The question today is not: Why did we invade Afghanistan? The question is: why are we still in Afghanistan one decade later? Why are we spending $135 billion? Why have we got 130,000 troops on the ground? Why were more people killed last month than in any preceding month of this conflict? How has this happened? The last 20 years has been the age of intervention, and Afghanistan is simply one act in a five-act tragedy. We came out of the end of the Cold War in despair. We faced Rwanda; we faced Bosnia, and then we rediscovered our confidence. In the third act, we went into Bosnia and Kosovo and we seemed to succeed. In the fourth act, with our hubris, our overconfidence developing, we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the fifth act, we plunged into a humiliating mess.
今日嘅問題唔係︰ 點解我哋派兵阿富汗? 問題係︰ 點解十年後嘅今日 我哋仲喺阿富汗? 點解我哋仲要用 1350億美金? 點解仲有13萬地面軍隊? 點解呢場衝突 上個月犧牲嘅人數 比起以前嘅月份都多? 點解會咁? 過去20年 係干預嘅年代 阿富汗只係五幕悲劇中嘅 其中一幕 我哋喺絕望中 由冷戰結束行出嚟 我哋面對盧旺達 我哋面對波斯尼亞 然後我哋搵番自信 喺第三幕,我哋進入波斯尼亞同科索沃 而且我哋睇起嚟成功咗 喺第四幕 傲慢助長咗過度自信 我哋入侵咗伊拉克同阿富汗 而喺第五章 我哋趺入咗令人羞愧嘅混亂
So the question is: What are we doing? Why are we still stuck in Afghanistan? And the answer, of course, that we keep being given is as follows: we're told that we went into Afghanistan because of 9/11, and that we remain there because the Taliban poses an existential threat to global security. In the words of President Obama, "If the Taliban take over again, they will invite back Al-Qaeda, who will try to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." The story that we're told is that there was a "light footprint" initially -- in other words, that we ended up in a situation where we didn't have enough troops, we didn't have enough resources, that Afghans were frustrated -- they felt there wasn't enough progress and economic development and security, and therefore the Taliban came back -- that we responded in 2005 and 2006 with troop deployments, but we still didn't put enough troops on the ground. And that it wasn't until 2009, when President Obama signed off on a surge, that we finally had, in the words of Secretary Clinton, "the strategy, the leadership and the resources." So, as the president now reassures us, we are on track to achieve our goals.
所以個問題係︰我哋喺度做緊咩? 點解我哋仲留喺阿富汗? 答案,當然 正如人哋一直同我哋咁講︰ 我哋派兵阿富汗 係因為911 而軍隊仲留喺當地 係因為塔利班對全球嘅安全 存在威脅 用總統奧巴馬嘅說話︰ "如果塔利班再次掌控 佢哋會請阿爾蓋達組織番嚟 殺盡我哋嘅人" 人哋話俾我哋聽 一開始只係一個"輕足印" – 即係話,當時嘅情況係 無足夠嘅軍隊 無足夠嘅資源 令阿富汗人失望 佢哋覺得經濟發展同保安 嘅進展都都唔夠 所以塔利班番咗嚟 – 於是我哋喺2005同2006年 以軍隊部署嚟回應 但係我哋嘅地面部隊都係唔夠 直至2009年 總統奧巴馬簽署咗增加兵嘅方案 終於,我哋有啦 用美國國務卿希拉里嘅說話 "戰略、領導同資源" 所以總統依架同我哋保證 我哋向緊目標進發
All of this is wrong. Every one of those statements is wrong. Afghanistan does not pose an existential threat to global security. It is extremely unlikely the Taliban would ever be able to take over the country -- extremely unlikely they'd be able to seize Kabul. They simply don't have a conventional military option. And even if they were able to do so, even if I'm wrong, it's extremely unlikely the Taliban would invite back Al-Qaeda. From the Taliban's point of view, that was their number one mistake last time. If they hadn't invited back Al-Qaeda, they would still be in power today.
所有都係錯架 每一句都係錯架 阿富汗無對全球全球嘅安全 造成威脅 而塔利班 係其乎無可能奪得國家嘅控制權 – 佢哋無咩可能奪取喀布爾 佢哋根本無常規軍隊 就算佢哋可以咁做,就算我錯 喺塔利班嘅角度嚟睇 塔利班都無咩可能 請阿爾蓋達組織番嚟 呢個正係佢哋上次犯嘅最大錯誤 如果佢哋無請阿爾蓋達組織番嚟 佢哋今日仲掌緊權
And even if I'm wrong about those two things, even if they were able to take back the country, even if they were to invite back Al-Qaeda, it's extremely unlikely that Al-Qaeda would significantly enhance its ability to harm the United States or harm Europe. Because this isn't the 1990s anymore. If the Al-Qaeda base was to be established near Ghazni, we would hit them very hard, and it would be very, very difficult for the Taliban to protect them.
如果呢兩點我都係錯 就算佢哋可以攞番個國家 就算佢哋請阿爾蓋達組織番嚟 阿爾蓋達組織都唔太可能 大幅增加實力 去危害美國 或者去危害歐洲 因為依架已經唔再係90年代 如果阿爾蓋達組織嘅基地 係喺加茲尼附近 我哋就可以大力打擊佢哋 而塔利班就好難,好難 保護佢哋
Furthermore, it's simply not true that what went wrong in Afghanistan is the light footprint. In my experience, in fact, the light footprint was extremely helpful. And these troops that we brought in -- it's a great picture of David Beckham there on the sub-machine gun -- made the situation worse, not better. When I walked across Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-2002, what I saw was scenes like this. A girl, if you're lucky, in the corner of a dark room -- lucky to be able to look at the Koran. But in those early days when we're told we didn't have enough troops and enough resources, we made a lot of progress in Afghanistan. Within a few months, there were two and a half million more girls in school. In Sangin where I was sick in 2002, the nearest health clinic was within three days walk. Today, there are 14 health clinics in that area alone. There was amazing improvements. We went from almost no Afghans having mobile telephones during the Taliban to a situation where, almost overnight, three million Afghans had mobile telephones. And we had progress in the free media. We had progress in elections -- all of this with the so-called light footprint.
再講,人哋話 喺阿富汗發生過嘅係輕足印 係錯架 喺我嘅經驗嚟睇,事實上 輕足印係非常有幫助 我哋呢啲軍隊 – 將碧咸張靚相 放咗喺佢哋嘅衝鋒槍上 – 令到情況差咗,而唔係好咗 喺2001到2002年嘅冬天 我徒步橫越阿富汗 我睇到嘅係咁樣嘅景象 如果你好彩嘅話會見到 一個女仔喺陰暗嘅房間角落 – 好好彩咁可以睇可蘭經 但係之前 當我哋嘅軍隊同資源都唔夠嘅時候 我哋喺阿富汗嘅進展好好 喺幾個月之內 多咗25萬個女仔入學 2002年我喺Sangin嘅時候病咗 最近嘅診所 要行三日先到 今日,單單喺嗰個地區 就有14間診所 進展得好驚人 阿富汗人由塔利班 幾乎無人有手提電話嘅時代 到差唔多一夜間 30萬阿富汗人都有手提電話 我哋喺媒體自由方面都有進展 選舉方面都有進展 – 呢啲就係所謂嘅輕足印
But when we began to bring more money, when we began to invest more resources, things got worse, not better. How? Well first see, if you put 125 billion dollars a year into a country like Afghanistan where the entire revenue of the Afghan state is one billion dollars a year, you drown everything. It's not simply corruption and waste that you create; you essentially replace the priorities of the Afghan government, the elected Afghan government, with the micromanaging tendencies of foreigners on short tours with their own priorities. And the same is true for the troops.
但係當我哋開始投放更多資金 當我哋投入更多資源 事情變壞,而無好到,點解? 首先,如果你每年將1250億美金 投放喺阿富汗呢種國家 全國整體收入 每年只有10億美金 你就會掩蓋曬所有嘢 你唔只造成貪污 同浪費 你根本上取代咗阿富汗政府嘅主要任務 選出嚟嘅阿富汗政府 傾向微觀管理 去短途旅行嘅外國人 軍隊方面都係一樣道理
When I walked across Afghanistan, I stayed with people like this. This is Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj. Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj was a great host. He was very generous, like many of the Afghans I stayed with. But he was also considerably more conservative, considerably more anti-foreign, considerably more Islamist than we'd like to acknowledge. This man, for example, Mullah Mustafa, tried to shoot me. And the reason I'm looking a little bit perplexed in this photograph is I was somewhat frightened, and I was too afraid on this occasion to ask him, having run for an hour through the desert and taken refuge in this house, why he had turned up and wanted to have his photograph taken with me. But 18 months later, I asked him why he had tried to shoot me. And Mullah Mustafa -- he's the man with the pen and paper -- explained that the man sitting immediately to the left as you look at the photograph, Nadir Shah had bet him that he couldn't hit me. Now this is not to say Afghanistan is a place full of people like Mullah Mustafa. It's not; it's a wonderful place full of incredible energy and intelligence. But it is a place where the putting-in of the troops has increased the violence rather than decreased it.
我行過阿富汗嘅時候 我同呢啲人一齊 佢係喺 Kamenj 嘅 指揮官 Haji Malem Mohsin Khan 佢係一個好好嘅主人 佢好慷慨 同好多我相處過嘅阿富汗人一樣 但係佢比我哋認為嘅 相對地更保守 相對更排斥外國 相對更相信伊斯蘭教 例如呢個人 Mullah Mustafa 試過射殺我 我喺呢張相入面望落有嘅困惑嘅原因 係我有啲嚇親 當時我好驚,唔敢問佢 佢用咗成個鐘跑過嗰沙漠 匿喺呢間屋 問佢點解會出現要我同佢合照 但18個月之後,我問佢 點解要射殺我 Mullah Mustafa 解釋 因為佢係拎住紙同筆嘅人 而喺呢張相我嘅左手邊 Nadir Shah同佢輸賭佢傷唔到我 我嘅意思唔係話 阿富汗人都同 Mullah Mustafa 一樣 唔係咁嘅 嗰個地方好美好 充滿活力同智慧 但係呢個地方 被投放咗軍隊
2005, Anthony Fitzherbert, an agricultural engineer, could travel through Helmand, could stay in Nad Ali, Sangin and Ghoresh, which are now the names of villages where fighting is taking place. Today, he could never do that. So the idea that we deployed the troops to respond to the Taliban insurgency is mistaken. Rather than preceding the insurgency, the Taliban followed the troop deployment, and as far as I'm concerned, the troop deployment caused their return.
增加咗,而無減少到暴力 2005年 一位農業工程師 Anthony Fitzherbert 可以橫越赫爾曼德省 可以留喺 Nad Ali, Sangin 同 Ghoresh 呢啲哋方依架已經成為咗戰地 今日,佢唔再可以咁樣做 所以我哋話以部處軍隊 嚟回應塔利班嘅叛亂 係錯架 部署軍隊唔係喺塔利班叛亂之後發生 而係隨之而嚟 依我睇 部署軍隊係塔利班回歸嘅原因
Now is this a new idea? No, there have been any number of people saying this over the last seven years. I ran a center at Harvard from 2008 to 2010, and there were people like Michael Semple there who speak Afghan languages fluently, who've traveled to almost every district in the country. Andrew Wilder, for example, born on the Pakistan-Iranian border, served his whole life in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Paul Fishstein who began working there in 1978 -- worked for Save the Children, ran the Afghan research and evaluation unit. These are people who were able to say consistently that the increase in development aid was making Afghanistan less secure, not more secure -- that the counter-insurgency strategy was not working and would not work. And yet, nobody listened to them. Instead, there was a litany of astonishing optimism.
呢個係一個新嘅講法? 唔係,喺過去嘅七年 已經有好多人談論呢個觀點 喺 2008 至 2010 年我喺哈佛 管理過一個中心 嗰度嘅人,好似 Michael Semple 可以講流利嘅阿富汗語言 佢幾乎遊歷過阿富汗所有地區 例如 Andrew Wilder 喺巴基斯坦同伊朗邊境出世 佢一生 都為巴基斯坦同阿富汗工作 Paul Fishstein 喺 1978 年開始 喺阿富汗工作 – 喺救助兒童會做 負責當地嘅研究同評估小組 呢啲人 佢哋由始至終都係話 增加發展援助 令阿富汗無咁安全 而唔係更安全 – 而反叛亂策略 係行唔通,亦唔會行得通 但係,無人聽佢哋講 反而 係一連串令人驚訝嘅樂觀主義
Beginning in 2004, every general came in saying, "I've inherited a dismal situation, but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy, which will deliver," in General Barno's word in 2004, the "decisive year." Well guess what? It didn't. But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying that he had the strategy and the resources to deliver, in 2005, the "decisive year." Or General David Richards to come in 2006 and say he had the strategy and the resources to deliver the "crunch year." Or in 2007, the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide, to say that that would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2008, Major General Champoux to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2009, my great friend, General Stanley McChrystal, who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year." Or in 2010, the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband, who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year." And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today, that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, assures us that we are in the "decisive year."
喺 2004 年開始 每一位上任嘅將軍都話 "我接手咗一個慘淡嘅局面 但最終當我有 適合嘅資源同啱嘅策略 會創造出" 用 Barno 將軍喺 2004 年嘅原話 “決定性嘅一年” 你估下點?事實唔係咁 但係咁並唔足以 阻止 Abuzaid 將軍話 佢有戰略同資源 喺 2005 年創造 "決定性嘅一年" 或者 David Richards 將軍 喺 2006 年上任嘅時候 話佢有戰略同資源 創造"關鍵嘅一年" 或者喺 2007 年 挪威副外交大臣 Espen Eide 話會創造"決定性嘅一年" 或者喺2008年 Champoux 少將上任 話佢會創造"決定性嘅一年" 或者喺2009年,我嘅好朋友 Stanley McChrystal 將軍 話佢"非常關注決定性嘅一年" 或者喺2010年 英國外相文禮彬話 最後我哋會創造"決定性嘅一年" 2011年嘅今日 你會好開心咁聽到 德國外交部長 Guido Westerwelle 同我哋保證 我哋處於"決定性嘅一年"
(Applause)
(掌聲)
How do we allow any of this to happen? Well the answer, of course, is, if you spend 125 billion or 130 billion dollars a year in a country, you co-opt almost everybody. Even the aid agencies, who begin to receive an enormous amount of money from the U.S. and the European governments to build schools and clinics, are somewhat disinclined to challenge the idea that Afghanistan is an existential threat to global security. They're worried, in other words, that if anybody believes that it wasn't such a threat -- Oxfam, Save the Children wouldn't get the money to build their hospitals and schools. It's also very difficult to confront a general with medals on his chest. It's very difficult for a politician, because you're afraid that many lives have been lost in vain. You feel deep, deep guilt. You exaggerate your fears, and you're terrified about the humiliation of defeat.
我哋點會俾 呢啲嘢發生? 個答案當然係 如果你一年喺一個國家 用1250或者1300億美金 你幾乎要說服所有人支持你 甚係援助機構 佢哋喺美國同歐洲政府度 收到巨額資助 用嚟起學校同診所 都會唔願意 去挑戰呢個諗法 話阿富汗係全球安全 存在威脅 換句話嚟講,佢哋擔心 如果有任何人相信根本無威脅 – 樂施會、救助兒童 就唔會拎到錢 去起醫院同學校 我哋都好難同一個 心口掛滿勛章嘅將軍對抗 對政客嚟講都好難 因為你驚好多人會白白浪費咗生命 你深深感受到愧疚 你誇大你嘅恐懼 俾擊敗嘅屈辱嚇怕
What is the solution to this? Well the solution to this is we need to find a way that people like Michael Semple, or those other people, who are telling the truth, who know the country, who've spent 30 years on the ground -- and most importantly of all, the missing component of this -- Afghans themselves, who understand what is going on. We need to somehow get their message to the policymakers. And this is very difficult to do because of our structures.
有咩解決嘅方法呢? 解決嘅方法係 我哋要搵到 好似 Michael Semple 或者其他會講真話嘅人 了解佢哋國家嘅情況 喺當地生活咗30年 – 更重要嘅係 缺乏嘅呢部份嘅正係 – 阿富汗人自己 佢哋明白發生緊咩事 我哋要將佢哋嘅信息 話俾制定政策嘅人知 呢點好難做到 因為我哋嘅體制
The first thing we need to change is the structures of our government. Very, very sadly, our foreign services, the United Nations, the military in these countries have very little idea of what's going on. The average British soldier is on a tour of only six months; Italian soldiers, on tours of four months; the American military, on tours of 12 months. Diplomats are locked in embassy compounds. When they go out, they travel in these curious armored vehicles with these somewhat threatening security teams who ready 24 hours in advance who say you can only stay on the ground for an hour.
我哋首先要改變嘅係 我哋政府嘅架構 非常悲哀嘅係 我哋嘅大使館、聯合國 喺呢啲國家嘅軍隊 都唔了解當地嘅情況 平均每個英國軍人駐紮6個月 意大利軍人駐紮4個月 美國軍隊駐紮12個月 外交官又唔俾離開大使館 離開嘅時候 都喺坐呢啲唔尋常有武器嘅車 又會有啲嚇人嘅保鑣團隊 呢啲保鑣仲會早24小時準備好 佢哋只會俾你喺出面逗留1個鐘
In the British embassy in Afghanistan in 2008, an embassy of 350 people, there were only three people who could speak Dari, the main language of Afghanistan, at a decent level. And there was not a single Pashto speaker. In the Afghan section in London responsible for governing Afghan policy on the ground, I was told last year that there was not a single staff member of the foreign office in that section who had ever served on a posting in Afghanistan. So we need to change that institutional culture. And I could make the same points about the United States and the United Nations.
喺駐阿富汗嘅英國使館 喺2008年 成個使館入面350個工作人員 只有3個人識得講似樣嘅 阿富汗嘅主要語言達利語 同埋無一個識講普什圖語 喺倫敦嘅阿富汗組 負責決定喺阿富汗嘅政策 舊年有人話俾我知 喺外交部嘅嗰個組別入面 無任何一個職員 曾經喺阿富汗任職 所以我哋需要改變呢種體制文化 我都可以話俾大家知 美國同聯合國都有相同嘅問題
Secondly, we need to aim off of the optimism of the generals. We need to make sure that we're a little bit suspicious, that we understand that optimism is in the DNA of the military, that we don't respond to it with quite as much alacrity. And thirdly, we need to have some humility. We need to begin from the position that our knowledge, our power, our legitimacy is limited. This doesn't mean that intervention around the world is a disaster. It isn't.
第二,我哋要小心對待將士嘅樂觀 我哋需要抱持住一啲懷疑 明白樂觀 係植根咗喺軍隊嘅DNA入面 我哋唔會好快咁 用沉默回應 第三,我哋要有謙遜 我哋要喺 我哋嘅知識,我哋嘅權力 我哋嘅合法性 都係有限嘅情況下開始 咁唔係話 世界上所有嘅干預都係一個災難 唔係架
Bosnia and Kosovo were signal successes, great successes. Today when you go to Bosnia it is almost impossible to believe that what we saw in the early 1990s happened. It's almost impossible to believe the progress we've made since 1994. Refugee return, which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees thought would be extremely unlikely, has largely happened. A million properties have been returned. Borders between the Bosniak territory and the Bosnian-Serb territory have calmed down. The national army has shrunk. The crime rates in Bosnia today are lower than they are in Sweden.
波斯尼亞同科索沃 都係成功嘅例子 係極大嘅成功 當你今日去波斯尼亞 你幾乎唔會相信 90年早期喺嗰度發生嘅事 由1994年開始,嗰度嘅進展 幾乎無辦法相信 難民番屋企 但係聯合國難民署 就認為係好唔可能發生嘅 喺嗰度大規模發生咗 退還咗100萬份財產 波斯尼亞人同 波斯尼亞塞族人之間嘅邊界分爭停止咗 國家嘅軍隊縮減咗 今日波斯尼亞嘅犯罪率 比瑞典仲低
This has been done by an incredible, principled effort by the international community, and, of course, above all, by Bosnians themselves. But you need to look at context. And this is what we've lost in Afghanistan and Iraq. You need to understand that in those places what really mattered was, firstly, the role of Tudman and Milosevic in coming to the agreement, and then the fact those men went, that the regional situation improved, that the European Union could offer Bosnia something extraordinary: the chance to be part of a new thing, a new club, a chance to join something bigger.
呢個成就 係源於國際社會嘅 不可思議,有原則嘅努力 當然,最主要嘅係 波斯尼亞人自己嘅努力 另外,你仲要睇下件事嘅背景 呢樣就係我哋對阿富汗 同伊拉克中缺少嘅 你要明白,喺嗰啲地方 最重要嘅係 首先,圖季曼同米洛舍維奇 喺達成協議過程中嘅角色 同埋佢哋經歷過嘅事 好似係地區嘅情況改善 歐盟可以為波斯尼亞 提供特別嘅機會︰ 加入一個 新嘅俱樂部嘅機會 加入一個更大組織嘅機會
And finally, we need to understand that in Bosnia and Kosovo, a lot of the secret of what we did, a lot of the secret of our success, was our humility -- was the tentative nature of our engagement. We criticized people a lot in Bosnia for being quite slow to take on war criminals. We criticized them for being quite slow to return refugees. But that slowness, that caution, the fact that President Clinton initially said that American troops would only be deployed for a year, turned out to be a strength, and it helped us to put our priorities right.
最後,我哋要明白 喺波斯尼亞同科索沃入面 有好多我哋做過嘅秘密 有好多我哋成功嘅秘密 都係我哋嘅謙遜 – 係我哋暫時性嘅干預 我哋喺波斯尼亞批評咗好多人 佢哋對戰犯嘅行動緩慢 我哋批評佢哋 對難民歸國嘅行動緩慢 克林頓總統一開始話 美軍只會留守一年 但正正係呢種緩慢,呢種謹慎 依架睇嚟係優勢 而且幫我哋搞清咗楚重點
One of the saddest things about our involvement in Afghanistan is that we've got our priorities out of sync. We're not matching our resources to our priorities. Because if what we're interested in is terrorism, Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan. If what we're interested in is regional stability, Egypt is far more important. If what we're worried about is poverty and development, sub-Saharan Africa is far more important. This doesn't mean that Afghanistan doesn't matter, but that it's one of 40 countries in the world with which we need to engage.
喺我哋對阿富汗嘅干預之中 最悲哀嘅莫過於 所有人嘅重點唔一致 我哋嘅資源同重點配對唔到 如果我哋想反恐 咁巴基斯坦比阿富汗更加重要 如果我哋想穩定地區局勢 咁埃及更加重要 如果我哋擔心貧困同發展 咁撒哈拉以南嘅非洲更加重要 咁唔係話阿富汗唔重要 但係呢個只係世界上40個 我哋需要照顧嘅國家之一
So if I can finish with a metaphor for intervention, what we need to think of is something like mountain rescue. Why mountain rescue? Because when people talk about intervention, they imagine that some scientific theory -- the Rand Corporation goes around counting 43 previous insurgencies producing mathematical formula saying you need one trained counter-insurgent for every 20 members of the population. This is the wrong way of looking at it. You need to look at it in the way that you look at mountain rescue.
咁如果我要比喻國際干預 我哋可以將佢 想像成山地救援 點解係山地救援? 因為當人講起國際干預 佢哋會想像出一啲科學理論 – 蘭德公司 搜集咗43個叛亂嘅先例 建立出一條數學公式 話俾你知,每20個居民 就要有一個受過訓練嘅 反叛亂部隊成員 呢個睇法係錯架 你應該將山地救援睇法
When you're doing mountain rescue,
擺落呢件事度
you don't take a doctorate in mountain rescue, you look for somebody who knows the terrain. It's about context. You understand that you can prepare, but the amount of preparation you can do is limited -- you can take some water, you can have a map, you can have a pack. But what really matters is two kinds of problems -- problems that occur on the mountain which you couldn't anticipate, such as, for example, ice on a slope, but which you can get around, and problems which you couldn't anticipate and which you can't get around, like a sudden blizzard or an avalanche or a change in the weather.
喺山地救援入面 你唔需要一個博士學位 你需要嘅係搵一個熟悉地形嘅人 係睇情況而定 你可以提早準備 但係可以準備嘅嘢 係有限嘅 – 你可以帶啲水,帶張地圖 孭個背囊 但真正重要嘅 係兩種困難 – 喺山度出現嘅問題 係唔可以預測嘅 例如山坡上面結咗冰 但你都可以避開 另外就係你預計唔到 而且無避唔開嘅問題 好似係突發嘅暴風雪或者雪崩 或者係天氣嘅變化
And the key to this is a guide who has been on that mountain, in every temperature, at every period -- a guide who, above all, knows when to turn back, who doesn't press on relentlessly when conditions turn against them. What we look for in firemen, in climbers, in policemen, and what we should look for in intervention, is intelligent risk takers -- not people who plunge blind off a cliff, not people who jump into a burning room, but who weigh their risks, weigh their responsibilities. Because the worst thing we have done in Afghanistan is this idea that failure is not an option. It makes failure invisible, inconceivable and inevitable. And if we can resist this crazy slogan, we shall discover -- in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya, and anywhere else we go in the world -- that if we can often do much less than we pretend, we can do much more than we fear.
呢度嘅關鍵 就係搵一個喺唔同嘅溫度下 喺每一個時段 去過呢坐山嘅嚮導 – 最重要嘅係呢個嚮導 知道幾時折返 喺條件轉差嘅情況下 佢唔會不停咁前進 我哋揀 消防員、登山者、警察嘅時候 同我哋揀人去參與國際干預嘅時候 都係搵聰明嘅冒險者 – 唔係會跳落懸崖嘅人 唔係會跳入火場嘅人 係會衡量風險嘅人 會權衡責任嘅人 因為我哋喺阿富汗做過最差嘅嘢 係呢個諗法 唔準失敗 咁樣令失敗變成透明 難以置信同埋唔可以避免 如果我哋可以抵抗 呢個瘋狂嘅口號 我哋就會發現 – 喺埃及、敍利亞、利比亞 仲有我哋干預過嘅國家 – 如果我哋可以做得比假裝嘅少啲 我哋反而可以做得比起驚慌更多
Thank you very much.
多謝大家
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
多謝,非常多謝 多謝,非常多謝 多謝,多謝,多謝
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
多謝 多謝,多謝 多謝
(Applause)
(掌聲)
Bruno Giussani: Rory, you mentioned Libya at the end. Just briefly, what's your take on the current events there and the intervention?
Bruno Giussani︰Rory 你最後提到利比亞 簡單啲問,你對嗰度近期嘅事件 同干預有咩睇法?
Rory Stewart: Okay, I think Libya poses the classic problem. The problem in Libya is that we are always pushing for the black or white. We imagine there are only two choices: either full engagement and troop deployment or total isolation. And we are always being tempted up to our neck. We put our toes in and we go up to our neck. What we should have done in Libya is we should have stuck to the U.N. resolution. We should have limited ourselves very, very strictly to the protection of the civilian population in Benghazi. We could have done that. We set up a no-fly zone within 48 hours because Gaddafi had no planes within 48 hours. Instead of which, we've allowed ourselves to be tempted towards regime change. In doing so, we've destroyed our credibility with the Security Council, which means it's very difficult to get a resolution on Syria, and we're setting ourselves up again for failure. Once more, humility, limits, honesty, realistic expectations and we could have achieved something to be proud of.
Rory︰我覺得利比亞 展示咗一個經典問題 喺利比亞嘅問題 係我哋成日要分黑白 想像一下我哋淨係得兩個選擇 一係完全干預同部署軍隊 一係完全孤立 我哋成日都忍唔住陷入去 我哋輕微咁接觸就完全陷入 我哋喺利比亞應該 嚴格遵守聯合國決議 我哋應該好嚴咁限制自己 去保護班加西嘅人民 我哋本來可以咁做 我哋喺48個鐘內制定禁飛區 因為卡達菲喺48個鐘入面 無飛機 調反轉頭,如果我哋忍受唔到 政權更變嘅誘惑 咁我哋就會破壞咗 安全理事會嘅誠信 亦即係話更難 為敍利亞提供議案 我哋又再為自己埋下失敗嘅種子 再一次,謙遜嘅態度 自我限定、誠實 實際嘅期望 可以成就一啲我哋引以自豪嘅事
BG: Rory, thank you very much.
Bruno︰Rory,好多謝你
RS: Thank you. (BG: Thank you.)
Rory︰多謝你 (Bruno︰多謝你)