In December of 2010, the city of Apatzingán in the coastal state of Michoacán, in Mexico, awoke to gunfire. For two straight days, the city became an open battlefield between the federal forces and a well-organized group, presumably from the local criminal organization, La Familia Michoacana, or the Michoacán family. The citizens didn't only experience incessant gunfire but also explosions and burning trucks used as barricades across the city, so truly like a battlefield. After these two days, and during a particularly intense encounter, it was presumed that the leader of La Familia Michoacana, Nazario Moreno, was killed.
U prosincu 2010., grad Apatzingan u obalnoj državi Michoacán, u Meksiku, se probudio uz pucnjavu. Dva dana zaredom, grad je bio otvoreno bojište između federalnih snaga i dobro organizirane grupe, vjerojatno iz lokalne kriminalne organizacije La Familia Michoacana, ili obitelj Michoacan. Građani nisu samo iskusili neprekidnu paljbu već i eksplozije i zapaljene kamione koji su korišteni poput barikada diljem grada, dakle istinski poput bojišta. Nakon ta dva dana, i tijekom posebno napetog susreta, pretpostavljeno je da je vođe obitelji Michoacan, Nazario Moreno, ubijen.
In response to this terrifying violence, the mayor of Apatzingán decided to call the citizens to a march for peace. The idea was to ask for a softer approach to criminal activity in the state. And so, the day of the scheduled procession, thousands of people showed up. As the mayor was preparing to deliver the speech starting the march, his team noticed that, while half of the participants were appropriately dressed in white, and bearing banners asking for peace, the other half was actually marching in support of the criminal organization and its now-presumed-defunct leader. Shocked, the mayor decided to step aside rather than participate or lead a procession that was ostensibly in support of organized crime. And so his team stepped aside. The two marches joined together, and they continued their path towards the state capital.
U odgovoru na ovo užasno nasilje, gradonačelnik Apatzingana je odlučio pozvati građane na marš za mir. Ideja je bila blaži pristuo kriminalnoj aktivnosti u državi. Na dan zakazane procesije, tisuće su se pojavile. Dok se gradonačelnik pripremao dati govor za početak marša, njegov tim je primjetio da, dok je pola sudionika bilo prigodno obučeno u bijelo, i nosilo transparente u kojima traže mir, druga polovica je zapravo marširala za podršku kriminalnoj organizaciji i njenom pretpostavljeno mrtvom vođi. Šokiran, gradonačelnik je radije odlučio odstupiti nego sudjelovati ili voditi procesiju koja prividno podupire organizirani kriminal. Stoga je njegov tim odstupio. Dva skupa su se spojila i nastavila svoj put prema glavnom gradu.
This story of horrific violence followed by a fumbled approach by federal and local authorities as they tried to engage civil society, who has been very well engaged by a criminal organization, is a perfect metaphor for what's happening in Mexico today, where we see that our current understanding of drug violence and what leads to it is probably at the very least incomplete.
Ova priča o užasnom nasilju koja je popraćena nespretnim pristupom federalnih i lokalnih vlasti dok su pokušavali pristupiti građanstvu kojemu je vrlo uspješno pristupila kriminalna organizacija, je savršena metafora za ono što se događa danas u Meksiku gdje vidimo da je naše trenutačno shvaćanje nasilja u vezi droge i onoga što ga potiče u najmanju ruku nepotpuno.
If you decided to spend 30 minutes trying to figure out what's going on with drug violence in Mexico by, say, just researching online, the first thing you would find out is that while the laws state that all Mexican citizens are equal, there are some that are more and there are some that are much less equal than others, because you will quickly find out that in the past six years anywhere between 60 and 100,000 people have lost their lives in drug-related violence. To put these numbers in perspective, this is eight times larger than the number of casualties in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined. It's also shockingly close to the number of people who have died in the Syrian civil war, which is an active civil war. This is happening just south of the border.
Ako odlučite potrošiti pola sata pokušavajući shvatiti odakle nasilje u vezi s drogom u Meksiku samo online pretragom, prva stvar koju biste otkrili je da, dok zakon kaže da su svi građani Meksika jednaki, postoje oni koji su više i oni koji su puno manje jednaki nego drugi, jer ćete brzo saznati da je u zadnjih 6 godina između 60 i 100.000 ljudi izgubilo život u nasilju povezanim s drogom. Kako bi stavili ove brojke u perspektivu, ovo je osam puta veći broj žrtava nego u ratovima u Afganistanu i Iraku zajedno. Također je šokantno blizu broju ljudi koji su poginuli u sirijskom građanskom ratu, koji je aktivan građanski rat. Ovo se događa neposredno južno od granice.
Now as you're reading, however, you will be maybe surprised that you will quickly become numb to the numbers of deaths, because you will see that these are sort of abstract numbers of faceless, nameless dead people. Implicitly or explicitly, there is a narrative that all the people who are dying were somehow involved in the drug trade, and we infer this because they were either tortured or executed in a professional manner, or, most likely, both. And so clearly they were criminals because of the way they died. And so the narrative is that somehow these people got what they were deserved. They were part of the bad guys. And that creates some form of comfort for a lot of people.
Međutim, dok čitate, možda će vas iznenaditi da ćete brzo otupjeti na broj žrtava, jer ćete vidjeti da su to apstraktni brojevi mrtvih, bezimenih ljudi bez lica. Prešutno ili javno, postoji priča da su svi poginuli bili nekako uključeni u prodaju droga, a to zaključujemo jer su bili ili mučeni ili profesionalno pogubljeni, ili vrlo vjerojatno oboje. Očito su bili kriminalci zbog načina na koji su umrli. Dakle priča govori da su na neki način ti ljudi dobili što su i zaslužili. Bili su negativci. To stvara neku vrstu ugode za mnogo ljudi.
However, while it's easier to think of us, the citizens, the police, the army, as the good guys, and them, the narcos, the carteles, as the bad guys, if you think about it, the latter are only providing a service to the former. Whether we like it or not, the U.S. is the largest market for illegal substances in the world, accounting for more than half of global demand. It shares thousands of miles of border with Mexico that is its only route of access from the South, and so, as the former dictator of Mexico, Porfirio Diaz, used to say, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States."
Međutim, dok je lakše misliti o nama, građanima, policiji i vojsci kao o pozitivcima, a o njima, narkosima, kartelima, kao negativcima, ako razmislite, drugi samo pružaju uslugu prvima. Sviđalo se to vama ili ne, SAD je najveće tržište za ilegalne supstance u svijetu, odgovarnoi za više od pola globalne potražnje. Dijeli granicu od više tisuća kilometara s Meksikom koji je jedini pristup s juga, te je stoga, bivši meksički diktator, Porfirio Diaz govorio: "Jadan Meksiko, toliko daleko od Boga i toliko blizu SAD-u."
The U.N. estimates that there are 55 million users of illegal drugs in the United States. Using very, very conservative assumptions, this yields a yearly drug market on the retail side of anywhere between 30 and 150 billion dollars. If we assume that the narcos only have access to the wholesale part, which we know is false, that still leaves you with yearly revenues of anywhere between 15 billion and 60 billion dollars. To put these numbers in perspective, Microsoft has yearly revenues of 60 billion dollars. And it so happens that this is a product that, because of its nature, a business model to address this market requires you to guarantee to your producers that their product will be reliably placed in the markets where it is consumed. And the only way to do this, because it's illegal, is to have absolute control of the geographic corridors that are used to transport drugs. Hence the violence. If you look at a map of cartel influence and violence, you will see that it almost perfectly aligns with the most efficient routes of transportation from the south to the north. The only thing that the cartels are doing is that they're trying to protect their business.
UN procjenjuje da postoji 55 milijuna korisnika ilegalnih droga u SAD-u. Koristeći vrlo, vrlo konzervativne pretpostavke, ovo godišnje donosi profit između 30 i 150 milijardi dolara. Ako pretpostavimo da narkosi imaju pristup samo prodaji naveliko, što znamo da je pogrešno, još uvijek ostaje godišnji prihod od 15 do 60 milijardi dolara. Kako bismo stavili ove brojeve u omjer, Microsoft ima godišnji prihod od 60 milijardi dolara. Ovaj proizvod, zbog svoje prirode, traži poslovni model koji zahtijeva da osigurate vašim proizvođačima kako će njihov proizvod biti pouzdano dostavljen na tržišta na kojima se prodaje. I jedini način za ovo, jer je ilegalan, je da imate potpunu kontrolu geografskih koridora koji se koriste za transport droge. Iz toga proizlazi nasilje. Ako pogledate na kartu nasilja i utjecaja kartela, vidjet ćete da se gotovo savršeno poklapaju s najučinkovitijim rutama prijevoza od juga prema sjeveru. Jedina stvar koju karteli rade je da pokušavaju zaštititi svoj posao.
It's not only a multi-billion dollar market, but it's also a complex one. For example, the coca plant is a fragile plant that can only grow in certain latitudes, and so it means that a business model to address this market requires you to have decentralized, international production, that by the way needs to have good quality control, because people need a good high that is not going to kill them and that is going to be delivered to them when they need it. And so that means they need to secure production and quality control in the south, and you need to ensure that you have efficient and effective distribution channels in the markets where these drugs are consumed. I urge you, but only a little bit, because I don't want to get you in trouble, to just ask around and see how difficult it would be to get whatever drug you want, wherever you want it, whenever you want it, anywhere in the U.S., and some of you may be surprised to know that there are many dealers that offer a service where if you send them a text message, they guarantee delivery of the drug in 30 minutes or less.
Ne radi se samo o multimilijardskom tržištu, već i o kompleksnom poslu. Na primjer, biljka koka je osjetljiva biljka koja raste samo na određenim područjima, što znači da poslovni model koji je dovodi na tržište, zahtijeva decentraliziranu, internacionalnu proizvodnju, koja mora imati dobru kontrolu kvalitete, jer ljudi trebaju dobru drogu koja ih neće ubiti i koja će im biti dostavljena kada ju trebaju. To znači da moraju osigurati proizvodnju i kontrolu kvalitete na jugu, i moraju osigurati učinkovite i uspješne distribucijske kanale do tržišta gdje se droge konzumiraju. Potičem vas, no samo malo, jer ne želim da upadnete u nevolje, da se raspitate koliko je teško dobiti koju god drogu želite, gdje god ju želite, kada god ju želite, bilo gdje u SAD-u., i neki od vas će se iznenaditi kad saznaju da mnogi dileri nude uslugu u kojoj ako im pošaljete poruku, jamče dostavu droge u pola sata ili kraće.
Think about this for a second. Think about the complexity of the distribution network that I just described. It's very difficult to reconcile this with the image of faceless, ignorant goons that are just shooting each other, very difficult to reconcile.
Razmislite o tome na sekundu. Razmislite o kompleksnosti distribucijske mreže koju sam upravo opisao. Vrlo je teško pomiriti ovo sa slikama bezličnih, ignorantnih budala koji pucaju jedni na druge. Vrlo je teško prihvatiti.
Now, as a business professor, and as any business professor would tell you, an effective organization requires an integrated strategy that includes a good organizational structure, good incentives, a solid identity and good brand management. This leads me to the second thing that you would learn in your 30-minute exploration of drug violence in Mexico. Because you would quickly realize, and maybe be confused by the fact, that there are three organizations that are constantly named in the articles. You will hear about Los Zetas, the Knights Templar, which is the new brand for the Familia Michoacana that I spoke about at the beginning, and the Sinaloa Federation. You will read that Los Zetas is this assortment of sociopaths that terrify the cities that they enter and they silence the press, and this is somewhat true, or mostly true. But this is the result of a very careful branding and business strategy. You see, Los Zetas is not just this random assortment of individuals, but was actually created by another criminal organization, the Gulf Cartel, that used to control the eastern corridor of Mexico. When that corridor became contested, they decided that they wanted to recruit a professional enforcement arm. So they recruited Los Zetas: an entire unit of elite paratroopers from the Mexican Army. They were incredibly effective as enforcers for the Gulf Cartel, so much so that at some point, they decided to just take over the operations, which is why I ask you to never keep tigers as pets, because they grow up. Because the Zetas organization was founded in treason, they lost some of the linkages to the production and distribution in the most profitable markets like cocaine, but what they did have, and this is again based on their military origin, was a perfectly structured chain of command with a very clear hierarchy and a very clear promotion path that allowed them to supervise and operate across many, many markets very effectively, which is the essence of what a chain of command seeks to do. And so because they didn't have access to the more profitable drug markets, this pushed them and gave them the opportunity to diversify into other forms of crime. That includes kidnapping, prostitution, local drug dealing and human trafficking, including of migrants that go from the south to the U.S. So what they currently run is truly and quite literally a franchise business. They focus most of their recruiting on the army, and they very openly advertise for better salaries, better benefits, better promotion paths, not to mention much better food, than what the army can deliver. The way they operate is that when they arrive in a locality, they let people know that they are there, and they go to the most powerful local gang and they say, "I offer you to be the local representative of the Zeta brand." If they agree -- and you don't want to know what happens if they don't -- they train them and they supervise them on how to run the most efficient criminal operation for that town, in exchange for royalties. This kind of business model obviously depends entirely on having a very effective brand of fear, and so Los Zetas carefully stage acts of violence that are spectacular in nature, especially when they arrive first in a city, but again, that's just a brand strategy. I'm not saying they're not violent, but what I am saying is that even though you will read that they are the most violent of all, when you count, when you do the body count, they're actually all the same.
Kao profesor poslovanja, kao što bi vam rekao bilo koji profesor poslovanja, učinkovita organizacija zahtijeva integriranu strategiju koja uključuje dobru ogranizacijsku strukturu, dobre poticaje, solidan identitet i menadžment brenda. To me dovodi do druge stvari koju biste naučili u svom polusatnom istraživanju o nasilju vezanom uz drogu u Meksiku. Jer biste brzo shvatili, i možda bili zbunjeni činjenicom, da postoje tri organizacije koje se neprestano spominju u člancima. Čuti ćete o Los Zetasima, Vitezovima Templarima, što je novi brend za obitelj Michoacan o kojoj sam na početku govorio, i za federaciju Sinaloa. Čitat ćete da su Los Zetasi skupina sociopata koji užasavaju gradove u koje uđu i utišavaju medije, što je donekle ili većinom istina. No. to je rezultat vrlo pažljivog brendinga i poslovne strategije. Vidite, Los Zetasi nisu samo nasumična skupina pojedinaca, nego su stvoreni od druge kriminalne organizacije, Zaljevskog kartela, koji je kontrolirao istočni koridor Meksika. Kada je krenula borba za taj koridor, odlučili su da žele unovačiti profesionalce za borbu. Pa su unovačili Los Zetase: cijelu jedinicu elitnih padobranaca meksičke vojske. Bili su nevjerojatno uspješni kao borci za Zaljevski kartel, čak toliko da su u nekom trenutku odlučili jednostavno preuzeti operacije, zbog čega vas molim da nikada nemate tigrove za ljubimce, jer će narasti. Iz razloga što su Zetasi osnovani u izdaji, izgubili su neke veze s proizvodnjom i distribucijom na najprofitnijim tržištima poput kokaina, no ono što su imali, a temeljeno je na njihovom vojnom porijeklu, je bio savršeno strukturirani lanac zapovjedništva s vrlo jasnom hijerarhijom i vrlo jasnim putem do unapređenja koji ima dopušta da vrlo učinkovito nadgledaju i djeluju na mnogo tržišta, što je srž onoga što lanac zapovjedništva traži. Kako nisu imali pristup profitabilnijim tržištima droge, to ih je poguralo i dalo im priliku da prijeđu na druge vrste kriminala. To uključuje otmicu, prostituciju, lokalno raspačavanje i trgovinu ljudima, uključujući migrante koji putuju s juga u SAD. Ono što trenutno vode je, uistinu i poprilično doslovno, franšiza. Fokusiraju većinu svojeg novačenja na vojsku i vrlo otvoreno reklamiraju bolje plaće, bolje povlastice, bolje načine napredovanja, da ne spominjemo mnogo bolju hranu od one koju daje vojska. Način na koji djeluju je da, kada stignu u okrug, daju ljudima do znanja da su tamo, i dolaze najmoćnijoj lokalnoj bandi i kažu: "Nudimo ti da budeš lokalni predstavnik brenda Zeta." Ako se slože -- a ne želite znati što se događa ako se ne slože -- treniraju ih i nadgledaju po pitanju vođenja najučinkovitije kriminalne operacije u tom gradu, u zamjenu za honorar. Ova vrsta poslovnog modela očito ovisi u potpunosti o vrlo učinkovitom brendu straha, i zato Los Zetasi pažljivo sceniraju činove nasilja koji su po prirodi spektakularni, pogotovo kada prvi put dođu u grad, no, to je još uvijek samo strategije brenda. Ne kažem da nisu nasilni, ono što kažem je da iako ćete čitati da su najnasilniji od svih, kada izbrojite žrtve, svi su ustvari isti.
In contrast to them, the Knights Templar that arose in Michoacán emerged in reaction to the incursion of the Zetas into the state of Michoacán. Michoacán is a geographically strategic state because it has one of the largest ports in Mexico, and it has very direct routes to the center of Mexico, which then gives you direct access to the U.S. The Knights Templar realized very quickly that they couldn't face the Zetas on violence alone, and so they developed a strategy as a social enterprise. They brand themselves as representative of and protecting of the citizens of Michoacán against organized crime. Their brand of social enterprise means that they require a lot of civic engagement, so they invest heavily in providing local services, like dealing with home violence, going after petty criminals, treating addicts, and keeping drugs out of the local markets where they are, and, of course, protecting people from other criminal organizations. Now, they kill a lot of people too, but when they kill them, they provide very careful narratives and descriptions for why they did them, through newspaper insertions, YouTube videos, and billboards that explain that the people who were killed were killed because they represented a threat not to us, as an organization, of course, but to you, as citizens. And so we're actually here to protect you. They, as social enterprises do, have created a moral and ethical code that they advertise around, and they have very strict recruiting practices. And here you have the types of explanations that they provide for some of their actions. They have actually retained access to the profitable drug trade, but the way they do it is, because they control all of Michoacán, and they control the Port of Lázaro Cárdenas, they leverage that to, for example, trade copper from Michoacán that is legally created and legally extracted with illegal ephedrine from China which is a critical precursor for methamphetamines that they produce, and then they have partnerships with larger organizations like the Sinaloa Federation that place their products in the U.S.
U kontrastu s njima, Vitezovi Templari koji su se uzdigli u Michoacanu, uzdigli su se kao reakcija na upad Zetasa u državu Michoacan. Michoacan je geografski strateška država jer ima jednu od najvećih luka u Meksiku i vrlo direktne rute u centar Meksika, što daje direktan pristup SAD-u. Vitezovi Templari su vrlo brzo shvatili da se ne mogu sami suočiti s nasiljem Zetasa, stoga su razvili strategiju društvenog poduzeća. Prikazuju se kao predstavnici i zaštitnici građana Michoacana protiv organiziranog kriminala. Njihov brend društvenog poduzeća znači da zahtijevaju mnogo građanskog angažmana, stoga snažno financiraju pružanje lokalnih usluga, poput rješavanja obiteljskog nasilja, hvatanja sitnih kriminalaca, tretiranja ovisnika, držanja droga podalje od lokalnih tržišta gdje su oni, i naravno, zaštite ljudi od drugih kriminalnih organizacija. Također ubijaju mnogo ljudi, no kada ih ubiju, daju vrlo pažljive pripovijesti zašto su ih ubili, preko novina, YouTube videa, i plakata na kojima objašnjavaju da su ljudi koje su ubili ubijeni jer su predstavljali prijetnju. Ne za njih, kao organizaciju, naravno, nego za vas, kao građane. Oni su zapravo ovdje da vas zaštite. Oni su, kao društveno poduzeće, stvorili moralni i etički kod oko kojega se reklamiraju, i imaju vrlo striktne prakse novačenja. Postoje vrste objašnjenja koje daju za neke od svojih djela. Zapravo su uspjeli zadržati pristup profitabilnim rutama droge, no način na koji to rade, jer kontroliraju cijeli Michoacan i kontroliraju luku Lazara Cardenasa, je da izjednačuju, recimo, trgovinu bakra iz Michoacana koji je legalno stvoren i legalno vađen s ilegalnim efedrinom iz Kine koji je ključan za metamfetamine koje proizvode i onda imaju partnerstva s većim organizacijama poput Sinaloa federacije koja dostavlja njihove proizvode u SAD.
Finally, the Sinaloa Federation. When you read about them, you will often read about them with an undertone of reverence and admiration, because they are the most integrated and the largest of all the Mexican organizations, and, many people argue, the world. They started as just sort of a transport organization that specialized in smuggling between the U.S. and the Mexican borders, but now they have grown into a truly integrated multinational that has partnerships in production in the south and partnerships in global distribution across the planet. They have cultivated a brand of professionalism, business acumen and innovation. They have designed new drug products and new drug processes. They have designed narco-tunnels that go across the border, and you can see that these are not "The Shawshank Redemption" types. They have invented narco-submarines and boats that are not detected by radar. They have invented drones to transport drugs, catapults, you name it. One of the leaders of the Sinaloa Federation actually made it to the Forbes list.
Na kraju, Sinaloa federacija. Kada o njima čitate, često ćete naći da se o njima govori sa suptilnim znakovima obožavanja, jer su najintegriranija i najveća od svih meksičkih, mnogi bi rekli, i svjetskih organizacija. Počeli su kao prijevozna organizacija koja se specijalizirala u krijumčarenju između SAD-a i Meksika, no sada su narasli u istinski integriranu multinacionalnu organizaciju koja ima partnerstva s proizvodnjom na jugu i partnerstva u globalnoj distribuciji diljem planeta. Obradili su brend profesionalizma, poslovne sposobnosti i inovacije. Dizajnirali su nove droge i nove procese proizvodnje. Dizajnirali su narko tunele koji idu preko granice, i možete vidjeti da nisu poput onoga iz "Iskupljenja u Shawshanku". Izmislili su narko podmornice i brodove koje radar ne može otkriti. Izmislili su dronove za prijevoz droga, katapulte i još puno toga. Jedan od vođa Sinaloa federacije je zapravo došao na Forbesov popis.
[#701 Joaquin Guzman Loera]
[#701 Joaquin Guzman Loera]
Like any multinational would, they have specialized and focused only in the most profitable part of the business, which is high-margin drugs like cocaine, heroine, methamphetamines. Like any traditional Latin American multinational would, the way they control their operations is through family ties. When they're entering a new market, they send a family member to supervise it, or, if they're partnering with a new organization, they create a family tie, either through marriages or other types of ties. Like any other multinational would, they protect their brand by outsourcing the more questionable parts of the business model, like for example, when they have to engage in violence against other criminal organizations, they recruit gangs and other smaller players to do the dirty work for them, and they try to separate their operations and their violence and be very discrete about this.
Poput bilo koje multinacionalke, specijalizirali su i fokusirali se samo na najprofitniji dio posla, koji se odnosi na droge visoke zarade poput kokaina, heroina, metamfetamina. Kao i bilo koja tradicionalna latino-američka multinacionalka, način na koji upravljaju operacijama je putem obiteljskih veza. Kada ulaze na novo tržište, pošalju člana obitelji da nadgleda, ili, ako su u partnerstvu s novom organizacijom, naprave obiteljsku vezu, ili kroz brak ili kroz druge vrste veza. Kao bilo koja druga multinacionalka, štite svoj brend outsourcingom upitnijih dijelova svog poslovnog modela, poput, na primjer, kada trebaju pristupiti nasilju protiv drugih kriminalnih organizacija, novače bande i druge sitne ribe da obave prljav posao za njih, i pokušavaju odvojiti svoje operacije i svoje nasilje i biti vrlo diskretni u vezi toga.
To further strengthen their brand, they actually have professional P.R. firms that shape how the press talks about them. They have professional videographers on staff. They have incredibly productive ties with the security organizations on both sides of the border.
Kako bi dalje ojačali brend, imaju profesionalna PR poduzeća koja oblikuju pisanje novinara o njima. Imaju profesionalne snimatelje u službi. Imaju iznimno produktivne veze sa sigurnosnim organizacijama na obje strane granice.
And so, differences aside, what these three organizations share is on the one hand, a very clear understanding that institutions cannot be imposed from the top, but rather they are built from the bottom up one interaction at a time. They have created extremely coherent structures that they use to show the inconsistencies in government policies.
I tako, pored razlika, ono što ove tri organizacije dijele je s jedne strane vrlo očito razumijevanje da institucije ne mogu biti nametnute s vrha, nego su izgrađene s dna na više jednu po jednu interakciju. Stvorili su ekstremno povezane strukture koje koriste da pokažu nedosljednosti u politici vlade.
And so what I want you to remember from this talk are three things. The first one is that drug violence is actually the result of a huge market demand and an institutional setup that forces the servicing of this market to necessitate violence to guarantee delivery routes. The second thing I want you to remember is that these are sophisticated, coherent organizations that are business organizations, and analyzing them and treating them as such is probably a much more useful approach. The third thing I want you to remember is that even though we're more comfortable with this idea of "them," a set of bad guys separated from us, we are actually accomplices to them, either through our direct consumption or through our acceptance of the inconsistency between our policies of prohibition and our actual behavior of tolerance or even encouragement of consumption.
Ono što želim da zapamtite iz ovog govora su tri stvari. Prva je da je nasilje povezano s drogom rezultat ogromne tržišne potražnje i institucionalnog sustava koji prisiljava one koji rade na tom tržištu primjenu nasilja kako bi osigurali puteve dostave. Druga stvar koju želim da zapamtite je da su ovo sofisticirane, povezane organizacije koje su poslovne organizacije, i analizirajući ih i tretirajući ih takvima je vjerojatno puno korisniji pristup. Treća stvar koju želim da zapamtite je da iako nam je ugodnija ideja "njih", skupine negativaca odvojenih od nas, zapravo smo im suučesnici, ili kroz direktnu konzumaciju ili kroz prihvaćanje nedosljednosti između naše politike prohibicije i našeg tolerantnog ponašanja ili čak kroz ohrabrivanje konzumacije.
These organizations service, recruit from, and operate within our communities, so necessarily, they are much more integrated within them than we are comfortable acknowledging. And so to me the question is not whether these dynamics will continue the way they have. We see that the nature of this phenomenon guarantees that they will. The question is whether we are willing to continue our support of a failed strategy based on our stubborn, blissful, voluntary ignorance at the cost of the deaths of thousands of our young.
Ove organizacije služe, novače i djeluju unutar naših zajednica, stoga su nužno mnogo više integrirane u njih nego što nam je ugodno priznati. Po meni pitanje nije hoće li se ove dinamike nastaviti na način na koji jesu. Vidimo po prirodi ovog fenomena da zasigurno hoće. Pitanje je jesmo li voljni podupirati ovu propalu strategiju temeljenu na našem tvrdoglavom, blaženom, dobrovoljnom neznanju po cijenu smrti tisuća mladih.
Thank you.
Hvala vam.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)