The question today is not: Why did we invade Afghanistan? The question is: why are we still in Afghanistan one decade later? Why are we spending $135 billion? Why have we got 130,000 troops on the ground? Why were more people killed last month than in any preceding month of this conflict? How has this happened? The last 20 years has been the age of intervention, and Afghanistan is simply one act in a five-act tragedy. We came out of the end of the Cold War in despair. We faced Rwanda; we faced Bosnia, and then we rediscovered our confidence. In the third act, we went into Bosnia and Kosovo and we seemed to succeed. In the fourth act, with our hubris, our overconfidence developing, we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the fifth act, we plunged into a humiliating mess.
今天的問題不是: 我們為什麼侵略阿富汗? 而是 我們為什麼還待在那裡? 十年之後? 我們為什麼要花 135億美元 我們為什麼要有13萬軍隊部屬在戰爭現場 為什麼有更多人死去 上個月 比之前任何一個月都多 因為這個戰爭? 為什麼會這樣? 最後20年 是干預的年代 而阿富汗只是其中一個行動 在一個接連5個行動的悲劇 我們絕望地從冷戰末期 走出 我們面對過盧安達(種族)大屠殺 我們面對波士尼亞(瑟布雷尼卡)屠殺事件 然後我們重拾信心 在第三個行動中,我們進入波士尼亞和科索沃 最終我們似乎成功了 在第四個行動中,我們以驕傲的心態, 變得越來越過度自信 我們侵略了伊拉克和阿富汗 在第五個行動中 我們慘陷令人不堪的泥诏
So the question is: What are we doing? Why are we still stuck in Afghanistan? And the answer, of course, that we keep being given is as follows: we're told that we went into Afghanistan because of 9/11, and that we remain there because the Taliban poses an existential threat to global security. In the words of President Obama, "If the Taliban take over again, they will invite back Al-Qaeda, who will try to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." The story that we're told is that there was a "light footprint" initially -- in other words, that we ended up in a situation where we didn't have enough troops, we didn't have enough resources, that Afghans were frustrated -- they felt there wasn't enough progress and economic development and security, and therefore the Taliban came back -- that we responded in 2005 and 2006 with troop deployments, but we still didn't put enough troops on the ground. And that it wasn't until 2009, when President Obama signed off on a surge, that we finally had, in the words of Secretary Clinton, "the strategy, the leadership and the resources." So, as the president now reassures us, we are on track to achieve our goals.
所以,我們在幹嘛? 為什麼我們還陷在阿富汗? 當然這個答案 提供我們的一直是 如下 我們被告知去阿富汗 是因為911恐怖攻擊 而我們之所以還待在這裡 是因為塔利班的存在 對全球安全帶來了威脅 歐巴馬總統多次談到 如果塔利班捲土重來 他們將會迎回蓋達組織 這組織將盡他們所能 試著殺死我們的人民 我們被告知的說法 是我們最初只是輕輕地踏上那土地 換句話說,我們的結局反而造成了 我們並沒有足夠的軍力 我們沒有足夠的資源 使阿富汗人民很沮喪 他們感覺不到足夠的進展 經濟發展和安全 因此塔利班才會回來 2005年和2006年之間 我們部屬了軍隊 但數量依然不足夠 一直到2009年 當歐巴馬總統在波濤洶湧的情勢下批准後 我們才終於有了 套句美國國務卿希拉克林頓的話 策略,領導精神和資源 所以,當總統又再次向我們保證 我們正走在實現目標的正軌上時
All of this is wrong. Every one of those statements is wrong. Afghanistan does not pose an existential threat to global security. It is extremely unlikely the Taliban would ever be able to take over the country -- extremely unlikely they'd be able to seize Kabul. They simply don't have a conventional military option. And even if they were able to do so, even if I'm wrong, it's extremely unlikely the Taliban would invite back Al-Qaeda. From the Taliban's point of view, that was their number one mistake last time. If they hadn't invited back Al-Qaeda, they would still be in power today.
這些都是錯的 那些陳素也都是錯的 阿富汗並不是 對全球安全來說 並不是個威脅 根本不可能 塔利班能夠再次接管這個國家 他們更不可能能夠佔領喀布爾 她們就是沒有一個傳統的軍隊選擇 即使她們能夠這樣做,即使我錯了 依然不太可能 塔利班會迎回蓋達組織 從塔利班的角度來看, 上次是他們犯過最大的錯誤 如果他們沒有贏回蓋達組織 他們今天就應該還會掌權
And even if I'm wrong about those two things, even if they were able to take back the country, even if they were to invite back Al-Qaeda, it's extremely unlikely that Al-Qaeda would significantly enhance its ability to harm the United States or harm Europe. Because this isn't the 1990s anymore. If the Al-Qaeda base was to be established near Ghazni, we would hit them very hard, and it would be very, very difficult for the Taliban to protect them.
即使我對這兩件事的看法都錯了 即使她們可以奪回國家 即使他們會迎回蓋達組織 還是非常不可能 蓋達組織會顯著地強大 傷害美國的能力 或傷害英國 因為現在已經不是1990年代了 如果蓋達組織基地 會蓋在加茲尼附近 我們會猛烈攻擊他們 那將會非常困難 要保護他們的話
Furthermore, it's simply not true that what went wrong in Afghanistan is the light footprint. In my experience, in fact, the light footprint was extremely helpful. And these troops that we brought in -- it's a great picture of David Beckham there on the sub-machine gun -- made the situation worse, not better. When I walked across Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-2002, what I saw was scenes like this. A girl, if you're lucky, in the corner of a dark room -- lucky to be able to look at the Koran. But in those early days when we're told we didn't have enough troops and enough resources, we made a lot of progress in Afghanistan. Within a few months, there were two and a half million more girls in school. In Sangin where I was sick in 2002, the nearest health clinic was within three days walk. Today, there are 14 health clinics in that area alone. There was amazing improvements. We went from almost no Afghans having mobile telephones during the Taliban to a situation where, almost overnight, three million Afghans had mobile telephones. And we had progress in the free media. We had progress in elections -- all of this with the so-called light footprint.
那完全不是事實 在阿富汗造成的錯誤 只是輕微的影響 事實上,就我經驗談 這個輕微影響其實很有幫助 而那些我們帶進去的軍隊 這是一張貝克漢的照片 拿著衝鋒槍 這使情況更糟,沒有更好 當我行走阿富汗時 在2001和2002年間的冬天 我看到的是像這樣的場景 如果你夠幸運,一個女孩 在昏暗房間的角落裡 幸運地能夠看著可蘭經 但是在早些日子那時 我們被告知沒有足夠的軍隊和資源 我們其實在阿富汗有很大的進展 在幾個月內 學校裡有超過250萬的女孩們就讀 2002年時我在Sangin病倒了 最近的衛生診所 還要走三天的路 今天,有14個衛生珍所 單單在那個區域 那時其實有驚人的改善 我們從幾乎沒有阿富汗人 在塔利班時期擁有電話 進展到一個現象,幾乎一夜之間 三百萬阿富汗人擁有手機 我們在媒體自由上也有進展 我們在選舉上也有進展 這些都是所謂的輕輕踏過
But when we began to bring more money, when we began to invest more resources, things got worse, not better. How? Well first see, if you put 125 billion dollars a year into a country like Afghanistan where the entire revenue of the Afghan state is one billion dollars a year, you drown everything. It's not simply corruption and waste that you create; you essentially replace the priorities of the Afghan government, the elected Afghan government, with the micromanaging tendencies of foreigners on short tours with their own priorities. And the same is true for the troops.
但是當我們開始帶來更多金錢 開始投資更多資源時 事情沒變好卻更糟。 怎麼這樣? 嗯 首先 如果你一年投入125億元 在像阿富汗這樣的國家上 整個國家財政收入 一年才一億元 那就是像石沉大海 你造成的不只是 貪汙和浪費 你根本上替換了阿富汗政府的執政重點 那個被選出來的政府 而傾向由短期旅居的外國人 隨著他們的喜好 管東管西 對軍隊來說也是這樣
When I walked across Afghanistan, I stayed with people like this. This is Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj. Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj was a great host. He was very generous, like many of the Afghans I stayed with. But he was also considerably more conservative, considerably more anti-foreign, considerably more Islamist than we'd like to acknowledge. This man, for example, Mullah Mustafa, tried to shoot me. And the reason I'm looking a little bit perplexed in this photograph is I was somewhat frightened, and I was too afraid on this occasion to ask him, having run for an hour through the desert and taken refuge in this house, why he had turned up and wanted to have his photograph taken with me. But 18 months later, I asked him why he had tried to shoot me. And Mullah Mustafa -- he's the man with the pen and paper -- explained that the man sitting immediately to the left as you look at the photograph, Nadir Shah had bet him that he couldn't hit me. Now this is not to say Afghanistan is a place full of people like Mullah Mustafa. It's not; it's a wonderful place full of incredible energy and intelligence. But it is a place where the putting-in of the troops has increased the violence rather than decreased it.
當我行走阿富汗時 我借住在這樣的人家裡 這位是指揮官 Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj 他是一位很讚的東家 非常大方 就像我借住過的很多阿富汗人一樣 但他相對來說也比較保守 比較仇外 比較伊斯蘭基本教義派 比起我們認為的 譬如說 這個人Mullah Mustafa 想要射殺我 我之所以在照片裡看來有點迷茫 是因為我有點被嚇到 而且我在這樣的場合下太害怕 問他 在我在沙漠中跑了一小時後 終於在這屋裡可以避難後 為什麼他突然要和我合照 但18個月後,我問他 為什麼他要射殺我 Mullah Mustafa 拿著筆和紙的那個人 解釋坐在照片左邊的那個人 Nadir Shah 和他打賭他不敢打我 我的意思不是說 在阿富汗都是像Nadir Shah這樣的人 不是 它是一個好地方 充滿著難以置信的能量和智慧 但是這個地方 部屬軍隊 只會增加暴力而不是減少
2005, Anthony Fitzherbert, an agricultural engineer, could travel through Helmand, could stay in Nad Ali, Sangin and Ghoresh, which are now the names of villages where fighting is taking place. Today, he could never do that. So the idea that we deployed the troops to respond to the Taliban insurgency is mistaken. Rather than preceding the insurgency, the Taliban followed the troop deployment, and as far as I'm concerned, the troop deployment caused their return.
2005年時 Anthony Fitzherbert 一個農業工程師 可以旅經爾曼德 可以待在奈德阿里Sangin 和Ghoresh 但現在那些村莊戰爭正在進行 現在他再也不能這樣做了 所以我們想部屬軍隊 來回應塔利班的暴亂 是錯的 不但沒有早於暴亂發生之前 塔利班還接著軍隊部屬後而來 就我所知 軍對部屬導致他們重返
Now is this a new idea? No, there have been any number of people saying this over the last seven years. I ran a center at Harvard from 2008 to 2010, and there were people like Michael Semple there who speak Afghan languages fluently, who've traveled to almost every district in the country. Andrew Wilder, for example, born on the Pakistan-Iranian border, served his whole life in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Paul Fishstein who began working there in 1978 -- worked for Save the Children, ran the Afghan research and evaluation unit. These are people who were able to say consistently that the increase in development aid was making Afghanistan less secure, not more secure -- that the counter-insurgency strategy was not working and would not work. And yet, nobody listened to them. Instead, there was a litany of astonishing optimism.
難道這是個新的想法嗎? 不,在過去七年裡 很多人一直提出這個想法 我在哈佛主持一個中心 從2008到2010年間 那裡有像Michael Semple 會一口流利阿富汗語的人 幾乎去過整個國家的每一區 比如說Andrew Wilder 他出生在巴基斯坦和伊朗的邊界 把他的一生都奉獻 於巴基斯坦和阿富汗 像從1978年就在那裡工作的Paul Fishstein 是為了拯救孩童 他主持阿富汗研究和評估單位 這些人 可以肯定一貫地說 發展援助的增加 讓阿富汗更不安全而不是更安全 而且反暴動策略 不但過去無效也不可能有效 但是卻沒人聽得進去 反之 卻有一連串驚人的樂觀主義出現
Beginning in 2004, every general came in saying, "I've inherited a dismal situation, but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy, which will deliver," in General Barno's word in 2004, the "decisive year." Well guess what? It didn't. But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying that he had the strategy and the resources to deliver, in 2005, the "decisive year." Or General David Richards to come in 2006 and say he had the strategy and the resources to deliver the "crunch year." Or in 2007, the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide, to say that that would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2008, Major General Champoux to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2009, my great friend, General Stanley McChrystal, who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year." Or in 2010, the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband, who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year." And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today, that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, assures us that we are in the "decisive year."
從膽2004開始 每個將軍都說 我承接著了一個慘淡的局勢 但終於有了對的資源和正確的策略 將帶來 套一句Barno將軍在2004年的話 決定性的一 年 你猜怎麼著? 那並沒有發生。 但這並足夠阻止General Abuzaid說 他有策略和資源 在2005年帶來 決定性的一年 或在2006年 阻止General David Richards 說他有策略和資源 帶來緊縮的一年 或是2007時 挪威外交部長代表Espen Eide 說的即將帶來決定性的一年 或是2008年時 少將 Champoux 說他會帶來決定性的一年 或2009年 我的好朋友 Stanley McChrystal將軍 他身處決定性的一年裡 或2010年 英國外交部長David Miliband 說我們終於將帶來決定性的一年 你會很開心聽到2011年的今天 德國的外交部長 Guido Westerwelle 向我們保證今年是決定性的一年
(Applause)
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How do we allow any of this to happen? Well the answer, of course, is, if you spend 125 billion or 130 billion dollars a year in a country, you co-opt almost everybody. Even the aid agencies, who begin to receive an enormous amount of money from the U.S. and the European governments to build schools and clinics, are somewhat disinclined to challenge the idea that Afghanistan is an existential threat to global security. They're worried, in other words, that if anybody believes that it wasn't such a threat -- Oxfam, Save the Children wouldn't get the money to build their hospitals and schools. It's also very difficult to confront a general with medals on his chest. It's very difficult for a politician, because you're afraid that many lives have been lost in vain. You feel deep, deep guilt. You exaggerate your fears, and you're terrified about the humiliation of defeat.
我們怎能容許 這些發生 答案當然是 如果你每年花125億或130億美元 在一個國家上 你幾乎吸收了每個人 甚至援助機構 他們開始收到一大筆錢 來自美國和英國政府 用來蓋學校和診所 他們不太願意 挑戰這個阿富汗是 是對全球安全的一個存在威脅 的想法 換句話說 他們擔心 如果有人相信其實阿富汗不具有如此威脅性 樂施會,拯救孩童 就不能得到錢 來建造醫院和學校 要對抗一個胸上有獎牌的上將 也是非常難的 對一個政治人物來說非常困難 因為你害怕太多生命已經徒勞犧牲 你感到愧疚萬分 你誇大了恐懼 而且你被失敗的羞辱嚇死了 嚇死了
What is the solution to this? Well the solution to this is we need to find a way that people like Michael Semple, or those other people, who are telling the truth, who know the country, who've spent 30 years on the ground -- and most importantly of all, the missing component of this -- Afghans themselves, who understand what is going on. We need to somehow get their message to the policymakers. And this is very difficult to do because of our structures.
這個解決方法是什麼呢? 解決方法就是 我們需要找到一個方法 讓像Michael Semple的人或其它那些人 那些說真話,了解這個國家 那些花了30年在現場 最重要的是 這件事情少了的部分 阿富汗人他們自己 他們才了解正在發生什麼 我們必須想辦法讓他們的訊息 傳給立法者知道 因為我們的結構 這很難辦到
The first thing we need to change is the structures of our government. Very, very sadly, our foreign services, the United Nations, the military in these countries have very little idea of what's going on. The average British soldier is on a tour of only six months; Italian soldiers, on tours of four months; the American military, on tours of 12 months. Diplomats are locked in embassy compounds. When they go out, they travel in these curious armored vehicles with these somewhat threatening security teams who ready 24 hours in advance who say you can only stay on the ground for an hour.
首要改變的是 我們政府的結構 令人很難過的是 我們的外國服務,聯合國 這些國家的軍隊 不甚了解發生了甚麼事 英國軍人平均巡迴阿富汗六個月 義大利軍人四個月 美國軍人12個月 外交官被關在大使館圍牆裡 就算他們出去,也是躲在奇怪的裝甲車裡 帶著這些有些嚇人的安防隊伍 每天24小時前就準備好 說你只能現場待一小時
In the British embassy in Afghanistan in 2008, an embassy of 350 people, there were only three people who could speak Dari, the main language of Afghanistan, at a decent level. And there was not a single Pashto speaker. In the Afghan section in London responsible for governing Afghan policy on the ground, I was told last year that there was not a single staff member of the foreign office in that section who had ever served on a posting in Afghanistan. So we need to change that institutional culture. And I could make the same points about the United States and the United Nations.
阿富汗的英國大使館裡 2008年時 在350個人的大使管理 只有3個人可以說像樣程度的Dari語 阿富汗的主要語言 沒有一個說Pashto語的人 在倫敦的阿富汗區 負責治理阿富汗現場的政策 去年我被告知 在那一個外交辦公室的組別裡 沒有任何一個組員 曾經用阿富汗語 張貼過任何消息 所以我們必須改變那個體制文化 對美國和聯合國來說 我講得也是有道理的
Secondly, we need to aim off of the optimism of the generals. We need to make sure that we're a little bit suspicious, that we understand that optimism is in the DNA of the military, that we don't respond to it with quite as much alacrity. And thirdly, we need to have some humility. We need to begin from the position that our knowledge, our power, our legitimacy is limited. This doesn't mean that intervention around the world is a disaster. It isn't.
第二,我們必須把目標從那些上將的樂觀主義上轉移 我們必須確定我們有些多疑 我們知道樂觀 是軍人基因中與生俱來的 我們不能太敏捷 地回應它 第三,我們必須謙虛一點 我們必須從了解到 我們的知識,力量 和合法性 是有限的定位出發 這並不是指 干預國際事務是個災難 不是
Bosnia and Kosovo were signal successes, great successes. Today when you go to Bosnia it is almost impossible to believe that what we saw in the early 1990s happened. It's almost impossible to believe the progress we've made since 1994. Refugee return, which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees thought would be extremely unlikely, has largely happened. A million properties have been returned. Borders between the Bosniak territory and the Bosnian-Serb territory have calmed down. The national army has shrunk. The crime rates in Bosnia today are lower than they are in Sweden.
波士尼亞和科索沃 是成功的信號 偉大的成功 如果你現在去波士尼亞 你幾乎不會相信 我們在1990年代看到 以及自從1994年來我們促進的發展 發生過 難民回來了 這是聯合國難民屬 覺得極不可能發生的 竟然大大的發生了 一百萬個檔案資料已經被送回 在波士尼亞領土附近的邊界 以及波士尼亞和賽爾維亞邊界的情勢已經安定下來 播士尼亞國軍已經縮減 現在波士尼亞的犯罪率 比瑞典還低
This has been done by an incredible, principled effort by the international community, and, of course, above all, by Bosnians themselves. But you need to look at context. And this is what we've lost in Afghanistan and Iraq. You need to understand that in those places what really mattered was, firstly, the role of Tudman and Milosevic in coming to the agreement, and then the fact those men went, that the regional situation improved, that the European Union could offer Bosnia something extraordinary: the chance to be part of a new thing, a new club, a chance to join something bigger.
這全靠 驚人 有紀律的努力 以及國際社會 當然最重要的是 波士尼亞人們自己才能辦到 但是必須要知道事情前後脈絡 這是我們在阿富汗和伊拉克所喪失的 你必須知道在那些地方 真正重要的 首先是圖季曼和米洛舍維奇的角色 能夠達成協議 以及那些人真的去了 區域的情勢改善了 歐盟也提供波士尼亞 很棒的東西 那個可以成為 一個新東西,一個新社團 可以加入一個更大的團體的機會
And finally, we need to understand that in Bosnia and Kosovo, a lot of the secret of what we did, a lot of the secret of our success, was our humility -- was the tentative nature of our engagement. We criticized people a lot in Bosnia for being quite slow to take on war criminals. We criticized them for being quite slow to return refugees. But that slowness, that caution, the fact that President Clinton initially said that American troops would only be deployed for a year, turned out to be a strength, and it helped us to put our priorities right.
最後,我們必須了解在波士尼亞和科索沃 我們所做得絕大秘密 我們成功的絕大秘密 都功歸於我們的謙虛 和我們試驗性的參與天性 我們在波士尼亞批評了很多人 太慢與戰爭罪人對抗 批評他們 太慢送回難民 但是那個慢速度,那個慎重 柯林頓總統最初說的事實 美國軍隊只會部屬一年 結果變成我們的強處 幫助我們放對重點
One of the saddest things about our involvement in Afghanistan is that we've got our priorities out of sync. We're not matching our resources to our priorities. Because if what we're interested in is terrorism, Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan. If what we're interested in is regional stability, Egypt is far more important. If what we're worried about is poverty and development, sub-Saharan Africa is far more important. This doesn't mean that Afghanistan doesn't matter, but that it's one of 40 countries in the world with which we need to engage.
在我們涉入阿富汗事件中 最可悲的事情 就是我們的重點沒做到同步 我們並沒有把資源運用在我們的重點上 因為如果我們關心恐怖主義 巴基斯坦比阿富汗重要得多了 如果我們關心的是區域性的穩定 埃及重要得多了 如果我們擔心的是貧窮和發展 次撒哈拉非洲地區重要得多了 這並不是說阿富汗不重要 但只是世界上40個國家中 我們需要參與其中的其中之一
So if I can finish with a metaphor for intervention, what we need to think of is something like mountain rescue. Why mountain rescue? Because when people talk about intervention, they imagine that some scientific theory -- the Rand Corporation goes around counting 43 previous insurgencies producing mathematical formula saying you need one trained counter-insurgent for every 20 members of the population. This is the wrong way of looking at it. You need to look at it in the way that you look at mountain rescue.
所以如果用一個比喻來說干預這件事 我們需要想到的是 像山區救援這樣的事情 為什麼呢 因為當人們談到干預 他們認為某些蘭德公司 做的科學理論 把之前43起叛亂 算出一個公式 告訴你你需要一個訓練好的反叛亂行動 給人口中每20個人一個 這是錯誤的看法 你需要像看山區救援那樣看待它
When you're doing mountain rescue, you don't take a doctorate in mountain rescue, you look for somebody who knows the terrain. It's about context. You understand that you can prepare, but the amount of preparation you can do is limited -- you can take some water, you can have a map, you can have a pack. But what really matters is two kinds of problems -- problems that occur on the mountain which you couldn't anticipate, such as, for example, ice on a slope, but which you can get around, and problems which you couldn't anticipate and which you can't get around, like a sudden blizzard or an avalanche or a change in the weather.
當你進行山區救援時 你不需要博士學位才行 你要找一個瞭解地勢的人 這和背景有關 你知道可以準備 但你能做的準備 有限 你可以帶些水,帶個地圖 你可以準備一個包包 但真的重要的是 兩種問題 山裡會發生的問題 而你預料不到 例如像是坡上的冰 但你還可以逃開 以及預料不到 又逃不開的問題 像突然的暴風雪和雪崩 或是天氣驟變
And the key to this is a guide who has been on that mountain, in every temperature, at every period -- a guide who, above all, knows when to turn back, who doesn't press on relentlessly when conditions turn against them. What we look for in firemen, in climbers, in policemen, and what we should look for in intervention, is intelligent risk takers -- not people who plunge blind off a cliff, not people who jump into a burning room, but who weigh their risks, weigh their responsibilities. Because the worst thing we have done in Afghanistan is this idea that failure is not an option. It makes failure invisible, inconceivable and inevitable. And if we can resist this crazy slogan, we shall discover -- in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya, and anywhere else we go in the world -- that if we can often do much less than we pretend, we can do much more than we fear.
對此的解決之道 就是一個曾經在山上 待過各種氣候 任何時間的嚮導 最重要的是, 一個 知道什麼時候該回頭 當情勢轉劣時不會堅持前進 的嚮導 我們從 消防員,登山員和警察 以及應該從干預中找的 是聰明的冒險者 不是盲目跳下懸崖的人 不是跳進火坑的人 而是會衡量風險 衡量她們的責任 因為我們在阿富汗做過最糟的事 就是抱著 沒有失敗的選擇的想法 這使失敗隱形了 無法想像且無可避免 如果我們能抵抗 這個瘋狂口號 我們會發現 在埃及 敘利亞 利比亞 以及世界上任何其他國家 如果我們能卸去偽裝 我們就能無畏地做得更多
Thank you very much.
非常感謝你們
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
謝謝。謝謝你們。 謝謝,謝謝你們。 謝謝你們謝謝你們謝謝你們
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
謝謝你們 謝謝你們謝謝你們 謝謝你們
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Bruno Giussani: Rory, you mentioned Libya at the end. Just briefly, what's your take on the current events there and the intervention?
Bruno Giussani: Rory你最後提到利比亞 簡短說一下,你對現今在那裏發生的事情的想法 還有那邊的干預
Rory Stewart: Okay, I think Libya poses the classic problem. The problem in Libya is that we are always pushing for the black or white. We imagine there are only two choices: either full engagement and troop deployment or total isolation. And we are always being tempted up to our neck. We put our toes in and we go up to our neck. What we should have done in Libya is we should have stuck to the U.N. resolution. We should have limited ourselves very, very strictly to the protection of the civilian population in Benghazi. We could have done that. We set up a no-fly zone within 48 hours because Gaddafi had no planes within 48 hours. Instead of which, we've allowed ourselves to be tempted towards regime change. In doing so, we've destroyed our credibility with the Security Council, which means it's very difficult to get a resolution on Syria, and we're setting ourselves up again for failure. Once more, humility, limits, honesty, realistic expectations and we could have achieved something to be proud of.
好 我認為利比亞構成一個經典的問題 利比亞的問題 是我們總是在推動黑人或白人 我們以為只有兩個選擇 不是全心投入部屬軍隊 就是完全與之隔離 我們總是對誘惑動心萬分 我們踏進泥诏然後滿身泥濘出來 我們在利比亞應該做的是 我們應該謹守聯合國的決議 我們應該嚴格限制自己 只要保護班加西的平民 我們應該早就做得到 我們設立一個48小時內無飛機的區域 因為格達費48小時內 沒有飛機 反之,我們允許自己被誘惑 想改變政權 因為這樣,我們已經摧毀安全理事會對我們的信任 這使得 對敘利亞的決議非常困難 而且我們又再次邁向自己設好的失敗 我再重申一次 謙虛 限制 誠實 實際的期望 那我們就能做到值得驕傲的事情
BG: Rory, thank you very much.
Rory非常謝謝你
RS: Thank you. (BG: Thank you.)
謝謝 謝謝