetu, porastao na samo dva procenta godišnje. Pronašli biste isto za imućne univerzitete - što je veći početni kapital,
Now, what could be done? The first thing is that I think we need more financial transparency. We know too little about global wealth dynamics, so we need international transmission of bank information. We need a global registry of financial assets, more coordination on wealth taxation, and even wealth tax with a small tax rate will be a way to produce information so that then we can adapt our policies to whatever we observe. And to some extent, the fight against tax havens and automatic transmission of information is pushing us in this direction. Now, there are other ways to redistribute wealth, which it can be tempting to use. Inflation: it's much easier to print money than to write a tax code, so that's very tempting, but sometimes you don't know what you do with the money. This is a problem. Expropriation is very tempting. Just when you feel some people get too wealthy, you just expropriate them. But this is not a very efficient way to organize a regulation of wealth dynamics. So war is an even less efficient way, so I tend to prefer progressive taxation, but of course, history — (Laughter) — history will invent its own best ways, and it will probably involve a combination of all of these.
veća će biti stopa povraćaja. Šta se može učiniti povodom toga? Prva stvar koja nam je, po mom mišljenju, potrebna je jasna slika finansija. Znamo vrlo malo o dinamici imovine u svetu pa nam je potreban međunarodni prenos podataka iz banaka. Potreban nam je svetski registar finansijskih dobara više koordinacije prilikom oporezivanja imovine, pa čak i porez na imovinu sa niskom stopom će biti vid prikupljanja podataka pa da možemo uskladiti svoje postupke shodno tome što primetimo. Donekle, naša borba protiv utočišta od poreza i automatsko širenje informarcija nas guraju u ovom pravcu. Postoje i drugi načini za raspodelu imovine, koji mogu biti primamljivi za primenu. Inflacija: mnogo je lakše ištampati novac i izbeći poreski postupak - vrlo primamljivo, iako nekad ni ne znate šta ste radili s novcem. Ovo je problem. Eksproprijacija je vrlo primamljiva. Taman kada osetite da su se neki ljudi obogatili, samo izvršite eksproprijaciju. Mada ovo nije najefikasniji način da se uspe u regulisanju dinamike imovine. Rat je još manje efikasan način, pa tako ja preferiram povećanje poreza, ali naravno, istorija - (Smeh) - će naći bolje načine koji će uključivati, verovatno kombinaciju
Thank you.
svega ovoga.
(Applause)
Hvala.
Bruno Giussani: Thomas Piketty. Thank you.
(Aplauz)
Thomas, I want to ask you two or three questions, because it's impressive how you're in command of your data, of course, but basically what you suggest is growing wealth concentration is kind of a natural tendency of capitalism, and if we leave it to its own devices, it may threaten the system itself, so you're suggesting that we need to act to implement policies that redistribute wealth, including the ones we just saw: progressive taxation, etc. In the current political context, how realistic are those? How likely do you think that it is that they will be implemented?
Bruno Đuzani: Tomas Piketi. Hvala. Tomase, želim da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja, jer je impresivno kako baratate informacijama koje imate, ali Vi zapravo hoćete da kažete da je rast gomilanja imovine samo jedna tendencija kapitalizma, i ako je ostavimo samoj sebi, može nauditi našem sistemu, a vi predlažete da se pokrenemo i uvedemo novu politiku preraspodele dobara, uključujući i one koje smo sad videli: povećanje poreza? U današnjem kontekstu politike koliko su one realne? Koliko mislite da mogu
Thomas Piketty: Well, you know, I think if you look back through time, the history of income, wealth and taxation is full of surprise. So I am not terribly impressed by those who know in advance what will or will not happen. I think one century ago, many people would have said that progressive income taxation would never happen and then it happened. And even five years ago, many people would have said that bank secrecy will be with us forever in Switzerland, that Switzerland was too powerful for the rest of the world, and then suddenly it took a few U.S. sanctions against Swiss banks for a big change to happen, and now we are moving toward more financial transparency. So I think it's not that difficult to better coordinate politically. We are going to have a treaty with half of the world GDP around the table with the U.S. and the European Union, so if half of the world GDP is not enough to make progress on financial transparency and minimal tax for multinational corporate profits, what does it take? So I think these are not technical difficulties. I think we can make progress if we have a more pragmatic approach to these questions and we have the proper sanctions on those who benefit from financial opacity.
biti sprovedene? Tomas Piketi: Smatram da ako pogledate nazad u vreme, istorijat prihoda, imovine i oporezivanja je pun iznenađenja. Nisam preterano impresioniran onima koji unapred znaju šta će biti, a i šta neće biti. Mislim da bi pre jednog veka mnogi ljudi rekli da povećanje poreza na prihode neće doći, a onda se dogodilo. Čak i pre pet godina, mnogi ljudi bi rekli da će tajne banaka biti zauvek s nama u Švajcarskoj, da je Švajcarska premoćna u odnosu na ostatak sveta, i odjednom, sve što je trebalo je nekoliko sankcija SAD-a protiv švajcarskih banaka, da bi dobili znatnu promenu, a sada se krećemo ka jasnom viđenju finansija. Mislim da nije naročito teško doći do bolje političke koordinacije. Da imamo sporazum sa BDP-om polovine sveta na stolu, sa SAD-om i Evropskom unijom, a ako BDP polovine sveta nije dovoljan da se rastumači slika finansija u svetu i da se se postave minimalni porezi za profit multinacionalnih korporacija, šta nam je onda potrebno? Smatram da ovo nisu tehničke poteškoće. Mislim da možemo napredovati ako bismo imali pragmatičniji pristup ovim pitanjima i ako bismo imali redovne sankcije
BG: One of the arguments against your point of view is that economic inequality is not only a feature of capitalism but is actually one of its engines. So we take measures to lower inequality, and at the same time we lower growth, potentially. What do you answer to that?
za one kojima godi zataškivanje finansija. BĐ: Jedan od argumenata protiv Vašeg gledišta je da ekonomska nejednakost nije samo karakteristika kapitalizma, već jedna od njenih mašina. Preduzimamo mere za smanjenje nejednakosti ali time i rizikujemo potencijalno smanjenje rasta.
TP: Yeah, I think inequality is not a problem per se. I think inequality up to a point can actually be useful for innovation and growth. The problem is, it's a question of degree. When inequality gets too extreme, then it becomes useless for growth and it can even become bad because it tends to lead to high perpetuation of inequality over time and low mobility. And for instance, the kind of wealth concentrations that we had in the 19th century and pretty much until World War I in every European country was, I think, not useful for growth. This was destroyed by a combination of tragic events and policy changes, and this did not prevent growth from happening. And also, extreme inequality can be bad for our democratic institutions if it creates very unequal access to political voice, and the influence of private money in U.S. politics, I think, is a matter of concern right now. So we don't want to return to that kind of extreme, pre-World War I inequality. Having a decent share of the national wealth for the middle class is not bad for growth. It is actually useful both for equity and efficiency reasons.
Kakav odgovor imate na to? TP: Da, mislim da nejednakost nije problem po sebi. Mislim da nejednakost donekle može zapravo biti korisna za inovacije i razvoj. Problem je što je to pitanje stepena. Kad nejednakost poprimi velike razmere, postaje neupotrebljiva za rast i čak može da postane loša jer uzrokuje ukorenjenu nejednakost i slabu mobilnost. Recimo, koncentracija imovine koju smo imali u 19. veku i sve do Prvog svetskog rata u svakoj evropskoj državi nije bila korisna za porast. Ovo je uništeno kombinacijom tragičnih događaja i promena poslovanja, i nije sprečilo pojavu porasta. Takođe, ekstremna nejednakost može biti loša za naše demokratske institucije, ako stvori nejednake načine političkog oglašavanja i uticaj ličnog bogatstva, u politici SAD-a, mislim, je sada već zabrinjavajuća stvar. Ne želimo da se vraćamo na takav ekstrem, nejednakost poput one u predratnom periodu. Imati pristojan udeo u nacionalnom blagu za srednju klasu, nije tako loše za porast. Zapravo je korisno kako za opštu pravičnost, tako i za efikasnost.
BG: I said at the beginning that your book has been criticized. Some of your data has been criticized. Some of your choice of data sets has been criticized. You have been accused of cherry-picking data to make your case. What do you answer to that?
BĐ: Rekao sam na početku da je Vaša knjiga bila kritikovana. Vaši podaci su kritikovani. Neki od Vaših izbora podataka su bili kritikovani. Optuženi ste za pristrasno skupljanje podataka
TP: Well, I answer that I am very happy that this book is stimulating debate. This is part of what it is intended for. Look, the reason why I put all the data online with all of the detailed computation is so that we can have an open and transparent debate about this. So I have responded point by point to every concern. Let me say that if I was to rewrite the book today, I would actually conclude that the rise in wealth inequality, particularly in the United States, has been actually higher than what I report in my book. There is a recent study by Saez and Zucman showing, with new data which I didn't have at the time of the book, that wealth concentration in the U.S. has risen even more than what I report. And there will be other data in the future. Some of it will go in different directions. Look, we put online almost every week new, updated series on the World Top Income Database and we will keep doing so in the future, in particular in emerging countries, and I welcome all of those who want to contribute to this data collection process. In fact, I certainly agree that there is not enough transparency about wealth dynamics, and a good way to have better data would be to have a wealth tax with a small tax rate to begin with so that we can all agree about this important evolution and adapt our policies to whatever we observe. So taxation is a source of knowledge, and that's what we need the most right now.
kako bi Vam išli u korist. Šta je Vaš odgovor? TP: Pa, odgovorio sam da sam jako srećan što ova knjiga podstiče diskusiju. To joj je delom i svrha. Vidite, razlog što sam stavio sve podatke na internet sa svom detaljnom računicom je da bismo imali otvorenu i jasnu diskusiju o ovome. Stoga sam reagovao pojedinačno na svaku brigu. Dozvolite, da imam priliku da opet napišem knjigu, zaključio bih da je rast imovinske nejednakosti naročito u Sjedinjenim državama, bio veći od onoga što navodim u svojoj knjizi. Postoji skorije istraživanje Saeza i Zukmana koje pokazuje, novim podacima koje nisam imao tokom pisanja knjige, da je gomilanje imovine u SAD-u poraslo i više nego što ja navodim. I biće boljih podataka u budućnosti. Neki od njih će ići u različitim pravcima. Vidite, mi na internet stavljamo skoro svake nedelje nove, unapređene serije na svetskoj bazi podataka o prihodima, a nastavićemo da radimo to i u budućnosti, posebno kod država u razvoju, stoga pozivam sve koji žele doprineti ovom procesu prikupljanja podataka. Svakako bih se složio da nije dovoljno jasna dinamika imovine. i dobar način da se prikupe bolji podaci bi bilo imati porez na imovinu sa niskom stopom, za početak tako da se možemo složiti u vezi sa ovom važnom evolucijom i da postupke uskladimo sa onim što opažamo. Oporezivanje je izvor znanja,
BG: Thomas Piketty, merci beaucoup.
i to je ono što bi nam najviše trebalo danas.
Thank you. TP: Thank you. (Applause)
BĐ: Tomas Piketi, hvala mnogo.