I get asked a lot what the difference between my work is and typical Pentagon long-range strategic planners. And the answer I like to offer is what they typically do is they think about the future of wars in the context of war. And what I've spent 15 years doing in this business -- and it's taken me almost 14 to figure it out -- is I think about the future of wars in the context of everything else. So I tend to specialize on the scene between war and peace. The material I'm going to show you is one idea from a book with a lot of ideas. It's the one that takes me around the world right now interacting with foreign militaries quite a bit. The material was generated in two years of work I did for the Secretary of Defense, thinking about a new national grand strategy for the United States. I'm going to present a problem and try to give you an answer.
很多人問我,我的工作 與一位典型的五角大樓長期戰略計劃者的工作有什麼區別 我給他們的答案是 那些計劃者們總是在戰爭的大背景下 思考戰爭的未來。 而我花費了15年時間所做的事情 其實我花了14年才搞清楚我到底在做什麼—— 是我卻是在非戰爭的大背景下思考戰爭的未來 所以我傾向於關注那些介於戰爭和和平之間的事情 我要向大家介紹的是一本書中的一個觀點 呃~不是一個,而是好幾個觀點 正是為此我才周遊世界 與各國軍方交流 這些觀點都是基於我這兩年來 為美國國防部所做的工作 尋找一個新的國家整體戰略 ——為美國 我想給大家提出一個問題 看看您怎麼回答
Here's my favorite bonehead concept from the 1990s in the Pentagon: the theory of anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategies. Why do we call it that? Because it's got all those A's lined up I guess. This is gobbledygook for if the United States fights somebody we're going to be huge. They're going to be small. And if they try to fight us in the traditional, straight-up manner we're going to kick their ass, which is why people don't try to do that any more. I met the last Air Force General who had actually shot down an enemy plane in combat. He's now a one star General. That's how distant we are from even meeting an air force willing to fly against ours. So that overmatched capability creates problems -- catastrophic successes the White House calls them.
以下是自上世紀90年代以來我最喜歡的“五角大樓的愚蠢概念” 反介入、區域封鎖的非對稱戰略理論 為什麼我們給它起了這麼一個名字呢? 我猜這是因為它所有的單詞開頭都是A 帶官腔的文章都這樣 如果美國要打誰,那麼我們美國必是巨大的 則對方必是渺小的 如果對方要以傳統的直接的方式開戰的話 我們必能將其揍扁 正因為如此,他們才不會以那樣傳統的方式向美國開戰 我遇到過一個當過空軍將軍的傢伙 他曾經在戰鬥中擊落過敵人的飛機 而他現在是一個一星上將 而自上次我們發現一個願意與美國空軍部隊進行空戰的敵人 竟然已經是那麼久遠的事情 因此,這種壓倒對手的能力引起了許多問題 ——而白宮稱之為“災難性的成功”
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
And we're trying to figure that out, because it is an amazing capability. The question is, what's the good you can do with it? OK? The theory of anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategies -- gobbledygook that we sell to Congress, because if we just told them we can kick anybody's asses they wouldn't buy us all the stuff we want. So we say, area-denial, anti-access asymmetrical strategies and their eyes glaze over.
我們正努力搞懂它 因為這是一種令人驚奇的能力 問題是,你能用它做什麼呢? 對麼? 反介入、區域封鎖的非對稱戰略理論—— 我們賣給國會的官樣文章 因為如果我們直接告訴議員們我們能揍扁敵人 議員們是不會給我們買我們所需要的東西的 所以我們將其稱之為反介入、區域封鎖的非對稱戰略理論 他們一聽,立刻就呆掉了
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
And they say, "Will you build it in my district?"
然後他們會問:“你會不會在我所在的區部署一個“?
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Here's my parody and it ain't much of one. Let's talk about a battle space. I don't know, Taiwan Straits 2025. Let's talk about an enemy embedded within that battle space. I don't know, the Million Man Swim.
下面我將舉一個例子 讓我們聊一個“戰鬥區域” 我也不懂,台灣海峽2025 讓我們先談一個在此戰鬥區域中的敵人 呃~~比如一百萬個在海峽中游泳的人
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
The United States has to access that battle space instantaneously. They throw up anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategies. A banana peel on the tarmac.
美國必須立刻進入該區域 於是使用了反介入、區域封鎖的非對稱戰略理論 而停機坪上出現了一個香蕉皮~
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Trojan horses on our computer networks reveal all our Achilles' heels instantly. We say, "China, it's yours." Prometheus approach, largely a geographic definition, focuses almost exclusively on the start of conflict. We field the first-half team in a league that insists on keeping score until the end of the game. That's the problem. We can run the score up against anybody, and then get our asses kicked in the second half -- what they call fourth generation warfare.
我們電腦網絡中的特洛伊木馬 立刻告訴敵人我們的致命弱點在何處 我們說,這木馬是中國的 主要從地理定義上來說,是普羅米修斯的方法 幾乎完全集中在衝突的初期 我們在聯賽的上半段領先 保持這個分數,直到比賽結束 這就是問題所在 我們能迅速得分超過任何人 然後再後半段的比賽中比人家揍扁 他們稱之為第四代戰爭
Here's the way I like to describe it instead. There is no battle space the U.S. Military cannot access. They said we couldn't do Afghanistan. We did it with ease. They said we couldn't do Iraq. We did it with 150 combat casualties in six weeks. We did it so fast we weren't prepared for their collapse. There is nobody we can't take down. The question is, what do you do with the power?
下面我要描述一下第四代戰爭 目前,沒有美軍不能進入的戰鬥區域 有人說我們不能進入阿富汗,而我們卻輕易地做到了 有人說我們不能進入伊拉克 我們也做到了,而且代價是六週內只有150個戰鬥傷員 我們進入的速度如此之快,以至於我們都還沒有對伊拉克的垮台做好準備 世上沒有我們打不垮的敵人 而問題是,我們怎麼使用這樣的能力
So there's no trouble accessing battle spaces. What we have trouble accessing is the transition space that must naturally follow, and creating the peace space that allows us to move on. Problem is, the Defense Department over here beats the hell out of you. The State Department over here says, "Come on boy, I know you can make it." And that poor country runs off that ledge, does that cartoon thing and then drops.
因此,在進入戰鬥區域方面,我們是不存在問題的 事實上,我們無法順利進入的 是隨之而來的“過渡區域” 並創造允許我們繼續前進的“和平區域” 問題是,管理此處的國防部門 他媽的把人家趕出去了 然後管理此處的國務院人員卻對人家說 ”來吧伙計,我知道你能行“ 然後那個可憐的國家就逃掉了 做一些卡通一樣的蠢事然後垮掉了
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
This is not about overwhelming force, but proportional force. It's about non-lethal technologies, because if you fire real ammo into a crowd of women and children rioting you're going to lose friends very quickly. This is not about projecting power, but about staying power, which is about legitimacy with the locals. Who do you access in this transition space?
我們的確擁有壓倒性的武力,不應盲目地全部使用 有些事情是於致命性武器無關的 因為如果你對一群參與暴亂的婦女和兒童 開火的話 你會很快失去你的朋友 這與啟用武力無關,問題在於如何克制使用武力 關係到合法性的問題 你應該派誰進入這種過渡區域呢?
You have to create internal partners. You have to access coalition partners. We asked the Indians for 17,000 peace keepers. I know their senior leadership, they wanted to give it to us. But they said to us, "You know what? In that transition space you're mostly hat not enough cattle. We don't think you can pull it off, we're not going to give you our 17,000 peace keepers for fodder." We asked the Russians for 40,000. They said no. I was in China in August, I said, "You should have 50,000 peace keepers in Iraq. It's your oil, not ours." Which is the truth. It's their oil. And the Chinese said to me, "Dr. Barnett, you're absolutely right. In a perfect world we'd have 50,000 there. But it's not a perfect world, and your administration isn't getting us any closer." But we have trouble accessing our outcomes.
你必須創造內部的合作夥伴,必須擁有同盟 我們請17000個印度人來當和平衛士 我認識他們的高層領導人,他們願意派人給我們 但是他們說,你知道麼? 在那個過渡區域你的人手還不夠 我們覺得你還是完不成 所以我們不會給我們的17000人去浪費 我們問俄國要40000人 他們不給 我說過,八月份的時候我在中國 “你們應該派50000人去伊拉克維和 因為那是你的石油,不是我的石油” 事實上,那確實是他們的石油 然後那個中國人告訴我,“Barnett先生,你完全正確 如果世界是完美的,我們願意派50000人過去 但是現在,世界是不完美的 而你們美國人在那裡的管理也沒有讓我們更接近完美世界” 我們在獲取成果上也存在問題
We lucked out, frankly, on the selection. We face different opponents across these three. And it's time to start admitting you can't ask the same 19-year-old to do it all, day in and day out. It's just too damn hard. We have an unparalleled capacity to wage war. We don't do the everything else so well. Frankly, we do it better than anybody and we still suck at it. We have a brilliant Secretary of War. We don't have a Secretary of Everything Else. Because if we did, that guy would be in front of the Senate, still testifying over Abu Ghraib. The problem is he doesn't exist. There is no Secretary of Everything Else. I think we have an unparalleled capacity to wage war. I call that the Leviathan Force. What we need to build is a force for the Everything Else. I call them the System Administrators.
坦白講,我們在選舉上的勝利是都是憑藉運氣 我們面對著這三方的敵人 是時候開始承認 你不能要求同樣是19歲的人來做所有的事情,過一天算一天 這他媽的太難了 我們擁有一種不平衡的發動戰爭的能力 但我們對非戰爭的事情卻處理不好 坦白說,我們已經比其他任何人做的都要好了,但我們仍然舉步維艱 我們有一個出色的“戰爭部長” 我們卻沒有一個“非戰爭事務部長” 因為如果我們有,那個傢伙就會成為出色的議員 繼續審查伊拉克美軍虐囚事件 問題是這個人並不存在 沒有所謂的“非戰爭事務部長” 我認為我們擁有一種不平衡的發動戰爭的能力 我稱之為“巨輪之力” 而我們需要打造一種能力,是處理非戰爭事務的能力 我稱之為”系統監管“
What I think this really represents is lack of an A to Z rule set for the world as a whole for processing politically bankrupt states. We have one for processing economically bankrupt states. It's the IMF Sovereign Bankruptcy Plan, OK? We argue about it every time we use it. Argentina just went through it, broke a lot of rules. They got out on the far end, we said, "Fine, don't worry about it." It's transparent. A certain amount of certainty gives the sense of a non-zero outcome. We don't have one for processing politically bankrupt states that, frankly, everybody wants gone. Like Saddam, like Mugabe, like Kim Jong-Il -- people who kill in hundreds of thousands or millions. Like the 250,000 dead so far in Sudan.
我認為,這說明了我們缺乏一套詳細的規則 來處理政治破產的國家 使這個世界成為一個整體 我們有處理經濟破產的國家的規則 就是”國際貨幣基金組織主權破產計劃“,對麼? 每次使用它時,我們總在爭論 阿根廷正在實行,打破了許多規則 他們快完了,我們說,無所謂啦,不要擔心它 它是透明的、總量確定的 給我們的感覺,總歸多多少少是有產出的 而當政治破產的時候呢? 坦白講,每個人都想逃離 例如薩達姆,例如穆加貝,例如金正日—— 那些殺害成百上千人的傢伙 例如目前在蘇丹已經有250000人受害
What would an A to Z system look like? I'm going to distinguish between what I call front half and back half. And let's call this red line, I don't know, mission accomplished.
這個監管系統該是什麼樣的呢? 下面我將區分一下我剛剛所講的 上半場和下半場 我稱之為紅線,或者說,”完成了的任務“
(Laughter)
笑聲
(Applause)
掌聲
What we have extant right now, at the beginning of this system, is the U.N. Security Council as a grand jury. What can they do? They can indict your ass. They can debate it. They can write it on a piece of paper. They can put it in an envelope and mail it to you, and then say in no uncertain terms, "Please cut that out."
目前在這個監管系統中,我們已經擁有的 是聯合國安理會,它可以作為一個大陪審團 他們能做什麼呢? 他們能起訴你 他們會討論你問題,然後寫下來 裝到信封裡寄給你 然後說義正言辭地說,請不要這樣做
(Laughter)
笑聲
That gets you about four million dead in Central Africa over the 1990s. That gets you 250,000 dead in the Sudan in the last 15 months. Everybody's got to answer their grandchildren some day what you did about the holocaust in Africa, and you better have an answer. We don't have anything to translate that will into action.
因為它的存在,讓上世紀90年代的非洲中部死亡了大約4000000人 因為它的存在,過去的15個月中蘇丹死亡了250000人 有一天每個人都要告訴他們的子孫 你在非洲大屠殺中擔任了什麼角色 到時你最好能答得出來 我們無法將那種意願轉化為行動
What we do have is the U.S.-enabled Leviathan Force that says, "You want me to take that guy down? I'll take that guy down. I'll do it on Tuesday. It will cost you 20 billion dollars."
我們所有的就是美國具有的”巨輪之力“,他說 ”你要我打倒誰,我就會打到誰 我周二就能打到他,那會花費你200億美元“
(Laughter)
笑聲
But here's the deal. As soon as I can't find anybody else to air out, I leave the scene immediately. That's called the Powell Doctrine. Way downstream we have the International Criminal Court. They love to put them on trial. They've got Milosević right now.
但是立刻就能成交了 只要我們找不到任何其他人來 我就立即離開 這叫做”鮑威爾主義“ 然後我們有國際刑事法庭 他們喜歡審判罪犯,他們現在已經有了米洛舍維奇了
What are we missing? A functioning executive that will translate will into action, because we don't have it. Every time we lead one of these efforts we have to whip ourselves into this imminent threat thing. We haven't faced an imminent threat since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. But we use this language from a bygone era to scare ourselves into doing something because we're a democracy and that's what it takes. And if that doesn't work we scream, "He's got a gun!" just as we rush in.
我們還缺什麼? 一個能發揮作用、將意願轉化為行動的行政力量 因為我們還沒有 每次我們作為領導力量去做點什麼 我們都會為自己製造一種迫在眉睫的巨大威脅 自從1962年的古巴導彈危機以來 其實我們再也沒有面臨過這種威脅了 但我們總在使用一種過了時的語言 自我恐嚇地去做一些事情 因為我們是一個民主的國家,就該當如此 如果不能成功,我們就會尖叫,“對方有槍!” 一邊說著,我們一邊急著往對方那裡趕
(Laughter)
笑聲
And then we look over the body and we find an old cigarette lighter and we say, "Jesus, it was dark."
然後,我們搜查人家 我們發現了一個老式的打火機,我們就說 “天哪,果真不是什麼好人”
(Laughter)
笑聲
Do you want to do it, France? France says, "No, but I do like to criticize you after the fact."
你想讓法國也來這樣做麼? 法國說,“不,我不去,但是你做完了我會批評你”
What we need downstream is a great power enabled -- what I call that Sys Admin Force. We should have had 250,000 troops streaming into Iraq on the heels of that Leviathan sweeping towards Baghdad. What do you get then? No looting, no military disappearing, no arms disappearing, no ammo disappearing, no Muqtada Al-Sadr -- I'm wrecking his bones -- no insurgency. Talk to anybody who was over there in the first six months. We had six months to feel the lob, to get the job done, and we dicked around for six months. And then they turned on us. Why? Because they just got fed up. They saw what we did to Saddam. They said, "You're that powerful, you can resurrect this country. You're America."
我們接下來需要的,就是啟動一種巨大的力量 我們稱之為“系統監督部隊” 我們應該派250000部隊去伊拉克 為前往巴格達的部隊保駕護航 去了能起什麼作用呢? 沒有掠奪,不再有軍人失踪 沒有人再偷我們的武器軍火 也再沒有薩德爾出現——我正在啃他的骨頭—— 也沒有叛亂了 在前半年的時間裡,與在伊拉克的人交流 我們就有六個月的時間去感受“高球”,去完成任務 我們花六個月的時間去熟悉它 然後他們就會站在我們這邊了 為什麼?因為他們只是被激怒了 他們看到了我們隊薩達姆做了什麼 他們說,“你們真棒,你們能能讓這個國家復活 你們是美國”
What we need is an international reconstruction fund -- Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post, great idea. Model on the IMF. Instead of passing the hat each time, OK? Where are we going to find this guy? G20, that's easy. Check out their agenda since 9/11. All security dominated. They're going to decide up front how the money gets spent just like in the IMF. You vote according to how much money you put in the kitty. Here's my challenge to the Defense Department. You've got to build this force. You've got to seed this force. You've got to track coalition partners. Create a record of success. You will get this model. You tell me it's too hard to do. I'll walk this dog right through that six part series on the Balkans. We did it just like that. I'm talking about regularizing it, making it transparent. Would you like Mugabe gone? Would you like Kim Jong-Il, who's killed about two million people, would you like him gone? Would you like a better system? This is why it matters to the military. They've been experiencing an identity crisis since the end of the Cold War. I'm not talking about the difference between reality and desire, which I can do because I'm not inside the beltway.
我們需要的是一個國際重建基金 塞巴斯蒂安馬拉比,華盛頓郵報,都挺不錯的 這都是如同國際貨幣基金組織一樣的好例子 我們不再需要每次從人們那裡籌集善款了 那我們從哪裡找到錢呢? G20嘛,多簡單啊 看一下911事件後他們的日程表 全都在關心安全問題 他們會提前決定要花多少錢 就像國際貨幣基金組織一樣 你再根據你下注的錢數來進行投票 這是我對國防部門的建議 你要建立這支部隊,你要供養這支部隊 你要跟踪聯合部隊,創造一個新的成功記錄 你會成功的 你告訴我這很難 那為什麼我們就在巴爾幹半島做到了呢? 我就是照這樣做的 我們現在需要的就是將其規範化,透明化 你要除掉穆加貝麼? 你要除掉殺害了大約2百萬人的金正日麼? 要麼? 你喜歡一個更好的系統麼? 這就是為什麼它這麼重要 從冷戰末期他們就經歷著身份危機 我現在不是在講現實與期望的差別 雖然真的能講清楚,因為我不在華盛頓
(Laughter)
笑聲
I'm talking about the 1990s. The Berlin Wall falls. We do Desert Storm. The split starts to emerge between those in the military who see a future they can live with, and those who see a future that starts to scare them, like the U.S. submarine community, which watches the Soviet Navy disappear overnight. Ah!
雖然真的能講清楚,因為我不在華盛頓 柏林牆倒了,我們完成了沙漠風暴 軍隊中那些看到美好未來的人 還有那些看到一種令他們驚恐的未來的人 他們之間的裂痕開始癒合 就像美軍潛水艇部隊 目睹了蘇聯海軍的一夜消失 啊哈
(Laughter)
笑聲
So they start moving from reality towards desire and they create their own special language to describe their voyage of self-discovery and self-actualization.
因此他們開始從現實走向理想 他們創造了特殊的語言 來描述這段自我發現、自我實現的旅程
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
The problem is you need a big, sexy opponent to fight against. And if you can't find one you've got to make one up. China, all grown up, going to be a looker!
問題是,你需要一個強大而又性感的對手 如果你找不到,你就需要自己造一個 中國,或所有成長起來的國家,都是不錯的對象
(Laughter)
笑聲
The rest of the military got dragged down into the muck across the 1990s and they developed this very derisive term to describe it: military operations other than war. I ask you, who joins the military to do things other than war? Actually, most of them. Jessica Lynch never planned on shooting back. Most of them don't pick up a rifle. I maintain this is code inside the Army for, "We don't want to do this." They spent the 1990s working the messy scene between globalized parts of the world What I call the core and the gap. The Clinton administration wasn't interested in running this. For eight years, after screwing up the relationship on day one -- inauguration day with gays in the military -- which was deft.
整個上世紀90年代 其餘的部隊都被拖到垃圾堆裡去了 他們提出了這種非常自嘲的說法 叫“非戰爭軍事行動” 我問你,誰會只為了非戰爭軍事行動而參軍? 事實上,大多數軍人都是如此 Jessica Lynch從沒想過要開槍回擊敵人 大多數人都沒摸過槍 我堅持認為這是軍隊內部的法則 因為我們不想這麼做 軍方在上世紀90年代一直在試圖解決這件事 尤其是在世界上的美軍可觸及的各個角落 我稱之為核心的差距 克林頓政府可不喜歡這樣 整整八年,在他上任的第一天起就犯下了這個錯誤 與存在同性戀的軍隊站在一起,進行他的就職演說 而且相當敏捷靈巧
(Laughter)
笑聲
So we were home alone for eight years. And what did we do home alone? We bought one military and we operated another. It's like the guy who goes to the doctor and says, "Doctor, it hurts when I do this."
所以我們在家裡孤獨了八年之久 我們在這八年中做了什麼呢? 我們養著一支部隊,然後派另一支去打仗 就像一個人到醫生面前,說: “醫生,當我這樣做的時候,我很疼”
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
The doctor says, "Stop doing that you idiot."
醫生說:“笨蛋,那你就別再那樣做不就行了?”
I used to give this brief inside the Pentagon in the early 1990s. I'd say, "You're buying one military and you're operating another, and eventually it's going to hurt. It's wrong. Bad Pentagon, bad!"
我在90年代初期一直給五角大樓這個建議 我說:“你們現在正在養著一支部隊,卻派另一支去打仗 最後這會讓我們都很痛,這樣做事是錯誤的 五角大樓那些壞蛋,壞蛋!
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
And they'd say, "Dr. Barnett, you are so right. Can you come back next year and remind us again?"
然後他們說:“Barnett博士,你很正確 請明年再來,然後再提醒我們一次好麼? ”
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Some people say 9/11 heals the rift -- jerks the long-term transformation gurus out of their 30,000 foot view of history, drags them down in to the muck and says, "You want a networked opponent? I've got one, he's everywhere, go find him." It elevates MOOTW -- how we pronounce that acronym -- from crap to grand strategy, because that's how you're going to shrink that gap.
有人說911解決了這個問題 他們認為911讓那些所謂的專家 丟開了三萬英尺高的歷史觀 讓他們滾到一邊,然後說,你想要一個網絡化了的對手? 我就有一個,他無處不在,去把他找出來 然後我們就有了MOOTW(非戰爭軍事行動)——我們就是這樣 從廢話中提煉出了偉大的戰略 因為那是你準備縮小差距的方式
Some people put these two things together and they call it empire, which I think is a boneheaded concept. Empire is about the enforcement of not just minimal rule sets, which you cannot do, but maximum rule sets which you must do. It's not our system of governance. Never how we've sought to interact with the outside world. I prefer that phrase System Administration. We enforce the minimal rule sets for maintaining connectivity to the global economy. Certain bad things you cannot do. How this impacts the way we think about the future of war. This is a concept which gets me vilified throughout the Pentagon. It makes me very popular as well. Everybody's got an opinion.
有些人把這兩件事歸到一起 稱之為絕對權力,我覺得這是一派胡言 據對權力是強制性的,而不只是你所做不到的 最小規則集 但是那些你所必須去做的最大規則集 卻不屬於你所能監管的系統 我們從來沒有試圖去與外界互動 我更喜歡“系統監管”這個說法 我們執行最小規則集 來維繫與全球經濟的聯繫 有些特定的事情你是堅決不能去做的 如何影響到我們思考戰爭的未來的方式 這個概念讓我被所有五角大樓的人都鄙視了一遍 同時它也讓我現在如此的受歡迎 人人都有自己的觀點
Going back to the beginning of our country -- historically, defenses meant protection of the homeland. Security has meant everything else. Written into our constitution, two different forces, two different functions. Raise an army when you need it, and maintain a navy for day-to-day connectivity. A Department of War, a Department of Everything Else. A big stick, a baton stick. Can of whup ass, the networking force. In 1947 we merged these two things together in the Defense Department. Our long-term rationale becomes, we're involved in a hair trigger stand off with the Soviets. To attack America is to risk blowing up the world. We connected national security to international security with about a seven minute time delay. That's not our problem now. They can kill three million in Chicago tomorrow and we don't go to the mattresses with nukes. That's the scary part.
回顧我們國家的歷史初期 在歷史上,國防意味著保衛家園 安全高於一切 這是寫進我們的憲法的 兩種不同的力量,兩種不同的功能 需要的時候,就養一支部隊 需要海軍就養一支海軍 一個戰爭部門,一個戰爭之外的部門 一個是大棒,另一個卻是指揮棒 不但要把他們打倒 而且要建立一個網絡來進行系統監管 1947年國防部把這兩件事情 融合到了一起 這就成為了我們的長期理論基礎 我們捲入了一種與蘇聯一觸即發的境地 進攻美國就是威脅全世界 我們將國家安全與世界安全聯繫起來 其中只有七分鐘的延時 現在那已經不是我們的問題了 明天他們就能在芝加哥殺死三百萬人 而且我們沒有核武器床墊 那才是最可怕的
The question is how do we reconnect American national security with global security to make the world a lot more comfortable, and to embed and contextualize our employment of force around the planet? What's happened since is that bifurcation I described. We talked about this going all the way back to the end of the Cold War. Let's have a Department of War, and a Department of Something Else. Some people say, "Hell, 9/11 did it for you." Now we've got a home game and an away game.
問題是我們如何再次將美國的安全與世界的安全聯繫起來 讓世界擁有安全保證,變得更美好 同時又讓我們在全球的部隊 參與其中 目前的情況,正是我所描述的一種 我們討論了這種 退回到冷戰末期的情況 我們需要一個戰爭部門,以及一個戰爭之外的部門 有人說,嘿,911已經為你完成了這個想法 現在我們已經有了主場和客場之分
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
The Department of Homeland Security is a strategic feel good measure. It's going to be the Department of Agriculture for the 21st century. TSA -- thousands standing around.
建立本土安全部門是一個很好的戰略方法 它將成為21世紀的農業部門 TSA的意思就是成千上萬人站在周圍
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I supported the war in Iraq. He was a bad guy with multiple priors. It's not like we had to find him actually killing somebody live to arrest him. I knew we'd kick ass in the war with the Leviathan Force. I knew we'd have a hard time with what followed. But I know this organization doesn't change until it experiences failure. What do I mean by these two different forces?
我支持伊拉克戰爭 他是個有著多重前科的壞人 我們是不可能在他殺人的現場 找到並逮捕他的 我早就知道我們在用“巨輪之力”來戰鬥 我早就知道之後我們會經歷一段困難的時期 但是我知道不經歷失敗,我們的組織是不會改變的 我提出這兩種力量是為了說明什麼呢?
This is the Hobbesian Force. I love this force. I don't want to see it go. That plus nukes rules out great power war. This is the military the rest of the world wants us to build. It's why I travel all over the world talking to foreign militaries.
這就是霍布斯的力量 我喜歡它,我不想沒有它 我不願意只看到由核武器支配的大國戰爭 這才是世界需要我們建立的軍事力量 這就是為什麼我滿世界地跑,去與各國軍方交流
What does this mean? It means you've got to stop pretending you can do these two very disparate skill sets with the same 19-year-old. Switching back, morning, afternoon, evening, morning, afternoon, evening. Handing out aid, shooting back, handing out aid, shooting back. It's too much. The 19-year-olds get tired from the switching, OK?
這意味著什麼呢? 意味著你不能再假裝自己能都用同樣的 19歲左右的人來完成兩件完全不同的事情 換回去,早、中、晚 早、中、晚 給予援助,還擊 給予援助,還擊 太過分了 那些19歲的傢伙會累的好不好
(Laughter)
笑聲)
That force on the left, you can train a 19-year-old to do that. That force on the right is more like a 40-year-old cop. You need the experience. What does this mean in terms of operations?
對於左邊的力量,你可以訓練一群19歲的人去做 但右邊的力量就必須要一群40歲左右的人去做了 你需要經驗 那怎麼行動呢?
The rule is going to be this. That Sys Admin force is the force that never comes home, does most of your work. You break out that Leviathan Force only every so often. But here's the promise you make to the American public, to your own people, to the world. You break out that Leviathan Force, you promise, you guarantee that you're going to mount one hell of a -- immediately -- follow-on Sys Admin effort. Don't plan for the war unless you plan to win the peace.
是這樣的 “系統監管”部隊是從來不回家的部隊 但去完成了大部分任務 你頻繁地派出“巨輪之力” 但是你要向美國民眾保證 向你的人民、向世界保證 你派出了軍事力量 你保證,你會在隨後 立刻跟上“系統監管” 只能在你真的要實現和平的時候,才能進行戰爭!
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Other differences. Leviathan traditional partners, they all look like the Brits and their former colonies.
另一個區別是軍事力量 傳統的伙伴,都像英國人 以及他們的殖民地
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Including us, I would remind you. The rest -- wider array of partners. International organizations, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, contractors. You're not going to get away from that. Leviathan Force, it's all about joint operations between the military services. We're done with that. What we need to do is inter-agency operations, which frankly Condi Rice was in charge of. And I'm amazed nobody asked her that question when she was confirmed.
我還要提醒你,這也包括我們 剩下的,更廣泛的同盟者 有國際組織、非政府組織 私人誌願者組織、承包商 你不能不管他們 巨輪之力,都只是在軍事方面的聯合行動 我們已經做完了 我們需要去做的是在那些組織之間去開展行動 也就是賴斯管的那攤子事 而我很奇怪為什麼沒人問她有關於那方面的問題
I call the Leviathan Force your dad's military. I like them young, male, unmarried, slightly pissed off.
我把“巨輪之力”稱為男人的力量 我喜歡那些年輕、未婚、易怒的男孩子們
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I call the Sys Admin Force your mom's military. It's everything the man's military hates. Gender balanced much more, older, educated, married with children. The force on the left, up or out. The force on the right, in and out. The force on the left respects Posse Comitatus restrictions on the use of force inside the U.S. The force on the right's going to obliterate it. That's where the National Guard's going to be. The force on the left is never coming under the purview of the International Criminal Court. Sys Admin Force has to. Different definitions of network centricity. One takes down networks, one puts them up. And you've got to wage war here in such a way to facilitate that.
我把“系統監管”稱為女人的力量 關於它的每件事都是男人不屑於做的 這樣性別更平衡、更成熟、有更好的教育,就會有更好的結果 左邊的力量要么使用,要不就不用 而右邊的力量不可或缺 左邊的力量要顧及到在調配美國國內的 臨時部隊時遇到的問題 而右邊的力量就會掃平一切問題 那就是國民警衛隊要做的事情 左邊的力量從來不需要考慮 是否違反了國際刑事法庭的規定 但“系統監管”會考慮 二者對網絡中心的定義是不同的 一個是摧毀網絡,一個是建立網絡 你必須在以一種更好的方式來發動戰爭
Do we need a bigger budget? Do we need a draft to pull this off? Absolutely not. I've been told by the Revolution of Military Affairs crowd for years, we can do it faster, cheaper, smaller, just as lethal. I say, "Great, I'm going to take the Sys Admin budget out of your hide."
我們需要更多預算麼? 我們需要預製一個計劃麼? 完全不需要 多年來倡導軍事變革的人們一種跟我講 我們能做得更快、花費更少、動員的規模更小,給出致命一擊 我說,“那太好了,我要把'系統監管'的錢從你的預算裡拿出來”
Here's the larger point. You're going to build the Sys Admin Force inside the U.S. Military first. But ultimately you're going to civilianize it, probably two thirds. Inter agency-ize it, internationalize it. So yes, it begins inside the Pentagon, but over time it's going to cross that river.
這才是重點 你要首先在美國軍隊內部建立“系統監管”力量 但是最終你要將其中的大約三分之二平民化 將它推廣到各種組織之間,使其全球化 當然,這要從五角大樓開始 但是很快就會越過那條河
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I have been to the mountain top. I can see the future. I may not live long enough to get you there, but it's going to happen. We're going to have a Department of Something Else between war and peace.
我已經登頂了,我能看到希望 我可能不能活到那一天,但是事情已經開始進行了 我們會擁有一個戰爭之外的部門 處理戰爭和和平之間的事務
Last slide. Who gets custody of the kids? This is where the Marines in the audience get kind of tense. (Laughter) And this is when they think about beating the crap out of me after the talk.
最後一頁 那麼誰來照顧這些孩子們呢? 台下的海軍陸戰隊員們開始有點緊張了 (笑聲) 這正是他們把我的話 當成廢話的時刻
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Read Max Boon. This is the history of the marines -- small wars, small arms. The Marines are like my West Highland Terrier. They get up every morning, they want to dig a hole and they want to kill something.
讀一下Max Boon 這是海軍陸戰隊的歷史——小型的戰爭,輕型的武器 海軍陸戰隊就像我的西高地白梗(一種狗) 每天早上醒來,挖一個洞 然後殺死些什麼
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I don't want my Marines handing out aid. I want them to be Marines. That's what keeps the Sys Admin Force from being a pussy force. It keeps it from being the U.N. You shoot at these people the Marines are going to come over and kill you.
我不想我的海軍陸戰隊去給誰提供援助 我只想讓他們當海軍陸戰隊 這使得“系統監管”力量免於淪為一直柔弱的部隊 免於變成聯合國的部隊 你若向他們射擊,那麼海軍陸戰隊員們會衝過來殺掉你
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Department of Navy, strategic subs go this way, surface combatants are over there, and the news is they may actually be that small.
海軍總部的戰略者們就要走這條路 水面戰鬥部隊就在那裡 將來可能他們會變得很小
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I call it the Smart Dust Navy. I tell young officers, "You may command 500 ships in your career. Bad news is they may not have anybody on them." Carriers go both ways because they're a swing asset. You'll see the pattern -- airborne, just like carriers. Armor goes this way. Here's the dirty secret of the Air Force, you can win by bombing. But you need lots of these guys on the ground to win the peace. Shinseki was right with the argument. Air force, strategic airlift goes both ways. Bombers, fighters go over here. Special Operations Command down at Tampa. Trigger-pullers go this way. Civil Affairs, that bastard child, comes over here. Return to the Army. The point about the trigger-pullers and Special Operations Command. No off season, these guys are always active. They drop in, do their business, disappear. See me now. Don't talk about it later.
我將那時的海軍稱之為“明智之塵” 我告訴年輕的官員,你可以在你一生之中指揮500艘艦船 但是船上沒有人 航母部隊兩條路線都要走,因為他們是不固定的 你會看到這樣的模式——海軍航空部隊,就像航母部隊一樣 裝甲部隊也會如此 下面就是關於空軍的噁心的秘密 你會用炸彈取勝 但是在贏得和平的過程中你需要很多這些在陸上的傢伙 辛賽奇的觀點是對的 空軍,在戰略上的空運中也要兩條腿走路 轟炸機,戰鬥機也要這樣走 特殊行動指揮部在坦帕市 步兵也要如此 民政部,那個混蛋小孩,也要到這裡來 回到部隊中去 這是關於步兵和特別行動指揮部的 不需要理由,這些傢伙總是很活躍 他們介入、做事情,然後消失 現在看我,以後可不要再討論這個問題了
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I was never here.
我從沒來過這裡
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
The world is my playground.
世界都是我的遊樂場
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
I want to keep trigger-pullers trigger-happy. I want the rules to be as loose as possible. Because when the thing gets prevented in Chicago with the three million dead that perverts our political system beyond all recognition, these are the guys who are going to kill them first. So it's better off to have them make some mistakes along the way than to see that.
我只想讓步兵們開開心心地當地道的步兵 我想讓這些規則盡可能地變寬鬆 因為在芝加哥事情受阻了 有三百萬人都死了 這就讓我們的政治部門很受打擊 有些人要先殺掉政治部門的人 所以最好讓他們沿著這條路先犯點錯誤 而不是只是眼睜睜地看著
Reserve component -- National Guard reserves overwhelmingly Sys Admin. How are you going to get them to work for this force? Most firemen in this country do it for free. This is not about money. This is about being up front with these guys and gals.
保留部分—— 國民警衛隊保留佔絕對優勢的“系統監管”力量 你怎樣才能讓他們為“系統監管”做事呢? 美國的許多消防員都是免費為它做事的 這不是錢的問題 而是要讓這些孩子們重到最前面
Last point, intelligence community -- the muscle and the defense agencies go this way. What should be the CIA, open, analytical, open source should come over here. The information you need to do this is not secret. It's not secret. Read that great piece in the New Yorker about how our echo boomers, 19 to 25, over in Iraq taught each other how to do Sys Admin work, over the Internet in chat rooms. They said, "Al Qaeda could be listening." They said, "Well, Jesus, they already know this stuff."
最後一點,情報界—— 政界和國防部都要參與 CIA要變的開放,去分析問題,公開資源 要參與其中 你做事所需要的信息不是秘密 這不是秘密 讀一下《紐約客》上的那一頁 關於那些嬰兒潮一代的子女們,大約19到25歲的那些在伊拉克的傢伙們 是怎樣通過互聯網上的聊天室來相互學習 完成“系統監管”的工作的 他們說,“基地組織應當聽聽” 他們說,“其實,主啊,他們已經都知道啦”
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Take a gift in the left hand. These are the sunglasses that don't scare people, simple stuff. Censors and transparency, the overheads go in both directions.
左手拿一個禮物 有不會嚇到別人的太陽鏡,簡單的東西 經費不僅要用於審查工作,也要用來使工作透明化
Thanks.
謝謝大家