Images like this, from the Auschwitz concentration camp, have been seared into our consciousness during the 20th century and have given us a new understanding of who we are, where we've come from and the times we live in. During the 20th century, we witnessed the atrocities of Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, Rwanda and other genocides, and even though the 21st century is only seven years old, we have already witnessed an ongoing genocide in Darfur and the daily horrors of Iraq. This has led to a common understanding of our situation, namely, that modernity has brought us terrible violence, and perhaps that native peoples lived in a state of harmony that we have departed from, to our peril.
这幅照片摄于奥斯维辛集中营 类似这样的场景构成我们对20世纪的感知的一部分 并且让我们对自身有了新的认识 让我们重新审视自己所处的环境和时代 在20世纪里,我们见证了 斯大林、希特勒、毛泽东、波尔布特的种种暴行,卢旺达种族大屠杀等等 尽管21世纪才过了7年 我们也目睹了达富尔正在进行中的种族大屠杀 以及伊拉克频繁的战乱 这些事件导致我们对现状的如下认识 暴力是现代社会的衍生品 也许,远古人们还能和睦相处,而今人已经做不到这点了 我可以举一个例子
Here is an example from an op-ed on Thanksgiving, in the "Boston Globe" a couple of years ago, where the writer wrote, "The Indian life was a difficult one, but there were no employment problems, community harmony was strong, substance abuse unknown, crime nearly nonexistent. What warfare there was between tribes was largely ritualistic and seldom resulted in indiscriminate or wholesale slaughter." Now you're all familiar with this treacle. We teach it to our children. We hear it on television and in storybooks. Now, the original title of this session was, "Everything You Know is Wrong," and I'm going to present evidence that this particular part of our common understanding is wrong, that, in fact, our ancestors were far more violent than we are, that violence has been in decline for long stretches of time, and that today, we are probably living in the most peaceful time in our species's existence.
几年前,波士顿环球报中有一篇专栏文章 作者关于感恩节写道 “虽然印第安人生活艰苦,但是他们不会面临失业问题 他们邻里和睦,没有人滥用毒品 基本上没有犯罪,即使在两个部落之间爆发战争 也通常是形式上的,鲜有导致部族歧视和大规模屠杀” 大家对于这种论调已经耳熟能详了 我们从电视及书本中了解到这些,并且这样教育孩子 这个讲座最初定的题目是 “你所知道的错误信息”,我现在就要给出证据 推翻大家原先对于暴力的一些认识 实际上,我们的祖先要比我们暴力得多 随着时间的推移,暴力出现的频率一直在走低 我想现在很有可能正处于人类历史上最和平的时期 在这个达富尔和伊拉克烽烟四起的年代
Now in the decade of Darfur and Iraq, a statement like that might seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene, but I'm going to try to convince you that that is the correct picture. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon. You can see it over millennia, over centuries, over decades and over years, although there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the 16th century. One sees it all over the world, although not homogeneously. It's especially evident in the West, beginning with England and Holland around the time of the Enlightenment.
说是史上最和平的年代,听上去像天方夜谭 但是我现在就要向你证明 事实就是如此。暴力行为的减少趋势 呈现不规律性。可以以千年、 百年、十年或年为单位观察 尽管在16世纪的理性时代初期 似乎存在过一个最高点。 这是普遍现象,而不局限在一地 在西方尤其明显,从英国 和荷兰在启蒙时期开始
Let me take you on a journey of several powers of 10 -- from the millennium scale to the year scale -- to try to persuade you of this. Until 10,000 years ago, all humans lived as hunter-gatherers, without permanent settlements or government. And this is the state that's commonly thought to be one of primordial harmony. But the archaeologist Lawrence Keeley, looking at casualty rates among contemporary hunter-gatherers, which is our best source of evidence about this way of life, has shown a rather different conclusion.
让我带你看看以10为衡量方式的一些权利-- 从以千年为单位到以年为单位 来试着告诉你们这点。直到一万年前 人类以打猎为生,没有固定聚居地、政府 这个状态通常被认为是 原始的和谐状态。 但考古学家Lawrence Keeley 通过观察当代狩猎者的死亡率——这类生活方式 最好的证据来源——得出了不同的结论
Here is a graph that he put together, showing the percentage of male deaths due to warfare in a number of foraging or hunting and gathering societies. The red bars correspond to the likelihood that a man will die at the hands of another man, as opposed to passing away of natural causes, in a variety of foraging societies in the New Guinea highlands and the Amazon rain forest. And they range from a rate of almost a 60 percent chance that a man will die at the hands of another man to, in the case of the Gebusi, only a 15 percent chance. The tiny little blue bar in the lower left-hand corner plots the corresponding statistic from the United States and Europe in the 20th century, and it includes all the deaths of both World Wars. If the death rate in tribal warfare had prevailed during the 20th century, there would have been two billion deaths rather than 100 million.
这是他统计出的图表 显示出在一些游牧民族中 男性因战争而死所占的比列 红色条表示男性死于其他人之手的可能性 对应自然死亡 数据源于新几内亚高地和亚马逊雨林的 一些游牧民族 游牧民族成员死于他人之手的比例 在Gebusi民族的接近60% 和15%之间变换。左下角的蓝色条 描绘了在20世纪的美国和欧洲 相应的数据,包括了 两次世界大战的死者。如果部落战争中的死亡率是普遍现象 那么在20世纪,死于战争的人数应该是20亿而不是1亿
Also on the millennium scale, we can look at the way of life of early civilizations, such as the ones described in the Bible. And in this supposed source of our moral values, one can read descriptions of what was expected in warfare, such as the following, from Numbers 31: "And they warred against the Midianites as the Lord commanded Moses, and they slew all the males. And Moses said unto them, 'Have you saved all the women alive? Now, therefore, kill every male among the little ones and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him, but all the women children that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves.'" In other words: kill the men, kill the children. If you see any virgins, then you can keep them alive so that you can rape them. And you can find four or five passages in the Bible of this ilk. Also in the Bible, one sees that the death penalty was the accepted punishment for crimes such as homosexuality, adultery, blasphemy, idolatry, talking back to your parents --
同样以千年为范围 我们来看看被记录在圣经中的早期文明生活方式 在圣经这本我们理论上的道德准则中 我们可以看到对于战争行为的描述 比如民数记31中所记载的: “他们就照耶和华所吩咐摩西的,与米甸人打仗, 杀了所有的男丁。摩西对他们说: 你们要存留这一切妇女的活命么?所以, 你们要把一切的男孩和所有已嫁的女子都杀了。 但女孩子中,凡没有出嫁的, 你们都可以存留他的活命。”换句话说 杀掉男人和小孩,但如果看到少女 就可以留下活口来占有她们。 在圣经中能找到四、五段这样的记录 同样,在圣经中死刑是种可接受的惩罚方式 对于例如同性恋、通奸、 语秽、盲目崇拜、说父母坏话—
(Laughter)
(笑声)—在安息日劳动等罪行
and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. Well, let's click the zoom lens down one order of magnitude and look at the century scale. Now, although we don't have statistics for warfare throughout the Middle Ages to modern times, we know just from conventional history that the evidence was under our nose all along that there has been a reduction in socially sanctioned forms of violence.
现在,让我们放大一格 来观察下以世纪为单位的数据 尽管我们没有从中世纪到现代的 所有战争数据 我们仅仅依据现有历史— 人类社会所支持的暴力行为一直在减少 这样的证据一直近在眼前
For example, any social history will reveal that mutilation and torture were routine forms of criminal punishment. The kind of infraction today that would give you a fine, in those days, would result in your tongue being cut out, your ears being cut off, you being blinded, a hand being chopped off and so on. There were numerous ingenious forms of sadistic capital punishment: burning at the stake, disemboweling, breaking on the wheel, being pulled apart by horses and so on. The death penalty was a sanction for a long list of nonviolent crimes: criticizing the king, stealing a loaf of bread. Slavery, of course, was the preferred labor-saving device, and cruelty was a popular form of entertainment. Perhaps the most vivid example was the practice of cat burning, in which a cat was hoisted on a stage and lowered in a sling into a fire, and the spectators shrieked in laughter as the cat, howling in pain, was burned to death.
例如,任何文明史都曾记录 截肢或酷刑是常见的罪行惩罚方式。 现在只能让你被罚款的违规,在过去可能导致 割舌,割耳,挖眼 斩手等结果 世界各地有无数种斩首的变态方式 捆在木装上烧,开膛破肚,车裂 五马分尸等等 而能处以死刑的非暴力罪行有长长的列表: 比如批评国王,偷面包。当然,奴隶制 是种理想的节约劳力的制度,而残忍行为 则被当作流行的娱乐方式。也许最生动的例子 是火烧猫的行为。猫在平台上被吊起来 通过吊索被慢慢放入火里 猫在火中痛苦地嚎叫直到被烧死 围观的人发出愉快的尖叫
What about one-on-one murder? Well, there, there are good statistics, because many municipalities recorded the cause of death. The criminologist Manuel Eisner scoured all of the historical records across Europe for homicide rates in any village, hamlet, town, county that he could find, and then he supplemented them with national data when nations started keeping statistics. He plotted on a logarithmic scale, going from 100 deaths per 100,000 people per year, which was approximately the rate of homicide in the Middle Ages, and the figure plummets down to less than one homicide per 100,000 people per year in seven or eight European countries. Then, there is a slight uptick in the 1960s. The people who said that rock and roll would lead to the decline of moral values actually had a grain of truth to that. But there was a decline from at least two orders of magnitude in homicide from the Middle Ages to the present, and the elbow occurred in the early 16th century.
那么一对一的凶杀呢?这个有据可查 因为许多市政当局记录了死因 犯罪学家Manuel Eisner 整理了欧洲的所有历史记录 涉及他能找到的乡、村、镇、县的凶杀率 然后综合了有数据记录以来的 所有国家数据 他用对数表示,从每年每十万人中 100例死亡,略等于中世纪的凶杀案发率 数据降低到了 每年每十万人中少于1例死亡率 在7、8个欧洲国家。然后1960年代稍有上涨 那些说摇滚导致了道德丧失的部分人 确实有一定道理 但谋杀率数据减少至少有两个数量级 从中世纪到现在 数据拐角出现在16世纪初期
Let's click down now to the decade scale. According to nongovernmental organizations that keep such statistics, since 1945, in Europe and the Americas, there has been a steep decline in interstate wars, in deadly ethnic riots or pogroms and in military coups, even in South America. Worldwide, there's been a steep decline in deaths in interstate wars. The yellow bars here show the number of deaths per war per year from 1950 to the present. And, as you can see, the death rate goes down from 65,000 deaths per conflict per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 deaths per conflict per year in this decade, as horrific as it is. Even in the year scale, one can see a decline of violence. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been fewer civil wars, fewer genocides -- indeed, a 90 percent reduction since post-World War II highs -- and even a reversal of the 1960s uptick in homicide and violent crime. This is from the FBI uniform crime statistics. You can see that there's a fairly low rate of violence in the '50s and the '60s, then it soared upward for several decades and began a precipitous decline, starting in the 1990s, so that it went back to the level that was last enjoyed in 1960. President Clinton, if you're here: thank you.
接下来以十年为单位观察 根据一些非政府组织的相关数据 从1945年起,在欧洲和美洲 国家间战争、严重种族暴乱和军事政变 数量急剧减少 即使在南美也是如此。在世界范围内 国家间战争的死亡率也急速下降。这里的黄色条 显示从1950年到现在每年每场战争的死亡数 正如你所见,死亡人数从1950年的65000例 每场战争每年,到近十年的2000例 每场战争每年,尽管这些战争显得很残酷。 就算是以年为单位也能看出暴力的减少 自从冷战终结,内战便很少发生 种族灭绝几乎绝迹。其实,数据从二战之后的最高点降低了90% 即使在60年代凶杀率和暴力行为有小的上升 这是联邦调查局犯罪统计数据。从中可知 在50至60年代暴力行为发生率相对较低 经历几十年的上升 在90年代开始骤降 直至回到60年代的水平 克林顿总统,如果你在的话,非常感谢
(Laughter)
(笑声)
So the question is: Why are so many people so wrong about something so important? I think there are a number of reasons. One of them is we have better reporting. The Associated Press is a better chronicler of wars over the surface of the earth than 16th-century monks were.
所以问题是:为什么对于如此重要的问题 有这么多人都持错误观点呢?我想原因很多 其一是有了更多的媒体报道。“在这个世界上, 美联社是比16世纪的僧人 更好的战争编年体作者。”
(Laughter)
There's a cognitive illusion. We cognitive psychologists know that the easier it is to recall specific instances of something, the higher the probability that you assign to it. Things that we read about in the paper with gory footage burn into memory more than reports of a lot more people dying in their beds of old age. There are dynamics in the opinion and advocacy markets; no one ever attracted advocates and donors by saying, "Things just seem to be getting better and better."
有这样一个认知幻觉:我们认知学家知道 越容易回忆一些具体的事情, 你就越容易去做。 我们每天读报纸中的血淋淋的描写 它们对我们记忆的影响远远大于更多人在床上老死的报道。 观点和市场宣传上有这么一说: 没有人能靠仅仅是说 “事情会变得越来越好的。" 来吸引围观者,宣讲者和捐赠者们
(Laughter)
(笑声)
There's guilt about our treatment of native peoples in modern intellectual life, and an unwillingness to acknowledge there could be anything good about Western culture. And, of course, our change in standards can outpace the change in behavior. One of the reasons violence went down is that people got sick of the carnage and cruelty in their time. That's a process that seems to be continuing, but if it outstrips behavior by the standards of the day, things always look more barbaric than they would have been by historic standards. So today, we get exercised -- and rightly so -- if a handful of murderers get executed by lethal injection in Texas after a 15-year appeal process. We don't consider that a couple of hundred years ago, they may have been burned at the stake for criticizing the king after a trial that lasted 10 minutes, and indeed, that that would have been repeated over and over again. Today, we look at capital punishment as evidence of how low our behavior can sink, rather than how high our standards have risen.
在现代文明社会,我们对待本土人的方式 以及不情愿承认西方文化一些好的方面 让我们觉得内疚 当然,我们标准的变化超过了我们行为的变化。 暴力下降的众多原因之一 人们对他们那时的屠杀和残忍性已经厌倦了。 那个过程可能看起来还在继续, 但是如果按照现在的标准它超过了行为, 事情比他们从历史标准上看来 要变得更加野蛮。所以,现在,我们受到训练--很应该地-- 如果有一小撮杀人犯经过15年的上诉程序 在得克萨斯受到注射死刑的惩罚。我们不认为 在几百年前,他们会因为批评国王 在经过10分钟的审判后 被处以火刑--的确,那种情形可能会 重复发生。今天,我们把极刑看成 我们行为沦落程度的证据 而不是我们的标准上升到多高的程度。
Well, why has violence declined? No one really knows, but I have read four explanations, all of which, I think, have some grain of plausibility. The first is: maybe Thomas Hobbes got it right. He was the one who said that life in a state of nature was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."
那么,为什么暴力下降了呢?没有人能真正回答这个问题, 但是,我读到过四种解释,我认为, 还是比较可信的。第一种解释是:或许 托马斯霍布斯是正确的。他说过 自然状态下的生命是“孤独,贫穷,肮脏,野蛮 和短暂的。”不是因为,他申辩到,
(Laughter)
Not because, he argued, humans have some primordial thirst for blood or aggressive instinct or territorial imperative, but because of the logic of anarchy. In a state of anarchy, there's a constant temptation to invade your neighbors preemptively, before they invade you.
人们对血腥行为,进攻本能或领土保护 的原始本能, 而是因为无政府状态的逻辑型。在无政府状态下, 在你的邻居侵犯你之前抢先侵占他们 是个永恒的诱惑。最近,托马斯霍布斯
More recently, Thomas Schelling gives the analogy of a homeowner who hears a rustling in the basement. Being a good American, he has a pistol in the nightstand, pulls out his gun, walks down the stairs. And what does he see but a burglar with a gun in his hand? Now, each one of them is thinking, "I don't really want to kill that guy, but he's about to kill me. Maybe I had better shoot him before he shoots me, especially since, even if he doesn't want to kill me, he's probably worrying right now that I might kill him before he kills me." And so on. Hunter-gatherer peoples explicitly go through this train of thought and will often raid their neighbors out of fear of being raided first.
将一个故事作为比喻。一位房东听到地下室沙沙的声音, 作为一位好美国公民,他的床头柜里有一把手枪 于是他装上子弹,走下楼梯。 他看到一个盗贼正拿着一把抢。 他们两个人都在想, “我不想杀掉那个人,但是他可能会杀我。 或许,我在他杀我之前,我有机会杀掉他, 虽然,他可能没有打算杀我, 他可能现在认为我在他杀掉我之前 我会先杀他。”等等,等等。 狩猎为生的人们经过这样清晰明确的思考, 通常会因为担心自己被杀害而先杀害他们的邻居。
Now, one way of dealing with this problem is by deterrence. You don't strike first, but you have a publicly announced policy that you will retaliate savagely if you are invaded. The only thing is that it's liable to having its bluff called, and therefore can only work if it's credible. To make it credible, you must avenge all insults and settle all scores, which leads to the cycles of bloody vendetta. Life becomes an episode of "The Sopranos." Hobbes's solution, "Leviathan," was that if authority for the legitimate use of violence was vested in a single democratic agency -- a leviathan -- then such a state can reduce the temptation of attack, because any kind of aggression will be punished, leaving its profitability zero. That would remove the temptation to invade preemptively out of fear of them attacking you first. It removes the need for a hair trigger for retaliation to make your deterrent threat credible, and therefore, it would lead to a state of peace. Eisner -- the man who plotted the homicide rates that you failed to see in the earlier slide -- argued that the timing of the decline of homicide in Europe coincided with the rise of centralized states. So that's a bit of a support for the leviathan theory. Also supporting it is the fact that we today see eruptions of violence in zones of anarchy, in failed states, collapsed empires, frontier regions, mafias, street gangs and so on.
现在,解决这个问题的一种方法是通过威慑: 你不先进攻,但是你先公开宣称 如果你受到侵犯,你将会进行野蛮报复。 这样公开宣称的唯一事情是 可被称为虚张声势,所以只能在其可信的情况下 变为可能。为了使其能够变为可能,你必须报复所有的侵犯 摆平所有的恩怨,但这会导致血腥复仇的循环圈。 人生变成了电视剧“黑道家族。”霍布斯的解决方法, “利维坦”,讲的是如果对暴力的合法使用权 是属于一个单一的民主机构--一种“利维坦”-- 然后这样一个国家能降低受到攻击的诱惑性, 因为任何一种进攻都将会受到惩罚, 进攻的好处变为零。那将会消除因为担心他人会先攻击你所以你 抢险攻击他人的诱惑性。 而且它能够消除为了使你自己的威慑变为可信的 一触即发的报复。因此,它会导致 一个国家的和平。艾斯纳--在前面的幻灯片你没看见的 划分杀人率的那个人-- 争辩道在欧洲杀人率下降的那个时期 恰逢中央集权的崛起。 那是对利维坦理论的一点小小的证明。 而且支持它的还有我们今天看到的在无政府地段 爆发的暴力行为:在失势的国家,崩溃的帝国, 边境地区,黑手党,街头帮派等等。
The second explanation is that in many times and places, there is a widespread sentiment that life is cheap. In earlier times, when suffering and early death were common in one's own life, one has fewer compunctions about inflicting them on others. And as technology and economic efficiency make life longer and more pleasant, one puts a higher value on life in general. This was an argument from the political scientist James Payne.
第二种解释是在很多次很多地方 有种认为生命卑贱的普遍看法。 早期,当受苦和早逝对于一个人 很平常的时候,人们对造成他人受苦或死亡的内疚感 不会强烈。当科技和经济有效地使 生命延长并且更愉快时,人们对生命的价值总体上有了更高的评价。 政治科学家詹姆斯佩恩对此有所论述。
A third explanation invokes the concept of a nonzero-sum game, and was worked out in the book "Nonzero" by the journalist Robert Wright. Wright points out that, in certain circumstances, cooperation or nonviolence can benefit both parties in an interaction, such as gains in trade when two parties trade their surpluses and both come out ahead, or when two parties lay down their arms and split the so-called peace dividend that results in them not having to fight the whole time. Wright argues that technology has increased the number of positive-sum games that humans tend to be embroiled in, by allowing the trade of goods, services and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of people. The result is that other people become more valuable alive than dead, and violence declines for selfish reasons. As Wright put it, "Among the many reasons that I think that we should not bomb the Japanese is that they built my minivan."
第三种解释用了“非零和游戏”的概念, 在记者罗伯特怀特的书“非零”中 有所讲述。怀特指出在特别情况下 合作,包括非暴力的,能够对相互的双方 都有利,比如交易的所得,当双方交换 他们的盈余,或者当双方 放下武器,分离所谓的和平界限 从而不会再发生战争。 怀特争辩说科技提升了“正和游戏" 的砝码,人类往往会陷入允许货物,贸易和思想 经过更长的旅途 在更多的人群中交换。 结果是其他人活着比死亡更加有用, 因为私自的原因,暴力下降了。如同怀特说的, ”在我认为我们不应该轰炸日本的众多原因之一是 他们建造了我的多功能休旅車。“
(Laughter)
(笑声)
The fourth explanation is captured in the title of a book called "The Expanding Circle," by the philosopher Peter Singer, who argues that evolution bequeathed humans with a sense of empathy, an ability to treat other people's interests as comparable to one's own. Unfortunately, by default, we apply it only to a very narrow circle of friends and family. People outside that circle are treated as subhuman and can be exploited with impunity. But, over history, the circle has expanded. One can see, in historical record, it expanding from the village, to the clan, to the tribe, to the nation, to other races, to both sexes and, in Singer's own arguments, something that we should extend to other sentient species. So the question is: If this has happened, what has powered that expansion?
第四种解释含在书题中 ”扩张的圈子“,由哲学家彼得辛格所写, 他争辩道进化遗留给人类 同情的感情:一种将他人的利益作为 自己的利益的一种能力。不幸的是,在默认状态下, 我们只将这种能力局限于朋友和家人的狭窄圈子中。 在圈外的人们被认为是次等人, 可以利用。但是经过历史, 圈子已经扩张了。可以看到的是,历史记录, 它从乡村扩张到氏族,扩张到部落, 扩张到国家,扩张到其他种族,扩张到两性 并且,在辛格自己的论文中,一些我们应该扩张到 其他有感情的物种的东西。问题是, 如果真是实现了,是什么驱使这种扩张?
And there are a number of possibilities, such as increasing circles of reciprocity in the sense that Robert Wright argues for. The logic of the Golden Rule -- the more you think about and interact with other people, the more you realize that it is untenable to privilege your interests over theirs, at least not if you want them to listen to you. You can't say that my interests are special compared to yours any more than you can say the particular spot that I'm standing on is a unique part of the universe because I happen to be standing on it that very minute. It may also be powered by cosmopolitanism, by histories and journalism and memoirs and realistic fiction and travel and literacy, which allows you to project yourself into the lives of other people that formerly you may have treated as subhuman, and also to realize the accidental contingency of your own station in life, the sense that "There but for fortune go I."
有很多种可能。在这个意义上增加 罗伯特怀特所认为的互惠圈。 黄金法则的逻辑是:你越为他人着想,越同他人交流, 你越多地意识到将你的利益凌驾于他人之上 是站不住脚的, 至少在你希望他们会听你的时候。你不能说 我的利益比你的利益更重要, 你说你正站在的那个地方 是宇宙中独特的一个地方 因为恰巧是你在那个时刻站在那个地方。 它也有可能是因世界主义而扩张:根据历史 新闻,回忆录和现实小说和旅行 以及文学,这些让你将自己融入 那些你认为是次等人的生活, 同时意识到你自己生命中的 偶然性;“听天由命”的感觉。
Whatever its causes, the decline of violence, I think, has profound implications. It should force us to ask not just, "Why is there war?" but also, "Why is there peace?" Not just, "What are we doing wrong?" but also, "What have we been doing right?" Because we have been doing something right, and it sure would be good to find out what it is. Thank you very much.
无论是什么原因,暴力的下降 具有深刻的影响。它应该迫使我们不仅要问:“为什么会有 战争?“而且要问”为什么会有和平?“不仅仅是 ”我们做错了什么?“还有”我们做对了什么?“ 因为我们做对了某些事, 找出我们做的对的事情一定没错。 非常谢谢大家。
(Applause)
(掌声)。
Chris Anderson: I loved that talk. I think a lot of people here in the room would say that that expansion you were talking about, that Peter Singer talks about, is also driven just by technology, by greater visibility of the other and the sense that the world is therefore getting smaller. I mean, is that also a grain of truth?
克里斯安德森(CA):我很喜爱这个讲话。我认为在这间屋子里的很多人都会说 那个扩张--你所讲到的那个, 彼得辛格所说的,同时也是因为科技, 因为其他人的可见性,因为对世界的感知使得一切都变小了 而扩张。我的意思是说,也有些道理吧?
Steven Pinker: Very much. It would fit both in Wright's theory, that it allows us to enjoy the benefits of cooperation over larger and larger circles. But also, I think it helps us imagine what it's like to be someone else. I think when you read of these horrific tortures that were common in the Middle Ages, you think, "How could they possibly have done it, how could they not have empathized with the person that they're disemboweling?" But clearly, as far as they're concerned, this is just an alien being that does not have feelings akin to their own. Anything, I think, that makes it easier to imagine trading places with someone else means that it increases your moral consideration to that other person.
史蒂芬品可:非常有道理。这既符合怀特的理论, 允许我们享受合作的利益 在一个更大更广的圈子中。而且,我认为它帮助我们 想象对于他人是什么样子。我认为当你读到 一些在中世纪很常见的那些可怕的遭遇的时候,你会想 他们怎么能做出那样的事情, 他们怎么能不同情他们残害的人? 但是明显的是, 对于他们而言,他们就像是外星人 不会对他们的同类有感情。任何事情,我认为, 能够将想象跟他人交换的情形 更容易的东西,意味着它能够增强 你对他人的道德心。 CA:非常好,史蒂夫,我希望每个新闻媒体的持有人在明年的时候都听到这段
CA: I'd love every news media owner to hear that talk at some point, it's so important.
讲话。我认为这太重要了。非常谢谢你。
CA: Thank you. SP: My pleasure.
SP:这是我的荣幸。