Chris Anderson: I have been long so fascinated and amazed by so many aspects of Netflix. You're full of surprises, if I may say so. One of those surprises happened, I think about six years ago. So, the company back then was doing really well, but you were basically a streaming service for other people's films and TV content. You'd persuaded Wall Street that you were right to make the kind of radical shift away from just sending people DVDs, so you were doing it by streaming. And you were growing like a weed -- you had more than six million subscribers and healthy growth rates, and yet, you chose that moment to kind of make a giant -- really, a bet-the-company decision. What was that decision, and what motivated it?
克里斯安德森: 網飛的許多面向都讓我 一直很著迷和驚艷。 充滿驚喜,我是說真的。 其中一個驚喜 是大約六年前發生的。 當時,網飛的狀況非常好, 但基本上,你的主要業務 就是串流服務, 內容是其他人製作的 電影和電視節目。 你讓華爾街看到你的眼光很正確, 做出徹底的轉變, 不再只是把 DVD 寄給客人, 你改用了串流的方式。 網飛就像野草般地成長—— 用戶數目超過六百萬, 成長率也很健康, 但,你選擇在這個時刻, 做出重大——可說根本是 賭上了公司的決策。 能否談談那個決策 以及背後的動機?
Reed Hastings: Well, cable networks from all time have started on other people's content and then grown into doing their own originals. So we knew of the general idea for quite a while. And we had actually tried to get into original content back in 2005, when we were on DVD only and buying films at Sundance -- Maggie Gyllenhaal, "Sherrybaby," we published on DVD -- we were a mini studio. And it didn't work out, because we were subscale. And then, as you said, in 2011, Ted Sarandos, my partner at Netflix who runs content, got very excited about "House of Cards." And at that time, it was 100 million dollars, it was a fantastic investment, and it was in competition with HBO. And that was really the breakthrough, that he picked right upfront.
里德哈斯廷斯:嗯, 各時期的有線網路 一開始都是用別人的內容, 成長之後接著做自己的原創內容。 所以,我們知道這個普遍的想法 已經有一段時間了。 其實我們在 2005 年 曾試著要去做原創內容, 當時我們只有做 DVD, 並從日舞影展購買電影—— 我們發行了瑪姬葛倫霍的 《雪莉寶貝》DVD —— 我們是間迷你電影公司。 並沒有成功,因為我們太小了。 接著,就是你剛剛說的,2011 年, 我在網飛負責經營內容的 夥伴泰德薩蘭多斯 對《紙牌屋》感到非常興奮。 在那時,它要價一億美金, 是很棒的投資, 且競爭對手是 HBO。 他先挑選到,真的是個突破。
CA: But that was a significant percentage of the revenue of the company at that time. But how could you get confident that that was actually worth doing? If you got that wrong, it might have been really devastating for the company.
克:在當時那佔了公司收入 很高的百分比。 你是哪來的信心, 認為那是值得做的? 如果你錯了, 公司可能會被拖垮。
RH: Yeah, we weren't confident. I mean, that's the whole tension of it. We were like, "Holy ...!" -- I can't say that. Yeah, it was scary.
里:是啊,我們並沒有信心。 我是指,我們非常有壓力。 我們就:「哇ㄎㄠˋ!」 不能說髒話。 的確,那很嚇人。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
CA: And with that, it wasn't just producing new content. You also, pretty much with that, if I understand right, introduced this idea of binge-viewing. It wasn't, "We're going to do these episodes and build excitement" -- boom! -- all at one time. And that consumer mode hadn't really been tested. Why did you risk that?
克:這麼一來, 就不只是製作新內容了。 如果我理解正確,你也因此 帶入馬拉松觀劇的風潮。 並不是「我們打算要推出 這麼多集,建立興奮感」,而是 砰!一次全部推出。 那種消費者模式 其實還沒有被測試過。 你為什麼要冒這個險?
RH: Well, you know, we had grown up shipping DVDs. And then there were series, box sets, on DVD. And all of us had that experience watching some of the great HBO content you know, with the DVD -- next episode, next episode. And so that was the trigger to make us think, wow, you know, with episodic content, especially serialized, it's so powerful to have all the episodes at once. And it's something that linear TV can't do. And so both of those made it really positive.
里:嗯,我們靠寄送 DVD 來成長。 接著就有影集,DVD 的盒裝組合。 我們大家都有過這樣的經驗: 看很棒的 HBO 節目, 看 DVD 版本,下一集,再下一集。 這觸發我們思考, 哇,如果是一集一集的 內容,特別是影集, 能一次拿到所有集數會非常棒。 而線性的電視做不到這一點。 這兩個原因,讓我們 十分看好這個想法。
CA: And so, did it work out on the math pretty much straight away, that an hour spent watching "House of Cards," say, was more profitable to you than an hour spent watching someone else's licensed content?
克:所以,結果是不是 馬上就如預期, 比如,花一個小時看《紙牌屋》 對你而言的利益 會高於花一個小時看 其他人的授權內容?
RH: You know, because we're subscription, we don't have to track it at that level. And so it's really about making the brand stronger, so that more people want to join. And "House of Cards" absolutely did that, because then many people would talk about it and associate that brand with us, whereas "Mad Men" we carried -- great show, AMC show -- but they didn't associate it with Netflix, even if they watched it on Netflix.
里:因為我們採用訂閱制, 無法追蹤到那個層級的資訊。 所以,重點在於要讓品牌更強, 才會有更多人想要加入。 而《紙牌屋》確實辦到了, 因為接下來很多人在談它, 並將那品牌和我們連結在一起, 反而是我們播的《廣告狂人》, 很棒的節目,AMC 的節目, 大家沒有把它和網飛連結在一起, 即使大家都是在網飛上看的。
CA: And so you added all these other remarkable series, "Narcos," "Jessica Jones," "Orange is the New Black," "The Crown," "Black Mirror" -- personal favorite -- "Stranger Things" and so on. And so, this coming year, the level of investment you're planning to make in new content is not 100 million. It's what?
克:所以你又增加了 許多其他很棒的影集, 《毒梟》、《潔西卡瓊斯》、 《勁爆女子監獄》、《王冠》、 《黑鏡》——我個人的最愛—— 《怪奇物語》等等。 所以,接下來的一年, 你計畫要對新內容做多少投資? 不是一億美金。 是多少?
RH: It's about eight billion dollars around the world. And it's not enough. There are so many great shows on other networks. And so we have a long way to go.
里:全世界總共大約八十億美金。 那並不足夠。 在其他網路還有很多很好的節目。 所以我們還有很長的路要走。
CA: But eight billion -- that's pretty much higher than any other content commissioner at this point?
克:但八十億, 在這個時點,這金額應該比所有 其他的內容委託公司都還要高?
RH: No, Disney is in that realm, and if they're able to acquire Fox, they're even bigger. And then, really, that's spread globally, so it's not as much as it sounds.
里:不,迪士尼差不多就那麼多, 如果能收購福斯,他們還會更強。 且那金額是散在全球各地的, 並沒有聽起來的那麼多。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
CA: But clearly, from the Barry Dillers and others in the media business, it feels like from nowhere, this company has come and has really revolutionized the business. It's like, as if Blockbuster one day said, "We're going to make Blockbuster videos," and then, six years later, was as big as Disney. I mean, that story would never have happened, and yet it did.
克:但,很顯然,就巴瑞迪勒 以及媒體業的其他人來說, 感覺這間公司就好像是 不知道從哪裡冒出來, 改革了這個產業。 就彷彿有一天,百視達說: 「我們打算要做百視達影片。」 接著,六年後, 它就和迪士尼一樣大了。 我的意思是,那種狀況 本不可能發生,卻真的發生了。
RH: That's the bitch about the internet -- it moves fast, you know? Everything around us moves really quick.
里:網際網路最難搞的 就是它改變很快,對吧? 我們周圍的一切都改變很快。
CA: I mean, there must be something unusual about Netflix's culture that allowed you to take such bold -- I won't say "reckless" -- bold, well thought-through decisions.
克:我的意思是,網飛的文化 一定有什麼不尋常之處, 讓你能做出這麼大膽—— 我不會說「魯莽」—— 大膽且深思熟慮的決策。
RH: Yeah, absolutely. We did have one advantage, which is we were born on DVD, and we knew that that was going to be temporary. No one thought we'd be mailing discs for 100 years. So then you have a lot of paranoia about what's coming next, and that's part of the founding ethos, is really worrying about what's coming next. So that's an advantage. And then in terms of the culture, it's very big on freedom and responsibility. I pride myself on making as few decisions as possible in a quarter. And we're getting better and better at that. There are some times I can go a whole quarter without making any decisions.
里:是啊,絕對是。 我們確實有一項優勢, 那就是,我們從 DVD 起家, 而我們知道那只是暫時的。 沒有人認為我們會做 一百年的光碟寄送。 所以,接著你偏執, 不斷想接下來會是什麼, 那是建立公司精神的一部分, 去擔心接下來會是什麼。 那是一項優勢。 在文化方面, 有很大的自由,及很大的責任。 我很自豪的一點是, 我每一季都盡可能做少一點決策。 我們越來越擅長那麼做。 有些時候,我能夠整整一季 都不做任何決策。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
(Applause)
(掌聲)
CA: But there are some really surprising things about your people. For example, I looked at one survey. It looks like Netflix employees, compared to your peers', are basically the highest paid for equivalent jobs. And the least likely to want to leave. And if you Google the Netflix culture deck, you see this list of quite surprising admonitions to your employees. Talk about a few of them.
克:但你的人有些 非常讓人驚艷之處。 比如,我看過一項調查。 看起來,和同地位的人相比, 基本上,網飛的員工 是做同類工作的人當中薪水最高的。 且最不可能離職。 如果你用 Google 搜尋「網飛文化集」, 可以找到一張給你的員工的 忠告清單,還蠻讓人驚訝的。 跟我們談談其中幾項。
RH: Well, you know, my first company -- we were very process obsessed. This was in the 1990s. And every time someone made a mistake, we tried to put a process in place to make sure that mistake didn't happen again -- so, very semiconductor-yield orientation. And the problem is, we were trying to dummy-proof the system. And then, eventually, only dummies wanted to work there. Then, of course, the market shifted -- in that case, it was C++ to Java. But you know, there's always some shift. And the company was unable to adapt, and it got acquired by our largest competitor. And so with Netflix, I was super focused on how to run with no process but not have chaos. And so then we've developed all these mechanisms, super high-talented people, alignment, talking openly, sharing information -- internally, people are stunned at how much information -- all the core strategies, etc. We're like the "anti-Apple" -- you know how they compartmentalize? We do the opposite, which is: everybody gets all the information. So what we're trying to do is build a sense of responsibility in people and the ability to do things. I find out about big decisions now that are made all the time, I've never even heard about it, which is great. And mostly, they go well.
里:嗯,我的第一間公司 對流程非常著迷。 時間是在九○年代。 每當有人犯了錯時, 我們就會試著建立一套流程, 來確保同樣的錯誤不會再發生。 所以,非常半導體良率導向。 問題是,我們試著要讓系統防呆。 結果,最後只有呆子 才會想在那裡工作。 當然,接著,市場轉變了—— 在這種情況下,是從 C++ 變成 java。 但你知道的,轉變總是不斷發生。 而公司無法適應, 被我們最大的競爭者收購了。 所以,對於網飛,我非常重視 要如何不用流程來經營, 且不造成混亂。 所以,我們開發出這些機制, 非常有才華的人、結盟、 公開談論、分享資訊—— 在內部,資訊的量 讓大家感到吃驚—— 所有的核心策略等等。 我們就像「反蘋果」—— 你知道他們如何做劃分嗎? 我們做的完全相反,也就是: 每個人都有所有的資訊。 我們是在試著建立大家的責任感, 以及去做事的能力。 我發現現在時時刻刻 都有重大決策被做出來, 甚至我沒聽到的,這是好事。 大部分的決策都很順利。
CA: So you just wake up and read them on the internet.
克:所以,你起床後, 上網才看到這些決策。
RH: Sometimes.
里:有時候是的。
CA: "Oh, we just entered China!"
克:「喔,我們剛進軍中國!」
RH: Yeah, well that would be a big one.
里:是啊,那會是件大事。
CA: But you allow employees to set their own vacation time, and ... There's just --
克:你讓員工排定自己的假期等等, 只是——
RH: Sure, that's a big symbolic one, vacation, because most people, in practice, do that, anyway. But yeah, there's a whole lot of that freedom.
里:當然,假期非常有象徵性, 因為大部分人在現實中會休假。 但,是啊,我們 在那方面有更多自由。
CA: And courage, you ask for as a fundamental value.
克:還有勇氣,你要求 把勇氣當作基本價值。
RH: Yeah, we want people to speak the truth. And we say, "To disagree silently is disloyal." It's not OK to let some decision go through without saying your piece, and typically, writing it down. And so we're very focused on trying to get to good decisions through the debate that always happens. And we try not to make it intense, like yelling at each other -- nothing like that. You know, it's really curiosity drawing people out.
里:是啊,我們希望 大家都能說實話。 我們說:「反對卻保持沉默 就是不忠的表現。」 若你有話沒說出來, 或沒寫下來,就讓決策通過, 這樣是不行的。 所以我們非常著重要透過 大家常在做的辯論方式 來做出好的決策。 我們試著不要讓辯論變得 太劇烈,比如彼此叫囂—— 不能變成那樣。 通常真的是好奇心吸引人們。
CA: You've got this other secret weapon at Netflix, it seems, which is this vast trove of data, a word we've heard a certain amount about this week. You've often taken really surprising stances towards building smart algorithms at Netflix. Back in the day, you opened up your algorithm to the world and said, "Hey, can anyone do better than this recommendation we've got? If so, we'll pay you a million dollars." You paid someone a million dollars, because it was like 10 percent better than yours.
克:在網飛,你似乎 還有另一項秘密武器, 就是寶貴的大量資料, 這週我們聽見這個詞好多次了。 在網飛,你對於建立智慧演算法 所採取的立場很讓人驚訝。 你過去把演算法公開給全世界, 並說:「這是我們得出的推薦, 有人能做得比它更好嗎? 若有,我們會付你一百萬美金。」 你曾付給某人一百萬美金, 因為他做的比你原本的好 10%。
RH: That's right.
里:沒錯。
CA: Was that a good decision? Would you do that again?
克:那是個好決策嗎? 你會再做一次嗎?
RH: Yeah, it was super exciting at the time; this was about 2007. But you know, we haven't done it again. So clearly, it's a very specialized tool. And so think of that as a lucky break of good timing, rather than a general framework. So what we've done is invest a lot on the algorithms, so that we feature the right content to the right people and try to make it fun and easy to explore.
里:會,我們當時超興奮的, 那時大約是 2007 年。 但,我們目前還沒有再做一次。 所以,很顯然,它是種 非常專門化的工具。 所以,把那想成是 運氣很好碰到好時機, 而不是個一般化的架構。 所以,我們投資很多在演算法上, 讓我們為適當的人提供適當的內容, 並試著把探索變得有趣和容易。
CA: And you made this, what seems like a really interesting shift, a few years ago. You used to ask people, "Here are 10 movies. What do you think? Which ones of these are your best movies?" And then tried to match those movies with recommendations for what was coming. And then you changed away from that. Talk about that.
克:而你在幾年前做出了 這個似乎真的很有趣的轉變。 你以前會問大家:「這裡有 十部電影。你們覺得如何? 當中有哪些是你覺得 最棒的電影?」 接著就試著把這些電影和接下來 要推出的電影比對來做出推薦。 接著你改變了,漸漸不用它了。 請談談這點。
RH: Sure. Everyone would rate "Schindler's List" five stars, and then they'd rate Adam Sandler, "The Do-Over" three stars. But, in fact, when you looked at what they watched, it was almost always Adam Sandler. And so what happens is, when we rate and we're metacognitive about quality, that's sort of our aspirational self. And it works out much better to please people to look at the actual choices that they make, their revealed preferences by how much they enjoy simple pleasures.
里:好的。 大家都會給《辛德勒的名單》五顆星, 然後他們會給亞當山德勒的 《假死新人生》三顆星。 但,事實上,當你去查 他們會看什麼電影時, 他們幾乎都是選亞當山德勒。 這個狀況就是,當我們給評價時, 我們對於品質有後設認知, 那有點算是我們嚮往的自我。 如果目的是要取悅人, 更好的方法是 去看他們真正做出的選擇, 從他們享受單純樂趣的程度 所顯露出來的偏好。
CA: OK, I want to talk for a couple of minutes about this, because this strikes me as a huge deal, not just for Netflix, for the internet as a whole. The difference between aspirational values and revealed values. You, brilliantly, didn't pay too much attention to what people said, you watched what they did, and then found the stuff that, "Oh my God, I never knew I would like a show about making horrible recipes, called 'Nailed It!'"
克:好,我希望能 花幾分鐘談談這一點, 因為我覺得這是件大事, 不只是對網飛而言, 對整個網際網路也是。 嚮往的價值和顯示出來的價值 之間的差異。 你很睿智,沒太注意人們的說詞, 而是觀察他們的行為, 找到東西,讓他們: 「喔,我的天,我從來沒有想過 我會喜歡那個做出恐怖食譜的節目 叫《Nailed It!》。」
RH: Called "Nailed It!" Right.
里:叫《Nailed It!》,是的。
CA: It's hilarious. I would never have even thought of that. But aren't there risks with this, if this go-only-with-revealed-values approach is taken too far?
克:它很好笑。 我完全沒有預期到。 但這樣做沒有風險嗎, 如果把「只看顯示出的價值」 這種方法用得太過頭了?
RH: Well, we get a lot of joy from making people happy, Sometimes you just want to relax and watch a show like "Nailed It!" And it's fun, and it's not stressful. Other times, people want to watch very intensive film. "Mudbound" was Oscar-nominated, it's a great, very intensive film. And you know, we've had over 20 million hours of viewing on "Mudbound," which is dramatically bigger than it would have been in the theaters or any other distribution. And so, we have some candy, too, but we have lots of broccoli. And you know, if you have the good mix, you get to a healthy diet.
里:讓大家開心使我們很喜悅。 有時候你就只是想放鬆, 看個像《Nailed It!》這樣的節目。 它很好玩,它沒有壓力。 其他時候,大家會想要 看非常有張力的電影。 《泥沼》得到奧斯卡提名, 它是部很棒且非常有張力的電影。 《泥沼》的觀看時數超過兩千萬小時, 這比在戲院放映或任何其他 發行方式能得到的觀看時數 都要高出非常多。 我們也有些糖果, 但我們有很多花椰菜。 如果你能做很好的組合, 就能有很健康的飲食。
CA: But -- yes, indeed. But isn't it the case that algorithms tend to point you away from the broccoli and towards the candy, if you're not careful? We just had a talk about how, on YouTube, somehow algorithms tend to, just by actually being smarter, tend to drive people towards more radical or specific content. It'd be easy to imagine that Netflix algorithms, just going on revealed values, would gradually --
克:但——是的,的確。 但演算法是不是會傾向於 引導你遠離花椰菜, 朝糖果的方向去, 一不小心就會這樣? 我們剛剛才談到在 YouTube 上, 不知怎麼的, 只要演算法比較聰明, 就很容易引導大家去看 更極端或明確的內容。 很容易就會想像, 如果網飛的演算法 只去看顯露出來的價值, 就會漸漸地——
RH: Right, get too base --
里:對,變得太惡劣——
CA: We'd all be watching violent pornography or something. Or some people would, you know. But, how --
克:我們可能最後都會 在看暴力色情片之類的。 或是有些人會,你知道的。 但,怎麼——
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
Not me! I'm the child of a missionary, I don't even think about these things. But --
我沒有喔! 我是傳教士的孩子, 我甚至不會去想這些東西。 但——
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
But I mean, it's possible, right?
但,我是說,這是有可能的吧?
RH: In practice, you're right that you can't just rely on algorithms. It's a mix of judgment and what we carry, and we're a curated service versus a platform like Facebook and YouTube, so we have an easier set of issues, which is: What are these great films and series that we acquire? But then within that, the algorithm is a tool.
里:在實做上,你說的沒錯, 不能只依靠演算法。 是要把判斷結合我們播放的內容, 我們是個策展的服務, 對抗臉書和 YouTube 這類平台, 所以我們的議題會比較簡單, 即:我們所取得的 好電影和影集是什麼? 但在那當中,演算法是個好工具。
CA: But how -- John Doerr just talked about measuring what matters. As a business, what matters, I presume, is fundamentally just growing subscribers. I mean, that's your unique advantage. Are subscribers grown only by the more time they spend watching Netflix, that is what will make them re-subscribe? Or is it even more about having shows that might not have been so much time as watching the whole season of "Nailed It!" or whatever? But just get into them more; they just think, "That was nourishing, that was extraordinary, I'm so glad I watched that with my family." Isn't there a version of the business model that would be less content but more awesome content, possibly even more uplifting content?
克:但——約翰杜爾 剛剛談到要衡量重要的東西。 我猜測,就企業來說,重要的 基本上應該是讓訂戶成長。 我的意思是, 那是你獨一無二的優勢。 唯一的訂戶成長方式就是 花更多時間看網飛嗎? 那是他們會續訂的原因嗎? 或者,更重要的是要有一些節目, 本來不會有跟看整季 《Nailed It!》一樣多的時間? 但就是對它們更多些興趣; 他們會想: 「那挺有營養的;那挺不凡的, 我很高興我和我家人一起看了。」 有沒有一個版本的商業模式 是比較少內容,但都是更棒的內容, 可能是更令人振奮的內容?
RH: And people choose that uplifting content. I think you're right, which is, when people talk about Netflix, they talk about the shows that move them: "13 Reasons Why" or "The Crown." And that is way disproportionate and positive impact, even for the subscriber growth that you talked about is those couple big, memorable shows. But what we want to do is offer a variety. You don't want to watch the same thing every night, as much as you like it; you want to try different things. And what we haven't seen is this, say, race to the bottom of your violent pornography kind of examples. Instead, we've seen great viewing across a whole range -- "Black Mirror" -- we're filming season five now. And that was a struggling show when it was only in the BBC. And with the distribution of on-demand, you can make these much bigger shows.
里:大家選擇那些令人振奮的內容。 我想你是對的,就是說, 當大家在談論網飛時, 他們談的是感動他們的節目: 《漢娜的遺言》或《王冠》。 那影響力非常不成比例且很正面, 即使對你所談及的訂戶成長來說, 就是那幾個讓人記得的大節目。 但我們想做的是提供多樣性。 你不會想要每晚都看一樣的東西, 不論你有多喜歡它; 你會想嘗試不同的東西。 我們還沒看見的是 這個狀況,比如, 你的暴力色情片例子的削價競爭。 反而,我們會看到 各種節目的觀看率都很高—— 《黑鏡》——我們正在拍第五季。 這節目只在 BBC 播放時 推得很辛苦。 透過隨選即看的發行方式, 就能使更多人看這些節目。
CA: You're telling me humans can get addicted by their angels as well as their demons.
克:你的意思是, 人們的良善和劣根性 都能讓他們上癮。
RH: Yeah, and again, we try not to think about it in addiction terms, we think about it as, you know: What are you going to do with your time and when you want to relax? You can watch linear TV, you can do video games, you can do YouTube, or you can watch Netflix. And if we're as great as we can be, and we have a variety of moods, then more often, people will choose us.
里:沒錯,我們試著不要從 上癮的角度來想這件事, 我們是這樣子想的: 當你想要放鬆時,要怎麼用時間? 你可以看線性電視、玩電玩、 看 YouTube, 或者你可以看網飛。 如果我們能盡可能做好, 我們就能提供各種心情的節目, 大家就會更常選擇我們。
CA: But you have people in the organization who are looking regularly at the actual impacts of these brilliant algorithms that you've created. Just for reality check, just, "Are we sure that this is the direction we want to go?"
克:你的組織裡有些人 經常在確認所創造出的 這些出色的演算法 在實際上有沒有影響力。 只是回來談現實面。 「我們確定這是我們 想要走的方向嗎?」
RH: You know, I think we learn. And you have to be humble and sort of say, "Look, there's no perfect tool." The algorithm’s one part, the way we commission the content, our relationships with societies. So there's a lot of ways that we have to look at it. So if you get too stuck in "Let's just increase viewing" or "Just increase subscribers," you're unlikely to be able to grow and be the great company you want to be. So think of it as this multiple measures of success.
里:我認為我們會學習。 你得要謙虛,並說類似這樣的話: 「聽著,沒有完美的工具。」 演算法是一部分, 我們委託製作內容的方式, 我們和社會的關係。 所以,我們要用很多 不同的方式來看它。 如果你太執著在: 「咱們來提高觀看率」 或「就把訂戶數增加吧」, 你就不太可能會成長 並成為你所希望的好公司。 所以,把它想成是 對成功有多種的衡量方式。
CA: So, speaking of algorithms that have raised questions: You were on the board of Facebook, and I think Mark Zuckerberg -- you've done some mentoring for him. What should we know about Mark Zuckerberg that people don't know?
克:說到帶出這些問題的演算法: 你是臉書董事會的一員, 我認為馬克祖克柏—— 你給過他一些指導。 關於馬克祖克柏,有什麼我們 不知道但應該要知道的事?
RH: Well, many of you know him or have seen him. I mean, he's a fantastic human being. Really first-class. And social -- these platforms, whether that's YouTube or Facebook, are clearly trying to grow up quickly. And we see that with all new technologies. I mean, yesterday we were talking about printed DNA, and it's like: could be fantastic or could be horrific. And you know, all new technologies -- when television was first popular in the 1960s in the US, it was called a "vast wasteland," and that television was going to rot the minds of everybody. It turns out everybody's minds were fine. And there were some adjustments, but think of it as -- or, I think of it as -- all new technologies have pros and cons. And in social, we're just figuring that out.
里:這裡很多人 都認識他且見過他。 他是個很棒的人。 真的是一流的。 而社交——這些平台, 不論是 YouTube 或臉書, 都很顯然在嘗試快速地成長。 我們看到各種新技術 被用在這方面。 我的意思是,昨天我們 還在談印 DNA, 談的大概是:它會很棒或是很糟。 你知道的,所有的新技術—— 六○年代,當電視 剛開始在美國流行時, 它被稱為「浩瀚的荒地」, 電視被認為會腐蝕大家的心靈。 結果大家的心靈都很好。 後來就有一些調整, 但,這樣來看它—— 或說,我是這樣看它的—— 所有的新技術都有優點和缺點。 在社交媒體上, 我們還正在參透這一點。
CA: How much of a priority is it for the board of Facebook to really address some of the issues? Or is the belief that, actually, the company has been completely unfairly criticized?
克:對臉書的董事會, 在優先順序的考量上, 有多迫切要真正去處理這些議題? 還是說,其實想法是 公司一直受到完全不公平的批評?
RH: Oh, it's not completely unfairly. And Mark's leading the charge on fixing Facebook. And he's very passionate about that.
里:喔,並非完全不公平的。 馬克在打前鋒,要來調整臉書。 他對此非常有熱忱。
CA: Reed, I want to look at another passion of yours. I mean, you've done incredibly well with Netflix, you're a billionaire, and you spend a lot of time and indeed, money, on education.
克:里德,我想再談 你的另一項熱忱。 你把網飛做得非常好, 你是億萬富翁了, 但你反而花很多時間 和金錢在教育上。
RH: Yep.
里:是的。
CA: Why is this a passion, and what are you doing about it?
克:為什麼是這項熱忱? 你針對它做了些什麼?
RH: Sure. Right out of college, I was a high school math teacher. So when I later went into business and became a philanthropist, I think I gravitated towards education and trying to make a difference there. And the main thing I noticed is, you know, educators want to work with other great educators and to create many unique environments for kids. And we need a lot more variety in the system than we have, and a lot more educator-centric organizations. And so the tricky thing is, right now in the US, most schools are run by a local school board. And it has to meet all needs in the community, and, in fact, what we need is a lot more variety. So in the US there's a form of public school called charter public schools, that are run by nonprofits. And that's the big emphasis for me, is if you can have schools run by nonprofits, they are more mission-focused, they support the educators well. I'm on the board of KIPP charter schools, which is one of the larger networks. And, you know, it's 30,000 kids a year getting very stimulating education.
里:好的。剛離開大學時, 我是高中的數學老師。 所以,後來,當我開始 從商並成為慈善家, 我想我受到了教育的牽引, 試圖在教育上造成不同。 我主要注意到一件事, 教育家想要和其他 很棒的教育家合作, 為孩子創造許多獨特的環境。 在這個體制中, 我們需要更高的多樣性, 目前還不夠, 還要有更多以教育家 為中心的組織。 所以,難搞的地方在於, 現在在美國, 大部分的學校是由當地的 學校董事會來經營。 它得要滿足社區的所有需求, 事實上,我們需要的 是更高的多樣性。 所以,在美國, 有一種公立學校的形式 叫做特許公立學校, 由非營利機構來營運。 對我來說,那是很重要的, 如果學校是由非營利機構來營運, 它們可以更聚焦在使命上, 它們也能支持教育家。 我是 KIPP 學校的董事會成員, KIPP 就是更大的網路之一。 每年有三萬名孩子能得到 非常有激發性的教育。
CA: Paint me a picture of what a school should look like. RH: It depends on the kid. Think about it as: with multiple kids, there's all different needs that need to be met, so there's not any one model. And you want to be able to choose, depending on your kid and what you think they need. But they should be very educator-centric and curious and stimulating and all of those things. And this whole idea of 30 kids in fifth grade, all learning the same thing at the same time, you know, is clearly an industrial throwback. But changing that, given the current government structure, is super hard. But what these innovative, nonprofit schools are doing is pushing the bounds, letting kids try new things. And so think of it as the governance reform, that is, the nonprofit, to allow the educational changes.
克:形容一下,學校 應該要是什麼樣子的? 里:會因孩子而異。 可以這樣想:多個孩子 會有不同的需求 需要被滿足, 所以並不會有一個模型。 且你會希望能選擇, 根據你的孩子,及你認為 孩子需要什麼來選擇。 但應該是要非常以教育家為中心, 有好奇心,有激發性, 諸如此類的。 而讓五年級的三十個孩子 在同一時間學習同樣的東西的想法 很明顯是產業開倒車。 但在目前的政府結構下, 要改變那狀況 是非常困難的。 但這些創新、非營利的學校 在做的,就是將邊界向外推, 讓孩子嘗試新事物。 所以,把它想成是管理上的改革, 也就是非營利, 允許教育產生改變。
CA: And sometimes the criticism is put that charter schools, intentionally or unintentionally, suck resources away from the public school system. Should we be concerned about that?
克:有時會聽到 一些批評說特許學校, 不論是否是國際學校, 會吸走公立學校體制的資源。 我們是否要擔心這一點?
RH: Well, they are public schools. I mean, there's these multiple types of public schools. And if you look at charters as a whole, they serve low-income kids. Because if high-income kids get in trouble, the parents will send them to a private school or they move neighborhoods. And low-income families generally don't have those choices. Like KIPP -- it's 80 percent low-income kids, free and reduced lunch. And the college admissions for KIPP is fantastic.
里:嗯,它們是公立學校。 我的意思是, 有各式各樣的公立學校。 如果你把特許學校當整體來看, 它們服務的是低收入的孩子。 因為如果高收入的孩子惹上麻煩, 他們的家長會把他們 送到私立學校去, 或搬去其他街坊。 而一般來說,低收入家庭 並沒有這些選擇。 就像 KIPP —— 有 80% 的低收入 孩子,午餐是免費或有折扣的。 而 KIPP 上大學的狀況非常好。
CA: Reed, you signed the Giving Pledge a few years ago, you're committed to giving away more than half of your fortune during your lifetime. Can I cheekily ask how much you've invested in education in the last few years?
克:里德,幾年前你簽了 「財富捐贈誓言」, 你承諾要在一生中把超過一半的 財富捐出。 我能不能很厚臉皮地問 過去幾年間你在教育上 投資了多少錢?
RH: It's a couple hundred million, I don't know exactly how many hundreds, but we're continuing to invest and --
里:幾億美金, 我不知道明確的數字, 但我們還在持續投資,且——
(Applause)
(掌聲)
thank you all --
謝謝大家——
(Applause)
(掌聲)
You know, honestly, for a little while I tried to do politics full-time, working for John Doerr. And while I loved working for John, I just didn't thrive on politics. I love business, I love competing. I love going up against Disney and HBO.
老實說,曾有段時間, 我試著要全職做政治, 為約翰杜爾工作。 雖然我很喜歡為約翰工作, 但我在政治上真的難有所成。 我喜歡商業,我喜歡競爭。 我喜歡對抗迪士尼和 HBO。
(Laughter)
(笑聲)
That's what gets me going. And now I do that to really increase Netflix's value, which allows me to write more checks to schools. And so for now, it's the perfect life.
那是我前進的動力。 現在,我這麼做的理由 是要增加網飛的價值, 我才能夠捐更多錢給學校。 所以,目前,這樣的生活很完美。
CA: Reed, you're a remarkable person, you've changed all of our lives and the lives of many kids.
克:里德,你是個很不凡的人, 你改變了我們大家的生活, 以及許多孩子的生活。
Thank you so much for coming to TED.
非常謝謝你來 TED。
(Applause)
(掌聲)