Video: Narrator: An event seen from one point of view gives one impression. Seen from another point of view, it gives quite a different impression. But it's only when you get the whole picture you can fully understand what's going on.
(影像:旁白:同一个事件,从一个角度看 让人产生一种印象。 从另一个角度看,又让人产生一种完全不同的印象。 但只有看到整个画面,才能了解 全部真相。)
Sasha Vucinic: It's a great clip, isn't it? And I found that in 29 seconds, it tells more about the power of, and importance of, independent media than I could say in an hour. So I thought that it will be good to start with it. And also start with a little bit of statistics. According to relevant researchers, 83 percent of the population of this planet lives in the societies without independent press. Think about that number: 83 percent of the population on the whole planet does not really know what is going on in their countries. The information they get gets filtered through somebody who either twists that information, or colors that information, does something with it. So they're deprived of understanding their reality. That is just to understand how big and important this problem is. Now those of you who are lucky enough to live in those societies that represent 17 percent, I think should enjoy it until it lasts. You know, Sunday morning, you flick the paper, get your cappuccino. Enjoy it while it lasts. Because as we heard yesterday, countries can lose stars from their flags, but they can also lose press freedom, as I guess Americans among us can tell us more about. But that's totally another and separate topic. So I can go back to my story.
沙沙维基尼:非常好的一个短片,是不是? 我发现这个短片在29秒内所表达的 独立媒体的威力和重要性 比我讲一个小时的话还要有力。 所以我认为今天的演讲以它开头很恰当。 下面我们来看一些统计数据。 据有关研究表明,这个星球上83%的人口 生活在没有独立媒体的社会中。 仔细想想这个数字:这个星球上83%的人 并不知道他们的国家里究竟在发生什么事。 他们得到的信息已经被别人 以歪曲事实、添油加醋、或其他方式 过滤了。 就这样,他们被剥夺了了解事实的权利。 以上说的这些让我们了解了这个问题有多大、多重要。 那么在座的各位中生活在另外那17%的社会里的, 希望你们在独立媒体尚存的时候好好珍惜。 星期日早晨,你翻开报纸,品着咖啡, 在它尚存时好好珍惜。 这么说是因为我们昨天听说了,一个国家不仅能丢掉她国旗上的星星, 还能丢掉新闻自由, 我想我们中间的美国朋友们就此有很多话要讲。 那完全是另一个话题了。 所以现在回到我自己的故事。
My story starts -- the story I want to share -- starts in 1991. At that time I was running B92, the only independent, for that matter the only electronic media, in the country. And I guess we were sharing -- we had that regular life of the only independent media in the country, operating in hostile environment, where government really wants to make your life miserable. And there are different ways. Yeah, it was the usual cocktail: a little bit of threats, a little bit of friendly advice, a little bit of financial police, a little bit of text control, so you always have somebody who never leaves your office. But what they really do, which is very powerful, and that is what governments in the late '90s started doing if they don't like independent media companies -- you know, they threaten your advertisers. Once they threaten your advertisers, market forces are actually, you know, destroyed, and the advertisers do not want to come -- no matter how much does it make sense for them -- do not want to come and advertise. And you have a problem making ends meet.
我要讲的故事始于1991年。 那时我在办B92,是整个国家唯一的独立、 甚至是唯一的电子媒体。 我想那时我们的处境——我们过的是一个国家里 唯一独立媒体司空见惯的生活——政府非制你于悲惨境地中不可, 这样一个敌对的环境下。 他们运用各种方式, 也就是那些惯用伎俩: 一点儿威胁,一点儿友善建议, 一点儿经济管制,一点儿文字控制。 所以总有这么一个人从不离开我们的办公室。 但是他们真正做的一件很有威力的, 也就是90年代后期那些政府开始做的一件事,就是 如果他们不喜欢独立媒体公司, 他们就威胁你的广告客户。 一旦他们威胁你的广告商, 市场力量实际上就被毁害了, 不管那些广告商有多少理由应该来, 他们都不愿再来刊登广告了。 这下你的生计就出问题了。
At that time at the beginning of the '90s, we had that problem, which was, you know, survival below one side, but what was really painful for me was, remember, the beginning of the '90s, Yugoslavia is falling apart. We were sitting over there with a country in a downfall, in a slow-motion downfall. And we all had all of that on tapes. We had the ability to understand what was going on. We were actually recording history. The problem was that we had to re-tape that history a week later; because if we did not, we could not afford enough tapes to keep archives of that history. So if I gave you that picture, I don't want to go too long on that. In that context a gentleman came to my office at that time. It was still 1991. He was running a media systems organization which is still in business, the gentleman is still in business. And what did I know at that time about media systems? I would think media systems were organizations, which means they should help you. So I prepared two plans for that meeting, two strategic plans: the small one and the big one. The small one was, I just wanted him to help us get those damn tapes, so we can keep that archive for the next 50 years. The big plan was to ask him for a 1,000,000-dollar loan. Because I thought, I still maintain, that serious and independent media companies are great business. And I thought that B92 will survive and be a great company once Milosevic is gone, which turned out to be true. It's now probably either the biggest or the second biggest media company in the country. And I thought that the only thing that we needed at that time was 1,000,000-dollar loan to take us through those hard times.
当时在90年代初期,我们遇到的难题 一方面是生存, 但最让我痛心的是我以下要讲的。 大家记得,90年代初,南斯拉夫正在瓦解。 我们在一旁观望一个国家垮台, 慢动作一般的垮台。 我们把这一切都录了下来。 我们有能力了解整个事件的过程。 其实就是在纪录历史。 问题是一周后,我们要重录历史, 因为如果不重录,我们买不起足够的录像带 将那段历史存档。 我只想给大家一个概况,不在说这件事上多费时间。 在那样一个背景下,一位先生来到我的办公室。 当时还是1991年。 那位先生在经营一家媒体管理机构, 这个机构现在还有生意,这位先生也还有生意。 当时我哪懂什么媒体管理啊? 我认为既然是媒体管理机构, 就应该帮助我们。 我为同先生的会议制定了两个战略方案: 一个小方案,一个大方案。 小方案是:我就想让他帮我们 把那些该死的录像带弄到手, 好让我们把完整的档案存放50年。 大的方案是找他要一百万元的贷款, 因为我当时——直到现在也仍然认为 严肃的独立媒体是很有潜力的企业。 B92一定会存活下去,而且一旦米洛舍维奇下台 (后来确如我所料),B92就会成为一家优秀的企业。 现在B92恐怕不是那个国家最大 也是第二大的媒体公司了。 我当时认为我们唯一需要的就是 一百万块钱带我们度过难关。
To make a long story short, the gentleman comes into the office, great suit and tie. I gave him what I thought was a brilliant explanation of the political situation and explained how hard and difficult the war will be. Actually, I underestimated the atrocities, I have to admit. Anyway, after that whole, big, long explanation, the only question he had for me -- and this is not a joke -- is, are we paying royalties after we broadcast music of Michael Jackson? That was really the only question he had. He left, and I remember being actually very angry at myself because I thought there must be an institution in the world that is providing loans to media companies. It's so obvious, straight in your face, and somebody must have thought of it. Somebody must have started something like that. And I thought, I'm just dumb and I cannot find it. You know, in my defense, there was no Google at that time; you could not just Google in '91. So I thought that that's actually my problem. Now we go from here, fast forward to 1995.
长话短说,这位先生来到了我们的办公室, 很漂亮的西服领带。 我给了他我当时认为是很精彩的一番阐述: 政治气候多恶劣,战争 会多艰难。 现在想起来,我当时还低估了暴行的残忍程度呢。 总之,一番长篇阐述之后, 他问的唯一一个问题是——我说的可不是笑话—— 我们广播迈克尔·杰克逊的歌是否要交 版权费? 这确实是他问的唯一一个问题。 我记得他走后我很生我自己的气 因为我觉得这个世界上肯定有一个给媒体公司 提供贷款的机构。 这个主意太显而易见了, 一定有人已经想到了。 一定有人已经开启了这类的先例。 我当时想:我这么笨,找不到这样的一个机构的。 不过我也有辩词:当时没有谷歌; 91年不能用谷歌搜索。 所以我当时认为是我本身有问题。 从这里开始,快放到1995年。
I have -- I left the country, I have a meeting with George Soros, trying for the third time to convince him that his foundation should invest in something that should operate like a media bank. And basically what I was saying is very simple. You know, forget about charity; it doesn't work. Forget about handouts; 20,000 dollars do not help anybody. What you should do is you should treat media companies as a business. It's business anywhere. Media business, or any other business, it needs to be capitalized. And what these guys need, actually, is access to capital. So third meeting, arguments are pretty well exercised. At the end of the meeting he says, look, it is not going to work; you will never see your money back; but my foundations will put 500,000 dollars so you can test the idea. See that it will not work. He said, I'll give you a rope to hang yourself. (Laughter) I knew two things after that meeting. First, under no circumstances I want to hang myself. And second, that I have no idea how to make it work. You see, at the level of a concept, it was a great concept. But it's one thing to have a concept; it's a totally separate thing to actually make it work.
我已经离开了那个国家。我要会面乔治·索罗斯, 这是我第三次力争说服 他的基金会投资一个类似 媒体银行的机构。 我说的大体很简单: 忘掉慈善机构,行不通的; 忘掉捐款,两万块钱帮不了任何人。 我们应该视媒体公司为商业机构。 当今,商业无处不在。 媒体商业和其它商业一样,需要资本。 他们真正需要的是获取资本的途径。 这第三次会面,我的论据摆的很彻底了。 会面将结束时他说, “我跟你说,这个想法行不通,你的投资看不见回报。 但是我的基金会给你50万,让你验证这个主意。 证明它不会成功。” 他说,“我等于给了你一条上吊绳。” (笑声) 会后我弄清了两件事。 第一,不论怎样我都不会上吊。 第二,我不知道如何将我的主意付诸现实。 从理论的层面看,这是个很好的概念。 但是有个好概念是一回事, 将其付诸事实又完全是另外一回事。
So I had absolutely no idea how that could actually work. Had the wrong idea; I thought that we can be a bank. You see banks -- I don't know if there are any bankers over here; I apologize in advance -- but it's the best job in the world. You know, you find somebody who is respectable and has a lot of money. You give them more money; they repay you that over a time. You collect interest and do nothing in between. So I thought, why don't we get into that business? (Laughter) So here we are having our first client, brilliant. First independent newspaper in Slovakia. The government cutting them off from all the printing facilities in Bratislava. So here's the daily newspaper that has to be printed 400 kilometers away from the capital. It's a daily newspaper with a deadline of 4 p.m. That means that they have no sports; they have no latest news; circulation goes down. It's a kind of very nice, sophisticated way how to economically strangle a daily newspaper. They come to us with a request for a loan. They want to -- the only way for them to survive is to get a printing press. And we said, that's fine; let's meet; you'll bring us your business plan, which eventually they did.
所以我完全不知道如何实际运作。 我最初的想法是错误的,以为我们可以成为银行。 你想想银行——不知道在座的有没有银行家, 我提前道歉,银行家确实是世界上最好的工作了。 你找到一个有名望 又有钱的人。 你给他更多的钱;他在一段时间内偿还给你。 在此期间,你什么都不做,只收利息。 所以我当时想:我们为什么不做这种买卖呢? (笑声) 我们的第一个客户来了。很杰出—— 斯洛伐克的第一家独立报社。 政府不允许他们在布拉迪斯拉发 任何一家印刷厂印刷。 这么一份日报 要在离首都400公里外印刷。 一份每天下午4点发行的日报。 这就意味着他们没有体育新闻, 没有最新报导。发行量下降。 这是一种非常漂亮高明的 从经济上扼杀一份日报的方式。 这家报社向我们寻求贷款。 目的就是要买一台印刷机——他们存活下去的 唯一出路。 我们说,好啊,那咱们就会面吧, 你把你的业务计划拿来。他们最终倒是拿来了。
We start the meeting. I get these two pieces of paper, not like this, A4 format, so it's much bigger. A lot of numbers there. A lot of numbers. But however you put it, you know, the numbers do not make any sense. And that's the best they could do. We were the best that they could do. So that is how we understood what our method is. It's not a bank. We had to actually go into these companies and earn our return by fixing them -- by establishing management systems, by providing all that knowledge, how do you run a business on one side -- while they all know how to run, how to create content.
我们的会面开始。 我手里拿着两张纸,不是这样的纸,是A4的, 比这纸要大很多。 上面有很多数字,很多数字。 但是不管你横竖怎么看,都看不懂 这些数字是什么意思。 他们只能做到这个程度。 他们真的只能做到这个程度。 所以我们就这样明白了应该如何运作。 我们不是银行。我们必须进入 这些公司里去挣我们的回报, 解决他们的问题——建立管理系统, 提供商业运作的知识, ——而他们精通的是如何撰写报纸的内容。
Just quickly on the results. Over these 10 years, 40 million dollars in affordable financing, average interest rate five percent to six percent. Lately we are going wild, charging seven percent from time to time. We do it in 17 countries of the developing world. And here is the most stunning number. Return rate -- the one that Soros was so worried about -- 97 percent. 97 percent of all the scheduled repayments came back to us on time. What do we typically finance? We finance anything that a media company would need, from printing presses to transmitters. What is most important is we do it either in form of loans, equities, lease -- whatever is appropriate for, you know, supporting anybody. But what is most important here is, who do we finance? We believe that in the last 10 years companies that we've financed are actually the best media companies in the developing world. That is a "Who is Who" list. And I could spend hours talking about them, because they're all kind of heroes. And I can, but I'll give you just, maybe one, and depending on time I may give you two examples who we work with.
简短的说一下我们的成绩。 10年内,4千万元可负担贷款, 平均利息5%到6%。 最近我们有些疯狂:有时候要7%的利息。 我们在17个发展中国家运作。 下面是最惊人的数字。 回报率——也是索罗斯最担心的——97%。 97%还款按期回来了。 我们一般融资给那些项目? 一个媒体公司所需要的任何东西, 从印刷机到发射机。 最重要的是我们融资的形式—— 贷款、入股、或租赁—— 哪种形式适合你,我们提供哪种。 但最最重要的是,我们给谁融资? 我认为过去10年内我们融资的公司 是发展中国家里最好的 媒体公司。 有这么一个“名人录”。 他们的故事我能讲几个小时, 因为他们在某种程度上都是英雄。 但是我就讲一个我们接触的例子, 如果时间允许,我可能讲给大家 两个例子。
You see we started working in Eastern and Central Europe, and moved to Russia. Our first loan in Russia was in Chelyabinsk. I'll bet half of you have never heard of that place. In the south of Russia there's a guy called Boris Nikolayevich Kirshin, who is running an independent newspaper there. The city was closed until early '90s because, of all things, they were producing glass for Tupolev planes. Anyway, he's running independent newspaper there. After two years working with us, he becomes the most respected newspaper in that small place. Governor comes to him one day, actually invites him to come to his office. He goes and sees the governor. The governor says, Boris Nikolayevich, I understand you are doing a great job, and you are the most respected newspaper in our district. And I want to offer you a deal. Can you please give me your newspaper for the next nine months, because I have elections -- there are elections coming up in nine months. I will not run, but it's very important for me who is going to succeed me. So give me the paper for nine months. I'll give it back to you. I have no interest in being in media business. How much would that cost? Boris Nikolayevich says, "It's not for sale." The governor says, "We will close you." Boris Nikolayevich says, "No, you cannot do it." Six months later the newspaper was closed. Luckily, we had enough time to help Boris Nikolayevich take all the assets out of that company and bring him into a new one, to get all the subscription lists, rehire staff. So what the governor got was an empty shell. But that is what happens if you're in business of independent media, and if you are a banker for independent media. So it sounds like a great story.
我们起初在东欧和中欧运作, 然后搬到俄罗斯。 我们在俄罗斯的第一份贷款是在车里雅宾斯克州。 在座的一半恐怕根本没有听说过那个地方。 在俄罗斯南部,有一个叫 鲍里斯·尼古拉耶维奇[语音不清]的人在那儿 办一份独立报纸。 这个城市直到90年代初都是封闭的 因为他们恰巧给筒式[语音不清]飞机生产玻璃。 总之,他在那儿办一份独立报纸。 与我们合作两年后,他的报纸在 那个小城市声望最高。 有一天总督来找他, 哦,是请他去总督的办公室。 他去见总督。总督说: 鲍里斯·尼古拉耶维奇,我知道你的报办得很棒, 也是我们区域里最有声望的。 我想跟你作笔交易。 今后九个月里,请你把报纸交给我办 因为九个月后 我有选举。 我不参选,但是很重视 由谁继任我。 所以把你的报纸交给我九个月,我再还给你, 我没有兴趣长期待在媒体业里。 你出个价钱? 鲍里斯·尼古拉耶维奇说:“我不卖。” 总督说:“我就把你关了。” 鲍里斯·尼古拉耶维奇说:“你不能关。” 六个月后报社被关掉。 但幸好我们有足够的时间帮助鲍里斯·尼古拉耶维奇 把原来公司的资本挪到一个新的公司里, 把订阅名单弄到手,重新招聘雇员。 最后总督得到的只是个空壳。 在独立媒体业里干、当独立媒体业的银行家 就是这样。 听起来这是个很了不起的故事。
Somewhere down the road we opened a media management center. We started our media lab, sounds like a real great story. But there is a second angle to that. The second angle, like in this clip. If you take the camera above, you start thinking about these numbers again. 40 million dollars over 10 years spread over 17 countries. That is not too much, is it? It's actually just a drop in the sea. Because when you think about the importance, some of the issues that we were talking about last night -- this last session we had about Africa and his hypothetical 50 billion dollars destined for Africa. All of those, not all, half of those problems mentioned last night -- government accountability, corruption, how do you fight corruption, giving voice to unheard, to poor -- it's why independent media is in business. And it's why it was invented. So from that perspective, what we did is just really one drop in the sea of that need that we can identify. Now ours is just one story.
干了一段时间,我们开了一家媒体管理中心, 开创了一家媒体研究所。听起来真的很了不起。 但是这个故事还有另外一个视角。 就像那个短片一样,另一个视角就是 当你用摄像机俯视的时候,再想想 那几个数字。 4千万元10年的时间再摊到17个国家里。 并不很多,是不是? 其实就是杯水车薪。 因为当你考虑到问题的重要性时—— 昨晚我们讨论的一些问题, 比如上一轮关于非洲的演讲以及 其中假想的输送给非洲的500亿元。 昨晚提到的所有问题,至少一半问题—— 政府问责制,腐败,如何反腐败, 给底层人、穷人说话的机会—— 这就是为什么独立媒体有市场, 就是为什么当初独立媒体会诞生。 所以从这个角度看,独立媒体这么大市场 我们做的真是微不足道。 我们的故事只是一个故事。
I'm sure that in this room there are, like, 15 other wonderful stories of nonprofits doing spectacular work. Here is where the problem is, and I'll explain to you as well as I can what the problem is. And it's called fundraising. Imagine that this third of this room is filled with people who represent different foundations. Imagine two thirds over here running excellent organizations, doing very important work. Now imagine that every second person over here is deaf, does not hear, and switch the lights off. Now that is how difficult it is to match people from this side of the room with people of that side of the room. So we thought that some kind of a big idea is needed to reform, to totally rethink fundraising. You know, instead of people running in this dark, trying to find their own match, who will be willing, who has the same goals. Instead of all of that we thought there is -- something new needs to be invented. And we came up with this idea of issuing bonds, press freedom bonds. If there are investors willing to finance U.S. government budget deficit, why wouldn't we find investors willing to finance press freedom deficit? We've decided to do it this fall; we will issue them, probably in denominations of 1,000 dollars. I don't want to advertise them too much; that's not the point. But the point is, if we ever survive to actually issue them, find enough investors that this can be considered a success, there's nothing stopping the next organization to start to issue bonds next spring. And those can be environmental bonds. And then two weeks later, Iqbal Quadir can issue his electricity in Bangladesh bonds. And before you know it, any social cause can be actually financed in this way.
我相信这间屋子里还有15个关于公益组织 大有作为的精彩故事。 而这就是问题所在, 我尽我所能给大家解释问题到底是什么。 问题的名字叫筹资。 设想这间屋子这三分之一坐满了 各个基金会的代表。 另外这三分之二在运作优秀的公益组织, 做着非常重要的工作。 再设想这边有一半人 耳聋,听不见,还在黑暗之中。 把屋子这边的人匹配给 屋子那边的人 的难度就是这样。 所以我们觉得要改革、重新思考筹资, 需要一个大创意。 以不至于人人在暗中 盲目寻找志同道合的 对象。 我们认为要发明一种新的筹资方式 来代替原来的方式。 我们想出了发行债券的主意, 新闻自由债券。 如果有投资者愿给美国政府预算赤字 提供资金, 难道我们就找不到愿给“新闻自由赤字” 投资的人? 我们已经决定了今年秋天就开始发行 估计是面值1000元的债券。 我不想在这儿给债券做广告,这不是今天讲的要点。 要点是,如果我们能存活到发行债券的那一天, 找到足够的投资者而使其成功, 就说不定另一个组织 明年春天开始发行债券。 可能是环保债券。 可能再过两个星期,伊卡柏·卡迪尔开始 在孟加拉国发行他的电力债券。 不知不觉中,任何一项公益事业 都可以这样融资了。
Now we do daydreaming in 11:30 with 55 seconds left. But let's take the idea further. You do it, you start it in the States, because it's, you know, concepts are very, very close to American minds. But you can actually bring it to Europe, too. You can bring it to Asia. You can, once you have all of those different points, you can make it easy for investors. Put all of those bonds at one place and they sit down and click. Once you have more than 10 of them you have to develop some kind of a matrix. What do investors get? On one side financial, on the other side social. So that brings the idea of some kind of rating agency, Morningstar type. It says, you know, social impact over here is spectacular, five stars. Financial, they give you one percent, only one star. Now take it to the last step. Once you have all of that put together, there's not one reason why you couldn't actually have a marketplace for all of that, where you cannot dispose of all of those bonds in a pretty quick way. And in that way you organize the financing so there are no dark rooms, no blind people running around to find each other.
现在11:30我们还有55秒的时间做白日梦。 我们把这个想法再推进一步。 我们在美国开始做这件事 因为这些概念很贴近美国人的思维方式。 然而你完全可以把它带到欧洲去, 带到亚洲去。 当这些地方都在这样做的时候, 你可以把投资变得更简易。 把这些债券放在一起, 让投资者坐下来点击。 达到10种债券时 就得制定一些指标。 投资者获得的是什么? 一方面是经济利益,一方面是对社会的影响。 由此产生了类似晨星的债券评级机构的 想法。 比如说,某债券对社会影响力很强,给五个星。 经济回报1%,只给一个星。 再把这个想法提升到最后一层。 一旦这些条件齐全了, 就没有理由不能设立一个 能很快 将这些债券脱手的交易场所。 这样组织融资 就没有黑屋子,没有人盲目的 互相寻找对方了。
Thank you.
谢谢。