I'm going to speak today about the relationship between science and human values. Now, it's generally understood that questions of morality -- questions of good and evil and right and wrong -- are questions about which science officially has no opinion. It's thought that science can help us get what we value, but it can never tell us what we ought to value. And, consequently, most people -- I think most people probably here -- think that science will never answer the most important questions in human life: questions like, "What is worth living for?" "What is worth dying for?" "What constitutes a good life?"
Danas ću pričati o vezi između nauke i ljudskih vrednosti. Uopšteno se smatra da su pitanja morala - šta je dobro i zlo, ispravno i pogrešno - pitanja o kojima nauka zvanično nema mišljenje. Smatra se da nam nauka može pomoći da razumemo ono što vrednujemo, ali da nam nikada ne može reći šta bi trebalo da vrednujemo. I posledično, većina ljudi - mislim i većina ljudi ovde, verovatno - misli da nauka nikada neće odgovoriti na najvažnija pitanja u ljudskom životu: na pitanja kao što su, "Za šta vredi živeti?" "Za šta vredi umreti?" "Šta čini dobar život?"
So, I'm going to argue that this is an illusion -- that the separation between science and human values is an illusion -- and actually quite a dangerous one at this point in human history. Now, it's often said that science cannot give us a foundation for morality and human values, because science deals with facts, and facts and values seem to belong to different spheres. It's often thought that there's no description of the way the world is that can tell us how the world ought to be. But I think this is quite clearly untrue. Values are a certain kind of fact. They are facts about the well-being of conscious creatures.
Tvrdiću vam da je to iluzija - da je podela između nauke i ljudskih vrednosti iluzija - i to prilično opasna u ovom momentu ljudske istorije. Sada, često se kaže da nauka ne može da nam pruži osnovu za moral i vrednosti, jer nauka se bavi činjenicama, a činjenice i vrednosti izgleda priradaju različitim sferama. Često se misli da ne postoji opis sveta takvog kakav je, koji nam može reći kakav bi svet trebalo da bude. Ali ja mislim da je ovo očigledno neistinito. Vrednosti su neka vrsta činjenice. One su činjenice o dobrobiti svesnih bića.
Why is it that we don't have ethical obligations toward rocks? Why don't we feel compassion for rocks? It's because we don't think rocks can suffer. And if we're more concerned about our fellow primates than we are about insects, as indeed we are, it's because we think they're exposed to a greater range of potential happiness and suffering. Now, the crucial thing to notice here is that this is a factual claim: This is something that we could be right or wrong about. And if we have misconstrued the relationship between biological complexity and the possibilities of experience well then we could be wrong about the inner lives of insects.
Zašto nemamo etičke obaveze prema kamenju? Zašto ne saosećamo sa kamenjem? Zato što ne mislimo da kamenje može da pati. I ako smo zabrinutiji za naše primate nego za insekte, kao što i jesmo, to je zato što smatramo da su oni izloženiji većem stepenu potencijalne sreće i patnje. Ključna stvar koju treba primetiti ovde je da je to činjenična tvrdnja: ovo je nešto u vezi s čim smo u pravu ili ne. I ako smo pogrešno razumeli vezu između biološke složenosti i mogućnostima za iskustvo, onda možda grešimo i u vezi sa unutrašnjim životom insekata.
And there's no notion, no version of human morality and human values that I've ever come across that is not at some point reducible to a concern about conscious experience and its possible changes. Even if you get your values from religion, even if you think that good and evil ultimately relate to conditions after death -- either to an eternity of happiness with God or an eternity of suffering in hell -- you are still concerned about consciousness and its changes. And to say that such changes can persist after death is itself a factual claim, which, of course, may or may not be true.
I ne postoji nijedna ideja, nijedna verzija ljudske moralnosti i ljudskih vrednosti na koju sam naišao a koja u jednom momentu ne može da se svede na brigu u vezi sa svesnim doživljavanjem i njegovim potencijalnim promenama. Čak i ako usvajate vrednosti iz religije, čak i ako mislite da se dobro i zlo na kraju odnose na uslove posle smrti - bilo na večnu sreću sa bogom ili na večnu patnju u paklu - i dalje ste zabrinuti za svesnost i njene promene. A reći da te promene opstaju i posle smrti je po sebi činjenična izjava koja može i ne mora biti istinita, naravno.
Now, to speak about the conditions of well-being in this life, for human beings, we know that there is a continuum of such facts. We know that it's possible to live in a failed state, where everything that can go wrong does go wrong -- where mothers cannot feed their children, where strangers cannot find the basis for peaceful collaboration, where people are murdered indiscriminately. And we know that it's possible to move along this continuum towards something quite a bit more idyllic, to a place where a conference like this is even conceivable.
Sada, ako pričamo o uslovima dobrobiti u ovom životu, za ljude, znamo da postoji kontinuum takvih činjenica. Znamo da je moguće živeti u propaloj državi, gde sve što može da pođe naopako i polazi naopako, gde majke ne mogu da nahrane svoju decu, gde stranci ne mogu da nađu osnovu za mirnu saradnju, gde se ljudi ubijaju nasumično. I znamo da je moguće kretati se po ovom kontinuumu, prema nečemu više idiličnom, ka mestu gde je konferencija kao ova sasvim moguća.
And we know -- we know -- that there are right and wrong answers to how to move in this space. Would adding cholera to the water be a good idea? Probably not. Would it be a good idea for everyone to believe in the evil eye, so that when bad things happened to them they immediately blame their neighbors? Probably not. There are truths to be known about how human communities flourish, whether or not we understand these truths. And morality relates to these truths.
Mi znamo - znamo - da postoje tačni i pogrešni odgovori na to kako se kretati u ovom prostoru. Da li bi dodavanje kolere u vodu bilo dobra ideja? Verovatno ne. Da li bi bila dobra ideja da svi veruju u kletve, tako da kad im se dese loše stvari svi odmah okrive svoje komšije? Verovatno ne. Postoje istine o tome kako se ljudska društva razvijaju bilo da ih mi razumemo ili ne. A moral je u vezi sa ovim istinama.
So, in talking about values we are talking about facts. Now, of course our situation in the world can be understood at many levels -- from the level of the genome on up to the level of economic systems and political arrangements. But if we're going to talk about human well-being we are, of necessity, talking about the human brain. Because we know that our experience of the world and of ourselves within it is realized in the brain --
Dakle, kada pričamo o vrednostima, mi govorimo o činjenicama. Naša svetska situacija može se razumeti na mnogim nivoima - počevši od nivoa genoma do nivoa ekonomskih sistema i političkih uređenja. ali ako ćemo da govorimo o ljudskoj dobrobiti, potrebno je da govorimo o ljudskom mozgu. Jer znamo da se naše doživljavanje sveta i nas samih u okviru sveta dešava u mozgu -
whatever happens after death. Even if the suicide bomber does get 72 virgins in the afterlife, in this life, his personality -- his rather unfortunate personality -- is the product of his brain. So the contributions of culture -- if culture changes us, as indeed it does, it changes us by changing our brains. And so therefore whatever cultural variation there is in how human beings flourish can, at least in principle, be understood in the context of a maturing science of the mind -- neuroscience, psychology, etc.
šta god da se dešava posle smrti. Čak i ako bombaš samoubica dobije svoje 72 device u zagrobnom životu, u ovom životu njegova ličnost - njegova prilično nesrećna ličnost - proizvod je njegovog mozga. Dakle - doprinosi kulture - ako nas kultura menja, a zaista je tako, menja nas menjajući naše mozgove. Dakle, kakva god da postoji kulturalna varijacija u tome kako se ljudi razvijaju, ona može, barem u principu, da se razume u kontekstu sazrevanja nauke o mozgu - neurologije, psihologije, itd.
So, what I'm arguing is that value's reduced to facts -- to facts about the conscious experience of conscious beings. And we can therefore visualize a space of possible changes in the experience of these beings. And I think of this as kind of a moral landscape, with peaks and valleys that correspond to differences in the well-being of conscious creatures, both personal and collective. And one thing to notice is that perhaps there are states of human well-being that we rarely access, that few people access. And these await our discovery. Perhaps some of these states can be appropriately called mystical or spiritual. Perhaps there are other states that we can't access because of how our minds are structured but other minds possibly could access them.
Znači, ono što govorim je da se vrednost može svesti na činjenice - činjenice o svesnom iskustvu - svesnih bića. Mi dakle možemo vizualizovati prostor mogućih promena u iskustvu ovih bića. O ovome razmišljam kao o moralnom predelu, sa vrhovima i dolinama koje su jednake razlikama u dobrobiti svesnih bića, pojedinačnim i kolektivnim. I primetimo da verovatno postoje stanja ljudske dobrobiti kojima retko pristupamo, kojima malo ljudi pristupa. Ona čekaju da ih otkrijemo. Možda neka od ovih stanja možemo nazvati mističnim ili spiritualnim. Možda postoje neka druga stanja kojima ne možemo pristupiti zbog strukture svog uma, ali neki drugi umovi bi možda mogli da im pristupe.
Now, let me be clear about what I'm not saying. I'm not saying that science is guaranteed to map this space, or that we will have scientific answers to every conceivable moral question. I don't think, for instance, that you will one day consult a supercomputer to learn whether you should have a second child, or whether we should bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, or whether you can deduct the full cost of TED as a business expense. (Laughter) But if questions affect human well-being then they do have answers, whether or not we can find them. And just admitting this -- just admitting that there are right and wrong answers to the question of how humans flourish -- will change the way we talk about morality, and will change our expectations of human cooperation in the future.
Da razjasnim ono o čemu ne govorim. Ne govorim da će nauka sigurno mapirati ovaj prostor, ili da ćemo imati naučni odgovor na svako postavljeno moralno pitanje. Ne mislim, na primer, da ćete jednog dana pitati neki superkompjuter da li bi trebalo da imate drugo dete, ili da li bi trebalo da bombardujemo nuklearna postrojenja u Iranu ili da li možete puni trošak za TED da uračunate u poslovne troškove. (smeh) Ali ako pitanja utiču na dobrobit ljudi, onda moraju postojati odgovori, bilo da ih možemo pronaći ili ne. Samo priznati to - priznati da postoje tačni i pogrešni odgovori na pitanje kako se ljudi razvijaju - promeniće način na koji pričamo o moralnosti i promeniće naša očekivanja o ljudskoj saradnji u budućnosti.
For instance, there are 21 states in our country where corporal punishment in the classroom is legal, where it is legal for a teacher to beat a child with a wooden board, hard, and raising large bruises and blisters and even breaking the skin. And hundreds of thousands of children, incidentally, are subjected to this every year. The locations of these enlightened districts, I think, will fail to surprise you. We're not talking about Connecticut.
Na primer, u našoj zemlji je u 21. državi dozvoljeno fizičko kažnjavanje u školi: gde je legalno da učitelj tuče dete drvenom pločom, jako, što izaziva velike modrice i plikove i čak i posekotine. I stotine hiljada dece je, usput, izloženo ovome svake godine. Mislim da vas neće iznenaditi gde su ove prosvetljene oblasti. Ne pričamo o Konektikatu.
And the rationale for this behavior is explicitly religious. The creator of the universe himself has told us not to spare the rod, lest we spoil the child -- this is in Proverbs 13 and 20, and I believe, 23. But we can ask the obvious question: Is it a good idea, generally speaking, to subject children to pain and violence and public humiliation as a way of encouraging healthy emotional development and good behavior? (Laughter) Is there any doubt that this question has an answer, and that it matters?
A objašnjenje ovakvog ponašanja je u religiji. Sam Kreator univerzuma nam je rekao da "ko žali prut mrzi na sina svojega". Ovo se nalazi u pričama Solomunovim, glava 13, 20 i 23. Ali možemo postaviti očigledno pitanje: da li je, uopšteno govoreći, dobra ideja izložiti decu bolu i nasilju i javnom poniženju u svrhu podsticanja zdravog emocionalnog razvoja i lepog ponašanja? (smeh) Postoji li bilo kakva sumnja u to da postoji odgovor na ovo pitanje i da je on bitan?
Now, many of you might worry that the notion of well-being is truly undefined, and seemingly perpetually open to be re-construed. And so, how therefore can there be an objective notion of well-being? Well, consider by analogy, the concept of physical health. The concept of physical health is undefined. As we just heard from Michael Specter, it has changed over the years. When this statue was carved the average life expectancy was probably 30. It's now around 80 in the developed world. There may come a time when we meddle with our genomes in such a way that not being able to run a marathon at age 200 will be considered a profound disability. People will send you donations when you're in that condition. (Laughter)
Sad, mnogi od vas možda brinu da je ideja dobrobiti zapravo nedefinisana i naizgled otvorena za rekonstrukciju. U tom slučaju, kako može postojati objektivna ideja dobrobiti? Pa, razmislite analogno, koncept fizičkog zdravlja. Koncept fizičkog zdravlja je nedefinisan. Kao što smo upravo čuli od Majkla Spektora, menjao se tokom godina. Kada je ova statua napravljena prosečan životni vek je verovatno bio 30 godina. Sada je oko 80 godina u razvijenom svetu. Možda će doći vreme kada ćemo promeniti genom tako da će se nemogućnost da istrčite maraton sa 200 godina smatrati izuzetnom nesposobnošću. Ljudi će vam slati donacije kad ste u takvom stanju. (smeh)
Notice that the fact that the concept of health is open, genuinely open for revision, does not make it vacuous. The distinction between a healthy person and a dead one is about as clear and consequential as any we make in science. Another thing to notice is there may be many peaks on the moral landscape: There may be equivalent ways to thrive; there may be equivalent ways to organize a human society so as to maximize human flourishing.
Primetite da činjenica da je koncept zdravlja otvoren, zaista otvoren za razmatranje ne znači da je beznačajan. Razlika između zdrave i mrtve osobe je jasna i značajna kao bilo koja u nauci. Treba primetiti i da možda ima puno vrhova u moralnom predelu: možda postoje jednaki načini za razvoj; možda postoje jednaki načini da se organizuje ljudsko društvo tako da se maksimizira ljudski razvoj.
Now, why wouldn't this undermine an objective morality? Well think of how we talk about food: I would never be tempted to argue to you that there must be one right food to eat. There is clearly a range of materials that constitute healthy food. But there's nevertheless a clear distinction between food and poison. The fact that there are many right answers to the question, "What is food?" does not tempt us to say that there are no truths to be known about human nutrition. Many people worry that a universal morality would require moral precepts that admit of no exceptions.
Zašto ovo ne bi oslabilo objektivnu moralnost? Pa razmislite o tome kako govorimo o hrani: nikada se ne bih usudio da vas ubeđujem da mora postojati jedna ispravna hrana za jelo. Očigledno postoji čitav niz materija koje čine zdravu hranu. Ali ipak je jasna razlika između hrane i otrova. Činjenica da postoji mnogo tačnih odgovora na pitanje, "Šta je hrana?" ne čini da kažemo kako ne postoje istine o ljudskoj ishrani. Mnogi ljudi brinu da bi univerzalna moralnost zahtevala moralne poglede koji ne priznaju izuzetke.
So, for instance, if it's really wrong to lie, it must always be wrong to lie, and if you can find an exception, well then there's no such thing as moral truth. Why would we think this? Consider, by analogy, the game of chess. Now, if you're going to play good chess, a principle like, "Don't lose your Queen," is very good to follow. But it clearly admits some exceptions. There are moments when losing your Queen is a brilliant thing to do. There are moments when it is the only good thing you can do. And yet, chess is a domain of perfect objectivity. The fact that there are exceptions here does not change that at all.
Tako na primer, ako je izuzetno loše lagati, mora uvek biti loše lagati i ako možete naći izuzetak, onda ne postoji tako nešto kao moralna istina. Zašto bismo ovako mislili? Razmislite, analogno, o partiji šaha. Sad, ako ćete dobro da igrate šah, vrlo je dobro pridržavati se principa "Nemoj da izgubiš kraljicu". Ali očigledno on dozvoljava izuzetke. Postoje trenuci kada je izgubiti kraljicu sjajna stvar koju možete da uradite. Postoje trenuci kada je to jedina dobra stvar koju možete da uradite. A ipak, šah je domen savršene objektivnosti. Činjenica da ovde postoje izuzeci to uopšte ne menja.
Now, this brings us to the sorts of moves that people are apt to make in the moral sphere. Consider the great problem of women's bodies: What to do about them? Well this is one thing you can do about them: You can cover them up. Now, it is the position, generally speaking, of our intellectual community that while we may not like this, we might think of this as "wrong" in Boston or Palo Alto, who are we to say that the proud denizens of an ancient culture are wrong to force their wives and daughters to live in cloth bags? And who are we to say, even, that they're wrong to beat them with lengths of steel cable, or throw battery acid in their faces if they decline the privilege of being smothered in this way?
Sad, to nas dovodi do nekih poteza koje su ljudi skloni da čine u moralnoj sferi. Razmislite o velikom problemu ženskih tela: šta raditi u vezi sa njima? Pa, ovo je jedna stvar koju možete uraditi, možete ih pokriti. Sad, pozicija, uopšteno govoreći, naše intelektualne zajednice je da, dok nam se možda ne sviđa to, ili mislimo da je "pogrešno", u Bostonu ili Palo Altu, ko smo mi da kažemo da ponosni stanovnici starih kultura greše kada primoravaju svoje supruge i ćerke da žive u krpenim kesama? I ko smo mi da kažemo da greše čak i kad ih tuku dugačkim čeličnim kablovima, ili im sipaju kiselinu u lica ako odbiju privilegiju da budu ovako ugušene?
Well, who are we not to say this? Who are we to pretend that we know so little about human well-being that we have to be non-judgmental about a practice like this? I'm not talking about voluntary wearing of a veil -- women should be able to wear whatever they want, as far as I'm concerned. But what does voluntary mean in a community where, when a girl gets raped, her father's first impulse, rather often, is to murder her out of shame?
Pa, ko smo mi da to ne kažemo? Ko smo mi da se pretvaramo da znamo tako malo o ljudskoj dobrobiti da ne smemo da osuđujemo ovakvu praksu? Ne govorim o dobrovoljnom nošenju vela - žene treba da mogu da nose šta god žele, što se mene tiče. Ali šta znači dobrovoljno u zajednici gde, kada je devojka silovana, prva reakcija njenog oca prilično često, je da je ubije zbog srama?
Just let that fact detonate in your brain for a minute: Your daughter gets raped, and what you want to do is kill her. What are the chances that represents a peak of human flourishing?
Neka vam ova činjenica odzvanja malo u glavi: ćerka vam je silovana, a vi želite da je ubijete. Koje su šanse da ovo predstavlja vrhunac ljudskog razvoja?
Now, to say this is not to say that we have got the perfect solution in our own society. For instance, this is what it's like to go to a newsstand almost anywhere in the civilized world. Now, granted, for many men it may require a degree in philosophy to see something wrong with these images. (Laughter) But if we are in a reflective mood, we can ask, "Is this the perfect expression of psychological balance with respect to variables like youth and beauty and women's bodies?" I mean, is this the optimal environment in which to raise our children? Probably not. OK, so perhaps there's some place on the spectrum between these two extremes that represents a place of better balance. (Applause) Perhaps there are many such places --
Sad, kad to kažem, ne kažem da imamo savršeno rešenje u sopstvenom društvu. Na primer, ovako izgleda odlazak na trafiku skoro bilo gde u civilizovanom svetu. Sada, mnogim muškarcima je možda potrebna diploma iz filozofije da vide nešto pogrešno na ovim slikama. (smeh) Ali ako smo raspoloženi da razmislimo, možemo pitati, "Da li je ovo savršen izraz psihološke ravnoteže na teme mladosti i lepote i ženskih tela?" Mislim, da li je ovo optimalno okruženje za odgajanje naše dece? Verovatno nije. Ok, verovatno postoji neko mesto na spektru između ova dva ekstrema, koje predstavlja mesto bolje ravnoteže. (aplauz) Verovatno postoji mnogo takvih mesta -
again, given other changes in human culture there may be many peaks on the moral landscape. But the thing to notice is that there will be many more ways not to be on a peak. Now the irony, from my perspective, is that the only people who seem to generally agree with me and who think that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions are religious demagogues of one form or another.
opet, s obzirom na druge promene u ljudskoj kulturi možda ima mnogo vrhova na moralnom terenu. Ali treba primetiti da će biti mnogo više načina da se ne bude na vrhu. Sad, s moje tačke gledišta, ironija je da su jedini ljudi koji se u načelu slažu sa mnom i koji misle da postoje tačni i pogrešni odgovori na moralna pitanja su religiozni demagozi neke vrste.
And of course they think they have right answers to moral questions because they got these answers from a voice in a whirlwind, not because they made an intelligent analysis of the causes and condition of human and animal well-being. In fact, the endurance of religion as a lens through which most people view moral questions has separated most moral talk from real questions of human and animal suffering. This is why we spend our time talking about things like gay marriage and not about genocide or nuclear proliferation or poverty or any other hugely consequential issue. But the demagogues are right about one thing: We need a universal conception of human values.
I naravno, oni misle da imaju tačne odgovore na moralna pitanja zato što su oni svoje odgovore dobili od glasa u vrtlogu, ne zato što su inteligentno analizirali uzroke i uslov ljudske i životinjske dobrobiti. Zapravo, izdržljivost religije kao naočara kroz koje većina ljudi posmatra moralna pitanja, odvojilo je većinu moralnih razgovora od pravih pitanja ljudske i životinjske patnje. Zato provodimo svoje vreme pričajući o stvarima kao što su gej brakovi umesto o genocidu ili nuklearnom rastu ili siromaštvu ili bilo kojoj stvarno bitnoj temi. Ali demagozi su u pravu u jednoj stvari, potrebno nam je univerzalno razumevanje ljudskih vrednosti.
Now, what stands in the way of this? Well, one thing to notice is that we do something different when talking about morality -- especially secular, academic, scientist types. When talking about morality we value differences of opinion in a way that we don't in any other area of our lives. So, for instance the Dalai Lama gets up every morning meditating on compassion, and he thinks that helping other human beings is an integral component of human happiness. On the other hand, we have someone like Ted Bundy; Ted Bundy was very fond of abducting and raping and torturing and killing young women.
Sad, šta je prepreka ovome? Pa, za početak mi radimo nešto drugačije kada pričamo o moralnosti - naročito o sekularnim, akademskim ili naučnim vrstama. Kada pričamo o moralu mi vrednujemo različitost mišljenja što nije slučaj kad se radi o bilo kojoj drugoj oblasti našeg života. Na primer, Dalaj Lama svakog justra ustaje i meditira o saosećajnosti, i misli da je pomaganje drugim ljudskim bićima bitna komponenta ljudske sreće. Sa druge strane imamo nekoga kao što je Ted Bandi: Ted Bandi je veoma voleo da kidnapuje i siluje i muči i ubija mlade žene.
So, we appear to have a genuine difference of opinion about how to profitably use one's time. (Laughter) Most Western intellectuals look at this situation and say, "Well, there's nothing for the Dalai Lama to be really right about -- really right about -- or for Ted Bundy to be really wrong about that admits of a real argument that potentially falls within the purview of science. He likes chocolate, he likes vanilla. There's nothing that one should be able to say to the other that should persuade the other." Notice that we don't do this in science.
Dakle, izgleda da imamo veliku razliku u mišljenju o tome kako uspešno iskoristiti vreme. (smeh) Većina zapadnih intelektualaca gleda na ovu situaciju i kaže, "Pa, Dalaj Lama i nema oko čega da bude u pravu - stvarno u pravu - ili Ted Bandi da ne bude u pravu, što bi činilo argument koji potencijalno spada u domen nauke. Ovaj voli čokoladu, ovaj vanilu. Ne postoji ništa što bi jedan rekao drugome što bi trebalo da ga ubedi." Primetite da u nauci ovo ne radimo.
On the left you have Edward Witten. He's a string theorist. If you ask the smartest physicists around who is the smartest physicist around, in my experience half of them will say Ed Witten. The other half will tell you they don't like the question. (Laughter) So, what would happen if I showed up at a physics conference and said,"String theory is bogus. It doesn't resonate with me. It's not how I chose to view the universe at a small scale. I'm not a fan." (Laughter) Well, nothing would happen because I'm not a physicist; I don't understand string theory. I'm the Ted Bundy of string theory. (Laughter) I wouldn't want to belong to any string theory club that would have me as a member.
Sa leve strane je Edvard Viten. On je teoretičar nizova. Ako najpametnijeg fizičara u okolini pitate ko je najpametniji fizičar u okolini, po mom iskustvu, pola njih će reći Ed Viten. Druga polovina će vam reći da im se ne sviđa pitanje. (smeh) Šta bi se desilo da se pojavim na konferenciji fizike i kažem "Teorija nizova je glupost. Ne odgovara mi. Nije način na koji ja biram da posmatram svet u malom. Nisam ljubitelj toga." (smeh) Ništa se ne bi desilo, jer ja nisam fizičar, ne razumem teoriju nizova. Ja sam Ted Bandi u teoriji nizova. (smeh) Ne bih želeo da pripadam nijednom klubu teorije nizova koji bi me primio za člana.
But this is just the point. Whenever we are talking about facts certain opinions must be excluded. That is what it is to have a domain of expertise. That is what it is for knowledge to count. How have we convinced ourselves that in the moral sphere there is no such thing as moral expertise, or moral talent, or moral genius even? How have we convinced ourselves that every opinion has to count? How have we convinced ourselves that every culture has a point of view on these subjects worth considering? Does the Taliban have a point of view on physics that is worth considering? No. (Laughter) How is their ignorance any less obvious on the subject of human well-being? (Applause)
Ali u tome je poenta. Kad god govorimo o činjenicama, određena mišljena moraju da se isključe. To znači biti ekspert u nekom polju. To znači da se znanje računa. Kako smo se ubedili u to da u moralnoj sferi ne postoji tako nešto kao moralna ekspertiza ili moralni talenat ili čak moralni genije? Kako smo se ubedili da svako mišljenje mora da se računa? Kako smo se ubedili da svaka kultura ima tačku gledišta o ovim temama koju je vredno uzeti u obzir? Da li jedan Taliban ima mišljenje o fizici koje je vredno uzimanja u obzir? Ne. (smeh) Kako je njihovo neznanje manje očigledno na temu ljudske dobrobiti? (aplauz)
So, this, I think, is what the world needs now. It needs people like ourselves to admit that there are right and wrong answers to questions of human flourishing, and morality relates to that domain of facts. It is possible for individuals, and even for whole cultures, to care about the wrong things, which is to say that it's possible for them to have beliefs and desires that reliably lead to needless human suffering. Just admitting this will transform our discourse about morality. We live in a world in which the boundaries between nations mean less and less, and they will one day mean nothing.
Dakle, mislim da je ovo potrebno svetu u ovom trenutku. Potrebni su ljudi kao mi da priznaju da postoje ispravni i pogrešni odgovori na pitanja o ljudskom razvoju, a moral se odnosi na taj domen činjenica. Moguće je da je pojedincima, pa čak i čitavim kulturama, stalo do pogrešnih stvari: što znači da je moguće da oni imaju verovanja i težnje koje sigurno vode nepotrebnoj ljudskoj patnji. Samo priznavanje ovoga će promeniti naš diskurs o moralnosti. Živimo u svetu u kom granice među nacijama sve manje znače, a jednoga dana neće ništa značiti.
We live in a world filled with destructive technology, and this technology cannot be uninvented; it will always be easier to break things than to fix them. It seems to me, therefore, patently obvious that we can no more respect and tolerate vast differences in notions of human well-being than we can respect or tolerate vast differences in the notions about how disease spreads, or in the safety standards of buildings and airplanes. We simply must converge on the answers we give to the most important questions in human life. And to do that, we have to admit that these questions have answers. Thank you very much. (Applause)
Živimo u svetu ispunjenom destruktivnom tehnologijom, koja ne može da se učini ne-izmišljenom, uvek će biti lakše pokvariti nego popraviti stvari. Meni se čini prilično očiglednim da više ne možemo da poštujemo i tolerišemo ogromne razlike u ideji o dobrobiti, da poštujemo i tolerišemo ogromne razlike u idejama o tome kako se bolesti šire, ili u bezbednosnim standardima zgrada i aviona. Moramo da težimo odgovorima koje dajemo na najvažnija pitanja u ljudskom životu. A da bismo to učinili, moramo priznati da ova pitanja imaju odgovore. Hvala vam mnogo. (aplauz)
Chris Anderson: So, some combustible material there. Whether in this audience or people elsewhere in the world, hearing some of this, may well be doing the screaming-with-rage thing, after as well, some of them.
Kris Anderson: Ovo je zapaljiv materijal. Bilo da se radi o ovoj publici ili ljudima drugde u svetu, posle slušanja ovoga mogli bi da viču od besa, barem neki od njih.
Language seems to be really important here. When you're talking about the veil, you're talking about women dressed in cloth bags. I've lived in the Muslim world, spoken with a lot of Muslim women. And some of them would say something else. They would say, "No, you know, this is a celebration of female specialness, it helps build that and it's a result of the fact that" -- and this is arguably a sophisticated psychological view -- "that male lust is not to be trusted." I mean, can you engage in a conversation with that kind of woman without seeming kind of cultural imperialist?
Izgleda da je jezik ovde veoma bitan. Kada govorite o velu, govorite o ženama obučenim u krpene vreće, ja sam živeo u muslimanskom svetu, pričao sa mnogo muslimanskih žena. Neke od njih bi rekle nešto drugo. Rekle bi, "Ne, znate ovo je slava ženske posebnosti, pomaže u izgradnji toga i rezultat je činjenice..." i to je dokazivo u sofisticiranom psihološkom gledištu, "da muškoj požudi ne treba verovati." Mislim, možete li ući u razgovor sa takvom ženom, a da ne izgledate kao neki kulturni imperijalist.
Sam Harris: Yeah, well I think I tried to broach this in a sentence, watching the clock ticking, but the question is: What is voluntary in a context where men have certain expectations, and you're guaranteed to be treated in a certain way if you don't veil yourself? And so, if anyone in this room wanted to wear a veil, or a very funny hat, or tattoo their face -- I think we should be free to voluntarily do whatever we want, but we have to be honest about the constraints that these women are placed under. And so I think we shouldn't be so eager to always take their word for it, especially when it's 120 degrees out and you're wearing a full burqa.
Sem Haris: Da, pa mislim da sam pokušao da istaknem to u jednoj rečenici, dok sam gledao sat kako otkucava, ali pitanje je, šta je dobrovoljno u kontekstu gde muškarci imaju određena očekivanja, i garantovano vam je da će vas tretirati na određeni način, ako ne obučete veo? Dakle, ako neko iz ove prostorije želi da nosi veo, ili vrlo smešan šešir, ili da tetovira lice - mislim da bi trebalo da slobodno voljno radimo šta hoćemo, ali moramo biti iskreni o ograničenjima pod kojima su ove žene. I zato mislim da ne bi trebalo uvek da im verujemo na reč, posebno ako ima 50 stepeni napolju a one nose burku.
CA: A lot of people want to believe in this concept of moral progress. But can you reconcile that? I think I understood you to say that you could reconcile that with a world that doesn't become one dimensional, where we all have to think the same. Paint your picture of what rolling the clock 50 years forward, 100 years forward, how you would like to think of the world, balancing moral progress with richness.
K.A.: Mnogo ljudi želi da veruje u koncept moralnog napretka. Ali možete li to pomiriti? Mislim da sam razumeo da kažete da možete pomiriti to sa svetom koji ne postaje jednodimenzionalan, gde svi treba da mislimo jednako. Kako mislite da će svet izgledati, za 50 godina ili za 100 godina, kako biste voleli da izgleda, balansirajući moralni napredak sa bogatstvom.
SH: Well, I think once you admit that we are on the path toward understanding our minds at the level of the brain in some important detail, then you have to admit that we are going to understand all of the positive and negative qualities of ourselves in much greater detail. So, we're going to understand positive social emotion like empathy and compassion, and we're going to understand the factors that encourage it -- whether they're genetic, whether they're how people talk to one another, whether they're economic systems, and insofar as we begin to shine light on that we are inevitably going to converge on that fact space.
S.H.: Pa, mislim da kada priznate da se nalazimo na putu razumevanja naših umova i nivoa mozga u nekim bitnim stvarima, morate priznati da ćemo razumeti sve svoje pozitivne i negativne kvalitete mnogo detaljnije. Znači, razumećemo pozitivnu društvenu emociju kao što je empatija ili saosećanje, i razumećemo faktore koji ih podstiču - bilo da su genetski, ili način na koji ljudi razgovaraju, ili su ekonomski sistemi. Ukoliko počnemo to da osvetljavamo, neizbežno ćemo težiti tom činjeničnom prostoru.
So, everything is not going to be up for grabs. It's not going to be like veiling my daughter from birth is just as good as teaching her to be confident and well-educated in the context of men who do desire women. I mean I don't think we need an NSF grant to know that compulsory veiling is a bad idea -- but at a certain point we're going to be able to scan the brains of everyone involved and actually interrogate them. Do people love their daughters just as much in these systems? And I think there are clearly right answers to that.
Znači, neće sve biti dato na tanjiru. Neće biti da je oblačenje moje ćerke u veo od rođenja jednako dobro kao učiti je da bude pouzdana i dobro obrazovana u okruženju muškaraca koji žude za ženama. Mislim, ne treba nam nagrada naučne fondacije da znamo da je nametanje vela loša ideja - ali u nekom momentu ćemo moći da skeniramo mozgove svih uključenih i da ih stvarno ispitujemo. Da li ljudi jednako vole svoje ćerke u ovim sistemima? Mislim da postoje vrlo jasni odgovori na to.
CA: And if the results come out that actually they do, are you prepared to shift your instinctive current judgment on some of these issues?
K.A.: I ako dobijemo rezultate da je zaista tako, da li ste spremni da promenite svoj trenutni instinktivni sud na neku od ovih tema?
SH: Well yeah, modulo one obvious fact, that you can love someone in the context of a truly delusional belief system. So, you can say like, "Because I knew my gay son was going to go to hell if he found a boyfriend, I chopped his head off. And that was the most compassionate thing I could do." If you get all those parts aligned, yes I think you could probably be feeling the emotion of love. But again, then we have to talk about well-being in a larger context. It's all of us in this together, not one man feeling ecstasy and then blowing himself up on a bus.
S.H.: Pa da, osim jedne očigledne činjenice, da možete voleti nekog u kontekstu sistema uverenja koji je u zabludi. Možete reći, "Znao sam da će moj gej sin ići u pakao ako nađe momka, pa sam mu odsekao glavu. I to je najsaosećajnija stvar koju sam mogao učiniti." Ako poslažete sve te delove, pretpostavljam da možete osećati emociju ljubavi. Ali opet, onda moramo da govorimo o dobrobiti u širem kontekstu. Svi smo zajedno u ovome, a ne da jedan čovek oseća ekstazu i onda se raznese u autobusu.
CA: Sam, this is a conversation I would actually love to continue for hours. We don't have that, but maybe another time. Thank you for coming to TED.
K.A.: Ovaj razgovor bih stvarno voleo da nastavim satima. To nije moguće, ali možda neki drugi put. Hvala što ste došli na TED.
SH: Really an honor. Thank you. (Applause)
S.H.: Zaista mi je čast. Hvala. (aplauz)