Jeg vil tale til jer om optimisme -- eller mere præcist, den optimistiske tilbøjelighed. Det er en kognitiv illusion som vi har undersøgt i mit laboratorium i løbet af de sidste par år, og 80 procent af os har den.
I'm going to talk to you about optimism -- or more precisely, the optimism bias. It's a cognitive illusion that we've been studying in my lab for the past few years, and 80 percent of us have it.
Det er vores tendens til at overvurdere vores sandsynlighed for at opleve gode begivenheder i vores liv og undervurdere sandsynligheden for at opleve dårlige begivenheder. Så vi undervurderer vores sandsynlighed for at lide af kræft, være i et biluheld. Vi overvurderer vores levealder, vores karriere udsigter. Kort sagt, er vi mere optimistiske end realistiske, men vi er ikke bevidste om det faktum.
It's our tendency to overestimate our likelihood of experiencing good events in our lives and underestimate our likelihood of experiencing bad events. So we underestimate our likelihood of suffering from cancer, being in a car accident. We overestimate our longevity, our career prospects. In short, we're more optimistic than realistic, but we are oblivious to the fact.
Kig for eksempel på ægteskabet. I den vestlige verden, er sandsynligheden for skilsmisse på cirka 40 procent. Det betyder at ud af fem gifte par, vil der i sidste ende være to par der ender med at dele deres aktiver. Men når man spørger nygifte om deres egen sandsynlighed for skilsmisse, vurderer de den til at være nul procent. Og selv skilsmisse advokater, der virkelig burde vide bedre, undervurderer i høj grad deres egen sandsynlighed for skilsmisse. Så det viser sig, at optimister ikke har lavere sandsynlighed for skilsmisse, men de har større sandsynlighed for at gifte sig igen. Som Samuel Johnson sagde, "At gifte sig igen er håbets triumf over erfaring."
Take marriage for example. In the Western world, divorce rates are about 40 percent. That means that out of five married couples, two will end up splitting their assets. But when you ask newlyweds about their own likelihood of divorce, they estimate it at zero percent. And even divorce lawyers, who should really know better, hugely underestimate their own likelihood of divorce. So it turns out that optimists are not less likely to divorce, but they are more likely to remarry. In the words of Samuel Johnson, "Remarriage is the triumph of hope over experience."
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Så hvis vi er gift, er der større sandsynlighed for at få børn. Og vi mener alle at vores børn vil være specielt talentfulde. Dette, forresten, er min to-årige nevø, Guy. Og jeg vil bare gøre det helt klart , at han er et virkelig dårligt eksempel på optimistiske tilbøjelighed, fordi han er faktisk enestående talentfuld.
So if we're married, we're more likely to have kids. And we all think our kids will be especially talented. This, by the way, is my two-year-old nephew, Guy. And I just want to make it absolutely clear that he's a really bad example of the optimism bias, because he is in fact uniquely talented.
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Og det er ikke kun mig. Ud af fire britiske folk, sagde tre, at de var optimistiske omkring deres egen families fremtid. Det er 75 procent. Men kun 30 procent sagde, at de mente, at familier generelt klarer sig bedre end for et par generationer siden.
And I'm not alone. Out of four British people, three said that they were optimistic about the future of their own families. That's 75 percent. But only 30 percent said that they thought families in general are doing better than a few generations ago.
Og det er en virkelig vigtigt pointe, fordi vi er optimistiske om os selv, vi er optimistiske om vores børn, vi er optimistiske om vores familier, men vi er ikke så optimistiske om fyren der sidder ved siden af os, og vi er noget pessimistiske om vores medborgere skæbne og vores lands skæbne. Men privat optimisme om vores egen personlige fremtid bliver ved med at være vedholdende. Og det betyder ikke at vi mener at tingene på magisk vis bliver ok, men at vi har den specielle evne til at få det til det.
And this is a really important point, because we're optimistic about ourselves, we're optimistic about our kids, we're optimistic about our families, but we're not so optimistic about the guy sitting next to us, and we're somewhat pessimistic about the fate of our fellow citizens and the fate of our country. But private optimism about our own personal future remains persistent. And it doesn't mean that we think things will magically turn out okay, but rather that we have the unique ability to make it so.
Nu er jeg forsker, jeg laver eksperimenter. Så for at vise jer hvad jeg mener, vil jeg lave et eksperiment med jer. Så jeg vil give jer en liste af evner og karakteristika, og jeg vil gerne have at I for hver af disse evner tænker over hvor I er, i forhold til resten af befolkningen.
Now I'm a scientist, I do experiments. So to show you what I mean, I'm going to do an experiment here with you. So I'm going to give you a list of abilities and characteristics, and I want you to think for each of these abilities where you stand relative to the rest of the population.
Den første er at komme godt ud af det med andre. Hvem her tror på at de er blandt de nederste 25 procent? Okay, det er cirka 10 mennesker ud af 1.500. Hvem mener de er i de øverste 25 procent? Det er de fleste af os. Okay, nu gælder det samme for jeres køreegenskaber. Hvor interessant er du? Hvor tiltrækkende er du? Hvor ærlig er du? Og til slut, hvor beskeden er du?
The first one is getting along well with others. Who here believes they're at the bottom 25 percent? Okay, that's about 10 people out of 1,500. Who believes they're at the top 25 percent? That's most of us here. Okay, now do the same for your driving ability. How interesting are you? How attractive are you? How honest are you? And finally, how modest are you?
Så de fleste af os, sætter os selv over gennemsnittet i de fleste af disse evner. Det er statistisk set umuligt. Vi kan ikke alle være bedre end alle andre. (Latter) Men hvis vi mener vi er bedre end den anden fyr, så betyder det at der er en større sandsynlighed for at vi får en forfremmelse, at forblive gift, fordi vi er mere sociale, mere interessante.
So most of us put ourselves above average on most of these abilities. Now this is statistically impossible. We can't all be better than everyone else. (Laughter) But if we believe we're better than the other guy, well that means that we're more likely to get that promotion, to remain married, because we're more social, more interesting.
Og det er et globalt fænomen. Den optimistiske tilbøjelighed er blevet observeret i mange forskellige lande -- i vestlige kulturer, i ikke-vestlige kulturer, hos kvinder og mænd, hos børn, hos de ældre. Det er ret udbredt.
And it's a global phenomenon. The optimism bias has been observed in many different countries -- in Western cultures, in non-Western cultures, in females and males, in kids, in the elderly. It's quite widespread.
Men spørgsmålet er, er det godt for os? Så nogle mennesker siger nej. Nogle mennesker siger at hemmeligheden bag lykke er lave forventninger. Jeg tror logikken er noget i denne retning: Hvis vi ikke forventer storslåethed, hvis vi ikke forventer at finde kærlighed og være sunde og succesrige, jamen så bliver vi ikke skuffede, når disse ting ikke sker. Og hvis vi ikke er skuffede når der sker gode ting, og vi bliver glædeligt overraskede når de sker, bliver vi lykkelige.
But the question is, is it good for us? So some people say no. Some people say the secret to happiness is low expectations. I think the logic goes something like this: If we don't expect greatness, if we don't expect to find love and be healthy and successful, well we're not going to be disappointed when these things don't happen. And if we're not disappointed when good things don't happen, and we're pleasantly surprised when they do, we will be happy.
Så det er en meget god teori, men det viser sig at være forkert, af tre årsager. Nummer et: Hvad der end sker, uanset om man lykkedes eller fejler, har mennesker med høje forventninger det altid bedre. Fordi det vi føler når vi bliver dumpet eller bliver månedens medarbejder, kommer an på hvordan vi fortolker den begivenhed.
So it's a very good theory, but it turns out to be wrong for three reasons. Number one: Whatever happens, whether you succeed or you fail, people with high expectations always feel better. Because how we feel when we get dumped or win employee of the month depends on how we interpret that event.
Psykologerne Margaret Marshall og John Brown undersøgte studerende med høje og lave forventninger. Og de fandt ud af, at når mennesker med høje forventninger har succes, tilskriver de den succes deres egne evner. "Jeg er et geni, derfor fik jeg et A, derfor får jeg et A igen og igen i fremtiden." Da de dumpede, var det ikke fordi de var dumme, men fordi eksamenen bare var unfair. Næste gang vil de klare sig bedre. Mennesker med lave forventninger gør det modsatte. Så når de dumper var det fordi de var dumme, og da de bestod var det fordi den eksamen bare var rigtig nem. Næste gang vil virkeligheden indhente dem. Så de havde det dårligere.
The psychologists Margaret Marshall and John Brown studied students with high and low expectations. And they found that when people with high expectations succeed, they attribute that success to their own traits. "I'm a genius, therefore I got an A, therefore I'll get an A again and again in the future." When they failed, it wasn't because they were dumb, but because the exam just happened to be unfair. Next time they will do better. People with low expectations do the opposite. So when they failed it was because they were dumb, and when they succeeded it was because the exam just happened to be really easy. Next time reality would catch up with them. So they felt worse.
Nummer to: Uanset udfaldet, selve forventningen gør os lykkelige. Adfærds økonomen George Lowenstein, bad de studerende ved hans universitet om at forestille sig at få et følelsesrigt kys fra en kendt, en hvilken som helst kendt. Så sagde han, "Hvor meget er I villige til at betale for at få et kys fra en kendis hvis kysset blev afleveret med det samme, om tre timer, om 24 timer, om tre dage, om 1 år, om 10 år? Han fandt ud af, at de studerende var villige til at betale mest for ikke at få et kys med det samme, men for at få et kys om tre dage. De var villige til at betale ekstra, for at få lov til at vente. Nu var de ikke villige til at vente et år eller 10 år; ingen vil have en aldrende kendis. Men tre dage virkede som den optimale mængde.
Number two: Regardless of the outcome, the pure act of anticipation makes us happy. The behavioral economist George Lowenstein asked students in his university to imagine getting a passionate kiss from a celebrity, any celebrity. Then he said, "How much are you willing to pay to get a kiss from a celebrity if the kiss was delivered immediately, in three hours, in 24 hours, in three days, in one year, in 10 years? He found that the students were willing to pay the most not to get a kiss immediately, but to get a kiss in three days. They were willing to pay extra in order to wait. Now they weren't willing to wait a year or 10 years; no one wants an aging celebrity. But three days seemed to be the optimum amount.
Så hvorfor det? Jamen, hvis man får kysset nu, er det slut. Men hvis man får kysset om tre dage, jamen det er tre dage med forventning, forventningens glæde. De studerende ville have den tid til at forestille sig hvad der sker, hvordan sker det. Forventningen gjorde dem lykkelige.
So why is that? Well if you get the kiss now, it's over and done with. But if you get the kiss in three days, well that's three days of jittery anticipation, the thrill of the wait. The students wanted that time to imagine where is it going to happen, how is it going to happen. Anticipation made them happy.
Dette er, i øvrigt, hvorfor folk foretrækker fredag frem for søndag. Det er et virkelig besynderligt faktum, fordi er en arbejdsdag og søndag er en glædens dag, så man skulle tro at folk ville foretrække søndag, men det gør de ikke. Det er ikke fordi de virkelig, virkelig godt kan lide at være på kontoret, og de ikke kan holde det ud at gå en tur i parken eller have en sen brunch. Det ved vi, fordi når man spørger folk om deres ultimative favoritdag i ugen, surprise, surprise, lørdag er på førstepladsen, så fredag, så søndag. Folk foretrækker fredag, fordi fredagen bringer forventningens glæde om den foreliggende weekend, alle de planer man har. Om søndagen, den eneste ting man kan se frem til er arbejdsugen.
This is, by the way, why people prefer Friday to Sunday. It's a really curious fact, because Friday is a day of work and Sunday is a day of pleasure, so you'd assume that people will prefer Sunday, but they don't. It's not because they really, really like being in the office and they can't stand strolling in the park or having a lazy brunch. We know that, because when you ask people about their ultimate favorite day of the week, surprise, surprise, Saturday comes in at first, then Friday, then Sunday. People prefer Friday because Friday brings with it the anticipation of the weekend ahead, all the plans that you have. On Sunday, the only thing you can look forward to is the work week.
Så optimistiske mennesker, er mennesker der forventer flere kys i deres fremtid, flere gåture i parken. Og den forventning forstærker deres velbefindende. Faktisk, uden den optimistiske tilbøjelighed, ville vi alle være en smule deprimerede. Mennesker med en mild depression, de har ikke en tilbøjelighed når de kigger ind i fremtiden. De er faktisk mere realistiske end sunde individer. Men individer med svære depressioner, de har en pessimistisk tilbøjelighed. Så de har en tendens til at forvente at fremtiden er værre end den ender med at være.
So optimists are people who expect more kisses in their future, more strolls in the park. And that anticipation enhances their wellbeing. In fact, without the optimism bias, we would all be slightly depressed. People with mild depression, they don't have a bias when they look into the future. They're actually more realistic than healthy individuals. But individuals with severe depression, they have a pessimistic bias. So they tend to expect the future to be worse than it ends up being.
Så optimisme ændrer den subjektive virkelighed. Måden hvorpå vi forventer at verden ændrer sig, ændrer måden hvorpå vi ser den. Men det ændrer også den objektive virkelighed. Det ender som en selvopfyldende profeti. Og det er den tredje grund til, hvorfor det at sænke ens forventninger ikke vil gøre en lykkelig. Kontrollerede eksperimenter har vist at optimisme ikke kun relaterer sig til succes, det fører til succes. Optimisme fører til succes i den akademiske verden, sportsverden og den politiske verden. Og måske er den mest overraskende fordel ved optimisme helbredet. Hvis vi forventer at fremtiden er lys, bliver stress og angst reduceret.
So optimism changes subjective reality. The way we expect the world to be changes the way we see it. But it also changes objective reality. It acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy. And that is the third reason why lowering your expectations will not make you happy. Controlled experiments have shown that optimism is not only related to success, it leads to success. Optimism leads to success in academia and sports and politics. And maybe the most surprising benefit of optimism is health. If we expect the future to be bright, stress and anxiety are reduced.
Så, alt i alt, optimisme har mange fordele. Men det spørgsmål der virkelig forvirrede mig var, hvordan fastholder vi optimismen på trods af virkeligheden? Som forsker i neurovidenskab, var det specielt forvirrende, fordi ifølge alle teorierne derude, når ens forventninger ikke bliver indfriet, burde man ændre dem. Men det er ikke det vi fandt ud af. Vi bad mennesker om at komme ind i vores laboratorium, for at prøve at finde ud af hvad der skete.
So all in all, optimism has lots of benefits. But the question that was really confusing to me was, how do we maintain optimism in the face of reality? As an neuroscientist, this was especially confusing, because according to all the theories out there, when your expectations are not met, you should alter them. But this is not what we find. We asked people to come into our lab in order to try and figure out what was going on.
Vi bad dem om at evaluere deres sandsynlighed for at opleve forskellige forfærdelige begivenheder i deres liv. Så, for eksempel, hvad er din sandsynlighed for at få kræft? Og så fortalte vi dem den gennemsnitlige sandsynlighed for at en person lider disse uheldige skæbner. Så kræft, for eksempel, er cirka 30 procent. Og så spurgte vi dem igen, "Hvor stor er sandsynligheden for at du kommer til at få kræft?"
We asked them to estimate their likelihood of experiencing different terrible events in their lives. So, for example, what is your likelihood of suffering from cancer? And then we told them the average likelihood of someone like them to suffer these misfortunes. So cancer, for example, is about 30 percent. And then we asked them again, "How likely are you to suffer from cancer?"
Det vi ville finde ud af var, om mennesker tager den information vi gav dem og ændrede deres holdninger. Og det gjorde de -- men for det meste når den information vi gav dem var bedre end det de forventede. Så for eksempel, hvis nogen sagde, "Min sandsynlighed for at få kræft er cirka 50 procent." Og vi sagde, "Hey, godt nyt. Den gennemsnitlige sandsynlighed er 30 procent," den næste gang ville de sige, "Jamen måske er min sandsynlighed cirka 35 procent." Så de lærte hurtigt og effektivt. Men hvis nogen begyndte med at sige, "Min sandsynlighed for at få kræft er cirka 10 procent," og vi sagde, "Hey, dårligt nyt. Den gennemsnitlige sandsynlighed er 30 procent," den næste gang ville de sige, "Yep. Tror stadig den er cirka 11 procent."
What we wanted to know was whether people will take the information that we gave them to change their beliefs. And indeed they did -- but mostly when the information we gave them was better than what they expected. So for example, if someone said, "My likelihood of suffering from cancer is about 50 percent," and we said, "Hey, good news. The average likelihood is only 30 percent," the next time around they would say, "Well maybe my likelihood is about 35 percent." So they learned quickly and efficiently. But if someone started off saying, "My average likelihood of suffering from cancer is about 10 percent," and we said, "Hey, bad news. The average likelihood is about 30 percent," the next time around they would say, "Yep. Still think it's about 11 percent."
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Så det er ikke fordi de ikke lærte noget -- det gjorde de -- men meget, meget mindre end når vi gav dem positiv information om fremtiden. Og det er ikke fordi de ikke huskede de tal vi gav dem; alle kan huske at den gennemsnitlige sandsynlighed for at få kræft er cirka 30 procent, og den gennemsnitlige sandsynlighed for skilsmisse er 40 procent. Men de mente ikke, at de tal havde noget med dem at gøre.
So it's not that they didn't learn at all -- they did -- but much, much less than when we gave them positive information about the future. And it's not that they didn't remember the numbers that we gave them; everyone remembers that the average likelihood of cancer is about 30 percent and the average likelihood of divorce is about 40 percent. But they didn't think that those numbers were related to them.
Det det betyder er, at advarselsskilte som disse har muligvis kun en begrænset indvirkning. Ja, rygning dræber, men det dræber for det mest den anden fyr.
What this means is that warning signs such as these may only have limited impact. Yes, smoking kills, but mostly it kills the other guy.
Det jeg ville vide var, hvad sker der i den menneskelige hjerne, der forhindrer os i at tage disse advarselsskilte personligt. Men samtidig, når vi hører at boligmarkedet er håbefuldt, tænker vi, "Ah, mit hus bliver helt sikkert dobbelt så meget værd." For at prøve og finde ud af det, bad jeg de deltagende i eksperimentet om at lyve i en billeddannelses scanner. Det ser sådan ud. Og ved at bruge en metode der hedder funktionel MRI, var vi i stand til at identificere de områder i hjernen der reagerede på den positive information.
What I wanted to know was what was going on inside the human brain that prevented us from taking these warning signs personally. But at the same time, when we hear that the housing market is hopeful, we think, "Oh, my house is definitely going to double in price." To try and figure that out, I asked the participants in the experiment to lie in a brain imaging scanner. It looks like this. And using a method called functional MRI, we were able to identify regions in the brain that were responding to positive information.
Et af disse områder hedder den venstre inferiøre frontale gyrus. Så hvis nogen sagde, "Min sandsynlighed for at få kræft er cirka 50 procent," og vi sagde, "Hey, godt nyt. Den gennemsnitlige sandsynlighed er 30 procent," ville den venstre inferiøre frontale gyrus svare voldsomt. Og det betød ikke noget om man var en ekstrem optimist, mildt optimistisk eller lidt pessimistisk, alles venstre inferiøre frontale gyrus funktionerede perfekt, uanset om man er Barack Obama eller Woody Allen.
One of these regions is called the left inferior frontal gyrus. So if someone said, "My likelihood of suffering from cancer is 50 percent," and we said, "Hey, good news. Average likelihood is 30 percent," the left inferior frontal gyrus would respond fiercely. And it didn't matter if you're an extreme optimist, a mild optimist or slightly pessimistic, everyone's left inferior frontal gyrus was functioning perfectly well, whether you're Barack Obama or Woody Allen.
På den anden side af hjernen, svarede den højre inferiøre frontale gyrus på dårligt nyt. Og her er hagen; den gjorde ikke et særlig godt stykke arbejde. Jo mere optimistisk man var, jo mindre sandsynligt var det at dette område interagerede med den uventede, negative information. Og hvis ens hjerne ikke formår at integrere dårligt nyt om fremtiden, vil man konstant have ens lyserøde briller på.
On the other side of the brain, the right inferior frontal gyrus was responding to bad news. And here's the thing: it wasn't doing a very good job. The more optimistic you were, the less likely this region was to respond to unexpected negative information. And if your brain is failing at integrating bad news about the future, you will constantly leave your rose-tinted spectacles on.
Så det vi ville vide var, kan vi ændre dette? Kunne vi ændre folks optimistiske tilbøjelighed ved at ændre hjerneaktiviteten i disse områder? Og der er en måde hvorpå vi kan gøre det.
So we wanted to know, could we change this? Could we alter people's optimism bias by interfering with the brain activity in these regions? And there's a way for us to do that.
Dette er min samarbejdspartner Ryota Kanai. Og det han gør er, at han leder en lille magnetisk puls gennem kraniet på deltageren af vores studie ind i deres inferiøre frontale gyrus. Og ved at gøre det, forstyrrer han aktiviteten i dette område af hjernen i cirka en halv time. Derefter vender alt tilbage til normalen, kan jeg forsikre jer om.
This is my collaborator Ryota Kanai. And what he's doing is he's passing a small magnetic pulse through the skull of the participant in our study into their inferior frontal gyrus. And by doing that, he's interfering with the activity of this brain region for about half an hour. After that everything goes back to normal, I assure you.
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Så lad os se hvad der sker. For det første, vil jeg vise jer den gennemsnitlige mængde tilbøjelighed vi ser. Så hvis jeg ville teste jer alle sammen nu, ville dette være mængden I ville lære mere fra godt nyt i forhold til dårligt nyt. Nu vil vi forstyrre dette område som vi fandt ud af reagerede på den negative information i denne opgave, og den optimistiske tilbøjelighed voksede sig større. Vi fik folk til at have en større tilbøjelighed i måden hvorpå de bearbejdede information. Så forstyrrede vi området i hjernen som vi fandt ud af reagerede på godt nyt i denne opgave, og så forsvandt den optimistiske tilbøjelighed. Vi blev ret forbavsede over disse resultater fordi vi var i stand til at eliminere en dybt fæstet tilbøjelighed i mennesker.
So let's see what happens. First of all, I'm going to show you the average amount of bias that we see. So if I was to test all of you now, this is the amount that you would learn more from good news relative to bad news. Now we interfere with the region that we found to integrate negative information in this task, and the optimism bias grew even larger. We made people more biased in the way that they process information. Then we interfered with the brain region that we found to integrate good news in this task, and the optimism bias disappeared. We were quite amazed by these results because we were able to eliminate a deep-rooted bias in humans.
Og på dette tidspunkt stoppede vi og spurgte os selv, ville vi knuse den lille optimistiske illusion i små stykker? Hvis vi kunne gøre det, ville vi så have lyst til at fjerne menneskers optimistiske tilbøjelighed? Jamen jeg har allerede fortalt jer om alle fordelene ved den optimistiske tilbøjelighed, hvilket sikkert giver jer lyst til at holde fast i den som om det gjaldt livet. Men der er, selvfølgelig, faldgruber, og det ville være virkelig dumt af os at ignorere dem.
And at this point we stopped and we asked ourselves, would we want to shatter the optimism illusion into tiny little bits? If we could do that, would we want to take people's optimism bias away? Well I've already told you about all of the benefits of the optimism bias, which probably makes you want to hold onto it for dear life. But there are, of course, pitfalls, and it would be really foolish of us to ignore them.
Tag for eksempel denne email jeg modtog fra en brandmand her i Californien. Han siger, "Dødsulykke undersøgelser for brandmænd inkluderer ofte "Vi troede ikke at ildebranden ville gøre det," selv når al den tilgængelige information var til stede, til at tage en sikker beslutning." Denne kaptajn vil bruge vores opdagelser om den optimistiske tilbøjelighed til at prøve at forklare brandmænd hvorfor de tænker som de gør, for at få dem til at være opmærksomme på denne optimistiske tilbøjelighed i mennesker.
Take for example this email I recieved from a firefighter here in California. He says, "Fatality investigations for firefighters often include 'We didn't think the fire was going to do that,' even when all of the available information was there to make safe decisions." This captain is going to use our findings on the optimism bias to try to explain to the firefighters why they think the way they do, to make them acutely aware of this very optimistic bias in humans.
Så urealistisk optimisme kan lede til meget risikofyldt adfærd, til finansiel kollaps, til dårlig planlægning. Den britiske regering, for eksempel, har vedkendt at den optimistiske tilbøjelighed kan gøre individer mere modtagelige til at undervurdere omkostningerne og varigheden af projekter. Så de har justeret det Olympiske budget for 2012 på grund af den optimistiske tilbøjelighed.
So unrealistic optimism can lead to risky behavior, to financial collapse, to faulty planning. The British government, for example, has acknowledged that the optimism bias can make individuals more likely to underestimate the costs and durations of projects. So they have adjusted the 2012 Olympic budget for the optimism bias.
Min ven der bliver gift om et par uger har gjort det samme med hans bryllups budget. Og for øvrigt, da jeg spurgte ham om hans egen sandsynlighed for skilsmisse, sagde han, at han var ret sikker på at den var på nul procent.
My friend who's getting married in a few weeks has done the same for his wedding budget. And by the way, when I asked him about his own likelihood of divorce, he said he was quite sure it was zero percent.
Så det vi meget gerne vil gøre, er at vi gerne vil beskytte os selv fra farerne ved optimisme, men samtidig forblive håbefulde, og drage fordel af de mange goder der er ved optimisme. Og jeg mener at der er en måde vi kan gøre det på. Nøglen her, er faktisk viden. Vi er ikke født med en instinktiv forståelse af vores tilbøjeligheder. De skal identificeres af en videnskabelig undersøgelse. Men den gode nyhed er, at blive klar over den optimistiske tilbøjelighed ikke fjerner illusionen. Det er ligesom visuelle illusioner, hvor det at forstå dem ikke for dem til at forsvinde. Og det er godt nyt, fordi det betyder at vi burde være i stand til at finde en balance, til at finde på planer og regler for at beskytte os selv fra urealistisk optimisme, men på samme tid være håbefulde.
So what we would really like to do, is we would like to protect ourselves from the dangers of optimism, but at the same time remain hopeful, benefiting from the many fruits of optimism. And I believe there's a way for us to do that. The key here really is knowledge. We're not born with an innate understanding of our biases. These have to be identified by scientific investigation. But the good news is that becoming aware of the optimism bias does not shatter the illusion. It's like visual illusions, in which understanding them does not make them go away. And this is good because it means we should be able to strike a balance, to come up with plans and rules to protect ourselves from unrealistic optimism, but at the same time remain hopeful.
Jeg tror denne vittighedstegning fanger det godt. Fordi hvis man er en af disse pessimistiske pingviner deroppe der bare ikke tror på at de kan flyve, så kommer man aldrig til det. For for at have noget fremskridt, er vi nød til at være i stand til at forestille os en anden virkelighed, og vi skal være i stand til at tro på at den virkelighed er mulig. Men hvis man er en ekstremt optimistisk pingvin der bare springer ned og håber på det bedste, så kan man komme i noget være rod når man rammer jorden. Men hvis man er en optimistisk pingvin der tror på de kan flyve, men justerer det ved at have en faldskærm på ryggen, bare for det tilfælde at tingene ikke ender som planlagt, vil man svæve som en ørn, selvom man kun er en pingvin.
I think this cartoon portrays it nicely. Because if you're one of these pessimistic penguins up there who just does not believe they can fly, you certainly never will. Because to make any kind of progress, we need to be able to imagine a different reality, and then we need to believe that that reality is possible. But if you are an extreme optimistic penguin who just jumps down blindly hoping for the best, you might find yourself in a bit of a mess when you hit the ground. But if you're an optimistic penguin who believes they can fly, but then adjusts a parachute to your back just in case things don't work out exactly as you had planned, you will soar like an eagle, even if you're just a penguin.
Tak.
Thank you.
(Bifald)
(Applause)