I spent the better part of a decade looking at American responses to mass atrocity and genocide. And I'd like to start by sharing with you one moment that to me sums up what there is to know about American and democratic responses to mass atrocity.
私は10年近く 残虐行為や大量虐殺に対する 米国の反応を研究してきました エピソードをご紹介しましょう 私はここで 米国と民主主義の反応について 何を知るべきなのか学びました
And that moment came on April 21, 1994. So 14 years ago, almost, in the middle of the Rwandan genocide, in which 800,000 people would be systematically exterminated by the Rwandan government and some extremist militia. On April 21, in the New York Times, the paper reported that somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 people had already been killed in the genocide. It was in the paper -- not on the front page. It was a lot like the Holocaust coverage, it was buried in the paper. Rwanda itself was not seen as newsworthy, and amazingly, genocide itself was not seen as newsworthy.
1994年4月21日のことです 14年前ですね ルワンダでは大虐殺が進行中で 政府と一部の過激派によって 80万の人々が― 組織的に 殺されようとしていました その日 ニューヨークタイムズ紙は 既に虐殺された人の数を 20~30万人と報道しましたが 一面記事ではありませんでした ホロコーストの報道ととても似ていて 注目されませんでした ルワンダも虐殺も― 報道価値はないと みなされたのです
But on April 21, a wonderfully honest moment occurred. And that was that an American congresswoman named Patricia Schroeder from Colorado met with a group of journalists. And one of the journalists said to her, what's up? What's going on in the U.S. government? Two to 300,000 people have just been exterminated in the last couple of weeks in Rwanda. It's two weeks into the genocide at that time, but of course, at that time you don't know how long it's going to last. And the journalist said, why is there so little response out of Washington? Why no hearings, no denunciations, no people getting arrested in front of the Rwandan embassy or in front of the White House? What's the deal? And she said -- she was so honest -- she said, "It's a great question. All I can tell you is that in my congressional office in Colorado and my office in Washington, we're getting hundreds and hundreds of calls about the endangered ape and gorilla population in Rwanda, but nobody is calling about the people. The phones just aren't ringing about the people."
4月21日には こんな驚くほど率直なやり取りが 残されています パトリシア・シュローダーという コロラド州下院議員が 報道陣と会った際 記者が尋ねました 「この2週間 ルワンダでは 20~30万人が虐殺された それなのに米政府は 何をしてるんだ?」と 虐殺が始まって2週間 いつ終わるとも知れませんでした 記者は言いました 「何故米政府は 公聴会も開かず 非難声明も出さず 大使館やホワイトハウスの前で デモをして捕まる人もいないのか 何が起こってるんだ?」と 議員は正直に答えました 「それが問題なのです コロラドでも ワシントンでも 大勢が電話をくれます けれど内容は 絶滅寸前のゴリラの事で 虐殺される人間の事は― 誰も話しません 人間のことでの電話はありません」
And the reason I give you this moment is there's a deep truth in it. And that truth is, or was, in the 20th century, that while we were beginning to develop endangered species movements, we didn't have an endangered people's movement. We had Holocaust education in the schools. Most of us were groomed not only on images of nuclear catastrophe, but also on images and knowledge of the Holocaust. There's a museum, of course, on the Mall in Washington, right next to Lincoln and Jefferson. I mean, we have owned Never Again culturally, appropriately, interestingly. And yet the politicization of Never Again, the operationalization of Never Again, had never occurred in the 20th century.
このエピソードは 奥の深い真実を教えてくれます こういうことです―でした 20世紀に 絶滅危惧種を救う運動が始まりました でも私達は危機的状況にある 人々のためには 何もしません 学校では ホロコーストについて学び 大勢が 核戦争と同様 ホロコーストについても 知識を持っている ワシントンには ナショナルモールに ホロコースト博物館だってある 文化面では 適切に関心を持って 私達は「繰り返すまい」と してきました けれど 政治の世界では 問題にされず 具体的な運動も― 20世紀には起こらなかった
And that's what that moment with Patricia Schroeder I think shows: that if we are to bring about an end to the world's worst atrocities, we have to make it such. There has to be a role -- there has to be the creation of political noise and political costs in response to massive crimes against humanity, and so forth. So that was the 20th century.
議員の言葉が 示すのは― 世界中の残虐行為を終わらせるためには そういう運動が 必要だという事 人道的犯罪に対し 政治的な騒動がおき 政治的な代償を払う事 それが必要なのです でも安心してください
Now here -- and this will be a relief to you at this point in the afternoon -- there is good news, amazing news, in the 21st century, and that is that, almost out of nowhere, there has come into being an anti-genocide movement, an anti-genocide constituency, and one that looks destined, in fact, to be permanent. It grew up in response to the atrocities in Darfur. It is comprised of students. There are something like 300 anti-genocide chapters on college campuses around the country. It's bigger than the anti-apartheid movement. There are something like 500 high school chapters devoted to stopping the genocide in Darfur. Evangelicals have joined it. Jewish groups have joined it. "Hotel Rwanda" watchers have joined it. It is a cacophonous movement.
素晴らしいニュースが あります 20世紀には存在しなかった― 虐殺に反対する運動や団体が 21世紀 どこからともなく出現し しかも 恐らくは 消えてなくなることは ないでしょう ダルフール紛争反対を掲げ 学生達が始めた団体は全国の大学に広まり 支部は約300 反アパルトヘイト運動より 大規模な運動です ダルフールの虐殺を やめさせようとする 高校の支部は約500 参加者はいろいろ 福音派 ユダヤ教徒 『ホテル・ルワンダ』を見て 虐殺の事を知った人もいます
To call it a movement, as with all movements, perhaps, is a little misleading. It's diverse. It's got a lot of different approaches. It's got all the ups and the downs of movements. But it has been amazingly successful in one regard, in that it has become, it has congealed into this endangered people's movement that was missing in the 20th century. It sees itself, such as it is, the it, as something that will create the impression that there will be political cost, there will be a political price to be paid, for allowing genocide, for not having an heroic imagination, for not being an upstander but for being, in fact, a bystander.
これは「運動」では ないかも知れません いろいろな やり方を用い 成功も失敗もあります ただ 危機に置かれた人々のための 運動を形作ったという意味で 20世紀になかったものを 作り出すことに 成功したと言えるのです この「運動」の目的は もし― 虐殺を止めようとせず 虐殺について考えず 何もしない 傍観者でいれば 政治の世界では 非難される そう人々に思わせる事なのです
Now because it's student-driven, there's some amazing things that the movement has done. They have launched a divestment campaign that has now convinced, I think, 55 universities in 22 states to divest their holdings of stocks with regard to companies doing business in Sudan. They have a 1-800-GENOCIDE number -- this is going to sound very kitsch, but for those of you who may not be, I mean, may be apolitical, but interested in doing something about genocide, you dial 1-800-GENOCIDE and you type in your zip code, and you don't even have to know who your congressperson is. It will refer you directly to your congressperson, to your U.S. senator, to your governor where divestment legislation is pending. They've lowered the transaction costs of stopping genocide. I think the most innovative thing they've introduced recently are genocide grades. And it takes students to introduce genocide grades. So what you now have when a Congress is in session is members of Congress calling up these 19-year-olds or 24-year-olds and saying, I'm just told I have a D minus on genocide; what do I do to get a C? I just want to get a C. Help me. And the students and the others who are part of this incredibly energized base are there to answer that, and there's always something to do.
学生による運動だからこそ 素晴らしい事もあります 22の州 55の大学で スーダンで事業をしている 会社の株を手放そうという 活動があります 1800 GENOCIDE(虐殺)という 番号に電話すれば 参加できます と言うと 政治に無関心な人は 悪趣味だと思うかも知れません でも 何かしたいと 思う人には 手軽な方法です 投資引き揚げ法案を議論中の 政治家に― 直接 訴えかけることができ そのおかげで 反虐殺行動が容易になります 最近一番「新しい」と 思ったのは 「虐殺評価」というものです 評価するのは 学生達です 今や 下院の会期中には 議員が20歳そこそこの学生に 電話をかけて言います 「反虐殺行動の成績がDマイナスだった」 「Cを取るにはどうすればいい?」 この運動に参加する 学生や他の人々は それに答えることができます いつでも何かするべき事があるのです
Now, what this movement has done is it has extracted from the Bush administration from the United States, at a time of massive over-stretch -- military, financial, diplomatic -- a whole series of commitments to Darfur that no other country in the world is making. For instance, the referral of the crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court, which the Bush administration doesn't like. The expenditure of 3 billion dollars in refugee camps to try to keep, basically, the people who've been displaced from their homes by the Sudanese government, by the so-called Janjaweed, the militia, to keep those people alive until something more durable can be achieved. And recently, or now not that recently, about six months ago, the authorization of a peacekeeping force of 26,000 that will go.
この活動は 軍事、経済、外交で余裕のない時期に ブッシュ政権と国家に ダルフールでの出来事に対し 何かせねばという 義務感を持たせました 他の国ではできなかったことです ブッシュ政権は渋りつつ ダルフールの戦争犯罪を 国際法廷に持ち込み 30億ドルを 難民キャンプに支出 紛争で家を失った人々が もっと継続的な援助を 受けられるまで 生きていけるようにしました もう半年前ですが 平和維持軍の 26000人を派遣する 認可が下りました
And that's all the Bush administration's leadership, and it's all because of this bottom-up pressure and the fact that the phones haven't stopped ringing from the beginning of this crisis. The bad news, however, to this question of will evil prevail, is that evil lives on. The people in those camps are surrounded on all sides by so-called Janjaweed, these men on horseback with spears and Kalashnikovs. Women who go to get firewood in order to heat the humanitarian aid in order to feed their families -- humanitarian aid, the dirty secret of it is it has to be heated, really, to be edible -- are themselves subjected to rape, which is a tool of the genocide that is being used. And the peacekeepers I've mentioned, the force has been authorized, but almost no country on Earth has stepped forward since the authorization to actually put its troops or its police in harm's way.
ブッシュ政権のリーダーシップによってです 草の根運動の圧力 紛争勃発以来 人々が関心を― 持ち続けたおかげです しかし悲しい事に 悪は滅びません 人々はキャンプで 槍と自動小銃を持ち 馬に乗った民兵達に 四方を囲まれています やっかいなことに 支援物資を食べるには 調理が必要なので 女性は料理するため まきを拾いに行き レイプされる レイプは虐殺の中でも 行われている事です 平和維持活動が許可されても 危険な場所に 自国の部隊を送ろうとする国は ほぼゼロでした
So we have achieved an awful lot relative to the 20th century, and yet far too little relative to the gravity of the crime that is unfolding as we sit here, as we speak. Why the limits to the movement? Why is what has been achieved, or what the movement has done, been necessary but not sufficient to the crime? I think there are a couple -- there are many reasons -- but a couple just to focus on briefly.
私達の運動の成果は 20世紀と比べるとずっと増しているにもかかわらず 現在進行中の犯罪の深刻さには はるかに及びません なぜ運動に限界があるのか 必要な事をしても足りないのは なぜなのか 理由は実に多様ですが 中で2-3を手短に話します
The first is that the movement, such as it is, stops at America's borders. It is not a global movement. It does not have too many compatriots abroad who themselves are asking their governments to do more to stop genocide. And the Holocaust culture that we have in this country makes Americans, sort of, more prone to, I think, want to bring Never Again to life. The guilt that the Clinton administration expressed, that Bill Clinton expressed over Rwanda, created a space in our society for a consensus that Rwanda was bad and wrong and we wish we had done more, and that is something that the movement has taken advantage of. European governments, for the most part, haven't acknowledged responsibility, and there's nothing to kind of to push back and up against.
まず草の根の運動なので 国内に留まり 国際的な運動になりません 自国の政府に 反虐殺運動をすすめる 海外の同志は多くないのです 思うに米国には ホロコースト文化があるため 「繰り返すまい」という意識が強いのです クリントン政権は ルワンダ虐殺について 罪悪感を表明 「虐殺は悪だ」とする 世論を作り上げました 私達は無策を悔い 運動はそれを利用しました 欧州では 責任を認める政府は稀で 反虐殺運動も起きていません
So this movement, if it's to be durable and global, will have to cross borders, and you will have to see other citizens in democracies, not simply resting on the assumption that their government would do something in the face of genocide, but actually making it such. Governments will never gravitate towards crimes of this magnitude naturally or eagerly. As we saw, they haven't even gravitated towards protecting our ports or reigning in loose nukes. Why would we expect in a bureaucracy that it would orient itself towards distant suffering? So one reason is it hasn't gone global.
継続的 国際的な運動を 目指すなら この運動は国境を越え 民主主義国の国民が 政府まかせにせず 実際に反虐殺の行動を 起こす事 それが必要になります これほど大規模な犯罪を 政府は 無視しようとするのです 自国の港の防御や 核兵器管理といった― 問題から目を背けてきた 官僚が自ら 遠い外国の苦しみに― 目を向けるでしょうか? 問題を国際化できないことが運動の限界でした
The second is, of course, that at this time in particular in America's history, we have a credibility problem, a legitimacy problem in international institutions. It is structurally really, really hard to do, as the Bush administration rightly does, which is to denounce genocide on a Monday and then describe water boarding on a Tuesday as a no-brainer and then turn up on Wednesday and look for troop commitments. Now, other countries have their own reasons for not wanting to get involved. Let me be clear. They're in some ways using the Bush administration as an alibi. But it is essential for us to be a leader in this sphere, of course to restore our standing and our leadership in the world. The recovery's going to take some time.
そして 特に現在 国際機関には 信頼性や正当性に 問題があります ブッシュ政権が挑む 大きな困難とは 幅広い課題を抱えているという事 虐殺を非難したかと思えば 翌日は(自国で起きている)拷問の弁解 次は派兵国探し 他国が何もしないのにも理由があり はっきり言うと ブッシュ政権は 言い訳に使われました でも肝心なのは 米国が他国を主導し 世界における立場と 主導権を回復する事 それには時間が必要です
We have to ask ourselves, what now? What do we do going forward as a country and as citizens in relationship to the world's worst places, the world's worst suffering, killers, and the kinds of killers that could come home to roost sometime in the future? The place that I turned to answer that question was to a man that many of you may not have ever heard of, and that is a Brazilian named Sergio Vieira de Mello who, as Chris said, was blown up in Iraq in 2003. He was the victim of the first-ever suicide bomb in Iraq. It's hard to remember, but there was actually a time in the summer of 2003, even after the U.S. invasion, where, apart from looting, civilians were relatively safe in Iraq.
今 私達は 考えねばなりません 国として 国民として 何ができるのか かつて苦難に襲われ また同じ目に遭いかねない 世界で最も虐げられた地のため 何をできるのか? 私はその答えを ある男に求めました 知らない方も多いでしょうが ブラジル人外交官 セルジオ・ヴィエイラ・デメロです 2003年 イラクで 最初の自爆テロの犠牲となり 爆死した人です 2003年の夏 米国の侵攻後でも 略奪行為はあったにせよ イラク国民は比較的 安全に過ごしていた
Now, who was Sergio? Sergio Vieira de Mello was his name. In addition to being Brazilian, he was described to me before I met him in 1994 as someone who was a cross between James Bond on the one hand and Bobby Kennedy on the other. And in the U.N., you don't get that many people who actually manage to merge those qualities. He was James Bond-like in that he was ingenious. He was drawn to the flames, he chased the flames, he was like a moth to the flames. Something of an adrenalin junkie. He was successful with women. He was Bobby Kennedy-like because in some ways one could never tell if he was a realist masquerading as an idealist or an idealist masquerading as a realist, as people always wondered about Bobby Kennedy and John Kennedy in that way.
セルジオとは どんな人物だったのか 1994年 ブラジル人である彼と会うときに こう聞いていました 「ボンドとボビー・ケネディを 足して二で割ったような人だ」 そんな人 国連には たくさんはいません ボンドに似ていたのは 賢い所と― 火に引き寄せられる 蛾のように 危険に魅せられ 危険を求めた所 そして女性にもてた所です ボビー・ケネディに似ていたのは 理想主義ぶった現実主義者なのか 現実主義ぶった理想主義者なのかが 分からない所 ジョン・ケネディもそうでした
What he was was a decathlete of nation-building, of problem-solving, of troubleshooting in the world's worst places and in the world's most broken places. In failing states, genocidal states, under-governed states, precisely the kinds of places that threats to this country exist on the horizon, and precisely the kinds of places where most of the world's suffering tends to get concentrated. These are the places he was drawn to. He moved with the headlines. He was in the U.N. for 34 years. He joined at the age of 21. Started off when the causes in the wars du jour in the '70s were wars of independence and decolonization. He was there in Bangladesh dealing with the outflow of millions of refugees -- the largest refugee flow in history up to that point. He was in Sudan when the civil war broke out there. He was in Cyprus right after the Turkish invasion. He was in Mozambique for the War of Independence. He was in Lebanon. Amazingly, he was in Lebanon -- the U.N. base was used -- Palestinians staged attacks out from behind the U.N. base. Israel then invaded and overran the U.N. base.
彼は世界でも最悪の 最も傷ついた土地で 国を築き 問題を解決し 争いを鎮め 多方面で活躍 崩壊しつつある国 虐殺の起きた国 統治できていない国です 米国を脅かし この世から消そうとする国々 世界でも最悪の苦しみが 集中している国々 そんな国に― 彼は惹かれました 彼は注目の的でした 21歳から34年間 国連に勤め 独立と非植民地化のために 戦争が起きた70年代 彼はバングラデシュで 何百万の難民流出に対応 当時は史上最大の規模でした スーダンの内戦の時は 現地に トルコが侵攻した時は キプロスに モザンビーク独立戦争にも 居合わせました 驚くべき事に彼はレバノンで 国連の基地におり その背後からの パレスチナが軍事攻撃すると イスラエルが侵攻して基地を制圧しました
Sergio was in Beirut when the U.S. Embassy was hit by the first-ever suicide attack against the United States. People date the beginning of this new era to 9/11, but surely 1983, with the attack on the US Embassy and the Marine barracks -- which Sergio witnessed -- those are, in fact, in some ways, the dawning of the era that we find ourselves in today. From Lebanon he went to Bosnia in the '90s. The issues were, of course, ethnic sectarian violence. He was the first person to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge. Talk about evil prevailing. I mean, here he was in the room with the embodiment of evil in Cambodia. He negotiates with the Serbs. He actually crosses so far into this realm of talking to evil and trying to convince evil that it doesn't need to prevail that he earns the nickname -- not Sergio but Serbio while he's living in the Balkans and conducting these kinds of negotiations.
米国大使館に対する 初の自爆テロの時も 現地にいました 9・11が新時代の幕開けと されていますが 1983年 彼が目撃した― 大使館と海兵隊兵舎への攻撃も 今のこの時代の 始まりを告げていました 90年代に 彼はレバノンから ボスニアに移りました 民族間紛争が 問題となっていました クメール・ルージュとは 最初に交渉 悪は滅びません つまり彼は― カンボジアの悪魔と セルビア軍を相手にしました 彼は悪と対話する職務を越えて 勝たなくても大丈夫だ と説得を試みたので バルカン半島で 交渉をした時 セルビア寄りだからと 「セルビオ」と呼ばれました
He then goes to Rwanda and to Congo in the aftermath of the genocide, and he's the guy who has to decide -- huh, OK, the genocide is over; 800,000 people have been killed; the people responsible are fleeing into neighboring countries -- into Congo, into Tanzania. I'm Sergio, I'm a humanitarian, and I want to feed those -- well, I don't want to feed the killers but I want to feed the two million people who are with them, so we're going to go, we're going to set up camps, and we're going to supply humanitarian aid. But, uh-oh, the killers are within the camps. Well, I'd like to separate the sheep from the wolves. Let me go door-to-door to the international community and see if anybody will give me police or troops to do the separation. And their response, of course, was no more than we wanted to stop the genocide and put our troops in harm's way to do that, nor do we now want to get in the way and pluck genocidaires from camps.
虐殺後のルワンダとコンゴで 彼は決断を迫られました 「80万人が殺された虐殺は終わり 責任者は近隣諸国に逃げた 私は人道主義者だ 人殺しを養いたくない だが彼らと一緒にいる2百万の人々の為 難民キャンプを築き 人道支援物資を配ろう キャンプには 殺人者もいるから それ以外と分けたい 国際社会を回って 警察か軍隊を頼もう」 当然 反応は芳しくありませんでした 虐殺を止める為の 軍隊派遣と同様 殺人者をキャンプから つまみ出す事もできない
So then you have to make the decision. Do you turn off the international spigot of life support and risk two million civilian lives? Or do you continue feeding the civilians, knowing that the genocidaires are in the camps, literally sharpening their knives for future battle? What do you do? It's all lesser-evil terrain in these broken places.
決断が必要とされました 国際社会の支援を拒み 2百万の人命を 危険にさらすのか 人々を養い続けるのか 殺人者がそこに紛れて 戦いに備えているのに? どうすれば? 崩壊した国は小悪人の巣です
Late '90s: nation-building is the cause du jour. He's the guy put in charge. He's the Paul Bremer or the Jerry Bremer of first Kosovo and then East Timor. He governs the places. He's the viceroy. He has to decide on tax policy, on currency, on border patrol, on policing. He has to make all these judgments. He's a Brazilian in these places. He speaks seven languages. He's been up to that point in 14 war zones so he's positioned to make better judgments, perhaps, than people who have never done that kind of work. But nonetheless, he is the cutting edge of our experimentation with doing good with very few resources being brought to bear in, again, the world's worst places.
90年代後半には 国家再建の動きが目立ち 彼はコソボや東ティモールで 国を統括する立場に就きました 税、通貨、国境警備、治安維持 何もかも― 総督として 彼が決断せねばならない 彼は7ヶ国語を話す ブラジル人 経験した戦争は14 恐らく 経験のない人よりは ましな決断ができました そんな彼にとっても 未知の領域でした 世界最悪の国で ほぼ援助もなく 善行ができるのか?
And then after Timor, 9/11 has happened, he's named U.N. Human Rights Commissioner, and he has to balance liberty and security and figure out, what do you do when the most powerful country in the United Nations is bowing out of the Geneva Conventions, bowing out of international law? Do you denounce? Well, if you denounce, you're probably never going to get back in the room. Maybe you stay reticent. Maybe you try to charm President Bush -- and that's what he did. And in so doing he earned himself, unfortunately, his final and tragic appointment to Iraq -- the one that resulted in his death.
9・11同時多発テロの発生後 国連人権高等弁務官になり 自由と安全を 考慮する必要がありました 国連で最大の国が ジュネーブ条約を ―国際法を遵守しないという時 それを非難するかどうか はっきりしなければなりませんでした 非難すれば おそらくメンバーから外されるでしょう それとも 何も言わず ブッシュに取り入ろうとしますか? 彼はそうしました その結果 不運にも イラクに派遣され そこで死にました
One note on his death, which is so devastating, is that despite predicating the war on Iraq on a link between Saddam Hussein and terrorism in 9/11, believe it or not, the Bush administration or the invaders did no planning, no pre-war planning, to respond to terrorism. So Sergio -- this receptacle of all of this learning on how to deal with evil and how to deal with brokenness, lay under the rubble for three and a half hours without rescue. Stateless. The guy who tried to help the stateless people his whole career. Like a refugee. Because he represents the U.N.
彼の死について 注目すべきは イラク戦争を予測し フセインと同時多発テロの 関連を断定しておきながら イラクに侵攻したブッシュ政権が テロに備えていなかったという事 そのせいで 悪と交渉と 国家再建を知り尽くした男 セルジオは3時間半の間― 救助されず がれきの下に放置されました 自分が救い続けた難民と同じで 国を失くしたも同然
If you represent everyone, in some ways you represent no one. You're un-owned. And what the American -- the most powerful military in the history of mankind was able to muster for his rescue, believe it or not, was literally these heroic two American soldiers went into the shaft. Building was shaking. One of them had been at 9/11 and lost his buddies on September 11th, and yet went in and risked his life in order to save Sergio. But all they had was a woman's handbag -- literally one of those basket handbags -- and they tied it to a curtain rope from one of the offices at U.N. headquarters, and created a pulley system into this shaft in this quivering building in the interests of rescuing this person, the person we most need to turn to now, this shepherd, at a time when so many of us feel like we're lacking guidance.
国連という『全体』の代表だから どこにも属していないのです 人類史上最強のアメリカ軍が 彼を救助する為に 招集できたのは たった二人の勇敢な兵士でした 二人は揺れる建物に入っていきました 1人は9・11で 仲間を亡くしていましたが 危険を冒して建物に入っていきました 手元には 女物の手提げかばんだけ ただのかばんです それをオフィスのカーテンひもに結び 崩壊寸前の建物に 滑車装置を作ったのです 進むべき道を見失ったと感じる人が多い今 私達に最も必要な指導者を 助ける為にできたのは
And this was the pulley system. This was what we were able to muster for Sergio. The good news, for what it's worth, is after Sergio and 21 others were killed that day in the attack on the U.N., the military created a search and rescue unit that had the cutting equipment, the shoring wood, the cranes, the things that you would have needed to do the rescue. But it was too late for Sergio.
その滑車を用意することだけでした 今更ですが セルジオを含む22人が 国連に対するテロで死ぬと 捜索救助隊が発足 救助に必要な カッターや支持材や重機が この部隊に配備されています でも 彼は戻らない
I want to wrap up, but I want to close with what I take to be the four lessons from Sergio's life on this question of how do we prevent evil from prevailing, which is how I would have framed the question. Here's this guy who got a 34-year head start thinking about the kinds of questions we as a country are grappling with, we as citizens are grappling with now. What do we take away?
最後にお話しするのは 彼の人生から学んだ 4つの事です そこから 私なりに 考えました いかに悪の繁栄を妨げられるのか 私達が国として 国民として 今 取り組んでいる問題を 34年間 考え続けた男から 何を学べるでしょう?
First, I think, is his relationship to, in fact, evil is something to learn from. He, over the course of his career, changed a great deal. He had a lot of flaws, but he was very adaptive. I think that was his greatest quality. He started as somebody who would denounce harmdoers, he would charge up to people who were violating international law, and he would say, you're violating, this is the U.N. Charter. Don't you see it's unacceptable what you're doing? And they would laugh at him because he didn't have the power of states, the power of any military or police. He just had the rules, he had the norms, and he tried to use them. And in Lebanon, Southern Lebanon in '82, he said to himself and to everybody else, I will never use the word "unacceptable" again. I will never use it. I will try to make it such, but I will never use that word again. But he lunged in the opposite direction. He started, as I mentioned, to get in the room with evil, to not denounce, and became almost obsequious when he won the nickname Serbio, for instance, and even when he negotiated with the Khmer Rouge would black-box what had occurred prior to entering the room.
彼と悪との関係から 学べるものがあります 彼は変化し続けた人でした 欠点もありましたが適応力があり それが一番の強みでした 最初は 悪を行う人を 非難していた 国際法を犯す人を責めて言ったものでした 『国連憲章に違反してる 過ちを犯してるのがわからないのか』 でも国家、軍、警察力の後ろ盾がなく 相手にされませんでした 彼の武器はルールや規範でした そして82年 レバノンで 彼は宣言した 「『認められない』なんて もう二度と言わない」と それを目指しはするが その言葉は使わない 彼は正反対に走りました 悪人と同じ部屋にいても 非難せず へつらうかのようですらありました セルビオとあだ名された時や クメール・ルージュとの交渉時 彼らの過去の悪行を 問題にしませんでした
But by the end of his life, I think he had struck a balance that we as a country can learn from. Be in the room, don't be afraid of talking to your adversaries, but don't bracket what happened before you entered the room. Don't black-box history. Don't check your principles at the door. And I think that's something that we have to be in the room, whether it's Nixon going to China or Khrushchev and Kennedy or Reagan and Gorbachev. All the great progress in this country with relation to our adversaries has come by going into the room. And it doesn't have to be an act of weakness. You can actually do far more to build an international coalition against a harmdoer or a wrongdoer by being in the room and showing to the rest of the world that that person, that regime, is the problem and that you, the United States, are not the problem.
晩年は 理想と現実を両立させました 米国が見習うべき姿です 敵と交渉する時 対話を恐れない事 交渉前の出来事を 無視しない事 歴史を不明のままにせず 確固とした主義を置き去りにしない事 誰と誰が交渉するのか ニクソンと中国 フルシチョフとケネディー レーガンとゴルバチョフなど テーブルに着き 交渉することで 米国と敵国の関係は 前進してきました 交渉は弱者の行為ではない 国際社会が団結して 悪に立ち向かうには 問題なのは米国ではなく 交渉相手だと示す方がいい
Second take-away from Sergio's life, briefly. What I take away, and this in some ways is the most important, he espoused and exhibited a reverence for dignity that was really, really unusual. At a micro level, the individuals around him were visible. He saw them. At a macro level, he thought, you know, we talk about democracy promotion, but we do it in a way sometimes that's an affront to people's dignity. We put people on humanitarian aid and we boast about it because we've spent three billion. It's incredibly important, those people would no longer be alive if the United States, for instance, hadn't spent that money in Darfur, but it's not a way to live. If we think about dignity in our conduct as citizens and as individuals with relation to the people around us, and as a country, if we could inject a regard for dignity into our dealings with other countries, it would be something of a revolution.
セルジオの人生に学ぶ 二番目の事は 最も大事な事ですが 彼は尊厳というものに 敬意を払っていました 非常にまれな事です 直接に対応する個人の尊厳には 気を配っていた 国際問題レベルでは 民主主義の促進が 時には 人の尊厳を傷つける事もある 人道的支援に 「30億ドル出した」と自慢するが 大事なのは 米国の出資によって ダルフール難民の生命が救われはしたけれど 尊厳がないのです 米国民として また一個人として 身近な人の尊厳を尊重できれば また 国家として 他国の尊厳を考慮できれば それは革命的な事です
Third point, very briefly. He talked a lot about freedom from fear. And I recognize there is so much to be afraid of. There are so many genuine threats in the world. But what Sergio was talking about is, let's calibrate our relationship to the threat. Let's not hype the threat; let's actually see it clearly. We have reason to be afraid of melting ice caps. We have reason to be afraid that we haven't secured loose nuclear material in the former Soviet Union. Let's focus on what are the legitimate challenges and threats, but not lunge into bad decisions because of a panic, of a fear. In times of fear, for instance, one of the things Sergio used to say is, fear is a bad advisor. We lunge towards the extremes when we aren't operating and trying to, again, calibrate our relationship to the world around us.
また第三に 彼は 「恐れてはいけない」とよく言いました 恐れるべきもの 真の脅威は たくさんあります 「恐怖との向き合い方を 変えよう」と彼は言いました 「騒がず 真の姿を見極めよう」と 海面上昇を恐れる理由はあります ソビエトの核物質は野放し それを恐れる理由もあります 恐怖の為 誤った決断に走る事なく 脅威に対処する まともな方法について考えましょう 彼はよくこう言いました 「恐怖は悪い助言をする」と 政府の機能が低下したり 諸外国との関係を正そうとするとき 私達は極端に走ってしまいます
Fourth and final point: he somehow, because he was working in all the world's worst places and all lesser evils, had a humility, of course, and an awareness of the complexity of the world around him. I mean, such an acute awareness of how hard it was. How Sisyphean this task was of mending, and yet aware of that complexity, humbled by it, he wasn't paralyzed by it. And we as citizens, as we go through this experience of the kind of, the crisis of confidence, crisis of competence, crisis of legitimacy, I think there's a temptation to pull back from the world and say, ah, Katrina, Iraq -- we don't know what we're doing. We can't afford to pull back from the world. It's a question of how to be in the world.
最後に 4つ目です 彼は最悪の環境で働いたので 謙虚さを持ち 世界の複雑さを知っていました それがどんなに過酷かも知っていました 国家再建の使命には 終りがないようでした しかもその複雑さを知りつつ 謙虚さを持ち 行動を止めませんでした 米国民として 私達は 自信、能力、正当性の危機を 経験してきました そして 逃げ出す誘惑にかられます 「何をしているか分からない」と言いたくなります でも逃げは許されません 世界とのかかわりの問題です
And the lesson, I think, of the anti-genocide movement that I mentioned, that is a partial success but by no means has it achieved what it has set out to do -- it'll be many decades, probably, before that happens -- but is that if we want to see change, we have to become the change. We can't rely upon our institutions to do the work of necessarily talking to adversaries on their own without us creating a space for that to happen, for having respect for dignity, and for bringing that combination of humility and a sort of emboldened sense of responsibility to our dealings with the rest of the world. So will evil prevail? Is that the question? I think the short answer is: no, not unless we let it.
先に話した 反虐殺運動の教訓は 一部 成功したけれど 目的達成はできなかったという事 達成には何十年もかかるでしょう でも 変化を望むなら それを自分で起こさねば 敵国と自分から進んで対話するなど 国の機関に頼ることはできません 私達がそれを実現させ 尊厳を尊重させ 謙虚さと強い責任感を 諸外国との関係に もたらす事が必要なのです 悪は滅びないのか? 答えは「ノー」 私達が許しさえしなければ 滅びます
Thank you. (Applause)
ありがとう (拍手)