I get asked a lot what the difference between my work is and typical Pentagon long-range strategic planners. And the answer I like to offer is what they typically do is they think about the future of wars in the context of war. And what I've spent 15 years doing in this business -- and it's taken me almost 14 to figure it out -- is I think about the future of wars in the context of everything else. So I tend to specialize on the scene between war and peace. The material I'm going to show you is one idea from a book with a lot of ideas. It's the one that takes me around the world right now interacting with foreign militaries quite a bit. The material was generated in two years of work I did for the Secretary of Defense, thinking about a new national grand strategy for the United States. I'm going to present a problem and try to give you an answer.
很多人问我,我的工作 与一位典型的五角大楼长期战略计划者的工作有什么区别 我给他们的答案是 那些计划者们总是在战争的大背景下 思考战争的未来 而我花费了15年时间所做的事情 ——其实我花了14年才搞清楚我到底在做什么—— 是我却是在非战争的大背景下思考战争的未来 所以我倾向于关注那些介于战争和和平之间的事情 我要向大家介绍的是一本书中的一个观点 呃~不是一个,而是好几个观点 正是为此我才周游世界 与各国军方交流 这些观点都是基于我这两年来 为美国国防部所做的工作 ——为美国 寻找一个新的国家整体战略 我想给大家提出一个问题 看看您怎么回答
Here's my favorite bonehead concept from the 1990s in the Pentagon: the theory of anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategies. Why do we call it that? Because it's got all those A's lined up I guess. This is gobbledygook for if the United States fights somebody we're going to be huge. They're going to be small. And if they try to fight us in the traditional, straight-up manner we're going to kick their ass, which is why people don't try to do that any more. I met the last Air Force General who had actually shot down an enemy plane in combat. He's now a one star General. That's how distant we are from even meeting an air force willing to fly against ours. So that overmatched capability creates problems -- catastrophic successes the White House calls them.
以下是自上世纪90年代以来我最喜欢的“五角大楼的愚蠢概念” ——反介入、区域封锁的非对称战略理论 为什么我们给它起了这么一个名字呢? 我猜这是因为它所有的单词开头都是A 带官腔的文章都这样 如果美国要打谁,那么我们美国必是巨大的 则对方必是渺小的 如果对方要以传统的直接的方式开战的话 我们必能将其揍扁 正因为如此,他们才不会以那样传统的方式向美国开战 我遇到过一个当过空军将军的家伙 他曾经在战斗中击落过敌人的飞机 而他现在是一个一星上将 而自上次我们发现一个愿意与美国空军部队进行空战的敌人 竟然已经是那么久远的事情 因此,这种压倒对手的能力引起了许多问题 ——而白宫称之为“灾难性的成功”
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And we're trying to figure that out, because it is an amazing capability. The question is, what's the good you can do with it? OK? The theory of anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategies -- gobbledygook that we sell to Congress, because if we just told them we can kick anybody's asses they wouldn't buy us all the stuff we want. So we say, area-denial, anti-access asymmetrical strategies and their eyes glaze over.
我们正努力搞懂它 因为这是一种令人惊奇的能力 问题是,你能用它做什么呢? 对么? 反介入、区域封锁的非对称战略理论—— 我们卖给国会的官样文章 因为如果我们直接告诉议员们我们能揍扁敌人 议员们是不会给我们买我们所需要的东西的 所以我们将其称之为反介入、区域封锁的非对称战略理论 他们一听,立刻就呆掉了
(Laughter)
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And they say, "Will you build it in my district?"
然后他们会问:“你会不会在我所在的区部署一个“?
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(Applause)
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Here's my parody and it ain't much of one. Let's talk about a battle space. I don't know, Taiwan Straits 2025. Let's talk about an enemy embedded within that battle space. I don't know, the Million Man Swim.
下面我将举一个例子 让我们聊一个“战斗区域” 我也不懂,台湾海峡2025 让我们先谈一个在此战斗区域中的敌人 呃~~比如一百万个在海峡中游泳的人
(Laughter)
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The United States has to access that battle space instantaneously. They throw up anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategies. A banana peel on the tarmac.
美国必须立刻进入该区域 于是使用了反介入、区域封锁的非对称战略理论 而停机坪上出现了一个香蕉皮~
(Laughter)
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Trojan horses on our computer networks reveal all our Achilles' heels instantly. We say, "China, it's yours." Prometheus approach, largely a geographic definition, focuses almost exclusively on the start of conflict. We field the first-half team in a league that insists on keeping score until the end of the game. That's the problem. We can run the score up against anybody, and then get our asses kicked in the second half -- what they call fourth generation warfare.
我们电脑网络中的特洛伊木马 立刻告诉敌人我们的致命弱点在何处 我们说,这木马是中国的 主要从地理定义上来说,是普罗米修斯的方法 几乎完全集中在冲突的初期 我们在联赛的上半段领先 保持这个分数,直到比赛结束 这就是问题所在 我们能迅速得分超过任何人 然后再后半段的比赛中比人家揍扁 他们称之为第四代战争
Here's the way I like to describe it instead. There is no battle space the U.S. Military cannot access. They said we couldn't do Afghanistan. We did it with ease. They said we couldn't do Iraq. We did it with 150 combat casualties in six weeks. We did it so fast we weren't prepared for their collapse. There is nobody we can't take down. The question is, what do you do with the power?
下面我要描述一下第四代战争 目前,没有美军不能进入的战斗区域 有人说我们不能进入阿富汗,而我们却轻易地做到了 有人说我们不能进入伊拉克 我们也做到了,而且代价是六周内只有150个战斗伤员 我们进入的速度如此之快,以至于我们都还没有对伊拉克的垮台做好准备 世上没有我们打不垮的敌人 而问题是,我们怎么使用这样的能力
So there's no trouble accessing battle spaces. What we have trouble accessing is the transition space that must naturally follow, and creating the peace space that allows us to move on. Problem is, the Defense Department over here beats the hell out of you. The State Department over here says, "Come on boy, I know you can make it." And that poor country runs off that ledge, does that cartoon thing and then drops.
因此,在进入战斗区域方面,我们是不存在问题的 事实上,我们无法顺利进入的 是随之而来的“过渡区域” 并创造允许我们继续前进的“和平区域” 问题是,管理此处的国防部门 他妈的把人家赶出去了 然后管理此处的国务院人员却对人家说 ”来吧伙计,我知道你能行“ 然后那个可怜的国家就逃掉了 做一些卡通一样的蠢事然后垮掉了
(Laughter)
(笑声)
This is not about overwhelming force, but proportional force. It's about non-lethal technologies, because if you fire real ammo into a crowd of women and children rioting you're going to lose friends very quickly. This is not about projecting power, but about staying power, which is about legitimacy with the locals. Who do you access in this transition space?
我们的确拥有压倒性的武力,不应盲目地全部使用 有些事情是于致命性武器无关的 因为如果你对一群参与暴乱的妇女和儿童 开火的话 你会很快失去你的朋友 这与启用武力无关,问题在于如何克制使用武力 关系到合法性的问题 你应该派谁进入这种过渡区域呢?
You have to create internal partners. You have to access coalition partners. We asked the Indians for 17,000 peace keepers. I know their senior leadership, they wanted to give it to us. But they said to us, "You know what? In that transition space you're mostly hat not enough cattle. We don't think you can pull it off, we're not going to give you our 17,000 peace keepers for fodder." We asked the Russians for 40,000. They said no. I was in China in August, I said, "You should have 50,000 peace keepers in Iraq. It's your oil, not ours." Which is the truth. It's their oil. And the Chinese said to me, "Dr. Barnett, you're absolutely right. In a perfect world we'd have 50,000 there. But it's not a perfect world, and your administration isn't getting us any closer." But we have trouble accessing our outcomes.
你必须创造内部的合作伙伴,必须拥有同盟 我们请17000个印度人来当和平卫士 我认识他们的高层领导人,他们愿意派人给我们 但是他们说,你知道么? 在那个过渡区域你的人手还不够 我们觉得你还是完不成 所以我们不会给我们的17000人去浪费 我们问俄国要40000人 他们不给 我说过,八月份的时候我在中国 “你们应该派50000人去伊拉克维和 因为那是你的石油,不是我的石油” 事实上,那确实是他们的石油 然后那个中国人告诉我,“Barnett先生,你完全正确 如果世界是完美的,我们愿意派50000人过去 但是现在,世界是不完美的 而你们美国人在那里的管理也没有让我们更接近完美世界” 我们在获取成果上也存在问题
We lucked out, frankly, on the selection. We face different opponents across these three. And it's time to start admitting you can't ask the same 19-year-old to do it all, day in and day out. It's just too damn hard. We have an unparalleled capacity to wage war. We don't do the everything else so well. Frankly, we do it better than anybody and we still suck at it. We have a brilliant Secretary of War. We don't have a Secretary of Everything Else. Because if we did, that guy would be in front of the Senate, still testifying over Abu Ghraib. The problem is he doesn't exist. There is no Secretary of Everything Else. I think we have an unparalleled capacity to wage war. I call that the Leviathan Force. What we need to build is a force for the Everything Else. I call them the System Administrators.
坦白讲,我们在选举上的胜利是都是凭借运气 我们面对着这三方的敌人 是时候开始承认 你不能要求同样是19岁的人来做所有的事情,过一天算一天 这他妈的太难了 我们拥有一种不平衡的发动战争的能力 但我们对非战争的事情却处理不好 坦白说,我们已经比其他任何人做的都要好了,但我们仍然举步维艰 我们有一个出色的“战争部长” 我们却没有一个“非战争事务部长” 因为如果我们有,那个家伙就会成为出色的议员 继续审查伊拉克美军虐囚事件 问题是这个人并不存在 没有所谓的“非战争事务部长” 我认为我们拥有一种不平衡的发动战争的能力 我称之为“巨轮之力” 而我们需要打造一种能力,是处理非战争事务的能力 我称之为”系统监管“
What I think this really represents is lack of an A to Z rule set for the world as a whole for processing politically bankrupt states. We have one for processing economically bankrupt states. It's the IMF Sovereign Bankruptcy Plan, OK? We argue about it every time we use it. Argentina just went through it, broke a lot of rules. They got out on the far end, we said, "Fine, don't worry about it." It's transparent. A certain amount of certainty gives the sense of a non-zero outcome. We don't have one for processing politically bankrupt states that, frankly, everybody wants gone. Like Saddam, like Mugabe, like Kim Jong-Il -- people who kill in hundreds of thousands or millions. Like the 250,000 dead so far in Sudan.
我认为,这说明了我们缺乏一套详细的规则 来处理政治破产的国家 使这个世界成为一个整体 我们有处理经济破产的国家的规则 就是”国际货币基金组织主权破产计划“,对么? 每次使用它时,我们总在争论 阿根廷正在实行,打破了许多规则 他们快完了,我们说,无所谓啦,不要担心它 它是透明的、总量确定的 给我们的感觉,总归多多少少是有产出的 而当政治破产的时候呢? 坦白讲,每个人都想逃离 例如萨达姆,例如穆加贝,例如金正日—— 那些杀害成百上千人的家伙 例如目前在苏丹已经有250000人受害
What would an A to Z system look like? I'm going to distinguish between what I call front half and back half. And let's call this red line, I don't know, mission accomplished.
这个监管系统该是什么样的呢? 下面我将区分一下我刚刚所讲的 上半场和下半场 我称之为红线,或者说,”完成了的任务“
(Laughter)
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(Applause)
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What we have extant right now, at the beginning of this system, is the U.N. Security Council as a grand jury. What can they do? They can indict your ass. They can debate it. They can write it on a piece of paper. They can put it in an envelope and mail it to you, and then say in no uncertain terms, "Please cut that out."
目前在这个监管系统中,我们已经拥有的 是联合国安理会,它可以作为一个大陪审团 他们能做什么呢? 他们能起诉你 他们会讨论你问题,然后写下来 装到信封里寄给你 然后说义正言辞地说,请不要这样做
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That gets you about four million dead in Central Africa over the 1990s. That gets you 250,000 dead in the Sudan in the last 15 months. Everybody's got to answer their grandchildren some day what you did about the holocaust in Africa, and you better have an answer. We don't have anything to translate that will into action.
因为它的存在,让上世纪90年代的非洲中部死亡了大约4000000人 因为它的存在,过去的15个月中苏丹死亡了250000人 有一天每个人都要告诉他们的子孙 你在非洲大屠杀中担任了什么角色 到时你最好能答得出来 我们无法将那种意愿转化为行动
What we do have is the U.S.-enabled Leviathan Force that says, "You want me to take that guy down? I'll take that guy down. I'll do it on Tuesday. It will cost you 20 billion dollars."
我们所有的就是美国具有的”巨轮之力“,他说 ”你要我打倒谁,我就会打到谁 我周二就能打到他,那会花费你200亿美元“
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But here's the deal. As soon as I can't find anybody else to air out, I leave the scene immediately. That's called the Powell Doctrine. Way downstream we have the International Criminal Court. They love to put them on trial. They've got Milosević right now.
但是立刻就能成交了 只要我们找不到任何其他人来 我就立即离开 这叫做”鲍威尔主义“ 然后我们有国际刑事法庭 他们喜欢审判罪犯,他们现在已经有了米洛舍维奇了
What are we missing? A functioning executive that will translate will into action, because we don't have it. Every time we lead one of these efforts we have to whip ourselves into this imminent threat thing. We haven't faced an imminent threat since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. But we use this language from a bygone era to scare ourselves into doing something because we're a democracy and that's what it takes. And if that doesn't work we scream, "He's got a gun!" just as we rush in.
我们还缺什么? 一个能发挥作用、将意愿转化为行动的行政力量 因为我们还没有 每次我们作为领导力量去做点什么 我们都会为自己制造一种迫在眉睫的巨大威胁 自从1962年的古巴导弹危机以来 其实我们再也没有面临过这种威胁了 但我们总在使用一种过了时的语言 自我恐吓地去做一些事情 因为我们是一个民主的国家,就该当如此 如果不能成功,我们就会尖叫,“对方有枪!” 一边说着,我们一边急着往对方那里赶
(Laughter)
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And then we look over the body and we find an old cigarette lighter and we say, "Jesus, it was dark."
然后,我们搜查人家 我们发现了一个老式的打火机,我们就说 “天哪,果真不是什么好人”
(Laughter)
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Do you want to do it, France? France says, "No, but I do like to criticize you after the fact."
你想让法国也来这样做么? 法国说,“不,我不去,但是你做完了我会批评你”
What we need downstream is a great power enabled -- what I call that Sys Admin Force. We should have had 250,000 troops streaming into Iraq on the heels of that Leviathan sweeping towards Baghdad. What do you get then? No looting, no military disappearing, no arms disappearing, no ammo disappearing, no Muqtada Al-Sadr -- I'm wrecking his bones -- no insurgency. Talk to anybody who was over there in the first six months. We had six months to feel the lob, to get the job done, and we dicked around for six months. And then they turned on us. Why? Because they just got fed up. They saw what we did to Saddam. They said, "You're that powerful, you can resurrect this country. You're America."
我们接下来需要的,就是启动一种巨大的力量 我们称之为“系统监督部队” 我们应该派250000部队去伊拉克 为前往巴格达的部队保驾护航 去了能起什么作用呢? 没有掠夺,不再有军人失踪 没有人再偷我们的武器军火 也再没有萨德尔出现——我正在啃他的骨头—— 也没有叛乱了 在前半年的时间里,与在伊拉克的人交流 我们就有六个月的时间去感受“高球”,去完成任务 我们花六个月的时间去熟悉它 然后他们就会站在我们这边了 为什么?因为他们只是被激怒了 他们看到了我们队萨达姆做了什么 他们说,“你们真棒,你们能能让这个国家复活 你们是美国”
What we need is an international reconstruction fund -- Sebastian Mallaby, Washington Post, great idea. Model on the IMF. Instead of passing the hat each time, OK? Where are we going to find this guy? G20, that's easy. Check out their agenda since 9/11. All security dominated. They're going to decide up front how the money gets spent just like in the IMF. You vote according to how much money you put in the kitty. Here's my challenge to the Defense Department. You've got to build this force. You've got to seed this force. You've got to track coalition partners. Create a record of success. You will get this model. You tell me it's too hard to do. I'll walk this dog right through that six part series on the Balkans. We did it just like that. I'm talking about regularizing it, making it transparent. Would you like Mugabe gone? Would you like Kim Jong-Il, who's killed about two million people, would you like him gone? Would you like a better system? This is why it matters to the military. They've been experiencing an identity crisis since the end of the Cold War. I'm not talking about the difference between reality and desire, which I can do because I'm not inside the beltway.
我们需要的是一个国际重建基金 塞巴斯蒂安马拉比,华盛顿邮报,都挺不错的 这都是如同国际货币基金组织一样的好例子 我们不再需要每次从人们那里筹集善款了 那我们从哪里找到钱呢?G20嘛,多简单啊 看一下911事件后他们的日程表 全都在关心安全问题 他们会提前决定要花多少钱 就像国际货币基金组织一样 你再根据你下注的钱数来进行投票 这是我对国防部门的建议 你要建立这支部队,你要供养这支部队 你要跟踪联合部队,创造一个新的成功记录 你会成功的 你告诉我这很难 那为什么我们就在巴尔干半岛做到了呢? 我就是照这样做的 我们现在需要的就是将其规范化,透明化 你要除掉穆加贝么? 你要除掉杀害了大约2百万人的金正日么? 要么? 你喜欢一个更好的系统么? 这就是为什么它这么重要 从冷战末期他们就经历着身份危机 我现在不是在讲现实与期望的差别 虽然真的能讲清楚,因为我不在华盛顿
(Laughter)
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I'm talking about the 1990s. The Berlin Wall falls. We do Desert Storm. The split starts to emerge between those in the military who see a future they can live with, and those who see a future that starts to scare them, like the U.S. submarine community, which watches the Soviet Navy disappear overnight. Ah!
说说上世纪90年代 柏林墙倒了,我们完成了沙漠风暴 军队中那些看到美好未来的人 还有那些看到一种令他们惊恐的未来的人 他们之间的裂痕开始愈合 就像美军潜水艇部队 目睹了苏联海军的一夜消失 哈
(Laughter)
(笑声)
So they start moving from reality towards desire and they create their own special language to describe their voyage of self-discovery and self-actualization.
因此他们开始从现实走向理想 他们创造了特殊的语言 来描述这段自我发现、自我实现的旅程
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The problem is you need a big, sexy opponent to fight against. And if you can't find one you've got to make one up. China, all grown up, going to be a looker!
问题是,你需要一个强大而又性感的对手 如果你找不到,你就需要自己造一个 中国,或所有成长起来的国家,都是不错的对象
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The rest of the military got dragged down into the muck across the 1990s and they developed this very derisive term to describe it: military operations other than war. I ask you, who joins the military to do things other than war? Actually, most of them. Jessica Lynch never planned on shooting back. Most of them don't pick up a rifle. I maintain this is code inside the Army for, "We don't want to do this." They spent the 1990s working the messy scene between globalized parts of the world What I call the core and the gap. The Clinton administration wasn't interested in running this. For eight years, after screwing up the relationship on day one -- inauguration day with gays in the military -- which was deft.
整个上世纪90年代 其余的部队都被拖到垃圾堆里去了 他们提出了这种非常自嘲的说法 叫“非战争军事行动” 我问你,谁会只为了非战争军事行动而参军? 事实上,大多数军人都是如此 Jessica Lynch(从伊拉克战场被俘后归国的女战斗英雄)从没想过要开枪回击敌人 大多数人都没摸过枪 我坚持认为这是军队内部的法则 因为我们不想这么做 军方在上世纪90年代一直在试图解决这件事 尤其是在世界上的美军可触及的各个角落 我称之为核心的差距 克林顿政府可不喜欢这样 整整八年,在他上任的第一天起就犯下了这个错误 与存在同性恋的军队站在一起,进行他的就职演说 而且相当敏捷灵巧
(Laughter)
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So we were home alone for eight years. And what did we do home alone? We bought one military and we operated another. It's like the guy who goes to the doctor and says, "Doctor, it hurts when I do this."
所以我们在家里孤独了八年之久 我们在这八年中做了什么呢? 我们养着一支部队,然后派另一支去打仗 就像一个人到医生面前,说: “医生,当我这样做的时候,我很疼”
(Laughter)
(笑声)
The doctor says, "Stop doing that you idiot."
医生说:“笨蛋,那你就别再那样做不就行了?”
I used to give this brief inside the Pentagon in the early 1990s. I'd say, "You're buying one military and you're operating another, and eventually it's going to hurt. It's wrong. Bad Pentagon, bad!"
我在90年代初期一直给五角大楼这个建议 我说:“你们现在正在养着一支部队,却派另一支去打仗 最后这会让我们都很痛,这样做事是错误的 五角大楼那些坏蛋,坏蛋!”
(Laughter)
(笑声)
And they'd say, "Dr. Barnett, you are so right. Can you come back next year and remind us again?"
然后他们说:“Barnett博士,你很正确 请明年再来,然后再提醒我们一次好么?”
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Some people say 9/11 heals the rift -- jerks the long-term transformation gurus out of their 30,000 foot view of history, drags them down in to the muck and says, "You want a networked opponent? I've got one, he's everywhere, go find him." It elevates MOOTW -- how we pronounce that acronym -- from crap to grand strategy, because that's how you're going to shrink that gap.
有人说911解决了这个问题 他们认为911让那些所谓的专家 丢开了三万英尺高的历史观 让他们滚到一边,然后说,你想要一个网络化了的对手? 我就有一个,他无处不在,去把他找出来 然后我们就有了MOOTW(非战争军事行动)——我们就是这样读它的缩写—— 从废话中提炼出了伟大的战略 因为那是你准备缩小差距的方式
Some people put these two things together and they call it empire, which I think is a boneheaded concept. Empire is about the enforcement of not just minimal rule sets, which you cannot do, but maximum rule sets which you must do. It's not our system of governance. Never how we've sought to interact with the outside world. I prefer that phrase System Administration. We enforce the minimal rule sets for maintaining connectivity to the global economy. Certain bad things you cannot do. How this impacts the way we think about the future of war. This is a concept which gets me vilified throughout the Pentagon. It makes me very popular as well. Everybody's got an opinion.
有些人把这两件事归到一起 称之为绝对权力,我觉得这是一派胡言 据对权力是强制性的,而不只是你所做不到的 最小规则集 但是那些你所必须去做的最大规则集 却不属于你所能监管的系统 我们从来没有试图去与外界互动 我更喜欢“系统监管”这个说法 我们执行最小规则集 来维系与全球经济的联系 有些特定的事情你是坚决不能去做的 如何影响到我们思考战争的未来的方式 这个概念让我被所有五角大楼的人都鄙视了一遍 同时它也让我现在如此的受欢迎 人人都有自己的观点
Going back to the beginning of our country -- historically, defenses meant protection of the homeland. Security has meant everything else. Written into our constitution, two different forces, two different functions. Raise an army when you need it, and maintain a navy for day-to-day connectivity. A Department of War, a Department of Everything Else. A big stick, a baton stick. Can of whup ass, the networking force. In 1947 we merged these two things together in the Defense Department. Our long-term rationale becomes, we're involved in a hair trigger stand off with the Soviets. To attack America is to risk blowing up the world. We connected national security to international security with about a seven minute time delay. That's not our problem now. They can kill three million in Chicago tomorrow and we don't go to the mattresses with nukes. That's the scary part.
回顾我们国家的历史初期 在历史上,国防意味着保卫家园 安全高于一切 这是写进我们的宪法的 两种不同的力量,两种不同的功能 需要的时候,就养一支部队 需要海军就养一支海军 一个战争部门,一个战争之外的部门 一个是大棒,另一个却是指挥棒 不但要把他们打倒 而且要建立一个网络来进行系统监管 1947年国防部把这两件事情 融合到了一起 这就成为了我们的长期理论基础 我们卷入了一种与苏联一触即发的境地 进攻美国就是威胁全世界 我们将国家安全与世界安全联系起来 其中只有七分钟的延时 现在那已经不是我们的问题了 明天他们就能在芝加哥杀死三百万人 而且我们没有核武器床垫 那才是最可怕的
The question is how do we reconnect American national security with global security to make the world a lot more comfortable, and to embed and contextualize our employment of force around the planet? What's happened since is that bifurcation I described. We talked about this going all the way back to the end of the Cold War. Let's have a Department of War, and a Department of Something Else. Some people say, "Hell, 9/11 did it for you." Now we've got a home game and an away game.
问题是我们如何再次将美国的安全与世界的安全联系起来 让世界拥有安全保证,变得更美好 同时又让我们在全球的部队 参与其中 目前的情况,正是我所描述的一种 我们讨论了这种 退回到冷战末期的情况 我们需要一个战争部门,以及一个战争之外的部门 有人说,嘿,911已经为你完成了这个想法 现在我们已经有了主场和客场之分
(Laughter)
(笑声)
The Department of Homeland Security is a strategic feel good measure. It's going to be the Department of Agriculture for the 21st century. TSA -- thousands standing around.
建立本土安全部门是一个很好的战略方法 它将成为21世纪的农业部门 TSA的意思就是成千上万人站在周围
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I supported the war in Iraq. He was a bad guy with multiple priors. It's not like we had to find him actually killing somebody live to arrest him. I knew we'd kick ass in the war with the Leviathan Force. I knew we'd have a hard time with what followed. But I know this organization doesn't change until it experiences failure. What do I mean by these two different forces?
我支持伊拉克战争 他是个有着多重前科的坏人 我们是不可能在他杀人的现场 找到并逮捕他的 我早就知道我们在用“巨轮之力”来战斗 我早就知道之后我们会经历一段困难的时期 但是我知道不经历失败,我们的组织是不会改变的 我提出这两种力量是为了说明什么呢?
This is the Hobbesian Force. I love this force. I don't want to see it go. That plus nukes rules out great power war. This is the military the rest of the world wants us to build. It's why I travel all over the world talking to foreign militaries.
这就是霍布斯的力量 我喜欢它,我不想没有它 我不愿意只看到由核武器支配的大国战争 这才是世界需要我们建立的军事力量 这就是为什么我满世界地跑,去与各国军方交流
What does this mean? It means you've got to stop pretending you can do these two very disparate skill sets with the same 19-year-old. Switching back, morning, afternoon, evening, morning, afternoon, evening. Handing out aid, shooting back, handing out aid, shooting back. It's too much. The 19-year-olds get tired from the switching, OK?
这意味着什么呢? 意味着你不能再假装自己能都用同样的 19岁左右的人来完成两件完全不同的事情 换回去,早、中、晚 早、中、晚 给予援助,还击 给予援助,还击 太过分了 那些19岁的家伙会累的好不好
(Laughter)
(笑声)
That force on the left, you can train a 19-year-old to do that. That force on the right is more like a 40-year-old cop. You need the experience. What does this mean in terms of operations?
对于左边的力量,你可以训练一群19岁的人去做 但右边的力量就必须要一群40岁左右的人去做了 你需要经验 那怎么行动呢?
The rule is going to be this. That Sys Admin force is the force that never comes home, does most of your work. You break out that Leviathan Force only every so often. But here's the promise you make to the American public, to your own people, to the world. You break out that Leviathan Force, you promise, you guarantee that you're going to mount one hell of a -- immediately -- follow-on Sys Admin effort. Don't plan for the war unless you plan to win the peace.
是这样的 “系统监管”部队是从来不回家的部队 但去完成了大部分任务 你频繁地派出“巨轮之力” 但是你要向美国民众保证 向你的人民、向世界保证 你派出了军事力量 你保证,你会在随后 立刻跟上“系统监管” 只能在你真的要实现和平的时候,才能进行战争!
(Applause)
(掌声)
Other differences. Leviathan traditional partners, they all look like the Brits and their former colonies.
另一个区别是军事力量 传统的伙伴,都像英国人 以及他们的殖民地
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Including us, I would remind you. The rest -- wider array of partners. International organizations, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, contractors. You're not going to get away from that. Leviathan Force, it's all about joint operations between the military services. We're done with that. What we need to do is inter-agency operations, which frankly Condi Rice was in charge of. And I'm amazed nobody asked her that question when she was confirmed.
我还要提醒你,这也包括我们 剩下的,更广泛的同盟者 有国际组织、非政府组织 私人志愿者组织、承包商 你不能不管他们 巨轮之力,都只是在军事方面的联合行动 我们已经做完了 我们需要去做的是在那些组织之间去开展行动 也就是赖斯管的那摊子事 而我很奇怪为什么没人问她有关于那方面的问题
I call the Leviathan Force your dad's military. I like them young, male, unmarried, slightly pissed off.
我把“巨轮之力”称为男人的力量 我喜欢那些年轻、未婚、易怒的男孩子们
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I call the Sys Admin Force your mom's military. It's everything the man's military hates. Gender balanced much more, older, educated, married with children. The force on the left, up or out. The force on the right, in and out. The force on the left respects Posse Comitatus restrictions on the use of force inside the U.S. The force on the right's going to obliterate it. That's where the National Guard's going to be. The force on the left is never coming under the purview of the International Criminal Court. Sys Admin Force has to. Different definitions of network centricity. One takes down networks, one puts them up. And you've got to wage war here in such a way to facilitate that.
我把“系统监管”称为女人的力量 关于它的每件事都是男人不屑于做的 这样性别更平衡、更成熟、有更好的教育,就会有更好的结果 左边的力量要么使用,要不就不用 而右边的力量不可或缺 左边的力量要顾及到在调配美国国内的 临时部队时遇到的问题 而右边的力量就会扫平一切问题 那就是国民警卫队要做的事情 左边的力量从来不需要考虑 是否违反了国际刑事法庭的规定 但“系统监管”会考虑 二者对网络中心的定义是不同的 一个是摧毁网络,一个是建立网络 你必须在以一种更好的方式来发动战争
Do we need a bigger budget? Do we need a draft to pull this off? Absolutely not. I've been told by the Revolution of Military Affairs crowd for years, we can do it faster, cheaper, smaller, just as lethal. I say, "Great, I'm going to take the Sys Admin budget out of your hide."
我们需要更多预算么? 我们需要预制一个计划么? 完全不需要 多年来倡导军事变革的人们一种跟我讲 我们能做得更快、花费更少、动员的规模更小,给出致命一击 我说,“那太好了,我要把‘系统监管’的钱从你的预算里拿出来”
Here's the larger point. You're going to build the Sys Admin Force inside the U.S. Military first. But ultimately you're going to civilianize it, probably two thirds. Inter agency-ize it, internationalize it. So yes, it begins inside the Pentagon, but over time it's going to cross that river.
这才是重点 你要首先在美国军队内部建立“系统监管”力量 但是最终你要将其中的大约三分之二平民化 将它推广到各种组织之间,使其全球化 当然,这要从五角大楼开始 但是很快就会越过那条河
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I have been to the mountain top. I can see the future. I may not live long enough to get you there, but it's going to happen. We're going to have a Department of Something Else between war and peace.
我已经登顶了,我能看到希望 我可能不能活到那一天,但是事情已经开始进行了 我们会拥有一个战争之外的部门 处理战争和和平之间的事务
Last slide. Who gets custody of the kids? This is where the Marines in the audience get kind of tense. (Laughter) And this is when they think about beating the crap out of me after the talk.
最后一页 那么谁来照顾这些孩子们呢? 台下的海军陆战队员们开始有点紧张了 (笑声) 这正是他们把我的话 当成废话的时刻
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Read Max Boon. This is the history of the marines -- small wars, small arms. The Marines are like my West Highland Terrier. They get up every morning, they want to dig a hole and they want to kill something.
读一下Max Boon 这是海军陆战队的历史——小型的战争,轻型的武器 海军陆战队就像我的西高地白梗(一种狗) 每天早上醒来,挖一个洞 然后杀死些什么
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I don't want my Marines handing out aid. I want them to be Marines. That's what keeps the Sys Admin Force from being a pussy force. It keeps it from being the U.N. You shoot at these people the Marines are going to come over and kill you.
我不想我的海军陆战队去给谁提供援助 我只想让他们当海军陆战队 这使得“系统监管”力量免于沦为一直柔弱的部队 免于变成联合国的部队 你若向他们射击,那么海军陆战队员们会冲过来杀掉你
(Laughter)
(笑声)
(Applause)
(掌声)
Department of Navy, strategic subs go this way, surface combatants are over there, and the news is they may actually be that small.
海军总部的战略者们就要走这条路 水面战斗部队就在那里 将来可能他们会变得很小
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I call it the Smart Dust Navy. I tell young officers, "You may command 500 ships in your career. Bad news is they may not have anybody on them." Carriers go both ways because they're a swing asset. You'll see the pattern -- airborne, just like carriers. Armor goes this way. Here's the dirty secret of the Air Force, you can win by bombing. But you need lots of these guys on the ground to win the peace. Shinseki was right with the argument. Air force, strategic airlift goes both ways. Bombers, fighters go over here. Special Operations Command down at Tampa. Trigger-pullers go this way. Civil Affairs, that bastard child, comes over here. Return to the Army. The point about the trigger-pullers and Special Operations Command. No off season, these guys are always active. They drop in, do their business, disappear. See me now. Don't talk about it later.
我将那时的海军称之为“明智之尘” 我告诉年轻的官员,你可以在你一生之中指挥500艘舰船 但是船上没有人 航母部队两条路线都要走,因为他们是不固定的 你会看到这样的模式——海军航空部队,就像航母部队一样 装甲部队也会如此 下面就是关于空军的恶心的秘密 你会用炸弹取胜 但是在赢得和平的过程中你需要很多这些在陆上的家伙 辛赛奇的观点是对的 空军,在战略上的空运中也要两条腿走路 轰炸机,战斗机也要这样走 特殊行动指挥部在坦帕市 步兵也要如此 民政部,那个混蛋小孩,也要到这里来 回到部队中去 这是关于步兵和特别行动指挥部的 不需要理由,这些家伙总是很活跃 他们介入、做事情,然后消失 现在看我,以后可不要再讨论这个问题了
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I was never here.
我从没来过这里
(Laughter)
(笑声)
The world is my playground.
世界都是我的游乐场
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I want to keep trigger-pullers trigger-happy. I want the rules to be as loose as possible. Because when the thing gets prevented in Chicago with the three million dead that perverts our political system beyond all recognition, these are the guys who are going to kill them first. So it's better off to have them make some mistakes along the way than to see that.
我只想让步兵们开开心心地当地道的步兵 我想让这些规则尽可能地变宽松 因为在芝加哥事情受阻了 有三百万人都死了 这就让我们的政治部门很受打击 有些人要先杀掉政治部门的人 所以最好让他们沿着这条路先犯点错误 而不是只是眼睁睁地看着
Reserve component -- National Guard reserves overwhelmingly Sys Admin. How are you going to get them to work for this force? Most firemen in this country do it for free. This is not about money. This is about being up front with these guys and gals.
保留部分—— 国民警卫队保留占绝对优势的“系统监管”力量 你怎样才能让他们为“系统监管”做事呢? 美国的许多消防员都是免费为它做事的 这不是钱的问题 而是要让这些孩子们重到最前面
Last point, intelligence community -- the muscle and the defense agencies go this way. What should be the CIA, open, analytical, open source should come over here. The information you need to do this is not secret. It's not secret. Read that great piece in the New Yorker about how our echo boomers, 19 to 25, over in Iraq taught each other how to do Sys Admin work, over the Internet in chat rooms. They said, "Al Qaeda could be listening." They said, "Well, Jesus, they already know this stuff."
最后一点,情报界—— 政界和国防部都要参与 CIA要变的开放,去分析问题,公开资源 要参与其中 你做事所需要的信息不是秘密 这不是秘密 读一下《纽约客》上的那一页 关于那些婴儿潮一代的子女们,大约19到25岁的那些在伊拉克的家伙们 是怎样通过互联网上的聊天室来相互学习 完成“系统监管”的工作的 他们说,“基地组织应当听听” 他们说,“其实,主啊,他们已经都知道啦”
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Take a gift in the left hand. These are the sunglasses that don't scare people, simple stuff. Censors and transparency, the overheads go in both directions.
左手拿一个礼物 有不会吓到别人的太阳镜,简单的东西 经费不仅要用于审查工作,也要用来使工作透明化
Thanks.
谢谢大家