When I was a young officer, they told me to follow my instincts, to go with my gut, and what I've learned is that often our instincts are wrong.
Kad sam bio mladi časnik, rečeno mi je da slijedim svoje instikte, da budem hrabar, a ono što sam naučio jest da su naši instinkti često u krivu.
In the summer of 2010, there was a massive leak of classified documents that came out of the Pentagon. It shocked the world, it shook up the American government, and it made people ask a lot of questions, because the sheer amount of information that was let out, and the potential impacts, were significant. And one of the first questions we asked ourselves was why would a young soldier have access to that much information? Why would we let sensitive things be with a relatively young person?
U ljeto 2010, procurio je veliki broj povjerljivih dokumenata iz Pentagona. To je šokiralo svijet, uzdrmalo je američku vladu, a ljudi su počeli postavljati pitanja, jer je sama količina informacija koja je puštena kao i potencijalni utjecaji, bili značajni. Jedno od prvih pitanja koje smo si postavili je bilo zašto bi mladi vojnik imao pristup tako velikom broju informacija? Zašto bismo dopustili osjetljivim materijalima da budu kod relativno mlade osobe?
In the summer of 2003, I was assigned to command a special operations task force, and that task force was spread across the Mideast to fight al Qaeda. Our main effort was inside Iraq, and our specified mission was to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq. For almost five years I stayed there, and we focused on fighting a war that was unconventional and it was difficult and it was bloody and it often claimed its highest price among innocent people. We did everything we could to stop al Qaeda and the foreign fighters that came in as suicide bombers and as accelerants to the violence. We honed our combat skills, we developed new equipment, we parachuted, we helicoptered, we took small boats, we drove, and we walked to objectives night after night to stop the killing that this network was putting forward. We bled, we died, and we killed to stop that organization from the violence that they were putting largely against the Iraqi people.
U ljeto 2003., bio sam zapovjednik radne skupine na specijalnom zadatku koja je bila rasprostranjena na Bliskom Istoku kako bi se borila s al Qaeda-om. Naš najveći napor odnosio se na Irak, i naša posebna misija je bila da porazimo al Qaeda-u u Iraku. Tamo sam ostao gotovo pet godina, i usredotočili smo se na ratovanje koje je bilo nekonvencionalno i teško bilo je i krvavo a najčešće je uzimalo najviši danak među nedužnima. Učinili smo sve što smo mogli da zaustavimo al Quaeda-u i strane borce koji su dolazili kao bombaši samoubojice i tako pridonosili povećavanju nasilja. Usavršavali smo naše borbene vještine, razvili smo novu opremu, koristili pradobrane i helikoptere, uzimali smo malene brodove, vozili i hodali prema ciljevima iz noći u noć kako bismo zaustavili ubijanje koje je nametnula ova organizacija. Krvarili smo, umirali, i ubijali kako bismo spriječili tu organizaciju u nasilju kojeg su širili uglavnom protiv Iračana.
Now, we did what we knew, how we had grown up, and one of the things that we knew, that was in our DNA, was secrecy. It was security. It was protecting information. It was the idea that information was the lifeblood and it was what would protect and keep people safe. And we had a sense that, as we operated within our organizations, it was important to keep information in the silos within the organizations, particularly only give information to people had a demonstrated need to know. But the question often came, who needed to know? Who needed, who had to have the information so that they could do the important parts of the job that you needed? And in a tightly coupled world, that's very hard to predict. It's very hard to know who needs to have information and who doesn't. I used to deal with intelligence agencies, and I'd complain that they weren't sharing enough intelligence, and with a straight face, they'd look at me and they'd say, "What aren't you getting?" (Laughter) I said, "If I knew that, we wouldn't have a problem."
Naime, radili smo što smo znali, kako su nas odgojili, i jedna od stvari koje smo znali, koja je postojala u našem DNK, jest bila tajnovitost. Bila je sigurnost. Bila je zaštititi informaciju. Bila je ideja da je informacija žila kucavica i ono što treba zaštiti kako bi ljudi bili sigurni. Imali smo osjećaj za to, djelujući u našim organizacijama, bilo je važno držati informacije u silosima unutar organizacija, konkretno, davati ih samo ljudima koji su opravdali svoje zahtjeve za njom. Ali postavljalo se pitanje, tko treba znati? Tko je trebao, tko je morao imati informaciju kako bi učinili važne dijelove posla koji su tebi koristili? A u čvrsto grupiranom svijetu, to je vrlo teško za predvidjeti. Vrlo je teško znati tko treba imati informaciju a tko ne. Nekoć sam imao posla s tajnim službama, i žalio bih im se da ne dijele dovoljno informacija, i potpuno ozbiljni, oni bi me pogledali i rekli, „Što ne dobivaš?“ (Smijeh) Rekao sam, „Da to znam, ne bi imali problema.“
But what we found is we had to change. We had to change our culture about information. We had to knock down walls. We had to share. We had to change from who needs to know to the fact that who doesn't know, and we need to tell, and tell them as quickly as we can. It was a significant culture shift for an organization that had secrecy in its DNA.
Ali ono što smo shvatili jest da bismo se morali promijeniti. Morali bismo promjeniti našu kulturu u odnosu na informacije. Morali bismo srušiti zidove. Morali bismo dijeliti. Od pretpostavke tko treba znati trebali bismo prijeći na to da tko god ne zna, trebali bismo mu otkriti informaciju i to što brže moguće. To je bio značajan kulturalni preokret za organizaciju koja je imala tajnovitost u genima.
We started by doing things, by building, not working in offices, knocking down walls, working in things we called situation awareness rooms, and in the summer of 2007, something happened which demonstrated this. We captured the personnel records for the people who were bringing foreign fighters into Iraq. And when we got the personnel records, typically, we would have hidden these, shared them with a few intelligence agencies, and then try to operate with them. But as I was talking to my intelligence officer, I said, "What do we do?" And he said, "Well, you found them." Our command. "You can just declassify them." And I said, "Well, can we declassify them? What if the enemy finds out?" And he says, "They're their personnel records." (Laughter)
Počeli smo raditi stvari, graditi, ne radeći u uredima, rušeći zidove, radeći u kako smo ih zvali sobama za situacijsko osvještavanje, a u ljeto 2007, dogodilo se nešto što je demonstriralo to. Nabavili smo dokumente osoblja ljudi koji su dovodili strane borce u Irak. I kad smo dobili dokumente osoblja, tipično, sakrili bismo ih, podijelili ih s nekoliko tajnih službi, i onda pokušali djelovati s njima. No kako sam pričao sa časnikom svoje službe, Pitao sam „Što ćemo učiniti?“ A on je rekao, „Pa, ti si ih pronašao.“ Naše zapovjedništvo. „Ti ih možeš učiniti javnima.“ Ja sam pitao, „Dakle, možemo li ih označiti kao javne? Što ako neprijatelj sazna?“ A on je rekao, „To su dokumenti njihovog osoblja.“ (Smijeh)
So we did, and a lot of people got upset about that, but as we passed that information around, suddenly you find that information is only of value if you give it to people who have the ability to do something with it. The fact that I know something has zero value if I'm not the person who can actually make something better because of it. So as a consequence, what we did was we changed the idea of information, instead of knowledge is power, to one where sharing is power. It was the fundamental shift, not new tactics, not new weapons, not new anything else. It was the idea that we were now part of a team in which information became the essential link between us, not a block between us.
Stoga i jesmo, i mnogo ljudi se uznemirilo zbog toga, ali kako se informacija proširila, odjednom saznaš da je informacija jedino vrijedna ako je daš ljudima koji su sposobni učiniti nešto s njom. Činjenica da ja nešto znam nema nikakvu vrijednost ako ja nisam osoba koja zapravo može nešto poboljšati uz pomoć toga. Ono što smo napravili, za posljedicu je imalo promjenu ideje o informaciji , umjesto „znanje je moć“, u „dijeljenje je moć“. Bila je to temeljna prekretnica, nikakva nova taktika, nikakva nova oružja, ama baš ništa novo. Bila je to ideja da smo mi sad dio skupine u kojem je informacija postala osnovna poveznica a ne blokada, između nas.
And I want everybody to take a deep breath and let it out, because in your life, there's going to be information that leaks out you're not going to like. Somebody's going to get my college grades out, a that's going to be a disaster. (Laughter) But it's going to be okay, and I will tell you that I am more scared of the bureaucrat that holds information in a desk drawer or in a safe than I am of someone who leaks, because ultimately, we'll be better off if we share.
I želim da svi duboko udahnete i izdahnete, jer će u vašem životu, biti informacija koje će procuriti, a vama neće biti drago. Netko će objelodaniti moje ocjene s fakulteta, a to bi bila katastrofa. (Smijeh) Ali to će biti u redu, i reći ću vam da se više bojim birokrata koji drži informaciju u ladici ili u sefu nego nekoga koji ju otkrije, jer na kraju krajeva, bit će nam bolje ako dijelimo.
Thank you.
Hvala.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)
Helen Walters: So I don't know if you were here this morning, if you were able to catch Rick Ledgett, the deputy director of the NSA who was responding to Edward Snowden's talk earlier this week. I just wonder, do you think the American government should give Edward Snowden amnesty?
Helen Walters: Ne znam jeste li bili ovdje jutros, jeste li uspjeli uhvatiti Ricka Ledgetta, zamjenika direktora NSA koji je odgovarao na govor Edwarda Snowedena ranije ovog tjedna. Zanima me, smatrate li da američka vlada treba dati Edwardu amnestiju?
Stanley McChrystal: I think that Rick said something very important. We, most people, don't know all the facts. I think there are two parts of this. Edward Snowden shined a light on an important need that people had to understand. He also took a lot of documents that he didn't have the knowledge to know the importance of, so I think we need to learn the facts about this case before we make snap judgments about Edward Snowden. HW: Thank you so much. Thank you. (Applause)
Stanley McChrystal: Mislim da je Rick rekao nešto vrlo važno. Mi, većina, ne znamo sve činjenice. Držim da postoje dvije strane ovoga. Edward Snowden bacio je svijetlo na važnu potrebu koju ljudi trebaju razumijeti. On je također uzeo mnogo dokumenata za koje nije imao znanja razumijeti njihovu važnost, stoga mislim da trebamo shvatiti činjenice o ovom slučaju prije nego li brzamo s osudama o Edwardu Snowdenu. HW: Hvala puno. Hvala vam. (Pljesak)