Chris Anderson: I have been long so fascinated and amazed by so many aspects of Netflix. You're full of surprises, if I may say so. One of those surprises happened, I think about six years ago. So, the company back then was doing really well, but you were basically a streaming service for other people's films and TV content. You'd persuaded Wall Street that you were right to make the kind of radical shift away from just sending people DVDs, so you were doing it by streaming. And you were growing like a weed -- you had more than six million subscribers and healthy growth rates, and yet, you chose that moment to kind of make a giant -- really, a bet-the-company decision. What was that decision, and what motivated it?
克里斯 · 安德森(CA): 一直以来,奈飞在许多方面 都令我十分着迷和惊叹。 我可以这么说,你们总是让我们充满惊喜, 其中一个我认为发生在大概六年前。 公司那时运营得非常好, 但你们基本上也只是提供流媒体服务, 内容是其他公司制作的电影和电视内容。 你们说服了华尔街投资者,认为应该 把给用户寄送DVD的模式进行彻底转变, 改成通过流媒体的方式提供服务。 于是你们像野草一样成长—— 现在拥有超过600万订阅用户 和健康的增长率, 然而,你选择那个时刻, 做出那个巨大的、等于赌上了公司的决定。 那个决定是什么?它的动力是什么?
Reed Hastings: Well, cable networks from all time have started on other people's content and then grown into doing their own originals. So we knew of the general idea for quite a while. And we had actually tried to get into original content back in 2005, when we were on DVD only and buying films at Sundance -- Maggie Gyllenhaal, "Sherrybaby," we published on DVD -- we were a mini studio. And it didn't work out, because we were subscale. And then, as you said, in 2011, Ted Sarandos, my partner at Netflix who runs content, got very excited about "House of Cards." And at that time, it was 100 million dollars, it was a fantastic investment, and it was in competition with HBO. And that was really the breakthrough, that he picked right upfront.
里德 · 哈斯廷斯(RH): 所有有线电视网络公司都是 先用其他公司的内容起家, 然后成长到自己进行原创自制。 所以我们很早就知道这个惯常做法了。 我们真正开始尝试原创内容是在2005年, 当时我们还只有DVD模式, 还在圣丹斯电影节上购买电影—— 马吉 · 盖伦哈尔的《雪莉宝贝》, 我们发行了DVD—— 我们当时是个迷你工作室。 但那个模式没成功,因为我们规模太小。 然后,如你所说,在2011年, 泰德 · 萨兰多斯,我在奈飞负责内容的伙伴, 对“纸牌屋”非常兴奋。 那时,投资是1亿美元, 那是一项了不起的投资, 当时在与HBO竞争。 那是个真正的突破,他一开始就选对了。
CA: But that was a significant percentage of the revenue of the company at that time. But how could you get confident that that was actually worth doing? If you got that wrong, it might have been really devastating for the company.
CA:但那笔钱占到了公司当时 营收的很大一部分。 但你如何确信这值得去做? 如果你错了, 就可能是对公司毁灭性的打击。
RH: Yeah, we weren't confident. I mean, that's the whole tension of it. We were like, "Holy ...!" -- I can't say that. Yeah, it was scary.
RH:是的,我们也不是那么有信心。 我意思是我们全都提心吊胆的。 我们就想说:“我…”——我不能说脏话。 是的,挺吓人的。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
CA: And with that, it wasn't just producing new content. You also, pretty much with that, if I understand right, introduced this idea of binge-viewing. It wasn't, "We're going to do these episodes and build excitement" -- boom! -- all at one time. And that consumer mode hadn't really been tested. Why did you risk that?
CA:那么当时,不仅是制作新的内容。 你们还差不多是,如果我没理解错, 引入了刷剧这个概念。 它不是在“一集一集地累积兴奋点”,而是 嘣!——一气呵成。 那个消费模式还没有真正被验证过。 你们为什么会冒那个风险?
RH: Well, you know, we had grown up shipping DVDs. And then there were series, box sets, on DVD. And all of us had that experience watching some of the great HBO content you know, with the DVD -- next episode, next episode. And so that was the trigger to make us think, wow, you know, with episodic content, especially serialized, it's so powerful to have all the episodes at once. And it's something that linear TV can't do. And so both of those made it really positive.
RH:你知道,我们最初是靠邮寄DVD起家的。 那时候有DVD系列,套装。 我们所有人都有观看 某些HBO好剧的那种体验, 有DVD就可以一集接一集地看。 这就是我们思考的引线, 哇,对于剧集内容,尤其是连续剧, 一次拥有所有集数真是非常爽。 这是线性电视节目做不到的。 所以这两点都让我们看好它。
CA: And so, did it work out on the math pretty much straight away, that an hour spent watching "House of Cards," say, was more profitable to you than an hour spent watching someone else's licensed content?
CA:那么,是不是可以直接计算出来, 用户观看《纸牌屋》1小时, 相比观看其他公司版权内容1小时, 你们是不是收益更多?
RH: You know, because we're subscription, we don't have to track it at that level. And so it's really about making the brand stronger, so that more people want to join. And "House of Cards" absolutely did that, because then many people would talk about it and associate that brand with us, whereas "Mad Men" we carried -- great show, AMC show -- but they didn't associate it with Netflix, even if they watched it on Netflix.
RH:实际上,由于我们是订阅模式, 我们不需要这样去监测数据。 所以重点是为了让品牌更强大, 这样才会有更多的人想加入进来。 而《纸牌屋》的确做到了这点, 因为那时很多人谈论它, 并将那个品牌与我们联系起来, 而我们播的《广告狂人》, 大剧,AMC剧—— 大家不会觉得与奈飞有联系, 即便人们是在奈飞上观看的。
CA: And so you added all these other remarkable series, "Narcos," "Jessica Jones," "Orange is the New Black," "The Crown," "Black Mirror" -- personal favorite -- "Stranger Things" and so on. And so, this coming year, the level of investment you're planning to make in new content is not 100 million. It's what?
CA:所以你增加了 所有这些很棒的电视剧, 《毒枭》,《杰西卡 · 琼斯》, 《女子监狱》,《王冠》, 《黑镜》——我个人最爱—— 《怪奇物语》等等。 那么,在新的一年, 你们在新内容方面的投入水平 不再是1亿美元了。 那是多少呢?
RH: It's about eight billion dollars around the world. And it's not enough. There are so many great shows on other networks. And so we have a long way to go.
RH:全球大约80亿美元。 那还不够。 其他网络电视公司有太多好剧了。 所以我们还有很长的路要走。
CA: But eight billion -- that's pretty much higher than any other content commissioner at this point?
CA:但是80亿美元—— 目前是不是已经比其他 任何内容公司都要高很多了?
RH: No, Disney is in that realm, and if they're able to acquire Fox, they're even bigger. And then, really, that's spread globally, so it's not as much as it sounds.
RH:不,迪斯尼也在这个范围, 如果他们成功收购了 福克斯,他们会更多一些。 更何况还要在全球摊开, 所以并没有听起来那么多。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
CA: But clearly, from the Barry Dillers and others in the media business, it feels like from nowhere, this company has come and has really revolutionized the business. It's like, as if Blockbuster one day said, "We're going to make Blockbuster videos," and then, six years later, was as big as Disney. I mean, that story would never have happened, and yet it did.
CA:但是很明显, 从巴里 · 迪勒斯和其他媒体公司, 这有点像一夜之间, 这家公司就起来了, 并彻底改变了这个行业。 这有点,好像百视达突然说: “我们打算制作百视达影视”, 而6年之后,它的规模 就像迪斯尼一样大了。 我意思是,那种事原本 不可能发生,但的确发生了。
RH: That's the bitch about the internet -- it moves fast, you know? Everything around us moves really quick.
RH:这就是互联网的坏处, 它变化太快,对吧? 我们周遭这一切都变化很快。
CA: I mean, there must be something unusual about Netflix's culture that allowed you to take such bold -- I won't say "reckless" -- bold, well thought-through decisions.
CA:我想奈飞文化中一定有独特的东西, 让你们做出如此大胆,我不会说鲁莽, 大胆的、深思熟虑的决定。
RH: Yeah, absolutely. We did have one advantage, which is we were born on DVD, and we knew that that was going to be temporary. No one thought we'd be mailing discs for 100 years. So then you have a lot of paranoia about what's coming next, and that's part of the founding ethos, is really worrying about what's coming next. So that's an advantage. And then in terms of the culture, it's very big on freedom and responsibility. I pride myself on making as few decisions as possible in a quarter. And we're getting better and better at that. There are some times I can go a whole quarter without making any decisions.
RH:是的,当然。 我们的确有一个优点是, 我们虽然以DVD起家, 但我们知道那一切都是暂时的。 没有谁认为我们准备 一直就这么邮寄光碟。 所以你会执着地思考接下来该做什么, 这是创业精神的一部分, 是真的担心接下来会发生什么。 所以那就是优点。 就文化而言, 我们非常看重自由和责任。 我为自己在一个季度内 尽可能少做决定而感到自豪。 我们在这点上做得越来越好。 有些时候甚至整个季度, 我没做过任何决策。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
(Applause)
(鼓掌)
CA: But there are some really surprising things about your people. For example, I looked at one survey. It looks like Netflix employees, compared to your peers', are basically the highest paid for equivalent jobs. And the least likely to want to leave. And if you Google the Netflix culture deck, you see this list of quite surprising admonitions to your employees. Talk about a few of them.
CA:但你们的员工确实 体现了一些让人惊讶的事实。 比如,我看过一份调查。 好像奈飞的雇员,相比你们的同行, 基本上收入是同等工作中最高的。 离职的意愿也是最低的。 如果在谷歌上搜索奈飞文化版块, 就能看到一条条针对你们员工的告诫。 来谈谈其中几个吧。
RH: Well, you know, my first company -- we were very process obsessed. This was in the 1990s. And every time someone made a mistake, we tried to put a process in place to make sure that mistake didn't happen again -- so, very semiconductor-yield orientation. And the problem is, we were trying to dummy-proof the system. And then, eventually, only dummies wanted to work there. Then, of course, the market shifted -- in that case, it was C++ to Java. But you know, there's always some shift. And the company was unable to adapt, and it got acquired by our largest competitor. And so with Netflix, I was super focused on how to run with no process but not have chaos. And so then we've developed all these mechanisms, super high-talented people, alignment, talking openly, sharing information -- internally, people are stunned at how much information -- all the core strategies, etc. We're like the "anti-Apple" -- you know how they compartmentalize? We do the opposite, which is: everybody gets all the information. So what we're trying to do is build a sense of responsibility in people and the ability to do things. I find out about big decisions now that are made all the time, I've never even heard about it, which is great. And mostly, they go well.
RH:在我第一家公司,我们对流程非常着迷。 那是在1990年代。 每次有人犯错误, 我们都会建立一个流程 去确保这个错误不会再次发生—— 很像半导体公司提高良率的导向。 问题在于,我们努力让系统做到防呆。 然而最终只有傻瓜才愿意在那里工作。 然后,当然,市场发生了变化, 那时是C++向Java转变。 但你知道的,总是会有一些变化。 而那个公司不能够适应, 于是它被我们最大的竞争对手收购了。 于是在奈飞,我非常专注于 如何在没有流程的情况下运行, 但不能乱。 所以后来我们开发出这些机制, 特别有才能的人,齐头并进, 开放交流,信息共享—— 在公司内部,大家对 能看到这么多信息很震惊—— 所有的核心战略,等等。 我们像是“反苹果”—— 你知道他们是如何相互隔离的? 我们正相反,我们的策略是: 每个人都可以获得所有信息。 我们努力做的是构建员工的责任感 和完成事情的能力。 我发现常常有些重大的决定, 是我从来没有听说过的,这是好事。 大多数决策都进展良好。
CA: So you just wake up and read them on the internet.
CA:于是你早晨起床上网 才看到这些决策。
RH: Sometimes.
RH:有时候是这样。
CA: "Oh, we just entered China!"
CA:“哦,我们刚进入了中国市场!”
RH: Yeah, well that would be a big one.
RH:是的,噢,那可是件大事。
CA: But you allow employees to set their own vacation time, and ... There's just --
CA:你还允许员工自己 安排休假时间,还有… 这只是——
RH: Sure, that's a big symbolic one, vacation, because most people, in practice, do that, anyway. But yeah, there's a whole lot of that freedom.
RH:当然,假期安排是非常有代表性的, 因为大部分人其实反正也要休假。 但是的确,有很多这样的自由。
CA: And courage, you ask for as a fundamental value.
CA:另外,你还倡导把勇气作为基本价值。
RH: Yeah, we want people to speak the truth. And we say, "To disagree silently is disloyal." It's not OK to let some decision go through without saying your piece, and typically, writing it down. And so we're very focused on trying to get to good decisions through the debate that always happens. And we try not to make it intense, like yelling at each other -- nothing like that. You know, it's really curiosity drawing people out.
RH:是的,我们想让人们说出真相。 我们说:“沉默地反对代表不忠诚”。 在做出决定之前,必须说出你的意见, 通常还要把它写下来。 所以我们看重的是,通过不断辩论 来做出好的决定。 我们尽量不让辩论过激,变成互相吼叫, 不能那样。 你知道,是真正的好奇心 让人们主动开始表达。
CA: You've got this other secret weapon at Netflix, it seems, which is this vast trove of data, a word we've heard a certain amount about this week. You've often taken really surprising stances towards building smart algorithms at Netflix. Back in the day, you opened up your algorithm to the world and said, "Hey, can anyone do better than this recommendation we've got? If so, we'll pay you a million dollars." You paid someone a million dollars, because it was like 10 percent better than yours.
CA:看起来在奈飞你还有其他秘密武器, 这就是大量的数据, 这个词这周我们已经听了好多次。 在奈飞,你们同样会采用非常惊人的立场 去构建智能算法。 回到那天,你们向全球开放你们的算法, 还说“嘿,谁能把推荐 做得比我们这个更好? 如果有,我们会支付100万美元”。 你们给了某人100万美元, 因为他的算法比你们的好10%。
RH: That's right.
RH:没错。
CA: Was that a good decision? Would you do that again?
CA:那是个好决定吗? 你还会不会再做一次?
RH: Yeah, it was super exciting at the time; this was about 2007. But you know, we haven't done it again. So clearly, it's a very specialized tool. And so think of that as a lucky break of good timing, rather than a general framework. So what we've done is invest a lot on the algorithms, so that we feature the right content to the right people and try to make it fun and easy to explore.
RH:没错,当时真是觉得 极其兴奋,那是2007年。 不过你也知道,从那以后 我们还没再那样做过。 所以显然,它是一个很特殊的形式。 应该把那看作是一个幸运的时机, 而不是常规做法。 所以我们所做的是在算法上投入更多, 将对的内容提供给对的人, 并努力让它有趣和易于探索。
CA: And you made this, what seems like a really interesting shift, a few years ago. You used to ask people, "Here are 10 movies. What do you think? Which ones of these are your best movies?" And then tried to match those movies with recommendations for what was coming. And then you changed away from that. Talk about that.
CA:你们成功了,这在 几年前看起来的确是一个 有趣的转变。 你们以前会问大家, “这10部电影,你觉得怎么样? 其中哪一部电影是你最喜欢的?” 然后尝试把这些电影与 即将推出的电影匹配。 后来你就改变了那个模式。 来聊聊这个吧。
RH: Sure. Everyone would rate "Schindler's List" five stars, and then they'd rate Adam Sandler, "The Do-Over" three stars. But, in fact, when you looked at what they watched, it was almost always Adam Sandler. And so what happens is, when we rate and we're metacognitive about quality, that's sort of our aspirational self. And it works out much better to please people to look at the actual choices that they make, their revealed preferences by how much they enjoy simple pleasures.
RH:当然。 每个人都会给《辛德勒的名单》5分, 然后给亚当 · 桑德勒的 《假死新人生》打3分。 但实际上,当你研究他们的播放记录时, 几乎总是亚当 · 桑德勒。 事实上,我们评分时, 对评分质量有后设认知, 有点像是理想中的自我。 然而要分析用户的实际选择, 才能够更好地取悦他们。 他们对简单快乐的享受程度, 显示出了他们真正的偏好。
CA: OK, I want to talk for a couple of minutes about this, because this strikes me as a huge deal, not just for Netflix, for the internet as a whole. The difference between aspirational values and revealed values. You, brilliantly, didn't pay too much attention to what people said, you watched what they did, and then found the stuff that, "Oh my God, I never knew I would like a show about making horrible recipes, called 'Nailed It!'"
CA:好的,我想再谈一会儿这个话题, 因为这对我来说是件大事,不仅对奈飞, 对整个互联网而言都是如此。 目标价值与实际显示的价值 之间的差别。 你们很明智地没有太在意人们说什么, 而是去看他们怎么做,然后找到那种, “哦老天,我真不知道我会喜欢 一个制作可怕食谱的节目, 它叫《妙厨大考验》!”
RH: Called "Nailed It!" Right.
RH:叫《妙厨大考验》,对。
CA: It's hilarious. I would never have even thought of that. But aren't there risks with this, if this go-only-with-revealed-values approach is taken too far?
CA:它特别搞笑,我从来 没想过要看这种节目。 但会不会有风险, 如果这种只使用显示价值的 方法被过分地利用?
RH: Well, we get a lot of joy from making people happy, Sometimes you just want to relax and watch a show like "Nailed It!" And it's fun, and it's not stressful. Other times, people want to watch very intensive film. "Mudbound" was Oscar-nominated, it's a great, very intensive film. And you know, we've had over 20 million hours of viewing on "Mudbound," which is dramatically bigger than it would have been in the theaters or any other distribution. And so, we have some candy, too, but we have lots of broccoli. And you know, if you have the good mix, you get to a healthy diet.
RH:我们在取悦大众方面 获得了很多乐趣, 有时候你只想放松一下,看看 像《妙厨大考验》那样的节目。 它有趣,不会让你紧张。 也有时候,大家就想看非常紧张的电影。 《泥土之界》是奥斯卡提名电影, 它很精彩,扣人心弦。 《泥土之界》的观看时长 已超过2千万小时, 这个数字比它在电影院或其他发行渠道 要多得多。 所以,我们有糖果(让人放松大笑的节目), 但也有很多西兰花(积极健康的内容)。 如果你搭配得好,就会保持身心健康。
CA: But -- yes, indeed. But isn't it the case that algorithms tend to point you away from the broccoli and towards the candy, if you're not careful? We just had a talk about how, on YouTube, somehow algorithms tend to, just by actually being smarter, tend to drive people towards more radical or specific content. It'd be easy to imagine that Netflix algorithms, just going on revealed values, would gradually --
CA:但——是的,确实如此。 但是难道算法不是想在你不留神的 时候把你从花椰菜引开, 带到糖果 那边去吗? 我们刚谈过,在YouTube,算法多少有些 趋向于,只是通过更聪明的方式, 趋向于将人们推向更激进 或更特定的内容。 也很容易去想象奈飞的算法, 只是基于显示价值,可能会逐渐——
RH: Right, get too base --
RH:对,变得低俗——
CA: We'd all be watching violent pornography or something. Or some people would, you know. But, how --
CA:我们都会看些黄暴片子之类的。 至少有些人会看, 但是,如何——
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Not me! I'm the child of a missionary, I don't even think about these things. But --
不是我! 我是传教士的儿子,我甚至 都没想过这些事情。 但——
(Laughter)
(笑声)
But I mean, it's possible, right?
但我意思是,这是可能的,对吗?
RH: In practice, you're right that you can't just rely on algorithms. It's a mix of judgment and what we carry, and we're a curated service versus a platform like Facebook and YouTube, so we have an easier set of issues, which is: What are these great films and series that we acquire? But then within that, the algorithm is a tool.
RH:实际操作中,你是对的, 你不能只是依赖算法。 它结合了判断,和我们所坚持的东西, 而且我们是一个精心策划的服务, 与Facebook和YouTube 那样的平台不同, 所以我们的问题更简单些, 这就是:我们获得的这些 伟大电影和剧集是什么? 在这个范围里,算法就是个工具。
CA: But how -- John Doerr just talked about measuring what matters. As a business, what matters, I presume, is fundamentally just growing subscribers. I mean, that's your unique advantage. Are subscribers grown only by the more time they spend watching Netflix, that is what will make them re-subscribe? Or is it even more about having shows that might not have been so much time as watching the whole season of "Nailed It!" or whatever? But just get into them more; they just think, "That was nourishing, that was extraordinary, I'm so glad I watched that with my family." Isn't there a version of the business model that would be less content but more awesome content, possibly even more uplifting content?
CA:但是——约翰 · 杜尔刚刚 谈到了衡量什么是重要的。 我猜,对企业来说重要的是, 从根本上说就是不断 增加付费订阅用户, 我觉得那就是你的独特优势。 奈飞订阅用户的增长是 全靠用户花更多时间观看吗, 那应该是让他们继续订阅的原因吧? 或者更看重的是,有一些节目, 可能不会像观看 《妙厨大考验》或其他节目 那样需要大量观看时间, 但却更深入人心;让观众想, “这个节目很有好处,很棒, 我很高兴和家人一起看了。” 有没有这个版本的商业模式, 内容相对较少,但拥有更精彩的内容, 可能有更多让人振奋的内容?
RH: And people choose that uplifting content. I think you're right, which is, when people talk about Netflix, they talk about the shows that move them: "13 Reasons Why" or "The Crown." And that is way disproportionate and positive impact, even for the subscriber growth that you talked about is those couple big, memorable shows. But what we want to do is offer a variety. You don't want to watch the same thing every night, as much as you like it; you want to try different things. And what we haven't seen is this, say, race to the bottom of your violent pornography kind of examples. Instead, we've seen great viewing across a whole range -- "Black Mirror" -- we're filming season five now. And that was a struggling show when it was only in the BBC. And with the distribution of on-demand, you can make these much bigger shows.
RH:人们会选择那些令人振奋的内容。 我想你是对的,那就是当人们谈起奈飞, 他们会谈到触动他们的剧: 《13个原因》或者《王冠》。 这是一种不成比例且积极的影响, 即便你谈到的那些用户增长 是那几个大型的、令人难忘的节目。 但我们想要做的是提供多样的内容。 你不想每晚都看到同样的东西, 不管你有多喜欢; 你总想要尝试不同的东西。 我们还没看到的是,比如说, 抢先给你提供低级黄暴内容类型。 反之,我们看到整个内容类型 都有很不错的观看量, 《黑镜》,我们现在正在拍第五季。 它只在BBC播出时,收视率堪忧。 通过按需点播发行, 你可以做这些更大的节目。
CA: You're telling me humans can get addicted by their angels as well as their demons.
CA:你的意思是,人们的善良和邪恶 都能让他们上瘾。
RH: Yeah, and again, we try not to think about it in addiction terms, we think about it as, you know: What are you going to do with your time and when you want to relax? You can watch linear TV, you can do video games, you can do YouTube, or you can watch Netflix. And if we're as great as we can be, and we have a variety of moods, then more often, people will choose us.
RH:是的,但我们尽量不用 上瘾这个词来看待这件事, 我们认为这是, 你想要放松的时候会怎样 利用你的时间呢? 你可以看线性电视、可以玩 视频游戏、可以看YouTube, 或者你可以观看奈飞。 如果我们做得足够好,提供各种 让人们在情绪上产生共鸣的节目, 那么大家就会更多的选择我们。
CA: But you have people in the organization who are looking regularly at the actual impacts of these brilliant algorithms that you've created. Just for reality check, just, "Are we sure that this is the direction we want to go?"
CA:但你的公司里会有一些人, 定期观察你们创造的这些杰出算法 带来的实际影响。 只是为了实事求是,初衷只是 “我们确定这是我们想要的方向吗?”
RH: You know, I think we learn. And you have to be humble and sort of say, "Look, there's no perfect tool." The algorithm’s one part, the way we commission the content, our relationships with societies. So there's a lot of ways that we have to look at it. So if you get too stuck in "Let's just increase viewing" or "Just increase subscribers," you're unlikely to be able to grow and be the great company you want to be. So think of it as this multiple measures of success.
RH:我想我们会从中学到东西。 我们必须谦虚,要这样想: 并没有完美的工具。 算法是一部分,还有 我们委托内容的方式, 以及我们与社会的关系。 所以我们需要通过很多方式 去看待这个问题。 所以如果你太沉迷于只是“提高观看时长” 或只是“增加付费用户”, 你就不大可能成长为 所期待的那种伟大的公司。 所以要把它看作是 成功的多重衡量标准。
CA: So, speaking of algorithms that have raised questions: You were on the board of Facebook, and I think Mark Zuckerberg -- you've done some mentoring for him. What should we know about Mark Zuckerberg that people don't know?
CA:那么,提到算法引起的问题: 你曾是Facebook的董事会成员, 我觉得马克 · 扎克伯格—— 你为他做过一些指导。 关于马克 · 扎克伯格,我们需要 知道哪些人们所不知道的吗?
RH: Well, many of you know him or have seen him. I mean, he's a fantastic human being. Really first-class. And social -- these platforms, whether that's YouTube or Facebook, are clearly trying to grow up quickly. And we see that with all new technologies. I mean, yesterday we were talking about printed DNA, and it's like: could be fantastic or could be horrific. And you know, all new technologies -- when television was first popular in the 1960s in the US, it was called a "vast wasteland," and that television was going to rot the minds of everybody. It turns out everybody's minds were fine. And there were some adjustments, but think of it as -- or, I think of it as -- all new technologies have pros and cons. And in social, we're just figuring that out.
RH:当然,你们很多人 都知道他或见过他。 他是一个了不起的人。 真正一流的人才。 而社交平台——这些平台, 不管是Youtube还是Facebook, 显然都想要快速成长。 我们看到的所有新技术都是这样。 比如昨天我们在讨论打印DNA, 感觉像是:这有可能特别奇妙, 也有可能特别可怕。 你也知道,所有的新技术—— 当电视1960年代在美国刚开始流行时, 它被称为“大废墟”, 被认为会侵蚀每个人的大脑。 结果每个人的头脑都好好的。 当然也有一些调整, 但可以这么想——或者我会这么想—— 所有的新技术都是双刃剑。 在社交媒体方面,我们还在探索。
CA: How much of a priority is it for the board of Facebook to really address some of the issues? Or is the belief that, actually, the company has been completely unfairly criticized?
CA:对于Facebook的董事会来说, 去真正解决一些这类的问题 有多么重要? 或者他们是不是认为,事实上 公司受到了完全不公正的批评?
RH: Oh, it's not completely unfairly. And Mark's leading the charge on fixing Facebook. And he's very passionate about that.
RH:哦,并不是完全不公平。 马克在主导修复Facebook。 他对此很积极主动。
CA: Reed, I want to look at another passion of yours. I mean, you've done incredibly well with Netflix, you're a billionaire, and you spend a lot of time and indeed, money, on education.
CA:里德,我想谈谈你的另一种激情。 你在奈飞做得非常棒, 已经成了亿万富翁, 你花了很多时间和真金白银在教育上。
RH: Yep.
RH:是的。
CA: Why is this a passion, and what are you doing about it?
CA:为什么会有这种热情, 你具体是怎么做的?
RH: Sure. Right out of college, I was a high school math teacher. So when I later went into business and became a philanthropist, I think I gravitated towards education and trying to make a difference there. And the main thing I noticed is, you know, educators want to work with other great educators and to create many unique environments for kids. And we need a lot more variety in the system than we have, and a lot more educator-centric organizations. And so the tricky thing is, right now in the US, most schools are run by a local school board. And it has to meet all needs in the community, and, in fact, what we need is a lot more variety. So in the US there's a form of public school called charter public schools, that are run by nonprofits. And that's the big emphasis for me, is if you can have schools run by nonprofits, they are more mission-focused, they support the educators well. I'm on the board of KIPP charter schools, which is one of the larger networks. And, you know, it's 30,000 kids a year getting very stimulating education.
RH:好的,刚从大学毕业时, 我是一名高中数学教师。 我后来进入企业,并成为了一名慈善家, 我觉得教育事业很吸引我, 我想在这方面有所作为。 我关注到的主要事情是, 教育工作者想要和其他 伟大的教育工作者合作, 去为孩子创造许多独特的环境。 我们需要教育系统相比现在 更多样, 有更多以教育为中心的组织。 不过棘手的是,在现在的美国, 大多数学校是由当地的 学校董事会管理的。 它得满足社区所有的需求。 事实上,我们需要的是更多样化。 所以在美国,有一种公立学校叫做 特许公立学校,是非盈利组织运营的。 那是我的关注重点, 如果你能让非营利组织管理学校, 他们会更专注于使命,他们 对教育工作者的支持也更有效。 我是KIPP特许学校的董事会成员, 这是其中一个较大的网络。 每年有3万个孩子在接受 非常有启迪的教育。
CA: Paint me a picture of what a school should look like. RH: It depends on the kid. Think about it as: with multiple kids, there's all different needs that need to be met, so there's not any one model. And you want to be able to choose, depending on your kid and what you think they need. But they should be very educator-centric and curious and stimulating and all of those things. And this whole idea of 30 kids in fifth grade, all learning the same thing at the same time, you know, is clearly an industrial throwback. But changing that, given the current government structure, is super hard. But what these innovative, nonprofit schools are doing is pushing the bounds, letting kids try new things. And so think of it as the governance reform, that is, the nonprofit, to allow the educational changes.
CA:给我描述一下 学校应该是什么样的。 RH:这取决于孩子。 想想看:有多少个小孩, 就有多少种不同需求 需要被满足, 所以它并不遵从单一的模式。 你想要能够自己选择, 根据孩子的需求和 你认为孩子需要什么。 但应该是主要以教师为中心, 有好奇心和启发性, 等等。 然而30个五年级的孩子, 都在同一时间学习同样东西的整个想法, 很明显是行业的倒退。 但要改变它,在现在的政府结构下, 极其困难。 但这些创新的,非盈利的学校 正在做的是突破边界, 让孩子们尝试新东西。 所以把它看作是治理改革, 就是,非盈利组织治理, 让教育行业发生改革。
CA: And sometimes the criticism is put that charter schools, intentionally or unintentionally, suck resources away from the public school system. Should we be concerned about that?
CA:有些时候,批评人士指出特许学校会 有意或无意地, 从公立学校抢夺资源。 我们应该担心这点吗?
RH: Well, they are public schools. I mean, there's these multiple types of public schools. And if you look at charters as a whole, they serve low-income kids. Because if high-income kids get in trouble, the parents will send them to a private school or they move neighborhoods. And low-income families generally don't have those choices. Like KIPP -- it's 80 percent low-income kids, free and reduced lunch. And the college admissions for KIPP is fantastic.
RH:它们也是公立学校啊。 我是说,公立学校有很多类型。 假如你把特许学校看作一个整体, 它们服务于低收入儿童。 因为如果高收入家庭的儿童遇到困难, 他们的父母会把他们送到私立学校, 或者搬到别的学区。 低收入家庭一般没有这些选择。 像在KIPP——80%的学生是低收入儿童, 学校提供免费午餐和低价午餐。 而KIPP的大学录取情况是非常棒的。
CA: Reed, you signed the Giving Pledge a few years ago, you're committed to giving away more than half of your fortune during your lifetime. Can I cheekily ask how much you've invested in education in the last few years?
CA:里德,几年前你签署了捐赠宣言。 你承诺在一生中要捐出 至少一半的财富。 我能冒昧地问一下,你在过去几年 在教育上投了多少钱吗?
RH: It's a couple hundred million, I don't know exactly how many hundreds, but we're continuing to invest and --
RH:有几个亿吧, 我也不知道确切的数字, 但我们会继续投入——
(Applause)
(鼓掌)
谢谢你们——
thank you all --
(鼓掌)
(Applause)
You know, honestly, for a little while I tried to do politics full-time, working for John Doerr. And while I loved working for John, I just didn't thrive on politics. I love business, I love competing. I love going up against Disney and HBO.
老实说,有阵子我还 试过做全职的政治工作, 为约翰 · 杜尔工作。 虽然我喜欢为约翰工作,但在 政治上,我并没有如鱼得水的感觉。 我喜欢商业,我热爱竞争。 我热爱与迪斯尼和HBO抗衡。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
That's what gets me going. And now I do that to really increase Netflix's value, which allows me to write more checks to schools. And so for now, it's the perfect life.
这些都让我兴奋不已。 现在我这样做是为了增加奈飞的价值, 这也可以让我为学校开出更多的支票。 所以目前来说,我的生活挺完美的。
CA: Reed, you're a remarkable person, you've changed all of our lives and the lives of many kids.
CA:里德,你是一个了不起的人, 你改变了我们所有人, 以及很多孩子们的人生。
Thank you so much for coming to TED.
非常感谢你来到TED。
(Applause)
(鼓掌)