I spent the better part of a decade looking at American responses to mass atrocity and genocide. And I'd like to start by sharing with you one moment that to me sums up what there is to know about American and democratic responses to mass atrocity.
我花了十年中大部份的時間 觀察美國人對於大規模暴行和種族滅絕的反應 現在我想先跟各位分享一個事件 對我來說這個事件可以代表 有關美國與民主世界對於大規模暴行的反應
And that moment came on April 21, 1994. So 14 years ago, almost, in the middle of the Rwandan genocide, in which 800,000 people would be systematically exterminated by the Rwandan government and some extremist militia. On April 21, in the New York Times, the paper reported that somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 people had already been killed in the genocide. It was in the paper -- not on the front page. It was a lot like the Holocaust coverage, it was buried in the paper. Rwanda itself was not seen as newsworthy, and amazingly, genocide itself was not seen as newsworthy.
那個事件發生在1994年4月21號 所以差不多在14年前,在中非的盧安達種族大屠殺事件中 高達八十萬人 被盧安達政府與一些極端主義民兵給殺害。 在4月21號的紐約時報 報導說某地大約二三十萬人 已經在這場種族大屠殺中喪生。 這篇報導是在紐約時報中--但並不是在頭版 它很像一篇有關大屠殺報導 隱藏在報紙裡的許多報導中。 盧安達本身看起來沒什麼新聞價值 且令人驚訝的是,屠殺本身看似也沒什麼新聞價值
But on April 21, a wonderfully honest moment occurred. And that was that an American congresswoman named Patricia Schroeder from Colorado met with a group of journalists. And one of the journalists said to her, what's up? What's going on in the U.S. government? Two to 300,000 people have just been exterminated in the last couple of weeks in Rwanda. It's two weeks into the genocide at that time, but of course, at that time you don't know how long it's going to last. And the journalist said, why is there so little response out of Washington? Why no hearings, no denunciations, no people getting arrested in front of the Rwandan embassy or in front of the White House? What's the deal? And she said -- she was so honest -- she said, "It's a great question. All I can tell you is that in my congressional office in Colorado and my office in Washington, we're getting hundreds and hundreds of calls about the endangered ape and gorilla population in Rwanda, but nobody is calling about the people. The phones just aren't ringing about the people."
然而在4月21號時,出現了一個奇特地坦率言論 一位來自科羅拉多的國會議員 名字叫Patricia Schroeder 會見一群新聞記者 其中一位記者問她說:怎麼回事? 美國政府到底怎麼了? 二十到三十萬人剛被殺害 就在幾星期前的盧旺達 那時種族大屠殺已持續了兩個星期, 當然,那時誰也不會知道屠殺會持續多久 接著記者問到:為什麼華盛頓的回應是這麼的少? 為什麼沒有聽證?沒有制裁? 沒有任何人在盧安達大使館前被抓 也沒有在白宮前的人被抓?這是怎麼回事? 結果議員很誠實的回答,她說:這是一個好問題。 我僅能告訴你說在我科羅納多的國會辦公室 還有華盛頓辦公室 我接到上百通的電話 都是關心在盧旺達瀕臨危機的猿猴和大猩猩 但卻沒有人關心當地人民 電話就是沒有為人民響起
And the reason I give you this moment is there's a deep truth in it. And that truth is, or was, in the 20th century, that while we were beginning to develop endangered species movements, we didn't have an endangered people's movement. We had Holocaust education in the schools. Most of us were groomed not only on images of nuclear catastrophe, but also on images and knowledge of the Holocaust. There's a museum, of course, on the Mall in Washington, right next to Lincoln and Jefferson. I mean, we have owned Never Again culturally, appropriately, interestingly. And yet the politicization of Never Again, the operationalization of Never Again, had never occurred in the 20th century.
現在我認為的原因,是一個很深層的真相 真相就是,在二十世紀 當我們推動瀕臨危機動物保護運動時, 我們沒有推動瀕臨危機人類保護運動 我們在學校有有關大屠殺的教育 大部分的我們不只培養核變災難的圖像, 也了解納粹大屠殺的圖像與情況 有一座博物館,座落在華盛頓廣場 林肯與傑弗遜旁 我的意思是,我們有”絕不讓它再發生”的文化 適當地,有趣地 然而這”絕不讓它再發生”的政治 以及運作機制 卻不曾在二十世紀發生
And that's what that moment with Patricia Schroeder I think shows: that if we are to bring about an end to the world's worst atrocities, we have to make it such. There has to be a role -- there has to be the creation of political noise and political costs in response to massive crimes against humanity, and so forth. So that was the 20th century.
而我想這就是Patricia Schroedervu想表達的: 如果我們想結束世上最惡劣的暴行 我們必須採取行動。 必須有一個角色-- 必須製造政治噪音與政治成本 突顯大部分的人道犯罪等等 所以這就是二十世紀
Now here -- and this will be a relief to you at this point in the afternoon -- there is good news, amazing news, in the 21st century, and that is that, almost out of nowhere, there has come into being an anti-genocide movement, an anti-genocide constituency, and one that looks destined, in fact, to be permanent. It grew up in response to the atrocities in Darfur. It is comprised of students. There are something like 300 anti-genocide chapters on college campuses around the country. It's bigger than the anti-apartheid movement. There are something like 500 high school chapters devoted to stopping the genocide in Darfur. Evangelicals have joined it. Jewish groups have joined it. "Hotel Rwanda" watchers have joined it. It is a cacophonous movement.
現在--在這個下午有一件事可以讓各位鬆一口氣 有一個好消息,令人驚訝的消息, 而且,幾乎不知從哪冒出來的 一個反種族大屠殺運動,反種族大屠殺的社群 且它看似是注定的,事實上,會一直持續下去 它因達佛的暴行而發起 它是由學生組成的。有近三百個反種族大屠殺分會 分布在整個國家大學校園裡 規模大於反種族隔離運動 有近五百個高中分會 致力於制止在達佛的種族滅絕 有福因派的加入。有猶太人的加入 有盧安達旅館觀察家的加入。它是個噪雜的運動
To call it a movement, as with all movements, perhaps, is a little misleading. It's diverse. It's got a lot of different approaches. It's got all the ups and the downs of movements. But it has been amazingly successful in one regard, in that it has become, it has congealed into this endangered people's movement that was missing in the 20th century. It sees itself, such as it is, the it, as something that will create the impression that there will be political cost, there will be a political price to be paid, for allowing genocide, for not having an heroic imagination, for not being an upstander but for being, in fact, a bystander.
說它是個運動,就所有運動來說,或許,有點小小的誤導 它是多樣的。它採取很多不同的方式 它歷經過起起落落 但從某一方面來說它是出奇的成功 因為它已經變成, 它已經集結成拯救瀕臨危機人民的運動 這是之前二十世紀沒有的。 它認為它自己是, 它被認為是代表著一種政治成本, 政治的代價, 給默許讓種族大屠殺發生,不想出鋒頭, 不想站出來阻止大屠殺而只是旁觀的人
Now because it's student-driven, there's some amazing things that the movement has done. They have launched a divestment campaign that has now convinced, I think, 55 universities in 22 states to divest their holdings of stocks with regard to companies doing business in Sudan. They have a 1-800-GENOCIDE number -- this is going to sound very kitsch, but for those of you who may not be, I mean, may be apolitical, but interested in doing something about genocide, you dial 1-800-GENOCIDE and you type in your zip code, and you don't even have to know who your congressperson is. It will refer you directly to your congressperson, to your U.S. senator, to your governor where divestment legislation is pending. They've lowered the transaction costs of stopping genocide. I think the most innovative thing they've introduced recently are genocide grades. And it takes students to introduce genocide grades. So what you now have when a Congress is in session is members of Congress calling up these 19-year-olds or 24-year-olds and saying, I'm just told I have a D minus on genocide; what do I do to get a C? I just want to get a C. Help me. And the students and the others who are part of this incredibly energized base are there to answer that, and there's always something to do.
現在,因為它是由學生策動 這運動有了些驚人的成就 他們發起了撤資運動 現在能確信,至少我認為,二十二的州內的五十五所大學 將他們手中股票脫手 賣掉那些在蘇丹有事業的公司股票 他們有一支1-800-GENOCIDE免費熱線電話 這個聽起來很俗 但對很多人這並不是政治化, 而是想要對種族大屠殺做些事 你打1-800-GENOCIDE 這個電話並輸入你的郵遞區號 你甚至不需要知道你的議員是誰 它將直接轉接到你的議員,你的參議員 的州長讓你能為撤資立法做點事。 他們已經降低了制止種族大屠殺的遊說成本 我認為最近他們推出的最有創意的事情是 種族大屠殺程度 且使學生幫議員作種族大屠殺的評分 當議會開會的時候 國員說這些19歲或24歲的學生 說這些學生說我在大屠殺的成績是D減 我要怎麼做才能得到C。我只想得到C。幫幫忙吧 這些同學和其他人 那些屬於這個非常有創意與活力的社群 已經知道該怎麼做,而且總是有該做的事
Now, what this movement has done is it has extracted from the Bush administration from the United States, at a time of massive over-stretch -- military, financial, diplomatic -- a whole series of commitments to Darfur that no other country in the world is making. For instance, the referral of the crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court, which the Bush administration doesn't like. The expenditure of 3 billion dollars in refugee camps to try to keep, basically, the people who've been displaced from their homes by the Sudanese government, by the so-called Janjaweed, the militia, to keep those people alive until something more durable can be achieved. And recently, or now not that recently, about six months ago, the authorization of a peacekeeping force of 26,000 that will go.
現在,這運動已經做到的是它讓布希政府 讓美國, 在已經大規模軍事、經濟、外交負荷的當時 還為Darfur做了一連串的承諾 世界上沒有其它國家這樣做。 舉例來說,在Darfur的罪行 轉由國際刑事法院審理 這是布希政府不喜歡的 花在難民營的三十億美金基本上來說是試著要維持, 那些曾被蘇丹政府、所謂的Janjaweed(阿拉伯民兵)、軍隊 害得流離失所的人民 能活下去 一直到他們能得到更好的安置。 還有最近,或許沒那麼近, 大約六個月前,維和部隊授權 兩萬六千人的兵力會投入。
And that's all the Bush administration's leadership, and it's all because of this bottom-up pressure and the fact that the phones haven't stopped ringing from the beginning of this crisis. The bad news, however, to this question of will evil prevail, is that evil lives on. The people in those camps are surrounded on all sides by so-called Janjaweed, these men on horseback with spears and Kalashnikovs. Women who go to get firewood in order to heat the humanitarian aid in order to feed their families -- humanitarian aid, the dirty secret of it is it has to be heated, really, to be edible -- are themselves subjected to rape, which is a tool of the genocide that is being used. And the peacekeepers I've mentioned, the force has been authorized, but almost no country on Earth has stepped forward since the authorization to actually put its troops or its police in harm's way.
那是布希政府的領導 全都是因為由下而上的壓力 來自從未停止的電話遊說 從危機發生一開始就未曾停止 然而壞消息是,對於邪惡會戰勝的問題, 邪惡會繼續存在 難民營中的人們四周都被包圍了 被所謂的Janjaweed(阿拉伯民兵),這些騎在馬上 手拿矛與衝鋒槍的人。 有些婦女為了加熱救濟食物而必須取得木柴 為了餵飽她們的家人—救濟糧食-- 那不堪的的秘密是那些救濟品必須要煮過才能吃-- 她們因為要取得木柴而可能遭到強暴 這是種族大屠殺中常見的行為 另外我之前提到的維和部隊,被授權的那些 在授權後幾乎沒有一個國家 真的投入自身兵力或警察進入
So we have achieved an awful lot relative to the 20th century, and yet far too little relative to the gravity of the crime that is unfolding as we sit here, as we speak. Why the limits to the movement? Why is what has been achieved, or what the movement has done, been necessary but not sufficient to the crime? I think there are a couple -- there are many reasons -- but a couple just to focus on briefly.
所以相較於二十世紀我們進步了很多 但是相較於暴行的發生我們做的還是少得可憐 當我們現在坐著、說著的時候,暴行還在持續著 為什麼運動被限制呢? 為什麼那些已經達成的,或已發起的運動 是有必要卻無法遏止罪行? 我認為有一些--有很多原因-- 但我只強調兩個重點
The first is that the movement, such as it is, stops at America's borders. It is not a global movement. It does not have too many compatriots abroad who themselves are asking their governments to do more to stop genocide. And the Holocaust culture that we have in this country makes Americans, sort of, more prone to, I think, want to bring Never Again to life. The guilt that the Clinton administration expressed, that Bill Clinton expressed over Rwanda, created a space in our society for a consensus that Rwanda was bad and wrong and we wish we had done more, and that is something that the movement has taken advantage of. European governments, for the most part, haven't acknowledged responsibility, and there's nothing to kind of to push back and up against.
第一點是反大屠殺運動, 總停在美國的邊界。它不是個全球運動 沒有很多的海外同胞 能去要求他們的政府做更多事去阻止種族大屠殺 我們這國家的反抗大屠殺的文化 使美國人,更傾向於 追求”絕不再發生”的實現 那由柯林頓政府所表達的罪惡感 柯林頓對盧安達所表達的對 讓我們社會有機會建立一個共識 就是盧安達大屠殺是惡劣且錯誤的 並且我們希望我們能多做些事,而這就是 反大屠殺運動能加以發揮的 大部分的歐洲政府 沒意識到責任,且好像沒什麼 要去阻擋或奮而抵抗的
So this movement, if it's to be durable and global, will have to cross borders, and you will have to see other citizens in democracies, not simply resting on the assumption that their government would do something in the face of genocide, but actually making it such. Governments will never gravitate towards crimes of this magnitude naturally or eagerly. As we saw, they haven't even gravitated towards protecting our ports or reigning in loose nukes. Why would we expect in a bureaucracy that it would orient itself towards distant suffering? So one reason is it hasn't gone global.
所以這個運動如果要經得起考驗且是全球的 那勢必要跨越國界,必須要看到 其它民主社會的市民也參與,不只是假定 他們的政府會為種族大屠殺做些什麼, 而是真的去參與行動 政府絕不可能如此大規模地對抗暴行 自發或積極地 如我們所見,他們甚至曾未傾向試著保護我們的出入口 或各地的核彈 我們怎麼能夠冀求這樣的官僚 去管到遙遠的苦難? 其中一個原因是,它還未達到全球化
The second is, of course, that at this time in particular in America's history, we have a credibility problem, a legitimacy problem in international institutions. It is structurally really, really hard to do, as the Bush administration rightly does, which is to denounce genocide on a Monday and then describe water boarding on a Tuesday as a no-brainer and then turn up on Wednesday and look for troop commitments. Now, other countries have their own reasons for not wanting to get involved. Let me be clear. They're in some ways using the Bush administration as an alibi. But it is essential for us to be a leader in this sphere, of course to restore our standing and our leadership in the world. The recovery's going to take some time.
第二個原因是,從美國歷史來看此刻的美國 美國在國際上有誠信問題 在國際治理上有合法性問題 在制度上真的真的很難去做, 如同布希政府所做的 在某個星期一譴責種族大屠殺 並接著在星期二說水刑是可以接受的 然後又在星期三出面尋求軍事承諾 現在,別的國家有了不想牽涉其中的理由 讓我說的更明白些 各國往往拿布希政府當擋箭牌 但是美國在這重要領域扮演領導者角色是很重要的 恢復我們在世界上的地位與領導力。 這是要花時間的。
We have to ask ourselves, what now? What do we do going forward as a country and as citizens in relationship to the world's worst places, the world's worst suffering, killers, and the kinds of killers that could come home to roost sometime in the future? The place that I turned to answer that question was to a man that many of you may not have ever heard of, and that is a Brazilian named Sergio Vieira de Mello who, as Chris said, was blown up in Iraq in 2003. He was the victim of the first-ever suicide bomb in Iraq. It's hard to remember, but there was actually a time in the summer of 2003, even after the U.S. invasion, where, apart from looting, civilians were relatively safe in Iraq.
我們必須問問我們自己,現在該做什麼?我們如何前進? 作為一個國家及公民,面對世上最惡劣的地區 世上最慘的苦難、殺手,和各種屠殺 都可能在未來影響到我們 在此我用一個人的故事來回答這個問題 你們多半沒有聽過他, 一個名叫Sergio Vieira de Mello 的巴西人, 就如克里斯說的,他在2003年在伊拉克被炸死 他是在伊拉克第一個自殺炸彈的受害者。 很難記得,但確實發生在2003年的夏季, 即使在美國介入後, 除搶劫外,在伊拉克的人民基本上是安全的。
Now, who was Sergio? Sergio Vieira de Mello was his name. In addition to being Brazilian, he was described to me before I met him in 1994 as someone who was a cross between James Bond on the one hand and Bobby Kennedy on the other. And in the U.N., you don't get that many people who actually manage to merge those qualities. He was James Bond-like in that he was ingenious. He was drawn to the flames, he chased the flames, he was like a moth to the flames. Something of an adrenalin junkie. He was successful with women. He was Bobby Kennedy-like because in some ways one could never tell if he was a realist masquerading as an idealist or an idealist masquerading as a realist, as people always wondered about Bobby Kennedy and John Kennedy in that way.
現在,來談一下Sergio? Sergio Vieira de Mello 是他的名字。 除了他是巴西人之外,我會說他是 在1994年我遇見他之前他是一位介於 詹姆士龐德與鮑比甘迺迪的人。 在聯合國,你找不太到 那些真的同時具備那些特質的人 他就如詹姆士龐德般地聰明 總身陷戰火,追逐戰火, 他就像飛蛾撲火。一副腎上腺素亢進的樣子。 他頗有女人緣。 另一方面他像甘迺迪的地方是因為我們總是分不清 他是否是一個偽裝成理想主義的現實主義者 還是用現實主義偽裝的理想主義者,這就像人們想到 老甘迺迪與小甘迺迪的時候。
What he was was a decathlete of nation-building, of problem-solving, of troubleshooting in the world's worst places and in the world's most broken places. In failing states, genocidal states, under-governed states, precisely the kinds of places that threats to this country exist on the horizon, and precisely the kinds of places where most of the world's suffering tends to get concentrated. These are the places he was drawn to. He moved with the headlines. He was in the U.N. for 34 years. He joined at the age of 21. Started off when the causes in the wars du jour in the '70s were wars of independence and decolonization. He was there in Bangladesh dealing with the outflow of millions of refugees -- the largest refugee flow in history up to that point. He was in Sudan when the civil war broke out there. He was in Cyprus right after the Turkish invasion. He was in Mozambique for the War of Independence. He was in Lebanon. Amazingly, he was in Lebanon -- the U.N. base was used -- Palestinians staged attacks out from behind the U.N. base. Israel then invaded and overran the U.N. base.
他就像是十項全能,在建設國家、解決問題 在世上最最惡劣的地區裡解決各種問題 在世上最分裂的地方。 不管是衰敗的國家、種族大屠殺、缺乏治理的國家等 精確地說就是任何威脅國家存在的問題 且精確地說 世上最多苦難聚集的地方 那些就是他最愛去的地方。 他跟著頭條新聞跑 他在聯合國服務34年。他在他21歲時就加入了。 從70年代的戰爭的主因是 關於獨立與反殖民戰爭。 他當時在孟加拉 處理數百萬的難民潮 那可是歷史上規模最大的難民潮 蘇丹的內戰爆發時他也在 而土耳其入侵時他人在塞浦路斯。 莫桑比克的獨立戰爭他也在場。 他去黎巴嫩。神奇的是,他當時在黎巴嫩--聯合國基地-- 巴勒斯坦人從聯合國基地背後發動攻擊。 之後以色列人侵入且佔領聯合國基地。
Sergio was in Beirut when the U.S. Embassy was hit by the first-ever suicide attack against the United States. People date the beginning of this new era to 9/11, but surely 1983, with the attack on the US Embassy and the Marine barracks -- which Sergio witnessed -- those are, in fact, in some ways, the dawning of the era that we find ourselves in today. From Lebanon he went to Bosnia in the '90s. The issues were, of course, ethnic sectarian violence. He was the first person to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge. Talk about evil prevailing. I mean, here he was in the room with the embodiment of evil in Cambodia. He negotiates with the Serbs. He actually crosses so far into this realm of talking to evil and trying to convince evil that it doesn't need to prevail that he earns the nickname -- not Sergio but Serbio while he's living in the Balkans and conducting these kinds of negotiations.
他在貝魯特,那時美國大使館被攻擊 首次反美自殺式攻擊。 人們把911訂為新年代的開始,但事實上在1983年, 攻擊美國大使館與海軍軍營 --Sergio親眼目睹的從某方面說,那些事實上 就是我們今天新年代的濫觴。 在90年代他從黎巴嫩他跑至波士尼亞 當然議題是種族派系暴力衝突。 他是與Khmer Rouge協商的第一人 關於邪惡盛行。我的意思是,他就在 柬埔寨與邪惡的化身進行談判。 他與賽族人協商。 事實上他深入與邪惡談判的空間 且試著勸說邪惡停止惡行 因此他得到了個綽號--不是Sergio而是Serbio 當他在巴爾幹地區,處理著這些協商時被冠上這個綽號。
He then goes to Rwanda and to Congo in the aftermath of the genocide, and he's the guy who has to decide -- huh, OK, the genocide is over; 800,000 people have been killed; the people responsible are fleeing into neighboring countries -- into Congo, into Tanzania. I'm Sergio, I'm a humanitarian, and I want to feed those -- well, I don't want to feed the killers but I want to feed the two million people who are with them, so we're going to go, we're going to set up camps, and we're going to supply humanitarian aid. But, uh-oh, the killers are within the camps. Well, I'd like to separate the sheep from the wolves. Let me go door-to-door to the international community and see if anybody will give me police or troops to do the separation. And their response, of course, was no more than we wanted to stop the genocide and put our troops in harm's way to do that, nor do we now want to get in the way and pluck genocidaires from camps.
他接著去發生種族大屠殺的盧安達和剛果, 且他是那種必須要確定--恩,OK,種族大屠殺已經結束了的人; 八十萬人已經被殺害;該負責的人已逃離 至鄰近國家--剛果或坦薩尼亞。 我是Sergio,我是人道救援者,且我想救援那些-- 當然~我不想救那些殺手 但我想救那兩百萬名與殺手共處的人民,所以我們將前去 前去設置難民營 我們將提供人道救援 但,喔唷,殺手藏在難民營裡 當然~我想把羊群與狼群分開。 讓我挨家挨戶地遍訪國際社群 來看看是否有任何人能給我警力與軍隊來幫忙這件事。 而他們的回應是,當然,跟我們預期的一樣 去阻止種族大屠殺和把我們的軍隊置於危險之中 我們現在也不想親自動手從難民營抓出種族大屠殺的兇手。
So then you have to make the decision. Do you turn off the international spigot of life support and risk two million civilian lives? Or do you continue feeding the civilians, knowing that the genocidaires are in the camps, literally sharpening their knives for future battle? What do you do? It's all lesser-evil terrain in these broken places.
所以必須做出決定。 是停止國際人道救援 讓兩百萬人民的生命進入險境? 或著繼續進行人道救援,任由兇手藏在難民營 任由殺手繼續磨刀討論日後的戰鬥? 你會怎麼做? 在這滿是破碎的地方,只能選擇較小的惡。
Late '90s: nation-building is the cause du jour. He's the guy put in charge. He's the Paul Bremer or the Jerry Bremer of first Kosovo and then East Timor. He governs the places. He's the viceroy. He has to decide on tax policy, on currency, on border patrol, on policing. He has to make all these judgments. He's a Brazilian in these places. He speaks seven languages. He's been up to that point in 14 war zones so he's positioned to make better judgments, perhaps, than people who have never done that kind of work. But nonetheless, he is the cutting edge of our experimentation with doing good with very few resources being brought to bear in, again, the world's worst places.
90年代末期:國家建設是主要訴求。 他是那位居中負責的人。他是第一位科索沃 與 東帝汶的 Paul Bremer 和 Jerry Bremer。他治理這些地方。 他是總督。他必須要決定租稅政策、貨幣 邊境巡邏、治安等。他必須做所有的判斷。 他在這些地方是一位巴西人。一位有著七國語言能力的人。 他曾待過十四個戰亂區 或許他能有較好的判斷 因為他有很多親身體驗。 但儘管如此,他所做的是前所未有的 以極少的資源促進善行 在世界上最慘的地方。
And then after Timor, 9/11 has happened, he's named U.N. Human Rights Commissioner, and he has to balance liberty and security and figure out, what do you do when the most powerful country in the United Nations is bowing out of the Geneva Conventions, bowing out of international law? Do you denounce? Well, if you denounce, you're probably never going to get back in the room. Maybe you stay reticent. Maybe you try to charm President Bush -- and that's what he did. And in so doing he earned himself, unfortunately, his final and tragic appointment to Iraq -- the one that resulted in his death.
在帝汶事件之後,911事件發生了, 他被任命為聯合國人權特派員, 他必須要在自由和安全間取得平衡,並想出 在聯合國中最強的國家 是要向日內瓦公約低頭 還是國際公約低頭?你會譴責嘛? 當然~如果你譴責了 你大概就再也無法進到談判室裡了。 也許你保持沉默。也許你試著拉攏布希總統-- 這也是他的選擇。但說動小布希這件事為他自己帶來 ,很不幸地,最後也最悲慘的伊拉克任務-- 造成他死亡的任務。
One note on his death, which is so devastating, is that despite predicating the war on Iraq on a link between Saddam Hussein and terrorism in 9/11, believe it or not, the Bush administration or the invaders did no planning, no pre-war planning, to respond to terrorism. So Sergio -- this receptacle of all of this learning on how to deal with evil and how to deal with brokenness, lay under the rubble for three and a half hours without rescue. Stateless. The guy who tried to help the stateless people his whole career. Like a refugee. Because he represents the U.N.
在他死後,有一個很驚人的報導, 就是除了預測在伊拉克的戰事 海珊與911恐怖攻擊有的情形, 信不信由你,布希政府或侵略者 都沒有規畫,沒有戰前規劃,來對抗恐怖主義。 所以 Sergio--這位知道如何與邪惡交涉的人 和解決分裂的人, 躺在廢墟下三個小時半毫無救援。 沒有國籍。他以幫助無國籍的人們作為一生的志業 他像一位難民。因為他代表聯合國。
If you represent everyone, in some ways you represent no one. You're un-owned. And what the American -- the most powerful military in the history of mankind was able to muster for his rescue, believe it or not, was literally these heroic two American soldiers went into the shaft. Building was shaking. One of them had been at 9/11 and lost his buddies on September 11th, and yet went in and risked his life in order to save Sergio. But all they had was a woman's handbag -- literally one of those basket handbags -- and they tied it to a curtain rope from one of the offices at U.N. headquarters, and created a pulley system into this shaft in this quivering building in the interests of rescuing this person, the person we most need to turn to now, this shepherd, at a time when so many of us feel like we're lacking guidance.
如果你代表所有的人,你就等於不代表任何人。 你不屬於任何國家。 而有著世上最強軍隊的美國 且能召集足夠兵力救他 信不信由你,他們只派了兩位英勇的美國士兵 進入礦井。那時建築物正搖晃著。 其中一位曾在911事件中喪失他的夥伴 而今他要冒著生命危險去救Sergio。 但是他們卻只有一個女用手提包-- 聽說是一種手提包-- 且他們把它綁在一個從聯合國總部辦公室拿的窗簾繩上, 在搖晃的建築中製作一個滑輪系統進入這個礦井 以設法救出這個人, 這個我們最需要救的人,這位領袖, 我們多數覺得缺乏引導的時刻。
And this was the pulley system. This was what we were able to muster for Sergio. The good news, for what it's worth, is after Sergio and 21 others were killed that day in the attack on the U.N., the military created a search and rescue unit that had the cutting equipment, the shoring wood, the cranes, the things that you would have needed to do the rescue. But it was too late for Sergio.
而這樣的滑輪系統。是我們用來救Sergio的方法。 好消息是,就消息的價值而言, 在Sergio和其它二十一名在聯合國被攻擊事件中喪生後 軍隊就成立了搜救組織 有著切割工具,撐木,起重機, 所有救援所需的器具都有了。 但對Sergio來說還是太晚了。
I want to wrap up, but I want to close with what I take to be the four lessons from Sergio's life on this question of how do we prevent evil from prevailing, which is how I would have framed the question. Here's this guy who got a 34-year head start thinking about the kinds of questions we as a country are grappling with, we as citizens are grappling with now. What do we take away?
我想就此總結,但我還想更進一步 說說我從Sergio一生學到的四個心得 他一生教導我們如何防止邪惡戰勝的課題, 我以此定義問題。 這個人用34個年頭 思考我們作為一個國家所涉入的問題, 和身為公民所面對的問題。我們有什麼心得?
First, I think, is his relationship to, in fact, evil is something to learn from. He, over the course of his career, changed a great deal. He had a lot of flaws, but he was very adaptive. I think that was his greatest quality. He started as somebody who would denounce harmdoers, he would charge up to people who were violating international law, and he would say, you're violating, this is the U.N. Charter. Don't you see it's unacceptable what you're doing? And they would laugh at him because he didn't have the power of states, the power of any military or police. He just had the rules, he had the norms, and he tried to use them. And in Lebanon, Southern Lebanon in '82, he said to himself and to everybody else, I will never use the word "unacceptable" again. I will never use it. I will try to make it such, but I will never use that word again. But he lunged in the opposite direction. He started, as I mentioned, to get in the room with evil, to not denounce, and became almost obsequious when he won the nickname Serbio, for instance, and even when he negotiated with the Khmer Rouge would black-box what had occurred prior to entering the room.
第一,我認為是他與邪惡互動的關係是可以學的。 他在他的一生當中改變了很多很多。 他有很多缺點,但他很能適應。 我想那就是他最棒的特質。 他在一開始時會譴責施暴的人, 他會抨擊那些觸犯國際公法的人 且會跟他們說:你正在觸犯這個法規,這可是聯合國憲章。 難道你不知道你正在做些於法所不容的事嗎? 然後那些人會嘲笑他,只因他沒有國家權力, 沒有指揮軍隊或警察的權力。 他有的只是規則,他有規範,且他試著運用它們。 在黎巴嫩,1982年的黎巴嫩南部, 他對自己與所有人說, 我不會再說"無法接受"這些話了。 我不會再說了。我要盡力實現它, 但我不會再用說的了。 但是他卻往相反的方向撲去。 就像之前我提到的,他開始與邪惡談判。 不再譴責,而是變得近乎拍馬屁 就在他得到Serbio這個綽號的時候,例如, 他與Khmer Rouge談判時 他會在談判前用黑箱作業處理那些曾發生過的惡行。
But by the end of his life, I think he had struck a balance that we as a country can learn from. Be in the room, don't be afraid of talking to your adversaries, but don't bracket what happened before you entered the room. Don't black-box history. Don't check your principles at the door. And I think that's something that we have to be in the room, whether it's Nixon going to China or Khrushchev and Kennedy or Reagan and Gorbachev. All the great progress in this country with relation to our adversaries has come by going into the room. And it doesn't have to be an act of weakness. You can actually do far more to build an international coalition against a harmdoer or a wrongdoer by being in the room and showing to the rest of the world that that person, that regime, is the problem and that you, the United States, are not the problem.
但在他一生的最後,我認為他已達到了平衡 這是我們作為一個國家應該學習的。 在談判室裡,不要害怕跟你的對手說話, 但是不要拖出在外面曾經發生的事。 別對歷史黑箱作業。別在門口清點你的原則。 且我想那是些我們在談判時該做的, 不管是尼克森去大陸或是赫比雪夫與甘迺迪 或是雷根與戈巴契夫。 所有美國與對手間的大進步 都發生在談判室裡。 而且不需要把談判看作是軟弱的行為。 利用談判你能建立國際聯盟 來對抗施暴或惡行者 且讓世界所有的人知道這個人,這個政權, 是有問題的,而不是美國的問題。
Second take-away from Sergio's life, briefly. What I take away, and this in some ways is the most important, he espoused and exhibited a reverence for dignity that was really, really unusual. At a micro level, the individuals around him were visible. He saw them. At a macro level, he thought, you know, we talk about democracy promotion, but we do it in a way sometimes that's an affront to people's dignity. We put people on humanitarian aid and we boast about it because we've spent three billion. It's incredibly important, those people would no longer be alive if the United States, for instance, hadn't spent that money in Darfur, but it's not a way to live. If we think about dignity in our conduct as citizens and as individuals with relation to the people around us, and as a country, if we could inject a regard for dignity into our dealings with other countries, it would be something of a revolution.
第二點從Sergio的人生學到的,簡單來說, 我學到的,就某些方面來說,最重要的, 他展現出對人性尊嚴的崇敬 這是真的真的很不尋常。 從微觀的角度來看,圍繞在他身旁的個體都是可見的。 他看得見他們 從鉅觀角度來說,他認為 我們談到宣導民主,但我們在宣導的同時 某種程度上卻侮辱了對人們的尊嚴。 我們讓人民依賴人道救援 我們鼓吹它因為我們在這件事上花了三十億 這非常的重要, 舉個例子來說,如果沒有美國的援助, Darfur的人民可能活不下去的, 但依賴救濟的生活並不是一種生活方式。 如果我們想一想作為公民應有的尊嚴 以及作為一個人與身旁的人應有的互動 以及作為一個國家,如果我們將對尊嚴的關注 融入與其他國家的交涉上, 那將會像是一個革命。
Third point, very briefly. He talked a lot about freedom from fear. And I recognize there is so much to be afraid of. There are so many genuine threats in the world. But what Sergio was talking about is, let's calibrate our relationship to the threat. Let's not hype the threat; let's actually see it clearly. We have reason to be afraid of melting ice caps. We have reason to be afraid that we haven't secured loose nuclear material in the former Soviet Union. Let's focus on what are the legitimate challenges and threats, but not lunge into bad decisions because of a panic, of a fear. In times of fear, for instance, one of the things Sergio used to say is, fear is a bad advisor. We lunge towards the extremes when we aren't operating and trying to, again, calibrate our relationship to the world around us.
第三點,很簡潔的說。Sergio講到很多免於恐懼的自由。 我意識到還真有很多事情是令人害怕的。 世上還是有很多真正的威脅存在著。 但Sergio常說的是, 讓我們調整我們與威脅的關係。 讓我們別放大威脅;讓我們好好的看透它。 我們有理由害怕正在融化的冰帽。 我們有理由害怕我們尚未掌握 前蘇聯外流出來的核子原料。 讓我們專注在合法的挑戰與威脅, 但別因為恐荒與害怕而倉促作出錯誤的決定。 在恐懼的時代,就如Sergio常說的 恐懼是很糟的顧問。 恐懼讓我們衝向極端 當我們沒有經營或試著 調整我們與世界周遭國家的關係。
Fourth and final point: he somehow, because he was working in all the world's worst places and all lesser evils, had a humility, of course, and an awareness of the complexity of the world around him. I mean, such an acute awareness of how hard it was. How Sisyphean this task was of mending, and yet aware of that complexity, humbled by it, he wasn't paralyzed by it. And we as citizens, as we go through this experience of the kind of, the crisis of confidence, crisis of competence, crisis of legitimacy, I think there's a temptation to pull back from the world and say, ah, Katrina, Iraq -- we don't know what we're doing. We can't afford to pull back from the world. It's a question of how to be in the world.
第四點也是最後一點:因為他的工作是 在世上最多惡行的地方,與邪惡進行周旋, 他有一種謙悲精神, 還加上對世上圍著他的複雜問題的警覺。 我的意思是,關於問題困難度的高度覺察。 這件永無止境的困難要如何修復, 且還沒察覺到它的複雜, 他因而謙卑,但並未被它癱瘓。 且我們作為公民,當我們經歷這種 信心危機、能力危機、合法性危機, 我認為有種想從世界中撤退的傾向,且說, 啊~卡翠娜、伊拉克--我們不知道我們在做什麼。 我們不能承受從世界中撤退。 問題應該是我們在這世界中該怎麼做。
And the lesson, I think, of the anti-genocide movement that I mentioned, that is a partial success but by no means has it achieved what it has set out to do -- it'll be many decades, probably, before that happens -- but is that if we want to see change, we have to become the change. We can't rely upon our institutions to do the work of necessarily talking to adversaries on their own without us creating a space for that to happen, for having respect for dignity, and for bringing that combination of humility and a sort of emboldened sense of responsibility to our dealings with the rest of the world. So will evil prevail? Is that the question? I think the short answer is: no, not unless we let it.
所以從這些得到的教訓是,我認為, 從我先前提到的反種族大屠殺運動, 是局部的成功,但絕不意味著 它已經達成它所預設的目標-- 在那發生之前大概還需要幾十年-- 但是如果我們真想看到改變,我們自己就必須改變。 我們不能倚賴制度來完成這事 去與對手國家展開必要的談判 不能沒有我們開創有利的條件, 為了標舉人性尊嚴, 為了結合謙悲 和一種對世界的責任 融入我們與世界的互動中。 所以,邪惡會戰勝嗎? 是這個問題嗎? 我想最簡潔的回答是: 不會,除非我們任由它發生。
Thank you. (Applause)
謝謝大家。 (掌聲鼓勵鼓勵)