Video: Narrator: An event seen from one point of view gives one impression. Seen from another point of view, it gives quite a different impression. But it's only when you get the whole picture you can fully understand what's going on.
影像:旁白:從一個觀點看一個事件, 讓人產生一種印象, 然從另一個觀點看時,又產生一種截然不同的印象。 唯有看到整體狀況,你才能完整瞭解事件 的進行狀況。
Sasha Vucinic: It's a great clip, isn't it? And I found that in 29 seconds, it tells more about the power of, and importance of, independent media than I could say in an hour. So I thought that it will be good to start with it. And also start with a little bit of statistics. According to relevant researchers, 83 percent of the population of this planet lives in the societies without independent press. Think about that number: 83 percent of the population on the whole planet does not really know what is going on in their countries. The information they get gets filtered through somebody who either twists that information, or colors that information, does something with it. So they're deprived of understanding their reality. That is just to understand how big and important this problem is. Now those of you who are lucky enough to live in those societies that represent 17 percent, I think should enjoy it until it lasts. You know, Sunday morning, you flick the paper, get your cappuccino. Enjoy it while it lasts. Because as we heard yesterday, countries can lose stars from their flags, but they can also lose press freedom, as I guess Americans among us can tell us more about. But that's totally another and separate topic. So I can go back to my story.
沙沙·維奇尼克:它是一部很棒的短片,不是嗎? 我發現這部短片在29秒內所要傳達 獨立媒體之力量和重要性 遠比我談一小時的內容還要有力。 所以我認為今天的主題很適合以它做開場。 也很適合先來看一些統計資料。 據相關研究指出,地球上83%的人口 生活在沒有獨立媒體的社會中。 仔細思考這個數字:全球83%的人口 並未真確知道他們的國家究竟發生什麼事。 他們所得的資訊已經被他人 以扭曲、渲染, 或以其它方式過濾了。 因此,他們被剝奪了瞭解事實的權利。 以上的內容主要讓我們瞭解這個問題有多重大。 現在在座的各位,是幸運生活在 那17%人口的社會裏, 我認為各位應該在獨立媒體續存時好好享有。 你知道嗎?當星期日早晨,你翻閱報紙,品用咖啡, 在它尚存時好好享受。 因為正如昨天我們得知的,一個國家不但能失去它自己國旗上的星星, 但能失去新聞自由。 我想在我們之中的美國朋友們會有很多話要分享, 但那會完全是另一個話題。 所以我要回到我自己的故事。
My story starts -- the story I want to share -- starts in 1991. At that time I was running B92, the only independent, for that matter the only electronic media, in the country. And I guess we were sharing -- we had that regular life of the only independent media in the country, operating in hostile environment, where government really wants to make your life miserable. And there are different ways. Yeah, it was the usual cocktail: a little bit of threats, a little bit of friendly advice, a little bit of financial police, a little bit of text control, so you always have somebody who never leaves your office. But what they really do, which is very powerful, and that is what governments in the late '90s started doing if they don't like independent media companies -- you know, they threaten your advertisers. Once they threaten your advertisers, market forces are actually, you know, destroyed, and the advertisers do not want to come -- no matter how much does it make sense for them -- do not want to come and advertise. And you have a problem making ends meet.
我要分享的故事始於1991年。 那時我正在經營B92,是整個國家唯一獨立 更可說是是唯一的電子媒體。 而那時認為我們正在分享的是——我們處在一個國家裏擁有唯一 獨立媒體的常態生活——政府欲使你 生活處於不幸的敵對環境。 它們用不同的方式, 那是一些慣用的手法: 帶著一點威脅,一點友善建議, 一點金融管制,一點文字控制。 所以總是有這麼一個人從不離開你們的辦公室。 但他們真正從事的事情卻是帶來很大的影響, 而這就是90年代後期政府開始做的事情, 即如果他們不喜歡獨立媒體公司, 你知道,他們就威脅你的廣告客戶。 一旦他們威脅你的廣告商, 市場力量實際上 你知道,就被摧毀了,廣告主他們不會來了。 不管有多少意義及理由應該刊登廣告, 他們都不願意, 而你的生計就會出問題了。
At that time at the beginning of the '90s, we had that problem, which was, you know, survival below one side, but what was really painful for me was, remember, the beginning of the '90s, Yugoslavia is falling apart. We were sitting over there with a country in a downfall, in a slow-motion downfall. And we all had all of that on tapes. We had the ability to understand what was going on. We were actually recording history. The problem was that we had to re-tape that history a week later; because if we did not, we could not afford enough tapes to keep archives of that history. So if I gave you that picture, I don't want to go too long on that. In that context a gentleman came to my office at that time. It was still 1991. He was running a media systems organization which is still in business, the gentleman is still in business. And what did I know at that time about media systems? I would think media systems were organizations, which means they should help you. So I prepared two plans for that meeting, two strategic plans: the small one and the big one. The small one was, I just wanted him to help us get those damn tapes, so we can keep that archive for the next 50 years. The big plan was to ask him for a 1,000,000-dollar loan. Because I thought, I still maintain, that serious and independent media companies are great business. And I thought that B92 will survive and be a great company once Milosevic is gone, which turned out to be true. It's now probably either the biggest or the second biggest media company in the country. And I thought that the only thing that we needed at that time was 1,000,000-dollar loan to take us through those hard times.
在90年代初期,我們遇到的問題, 你知道的,一方面是生存, 但最讓我痛苦的是, 記得在90年代初期,南斯拉夫正在瓦解。 我們在一旁觀望一個國家垮臺, 如慢動作般的垮臺。 而我們把這所有情形都錄下來。 我們有能力瞭解這事件的發展過程。 我們事實上就是在紀錄歷史。 問題就在一周後,我們要重錄歷史, 因為如果不重錄,我們負擔不起足夠的影帶將那段歷史存錄。 將那段歷史存錄。 我想給各位這個事件的概況,而不在這件事上多費時間說明。 在當時,一位先生來到我的辦公室。 當時仍是1991年。 那位先生在經營一家媒體系統組織, 這公司至今仍在營業,這位先生也還在業界。 而當時我哪了解媒體系統? 我認為既然是媒體系統, 就應該是幫助我們的組織。 因此我為了當時會議制定兩個策略計畫: 一個小計畫及一個大計畫。 小計畫是:我想讓他 幫我們把那些該死的錄影帶得手, 如此讓我們得以把完整的檔案存放50年; 大的計畫則是向他請求一百萬元的貸款, 因我當時認為,直到現在也仍認為, 嚴肅的獨立媒體公司是很大的事業。 此外,B92會存活下去, 且一旦米洛舍維奇下臺 (後來確事實成真),B92就會成為一家優秀的公司。 至今B92可能不是國家最大,也是第二大 的媒體公司了。 我當時認為我們唯一需要的, 就是那一百萬元帶領我們度過難關
To make a long story short, the gentleman comes into the office, great suit and tie. I gave him what I thought was a brilliant explanation of the political situation and explained how hard and difficult the war will be. Actually, I underestimated the atrocities, I have to admit. Anyway, after that whole, big, long explanation, the only question he had for me -- and this is not a joke -- is, are we paying royalties after we broadcast music of Michael Jackson? That was really the only question he had. He left, and I remember being actually very angry at myself because I thought there must be an institution in the world that is providing loans to media companies. It's so obvious, straight in your face, and somebody must have thought of it. Somebody must have started something like that. And I thought, I'm just dumb and I cannot find it. You know, in my defense, there was no Google at that time; you could not just Google in '91. So I thought that that's actually my problem. Now we go from here, fast forward to 1995.
長話短說,這位先生進來我們的辦公室, 很棒的的西裝領帶。 我給了他當時我自認精采的政治情勢說明, 述說政治情況將多惡劣, 戰爭會多艱難。 事實上,我還低估當時暴行的程度,我必須承認。 總之,在一番長篇說明後, 他向我提及唯一的問題是——這不是笑話—— 我們播放麥克.傑克遜的歌是否 須支付版權費? 這的確是他問的唯一一個問題。 當他離開後,我記得我很生自己的氣 因為我覺得這個世界上肯定有一個 提供貸款給媒體公司的機構。 這實在是太顯而易見, 而且一定有人想到 並開啟了先例。 我當時想著:我就是笨,所以我找不到這樣的機構。 不過在我的辯詞,當時還沒有谷歌; 91年不能用谷歌搜尋。 所以那時真的認為是我自己的問題。 現在,我們從這裏快轉到1995年。
I have -- I left the country, I have a meeting with George Soros, trying for the third time to convince him that his foundation should invest in something that should operate like a media bank. And basically what I was saying is very simple. You know, forget about charity; it doesn't work. Forget about handouts; 20,000 dollars do not help anybody. What you should do is you should treat media companies as a business. It's business anywhere. Media business, or any other business, it needs to be capitalized. And what these guys need, actually, is access to capital. So third meeting, arguments are pretty well exercised. At the end of the meeting he says, look, it is not going to work; you will never see your money back; but my foundations will put 500,000 dollars so you can test the idea. See that it will not work. He said, I'll give you a rope to hang yourself. (Laughter) I knew two things after that meeting. First, under no circumstances I want to hang myself. And second, that I have no idea how to make it work. You see, at the level of a concept, it was a great concept. But it's one thing to have a concept; it's a totally separate thing to actually make it work.
我已經離開那個國家。我要與喬治•索羅斯會面, 並第三次嘗試說服他的基金會應該 投資一個運作 如媒體銀行的機構。 基本上我的說明很簡單: 你知道,忘掉慈善機構,那是行不通的; 忘掉捐款,兩萬塊並幫不了任何人。 你們應該將媒體公司視為商業組織。 現今,商業無所不在。 媒體商業如其他商業一樣,都需要資本。 他們真正需要的是獲取資本的管道。 所以這第三次會面,我的論點已經說明很徹底。 會面將結束時他說 “我跟你說,這個主意行不通,你的投資會無法回收。 但是我的基金會給你50萬,讓你驗證這個主意, 證明它不會成功。 他說,“我會給你一條繩讓你上吊。” (笑聲) 會後我釐清了兩件事。 第一,無論如何我都不會上吊; 第二,我不知道該如何使我的想法付諸實行。 從概念的層面來看,這是個很好的概念。 但是有個好概念是一回事, 將其付諸實現又完全是另外一回事。
So I had absolutely no idea how that could actually work. Had the wrong idea; I thought that we can be a bank. You see banks -- I don't know if there are any bankers over here; I apologize in advance -- but it's the best job in the world. You know, you find somebody who is respectable and has a lot of money. You give them more money; they repay you that over a time. You collect interest and do nothing in between. So I thought, why don't we get into that business? (Laughter) So here we are having our first client, brilliant. First independent newspaper in Slovakia. The government cutting them off from all the printing facilities in Bratislava. So here's the daily newspaper that has to be printed 400 kilometers away from the capital. It's a daily newspaper with a deadline of 4 p.m. That means that they have no sports; they have no latest news; circulation goes down. It's a kind of very nice, sophisticated way how to economically strangle a daily newspaper. They come to us with a request for a loan. They want to -- the only way for them to survive is to get a printing press. And we said, that's fine; let's meet; you'll bring us your business plan, which eventually they did.
所以我完全不知道該如何實際執行。 我認為我們可以成為銀行的想法是錯誤的。 你想想銀行——不知道在座的有沒有銀行家, 我提前道歉,銀行家確實是世界上最好的工作了。 你找一個有名望 又有錢的人, 你給他更多的錢;他在一段時間內償還給你。 在此期間,你什麼都不用做,只收利息。 所以我當時想:為什麼我們不做這種生意? (笑聲) 我們的第一個客戶來了。很傑出—— 斯洛伐克的第一家獨立報社。 政府切斷他們 在布拉迪斯拉發印刷的任何管道。 因此這一份日報, 須在離首都400公里外印刷。 一份每天下午4點發行的日報。 這就意味著他們沒有體育新聞, 沒有最新報導,發行量下降。 這是一種相當漂亮高明地 從經濟上扼殺日報生存的方式。 這家報社向我們尋求貸款。 他們存活下去的唯一出路, 目的就是要買一台印刷機—— 我們說,好啊,那會個面吧, 你把你的事業計畫帶來。他們最終拿來了。
We start the meeting. I get these two pieces of paper, not like this, A4 format, so it's much bigger. A lot of numbers there. A lot of numbers. But however you put it, you know, the numbers do not make any sense. And that's the best they could do. We were the best that they could do. So that is how we understood what our method is. It's not a bank. We had to actually go into these companies and earn our return by fixing them -- by establishing management systems, by providing all that knowledge, how do you run a business on one side -- while they all know how to run, how to create content.
會議開始時, 我拿著兩張紙,不是像A4這樣的紙, 是還要大很多。 上面有很多數字,很多數字。 但是不管你怎麼解讀,這些數字 並未表示意義。 而這是他們最多能做的程度。 他們真的只能做到這個程度。 因此我們去了解我們的方法為何。 它不是銀行。我們必須真正 深入這些公司 藉解決問題以獲取報酬,如建置管理系統 及提供商業運作知識 ——而他們精通的是如何運作及創造內容。
Just quickly on the results. Over these 10 years, 40 million dollars in affordable financing, average interest rate five percent to six percent. Lately we are going wild, charging seven percent from time to time. We do it in 17 countries of the developing world. And here is the most stunning number. Return rate -- the one that Soros was so worried about -- 97 percent. 97 percent of all the scheduled repayments came back to us on time. What do we typically finance? We finance anything that a media company would need, from printing presses to transmitters. What is most important is we do it either in form of loans, equities, lease -- whatever is appropriate for, you know, supporting anybody. But what is most important here is, who do we finance? We believe that in the last 10 years companies that we've financed are actually the best media companies in the developing world. That is a "Who is Who" list. And I could spend hours talking about them, because they're all kind of heroes. And I can, but I'll give you just, maybe one, and depending on time I may give you two examples who we work with.
很快說明我們的結果。 超過這10年內, 4千萬元資金的可貸範圍, 平均利息5%到6%。 最近我們有些瘋狂:有時候我們索價7%的利息。 我們在17個開發中國家運作。 下面是最驚人的數字。 報酬率——也是索羅斯所擔心的——97%。 97%還款按期準時回來。 我們一般提供融資給那些項目? 我們提供融資給一家體公司所需要的任何東西, 從印刷流程到傳輸。 最重要的是我們融資的形式 —— 貸款、入股、或租賃—— 無論你適合何種形式,我們都支持。 但最重要的是,我們融資給誰? 我相信過去10年內 我們融資的公司,事實上是開發中國家裏最好的媒體公司。 最好的媒體公司。 有這麼一個“名人錄”。 有關他們的故事我可以花上幾個小時談, 因為他們某種程度上都可以稱是英雄。 而我或許就講一個我們自己接觸的例子, 視時間而定,我可以提供給大家 與我們一起工作的兩個例子。
You see we started working in Eastern and Central Europe, and moved to Russia. Our first loan in Russia was in Chelyabinsk. I'll bet half of you have never heard of that place. In the south of Russia there's a guy called Boris Nikolayevich Kirshin, who is running an independent newspaper there. The city was closed until early '90s because, of all things, they were producing glass for Tupolev planes. Anyway, he's running independent newspaper there. After two years working with us, he becomes the most respected newspaper in that small place. Governor comes to him one day, actually invites him to come to his office. He goes and sees the governor. The governor says, Boris Nikolayevich, I understand you are doing a great job, and you are the most respected newspaper in our district. And I want to offer you a deal. Can you please give me your newspaper for the next nine months, because I have elections -- there are elections coming up in nine months. I will not run, but it's very important for me who is going to succeed me. So give me the paper for nine months. I'll give it back to you. I have no interest in being in media business. How much would that cost? Boris Nikolayevich says, "It's not for sale." The governor says, "We will close you." Boris Nikolayevich says, "No, you cannot do it." Six months later the newspaper was closed. Luckily, we had enough time to help Boris Nikolayevich take all the assets out of that company and bring him into a new one, to get all the subscription lists, rehire staff. So what the governor got was an empty shell. But that is what happens if you're in business of independent media, and if you are a banker for independent media. So it sounds like a great story.
你可以看到我們起初在東歐和中歐運作, 之後轉移俄國。 我們在俄羅斯的第一份貸款是在車裏阿賓斯克州。 我敢打賭在座有一半沒有聽過那個地方。 在俄羅斯南部,有一個叫 伯利斯•尼古拉斯維奇的人, 在那兒辦獨立報紙。 這城市直到90年代初前都是封閉的。 他們在為托波力飛機生產玻璃。 總之,他在那裏辦獨立報紙。 與我們一起工作兩年後,他的報紙 為當地聲望最高。 有一天總督來找他, 事實上是請他去總督辦公室。 他去見總督。總督說: 伯利斯•尼古拉斯維奇,我知道你辦報辦得很好, 也是我們區裏最有聲望的。 我想跟你作筆交易。 之後九個月裏,請你將報紙交給我辦, 因為我有選舉 九個月後有選舉。 我不參選,但是我很重視 由誰繼任我。 所以你把報紙交給我九個月,我會再還給你, 我沒興趣待在媒體業裡。 你想出價多少? 伯利斯•尼古拉斯維奇說:“報社不賣。” 總督說:“我要把你的報社關了。” 伯利斯•尼古拉斯維奇說:“你關不了。” 六個月後報社被關掉。 幸好我們有足夠的時間幫助伯利斯•尼古拉斯維奇 把原來公司的資產帶到新公司, 並把訂閱名單弄到手,重新僱用員工。 最後總督得到的只是一個空殼。 然而處於獨立媒體業裏 當獨立媒體業的銀行家 就是如此發生。 因此聽起來這是個很了不起的故事。
Somewhere down the road we opened a media management center. We started our media lab, sounds like a real great story. But there is a second angle to that. The second angle, like in this clip. If you take the camera above, you start thinking about these numbers again. 40 million dollars over 10 years spread over 17 countries. That is not too much, is it? It's actually just a drop in the sea. Because when you think about the importance, some of the issues that we were talking about last night -- this last session we had about Africa and his hypothetical 50 billion dollars destined for Africa. All of those, not all, half of those problems mentioned last night -- government accountability, corruption, how do you fight corruption, giving voice to unheard, to poor -- it's why independent media is in business. And it's why it was invented. So from that perspective, what we did is just really one drop in the sea of that need that we can identify. Now ours is just one story.
一段時間後,我們開了一家媒體管理中心, 創立媒體實驗室,這聽起來很棒。 但這裡有第二個角度去看事情, 但是從第二個個角度來看,就像那部短片一樣, 另一個角度就是 當你用攝像機,你開始再想想 那些數字。 超過10年的時間4千萬元分散至17個國家裏。 那並不很多,是不是? 其實這是杯水車薪。 因為當你考慮到問題的重要性時— 當中有些議題是昨晚我們討論的, 比如上一回關於非洲的演講及 假設輸送給非洲的500億元。 昨晚所有的問題,至少有一半的問題 —— 政府責任,腐敗,如何對抗腐敗, 給底層人、窮人發聲的機會— — 這就是為什麼獨立媒體有市場, 會被創造。 所以從此觀點來看,獨立媒體這麼大的市場需求 , 我們做的真的僅是冰山一角。 我們的故事僅是其中一個小故事。
I'm sure that in this room there are, like, 15 other wonderful stories of nonprofits doing spectacular work. Here is where the problem is, and I'll explain to you as well as I can what the problem is. And it's called fundraising. Imagine that this third of this room is filled with people who represent different foundations. Imagine two thirds over here running excellent organizations, doing very important work. Now imagine that every second person over here is deaf, does not hear, and switch the lights off. Now that is how difficult it is to match people from this side of the room with people of that side of the room. So we thought that some kind of a big idea is needed to reform, to totally rethink fundraising. You know, instead of people running in this dark, trying to find their own match, who will be willing, who has the same goals. Instead of all of that we thought there is -- something new needs to be invented. And we came up with this idea of issuing bonds, press freedom bonds. If there are investors willing to finance U.S. government budget deficit, why wouldn't we find investors willing to finance press freedom deficit? We've decided to do it this fall; we will issue them, probably in denominations of 1,000 dollars. I don't want to advertise them too much; that's not the point. But the point is, if we ever survive to actually issue them, find enough investors that this can be considered a success, there's nothing stopping the next organization to start to issue bonds next spring. And those can be environmental bonds. And then two weeks later, Iqbal Quadir can issue his electricity in Bangladesh bonds. And before you know it, any social cause can be actually financed in this way.
我相信在這個房間裡,有其他15個 非營利組織的精采經營故事。 而這就是問題所在, 我向大家解釋問題到底是什麼。 這問題就是籌資。 假設這間屋子有三分之一坐滿了 不同基金會的代表。 另外三分之二則是運作優秀的組織, 做著非常重要的工作。 現在想像這邊每兩人有一人 是耳聾,聽不見,然後把屋裡的電燈關了, 把房間這邊的人配對 給這房間另一邊的人 之困難就是如此。 因此我們認為需要大創意 進行改革、重新思考籌資。 不讓人們在黑暗中 盲目尋找 志同 道合的對象。 此新的運作方式必須發展, 因我們想出發行債券的主意、新聞自由債券。 新聞自由債券。 如果有投資者願為 美國政府預算赤字融資, 難道我們找不到願為 “新聞自由赤字” 投資的人嗎? 我們已經決定今年秋天開始進行, 預計是面值1000元的債券。 我不想在這兒打太多廣告,這不是演講的重點。 重點是,如果我們能真正生存去發行債券, 找到足夠的投資者而使其成功, 說不定另一個組織 明年春天就開始發行債券, 他們發行可能是環境債券。 可能再過兩個星期,伊克柏•卡迪爾開始 在孟加拉發行電力債券。 無形之中,任何一個社會性原因 都可以找到融資的方法。
Now we do daydreaming in 11:30 with 55 seconds left. But let's take the idea further. You do it, you start it in the States, because it's, you know, concepts are very, very close to American minds. But you can actually bring it to Europe, too. You can bring it to Asia. You can, once you have all of those different points, you can make it easy for investors. Put all of those bonds at one place and they sit down and click. Once you have more than 10 of them you have to develop some kind of a matrix. What do investors get? On one side financial, on the other side social. So that brings the idea of some kind of rating agency, Morningstar type. It says, you know, social impact over here is spectacular, five stars. Financial, they give you one percent, only one star. Now take it to the last step. Once you have all of that put together, there's not one reason why you couldn't actually have a marketplace for all of that, where you cannot dispose of all of those bonds in a pretty quick way. And in that way you organize the financing so there are no dark rooms, no blind people running around to find each other.
現在是11:30我們還有55秒的時間做白日夢。 讓我們進一步思考這個想法。 我們在美國開始進行,因為這些 概念很貼近美國人的思維。 然而你也完全可以把它帶到歐洲, 帶到亞洲去實行。 當你擁有這些地方之所有不同觀點都在實行時, 你就可以讓投資變得更簡易。 把這些債券放在一起, 讓投資者坐下來點擊。 若達超過10種債券時, 你必須發展一些模型。 投資者從中獲得什麼? 一方面是經濟利益,一方面是社會影響力。 由此產生了類似 晨星的評級機構想法。 如社會影響力在這邊很重要,給五個星。 經濟回報僅1%,只給一個星。 再把這個概念帶到到最後一步, 一旦這些條件齊全了, 就沒有理由不能設立 一家交易場所, 能很快地進行債券處理 及組織所要的融資 如此一來交易就不會有黑房間, 無人盲目地相互找尋對方了,
Thank you.
謝謝。