In December of 2010, the city of Apatzingán in the coastal state of Michoacán, in Mexico, awoke to gunfire. For two straight days, the city became an open battlefield between the federal forces and a well-organized group, presumably from the local criminal organization, La Familia Michoacana, or the Michoacán family. The citizens didn't only experience incessant gunfire but also explosions and burning trucks used as barricades across the city, so truly like a battlefield. After these two days, and during a particularly intense encounter, it was presumed that the leader of La Familia Michoacana, Nazario Moreno, was killed.
2010年12月的一天 墨西哥米却肯州沿海城市 阿帕兹甘市的人们 被枪炮声惊醒 在接下来的两天 城市变成了战场 联邦军队 和米可安卡那家族 那是一个组织严密的地方黑社会团伙 展开了激战 这个城市的居民不仅经历了连续不断的枪炮声 同时也目睹了无处不在的 爆炸和那些用作弹幕的燃烧着的汽车 所以跟战场没什么两样 经过了两天的战斗 一场恶战之后 米可安卡那家族传说中的首领Nazario Moreno 据信已经战亡
In response to this terrifying violence, the mayor of Apatzingán decided to call the citizens to a march for peace. The idea was to ask for a softer approach to criminal activity in the state. And so, the day of the scheduled procession, thousands of people showed up. As the mayor was preparing to deliver the speech starting the march, his team noticed that, while half of the participants were appropriately dressed in white, and bearing banners asking for peace, the other half was actually marching in support of the criminal organization and its now-presumed-defunct leader. Shocked, the mayor decided to step aside rather than participate or lead a procession that was ostensibly in support of organized crime. And so his team stepped aside. The two marches joined together, and they continued their path towards the state capital.
对于此次可怕的暴力 阿帕廷干市市长 决定号召市民举行一次呼吁和平的游行 想法是呼吁州政府采用更加温和的方式 处理犯罪活动 于是,在按计划游行的那天 上千人走上了街头 当市长在准备宣布游行开始前的 演讲的时候 他们发现 参与游行的人中 有一半的人穿着得体的白色衣服 举着呼吁和平的标语 另一半的人 实际是为支持之前被打击的犯罪团伙 以及据信已经死亡的集团头目来的 市长震惊了,回避了 放弃了这场 表面是为了支持犯罪集团的游行 他的团队也集体回避了 两支游行队伍汇合了 一起继续 朝着州政府进发
This story of horrific violence followed by a fumbled approach by federal and local authorities as they tried to engage civil society, who has been very well engaged by a criminal organization, is a perfect metaphor for what's happening in Mexico today, where we see that our current understanding of drug violence and what leads to it is probably at the very least incomplete.
这个骇人的暴力故事 是墨西哥如今局势的一个完美缩影 联邦政府和地方政府 之后采取的笨拙手段 是在试图重新控制 被犯罪集团控制的社区 这让我们意识到 我们目前对于毒品暴力犯罪及其成因的理解 至少是非常局限的
If you decided to spend 30 minutes trying to figure out what's going on with drug violence in Mexico by, say, just researching online, the first thing you would find out is that while the laws state that all Mexican citizens are equal, there are some that are more and there are some that are much less equal than others, because you will quickly find out that in the past six years anywhere between 60 and 100,000 people have lost their lives in drug-related violence. To put these numbers in perspective, this is eight times larger than the number of casualties in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined. It's also shockingly close to the number of people who have died in the Syrian civil war, which is an active civil war. This is happening just south of the border.
如果你决定花30分钟时间 去调研一下墨西哥现在的毒品暴力现状 比如说,在网上搜索一下 你会首先发现 虽然法律赋予了每个墨西哥公民平等的权利 但事实上这些人的生命 是有贵贱之分的 因为你马上就会发现 过去的六年中 有6~10万墨西哥人死于 跟毒品交易有关的暴力活动 客观的看这个数字 它是伊拉克和阿富汗 伤亡人数总和的八倍 这个可怕的数字接近于 叙利亚内战的死亡人数 一场活跃的内战 而这就发生在南部边境
Now as you're reading, however, you will be maybe surprised that you will quickly become numb to the numbers of deaths, because you will see that these are sort of abstract numbers of faceless, nameless dead people. Implicitly or explicitly, there is a narrative that all the people who are dying were somehow involved in the drug trade, and we infer this because they were either tortured or executed in a professional manner, or, most likely, both. And so clearly they were criminals because of the way they died. And so the narrative is that somehow these people got what they were deserved. They were part of the bad guys. And that creates some form of comfort for a lot of people.
现在你们看到这些数字 可能会非常惊讶自己竟然这么快 就对这样的死亡数字麻木了 因为你们面对的这些都只是抽象的数字 数字的背后是已经死去的无名无姓的人 或多或少的,人们可能会猜想 死掉的那些人 都跟毒品交易有些关系 我们推断的原因是这些人有的被人用老练的手法折磨过 有的被人用熟练的手法杀死 多数是兼而有之 很明显,这些人死掉的方式 透露出他们生前一定是罪犯 于是故事就变成了 这些人都是自做自受 他们都是坏人 这个推断让很多的人不会再对 这个死亡数字在意
However, while it's easier to think of us, the citizens, the police, the army, as the good guys, and them, the narcos, the carteles, as the bad guys, if you think about it, the latter are only providing a service to the former. Whether we like it or not, the U.S. is the largest market for illegal substances in the world, accounting for more than half of global demand. It shares thousands of miles of border with Mexico that is its only route of access from the South, and so, as the former dictator of Mexico, Porfirio Diaz, used to say, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States."
然而,对我们来说通常会认为 我们自己,市民,警察,军队都是好人 而那些毒贩子, 黑帮 都是坏人 但是如果你仔细想想 后者不过是为前者提供一种服务而已 不管你是否喜欢这个说法 美国都是世界上最大的 违禁药物消费国 消费了超过全球一半的毒品 美国跟墨西哥有着上千公里的边界线 这是从南部进入美国的唯一途径 因此,正如墨西哥过去的统治波菲里奥·迪亚斯曾经感慨过的, “可怜的墨西哥啊" "离上帝如此之远,却离美国如此之近!"
The U.N. estimates that there are 55 million users of illegal drugs in the United States. Using very, very conservative assumptions, this yields a yearly drug market on the retail side of anywhere between 30 and 150 billion dollars. If we assume that the narcos only have access to the wholesale part, which we know is false, that still leaves you with yearly revenues of anywhere between 15 billion and 60 billion dollars. To put these numbers in perspective, Microsoft has yearly revenues of 60 billion dollars. And it so happens that this is a product that, because of its nature, a business model to address this market requires you to guarantee to your producers that their product will be reliably placed in the markets where it is consumed. And the only way to do this, because it's illegal, is to have absolute control of the geographic corridors that are used to transport drugs. Hence the violence. If you look at a map of cartel influence and violence, you will see that it almost perfectly aligns with the most efficient routes of transportation from the south to the north. The only thing that the cartels are doing is that they're trying to protect their business.
联合国的调查分析表明 美国有大约5500万人使用违禁药物 即使是非常非常保守的估计 由此带来的毒品零售市场的销售额 也在 300~1500 亿美元之间 如果我们假设毒贩只负责大宗毒品批发的业务 当然现实不是这样 那么零售市场的销售额 依然在150~600亿美元之间 做一个直观的比较 微软公司每年的年收入也就是600亿美元 而这个产品有一个特点 这是由它的本质决定的 想要做这样的生意 你需要保证自己的供货商 能够将货物安全可靠的送到 最终的消费者手里 由于这项生意是违法的,要做到这点 唯一的方法就是对毒品运输的边界线 实现绝对控制 暴力活动也变得理所当然 如果你们看过黑帮影响力和暴力活动的分布地图 就会发现这些几乎都是发生在 穿越南北的那些 必经之路上 这些黑帮其实也只是 想要保护自己的生意
It's not only a multi-billion dollar market, but it's also a complex one. For example, the coca plant is a fragile plant that can only grow in certain latitudes, and so it means that a business model to address this market requires you to have decentralized, international production, that by the way needs to have good quality control, because people need a good high that is not going to kill them and that is going to be delivered to them when they need it. And so that means they need to secure production and quality control in the south, and you need to ensure that you have efficient and effective distribution channels in the markets where these drugs are consumed. I urge you, but only a little bit, because I don't want to get you in trouble, to just ask around and see how difficult it would be to get whatever drug you want, wherever you want it, whenever you want it, anywhere in the U.S., and some of you may be surprised to know that there are many dealers that offer a service where if you send them a text message, they guarantee delivery of the drug in 30 minutes or less.
这不仅是一个数百亿美元规模的市场 它还有着复杂的运作机制 例如, 古柯是一种很脆弱的植物 只能生长在特定的纬度 这就意味着这个市场的商业模式 需要一个遍布全球的 分散的生产基地 同时也需要对毒品的纯度(品质)有很好的把握 因为瘾君子希望能够在他们 需要的时候随时能买到好货 而货的纯度又不至于把他们毒死 这也就意味着他们需要 美国南部的安全生产和质量控制 同时需要保证 有足够快速便捷的物流渠道 能够将自己的毒品送到瘾君子手中 我鼓励你,但是不要勉强 因为我不希望你因此惹上麻烦 去四处打听 想要随时随地买到自己想要的任何毒品有多么困难 在任何时间、在美国的任何地方 然后你们中的某些人可能会惊讶于 周围居然有那么多的小毒品贩子 甚至你发条短信都可以买到毒品 而且他们保证 能够在30分钟之内送货上门
Think about this for a second. Think about the complexity of the distribution network that I just described. It's very difficult to reconcile this with the image of faceless, ignorant goons that are just shooting each other, very difficult to reconcile.
稍想一想 想想看我刚才说的 毒品的分销网络需要多复杂才能做到这点 很难将这些小毒品贩子 与那些相互拿着枪棍杀来杀去的 无名无姓的帮派成员相提并论 很难将这两种人联系起来
Now, as a business professor, and as any business professor would tell you, an effective organization requires an integrated strategy that includes a good organizational structure, good incentives, a solid identity and good brand management. This leads me to the second thing that you would learn in your 30-minute exploration of drug violence in Mexico. Because you would quickly realize, and maybe be confused by the fact, that there are three organizations that are constantly named in the articles. You will hear about Los Zetas, the Knights Templar, which is the new brand for the Familia Michoacana that I spoke about at the beginning, and the Sinaloa Federation. You will read that Los Zetas is this assortment of sociopaths that terrify the cities that they enter and they silence the press, and this is somewhat true, or mostly true. But this is the result of a very careful branding and business strategy. You see, Los Zetas is not just this random assortment of individuals, but was actually created by another criminal organization, the Gulf Cartel, that used to control the eastern corridor of Mexico. When that corridor became contested, they decided that they wanted to recruit a professional enforcement arm. So they recruited Los Zetas: an entire unit of elite paratroopers from the Mexican Army. They were incredibly effective as enforcers for the Gulf Cartel, so much so that at some point, they decided to just take over the operations, which is why I ask you to never keep tigers as pets, because they grow up. Because the Zetas organization was founded in treason, they lost some of the linkages to the production and distribution in the most profitable markets like cocaine, but what they did have, and this is again based on their military origin, was a perfectly structured chain of command with a very clear hierarchy and a very clear promotion path that allowed them to supervise and operate across many, many markets very effectively, which is the essence of what a chain of command seeks to do. And so because they didn't have access to the more profitable drug markets, this pushed them and gave them the opportunity to diversify into other forms of crime. That includes kidnapping, prostitution, local drug dealing and human trafficking, including of migrants that go from the south to the U.S. So what they currently run is truly and quite literally a franchise business. They focus most of their recruiting on the army, and they very openly advertise for better salaries, better benefits, better promotion paths, not to mention much better food, than what the army can deliver. The way they operate is that when they arrive in a locality, they let people know that they are there, and they go to the most powerful local gang and they say, "I offer you to be the local representative of the Zeta brand." If they agree -- and you don't want to know what happens if they don't -- they train them and they supervise them on how to run the most efficient criminal operation for that town, in exchange for royalties. This kind of business model obviously depends entirely on having a very effective brand of fear, and so Los Zetas carefully stage acts of violence that are spectacular in nature, especially when they arrive first in a city, but again, that's just a brand strategy. I'm not saying they're not violent, but what I am saying is that even though you will read that they are the most violent of all, when you count, when you do the body count, they're actually all the same.
现在,我作为一名研究商业行为的教授 首先告诉你们一些商业领域公认的结论 一个高效的组织 必须要有一套整合的战略措施 包括良好的组织架构,有效的激励机制 严格的品牌和形象管理 这是我接下来要告诉你们的第二个事实 或许你上网半个小时也能了解得到 因为你很快就会发现 或许这还会让你感到困惑 就是在墨西哥毒品犯罪的相关文章中 有三个犯罪集团的名字反复出现 你一定会听到"洛斯塞塔斯" "圣殿骑士团" 就是我一开始就提到的米克阿卡那家族 还有 "锡纳罗亚贩毒集团" 集团 你可能会相关文章中得知 洛斯塞塔斯是这些团伙中最为残暴的一个 他们在渗透过的每一个城市制造恐怖、压制舆论 当然,这些多少或者大部分都是真实的 但是这些其实都是精细的品牌策略 和商业手段的效果 洛斯塞塔斯并不简单 并不是一群乌合之众的散漫组织 它实际上是由另外一个叫做“海湾集团”的犯罪集团创建的 这个犯罪集团曾经控制了墨西哥东部运输通道 后来运输通道的竞争开始变得激烈 他们决定要训练一支 专业的武装队伍 于是他们训练出了洛斯塞塔斯 成员都来自于墨西哥军队的军人 由伞兵中的精英组成 作为海湾集团意志的执行者,他们的确非常精干 直到有一天他们干掉了海湾集团 决定自己单干 所以我跟你们说, 别把老虎当猫养 因为它们迟早会要长大 因为洛斯塞塔斯是叛变出来的 他们没有办法做可卡因之类的利润丰厚的生意 因为他们没法控制生产和分销环节 但是他们有自己擅长的 源于他们的军队背景 他们的命令传达效率非常之高 组织结构清晰 人员的提拔机制和激励措施很明确 这使得他们在多种多样的非法生意中 脱颖而出 而做这些生意最需要的就是执行力 由于他们没有办法插手 利润丰厚的毒品市场 这迫使他们,也是他们有了机会 参与各种各样的犯罪活动 包括绑架勒索, 卖淫嫖娼 地区毒品零售以及贩卖人口 包括从墨西哥偷渡非法移民到美国境内 所以他们经营的生意 靠的是名副其实的"特许经营权" 他们主要从军队吸纳新人 他们公开宣扬自己能够提供更多的薪水 更好的福利以及更快的晋升途径 更不要提吃得也很好 比军队能提供的好多了 他们手法类似于"黑吃黑" 每到一个新的地盘 他们先制造点动静让人知道他们来了 然后他们去找当地实力最强的黑帮 对他们说 "我允许你们成为我们洛斯塞塔斯的加盟店" 如果当地黑帮同意了 ——你不会想知道不同意的下场 他们就训练和指导当地的黑帮 教他们如何在当地高效率的经营各种违法生意 用"特许经营权"换取在当地的威望 显然,这种商业模式能够成功 完全依赖于他们深烙在民众心里的恐惧烙印 所以洛斯塞塔斯 很推崇骨子里的暴力犯罪 但是他们做事之前也会慎重规划 尤其是当他们刚刚进入一个城市时 再提醒一下,这都是为了树立威望 我不是说他们不暴力 我说的意思是即使你看到的资料中 说他们是最残暴的 当你从死亡人数的角度来看 所有的黑帮都是一样的
In contrast to them, the Knights Templar that arose in Michoacán emerged in reaction to the incursion of the Zetas into the state of Michoacán. Michoacán is a geographically strategic state because it has one of the largest ports in Mexico, and it has very direct routes to the center of Mexico, which then gives you direct access to the U.S. The Knights Templar realized very quickly that they couldn't face the Zetas on violence alone, and so they developed a strategy as a social enterprise. They brand themselves as representative of and protecting of the citizens of Michoacán against organized crime. Their brand of social enterprise means that they require a lot of civic engagement, so they invest heavily in providing local services, like dealing with home violence, going after petty criminals, treating addicts, and keeping drugs out of the local markets where they are, and, of course, protecting people from other criminal organizations. Now, they kill a lot of people too, but when they kill them, they provide very careful narratives and descriptions for why they did them, through newspaper insertions, YouTube videos, and billboards that explain that the people who were killed were killed because they represented a threat not to us, as an organization, of course, but to you, as citizens. And so we're actually here to protect you. They, as social enterprises do, have created a moral and ethical code that they advertise around, and they have very strict recruiting practices. And here you have the types of explanations that they provide for some of their actions. They have actually retained access to the profitable drug trade, but the way they do it is, because they control all of Michoacán, and they control the Port of Lázaro Cárdenas, they leverage that to, for example, trade copper from Michoacán that is legally created and legally extracted with illegal ephedrine from China which is a critical precursor for methamphetamines that they produce, and then they have partnerships with larger organizations like the Sinaloa Federation that place their products in the U.S.
跟他们相反的是 来自米克阿坎的圣殿骑士团 实际上是为了抵御洛斯塞塔斯 占领米克阿坎市而联合起来的 米克阿坎在地理上是战略重地 因为她拥有墨西哥最大的港口之一 同时拥有一条交通枢纽可以直达墨西哥中部 提供了到达美国的直接通道 圣殿骑士团很快就意识到 他们单打独斗是干不过洛斯塞塔斯的 他们摸索出一种新策略 把自己改造成公益企业的样子 他们标榜自己是米克阿坎市民的代表和保护者 保护市民,抵御其它帮派的 有组织的犯罪 他们标榜的公益事业要求他们 需要在改善市民生活方面投入很多力量 所以他们在当地公共服务上大把的投入 像是处理家庭暴力 侦破某些类型的犯罪,强制戒毒 并禁止毒品进入他们占据的 当地市场上 并且,理所当然的,保护当地人 免受其它黑社会的骚扰 现在, 他们也杀了很多的人 但是他们杀人的时候 会小心的准备一份"杀人声明"或"故事背景" 解释为什么要杀这些人 他们会在报纸上,YouTube 上 以及室外广告牌上解释:他们是杀了人 但他们杀人是因为那些死者 显然对当地群众造成了威胁 而不是对他们自己造成了威胁 所以实际上"我们是来保护你们的" 就像是别的公益企业一样 他们有自己的道德准则和伦理信条 并且广为宣扬 对这些准则的遵守也近于苛刻 现在你们已经知道了他们如何解释 他们的某些类型的(犯罪)行为的 他们有效的控制了 毒品交易这一暴利行业 但他们的做法有些独特,他们完全控制了米克阿坎市 又控制了拉萨罗·卡德纳斯港口 基于这些条件,他们的生意模式类似于 从米克阿坎出口合法生产和出口的 黄铜到中国 非法的从中国带回来麻黄碱 这是制作冰毒的重要原材料 他们制作出来冰毒之后,通过跟锡纳罗亚贩毒集团 这样的更大的组织合作 将自己的产品投放到美国市场
Finally, the Sinaloa Federation. When you read about them, you will often read about them with an undertone of reverence and admiration, because they are the most integrated and the largest of all the Mexican organizations, and, many people argue, the world. They started as just sort of a transport organization that specialized in smuggling between the U.S. and the Mexican borders, but now they have grown into a truly integrated multinational that has partnerships in production in the south and partnerships in global distribution across the planet. They have cultivated a brand of professionalism, business acumen and innovation. They have designed new drug products and new drug processes. They have designed narco-tunnels that go across the border, and you can see that these are not "The Shawshank Redemption" types. They have invented narco-submarines and boats that are not detected by radar. They have invented drones to transport drugs, catapults, you name it. One of the leaders of the Sinaloa Federation actually made it to the Forbes list.
最后一个是锡纳罗亚贩毒集团 当你阅读介绍他们的文章时 你时常可以感受到文章隐含的敬畏和赞赏之意 因为这个组织是墨西哥最大的一个组织 也是经营范围最全的一个组织 很多人都觉得这是世界上最大的组织 这个组织一开始只是一个搞搞货运的小团队 专门在墨西哥和美国之间 做点走私的行当 但是现在他们已经成长成为 一个真正的跨国多元化集团 与南方各国的(毒品)生产国有合作关系 建立了合作关系的分销网络 遍布全球 他们培养出来的组织文化 包含了专业精神、商业智慧和创新 他们研发了新的毒品 改进了毒品制造工艺 他们挖出了一条毒品管道 能够穿越美国边境 你们看到了这个管道 跟”肖申克的救赎“里面的管道可不一样 他们发明了能够躲避雷达的潜水艇和船只 来运送毒品 他们还发明了用无人机来送货 还有弹弓……应有尽有 事实上锡纳罗亚贩毒集团的领导人之一 还让自己上了福布斯富豪榜
[#701 Joaquin Guzman Loera]
(第701富豪: Joaquin Guzman Loera)
Like any multinational would, they have specialized and focused only in the most profitable part of the business, which is high-margin drugs like cocaine, heroine, methamphetamines. Like any traditional Latin American multinational would, the way they control their operations is through family ties. When they're entering a new market, they send a family member to supervise it, or, if they're partnering with a new organization, they create a family tie, either through marriages or other types of ties. Like any other multinational would, they protect their brand by outsourcing the more questionable parts of the business model, like for example, when they have to engage in violence against other criminal organizations, they recruit gangs and other smaller players to do the dirty work for them, and they try to separate their operations and their violence and be very discrete about this.
跟别的跨国集团一样 他们的业务集中于利润最高的生意上 集中于高级毒品,像是可卡因 海洛因,冰毒等 同时,与拉丁美洲的跨国企业一样 他们控制集团的方式 主要靠家族纽带 每进入一个新的市场 他们就派一个家族成员去管理 当他们要与一个组织展开合作时 他们会先建立家族联系 通过婚姻或者是其它途径 跟别的跨国集团一样的还有 他们会通过外包脏活来维护组织的形象 把他们的生意中麻烦多的部分外包出去 比如,当他们需要用暴力解决问题的时候 需要跟其它犯罪团伙火拼的时候 他们招募一些小混混和小帮派 去替他们出头 他们也有意的把暴力犯罪 与他们自己的生意分离得干干净净
To further strengthen their brand, they actually have professional P.R. firms that shape how the press talks about them. They have professional videographers on staff. They have incredibly productive ties with the security organizations on both sides of the border.
为了维护他们的形象 他们甚至还有自己的专业公关公司 帮他们打理媒体上的报道 他们内部有职业的摄影师和摄影人员 他们跟美国边境和墨西哥边境的边防 建立了说不清道不明的关系 这点令人吃惊
And so, differences aside, what these three organizations share is on the one hand, a very clear understanding that institutions cannot be imposed from the top, but rather they are built from the bottom up one interaction at a time. They have created extremely coherent structures that they use to show the inconsistencies in government policies.
所以,抛开各自的特点 这三个组织有很多的共同点 其中之一就是:他们都非常明确的知道 一个体系的建立不可能从上而下的推动 而是自底向上 一点一点构建出来的 他们构建的组织结构具有非凡的一致性 这跟政府部门朝令夕改的行事作风 形成了鲜明对比
And so what I want you to remember from this talk are three things. The first one is that drug violence is actually the result of a huge market demand and an institutional setup that forces the servicing of this market to necessitate violence to guarantee delivery routes. The second thing I want you to remember is that these are sophisticated, coherent organizations that are business organizations, and analyzing them and treating them as such is probably a much more useful approach. The third thing I want you to remember is that even though we're more comfortable with this idea of "them," a set of bad guys separated from us, we are actually accomplices to them, either through our direct consumption or through our acceptance of the inconsistency between our policies of prohibition and our actual behavior of tolerance or even encouragement of consumption.
所以我希望你们在听完这次演讲后 能够记住三件事情 第一件事情是 毒品暴力犯罪 是强大的市场需求推动的结果 为了保证毒品的销售渠道畅通 需要有一个强大的组织支持 暴力不可避免 第二点是 他们的组织结构都非常复杂 内部非常紧密 他们实际上是商业组织 从这点出发来分析和打击他们 或许会有更好的效果 我想说的第三件事情是 即使我们非常习惯于称呼这些组织 称呼为"他们" 把他们看作远离我们的一群坏蛋 但是实际上我们是他们的同伙 要么是通过对毒品的直接消费 要么是通过你对毒品的接受或容忍 在法律法规禁止吸毒的同时 我们却能包容 甚至鼓励吸毒行为
These organizations service, recruit from, and operate within our communities, so necessarily, they are much more integrated within them than we are comfortable acknowledging. And so to me the question is not whether these dynamics will continue the way they have. We see that the nature of this phenomenon guarantees that they will. The question is whether we are willing to continue our support of a failed strategy based on our stubborn, blissful, voluntary ignorance at the cost of the deaths of thousands of our young.
这些组织为我们提供服务 从我们中招募新人,在我们的社区做生意 所以必然的,他们跟我们之间的关系 要比我们乐意承认的程度紧密得多 所以对我而言,我不会去怀疑 这些组织的运作方式能够延续下去 看到了这种现状的本质 我们就知道它一定会延续下去 而我们要思考的是,我们是否愿意 继续执行失败的毒品控制政策 继续保持着我们自己的顽固,天真,假装无知 罔视那些死去的、数以千计的年轻人
Thank you.
谢谢大家
(Applause)
(掌声)