Chris Anderson: Estic fascinat i sorprès des de fa molt temps per molts aspectes de Netflix. Esteu plens de sorpreses, si em permet dir-ho. Una d’aquestes sorpreses va passar crec que fa sis anys. En aquells temps l’empresa anava bastant bé, però era un servei de reproducció en línia de pel·lícules de tercers i continguts de televisió. Havíeu convençut Wall Street que teníeu raó de canviar radicalment i deixar d'enviar DVD a la gent, i ho feieu a través d’Internet. Estàveu creixent com la mala herba, més de sis milions de subscriptors i taxes de creixement positives, i no obstant això, vàreu escollir aquell moment per fer una gran aposta per al futur de l’empresa. Quina va ser aquella decisió i què va motivar-la?
Chris Anderson: I have been long so fascinated and amazed by so many aspects of Netflix. You're full of surprises, if I may say so. One of those surprises happened, I think about six years ago. So, the company back then was doing really well, but you were basically a streaming service for other people's films and TV content. You'd persuaded Wall Street that you were right to make the kind of radical shift away from just sending people DVDs, so you were doing it by streaming. And you were growing like a weed -- you had more than six million subscribers and healthy growth rates, and yet, you chose that moment to kind of make a giant -- really, a bet-the-company decision. What was that decision, and what motivated it?
Reed Hastings: Bé, les cadenes per cable sempre han començat amb contingut de tercers i després han passat a fer produccions originals. Ja sabíem quina era la idea general des de feia temps. I vam intentar introduir contingut propi l’any 2005, quan treballàvem amb DVD i compràvem pel·lícules a Sundance. "Sherrybaby", de Maggie Gyllenhaal, es va publicar en DVD, érem una petita productora. I no va funcionar, perquè estàvem a una escala inferior. I després, com has dit, l’any 2011, Ted Sarandos, el meu company a Netflix que administra els continguts, es va entusiasmar amb “House of Cards”. I en aquells temps, eren 100 milions de dòlars, era una inversió fantàstica i competia amb HBO. I això va ser realment el gran avenç que va decidir assumir.
Reed Hastings: Well, cable networks from all time have started on other people's content and then grown into doing their own originals. So we knew of the general idea for quite a while. And we had actually tried to get into original content back in 2005, when we were on DVD only and buying films at Sundance -- Maggie Gyllenhaal, "Sherrybaby," we published on DVD -- we were a mini studio. And it didn't work out, because we were subscale. And then, as you said, in 2011, Ted Sarandos, my partner at Netflix who runs content, got very excited about "House of Cards." And at that time, it was 100 million dollars, it was a fantastic investment, and it was in competition with HBO. And that was really the breakthrough, that he picked right upfront.
CA: Però allò era un percentatge important dels ingressos de la companyia en aquella època. Com podíeu confiar en què valdria la pena? Si no hagués funcionat, hauria estat colpidor per a l’empresa.
CA: But that was a significant percentage of the revenue of the company at that time. But how could you get confident that that was actually worth doing? If you got that wrong, it might have been really devastating for the company.
RH: Bé, no estàvem segurs. Aquesta és la qüestió. Pensàvem “Santa...!” – no puc dir-ho això. Sí, teníem por.
RH: Yeah, we weren't confident. I mean, that's the whole tension of it. We were like, "Holy ...!" -- I can't say that. Yeah, it was scary.
(Riures)
(Laughter)
CA: I amb aquest canvi, no tan sols calia produir nous continguts. També, en relació amb això, i si ho he entès bé, vau introduir la idea de les maratons. No era qüestió de fer capítols per crear expectació. Sinó que, pam!, tot a la vegada. I aquest model de consum no s’havia provat abans. Per què vau arriscar-vos?
CA: And with that, it wasn't just producing new content. You also, pretty much with that, if I understand right, introduced this idea of binge-viewing. It wasn't, "We're going to do these episodes and build excitement" -- boom! -- all at one time. And that consumer mode hadn't really been tested. Why did you risk that?
RH: Bé, com ja saps, vam créixer enviant DVD. I hi havia sèries que estaven senceres en DVD. I tothom ha viscut l’experiència de veure grans produccions de HBO en DVD, un capítol rere l'altre. Això va ser el que ens va fer pensar que amb contingut per episodis, especialment sèries, seria genial tenir tots els capítols junts. I això la televisió no ho pot fer. Per tant, aquests dos aspectes units semblaven molt positius.
RH: Well, you know, we had grown up shipping DVDs. And then there were series, box sets, on DVD. And all of us had that experience watching some of the great HBO content you know, with the DVD -- next episode, next episode. And so that was the trigger to make us think, wow, you know, with episodic content, especially serialized, it's so powerful to have all the episodes at once. And it's something that linear TV can't do. And so both of those made it really positive.
CA: I amb això, fent càlculs, us vau adonar que si algú passava una hora mirant “House of Cards” us era molt més rentable que si mirava una hora de contingut de tercers?
CA: And so, did it work out on the math pretty much straight away, that an hour spent watching "House of Cards," say, was more profitable to you than an hour spent watching someone else's licensed content?
RH: Funcionem per subscripció, no cal un seguiment a aquest nivell. I realment, el que interessa és enfortir la marca, perquè més gent s’hi vulgui unir. “House of Cards” va fer exactament això, perquè molta gent va parlar sobre la sèrie i va associar-la amb la nostra marca. “Mad Men”, una gran producció d’AMC que vam retransmetre, no va ser associada a Netflix encara que era on la gent la mirava.
RH: You know, because we're subscription, we don't have to track it at that level. And so it's really about making the brand stronger, so that more people want to join. And "House of Cards" absolutely did that, because then many people would talk about it and associate that brand with us, whereas "Mad Men" we carried -- great show, AMC show -- but they didn't associate it with Netflix, even if they watched it on Netflix.
CA: I aquí van sumar-s’hi moltes altres sèries de gran èxit com "Narcos", "Jessica Jones", "Orange is the New Black", "The Crown", "Black Mirror", la meva preferida, "Stranger Things" i més. I aquest pròxim any, la inversió per crear nous continguts no seran 100 milions de dòlars. De quant serà?
CA: And so you added all these other remarkable series, "Narcos," "Jessica Jones," "Orange is the New Black," "The Crown," "Black Mirror" -- personal favorite -- "Stranger Things" and so on. And so, this coming year, the level of investment you're planning to make in new content is not 100 million. It's what?
RH: D’uns 8.000 milions de dòlars per tot el món. I no és suficient. Hi ha molts programes genials a altres canals. Encara tenim molt camí per recórrer.
RH: It's about eight billion dollars around the world. And it's not enough. There are so many great shows on other networks. And so we have a long way to go.
CA: Però 8.000 milions... no és molt més del que inverteix qualsevol altre competidor?
CA: But eight billion -- that's pretty much higher than any other content commissioner at this point?
RH: No, Disney està en aquest marge, i si poden adquirir Fox, encara seran més grans. I després, es reparteixen arreu del món, i no és tant com sembla.
RH: No, Disney is in that realm, and if they're able to acquire Fox, they're even bigger. And then, really, that's spread globally, so it's not as much as it sounds.
(Riures)
(Laughter)
CA: Però segons Barry Dillers i altres del negoci mediàtic, aquesta empresa ha aparegut del no-res i ha revolucionat el sistema. És com si un dia Blockbuster digués: “Farem vídeos amb la marca Blockbuster”, i després, sis anys més tard, fossin un gegant com Disney. Vull dir, aquesta història semblava que mai havia de passar i ha passat.
CA: But clearly, from the Barry Dillers and others in the media business, it feels like from nowhere, this company has come and has really revolutionized the business. It's like, as if Blockbuster one day said, "We're going to make Blockbuster videos," and then, six years later, was as big as Disney. I mean, that story would never have happened, and yet it did.
RH: Aquesta és la putada d’Internet, avança ràpidament, saps? Tot al nostre voltant es mou molt de pressa.
RH: That's the bitch about the internet -- it moves fast, you know? Everything around us moves really quick.
CA: Vull dir, hi ha d’haver quelcom inusual de la cultura de Netflix que us ha permès prendre decisions tan atrevides, no diré temeràries, decisions meditades.
CA: I mean, there must be something unusual about Netflix's culture that allowed you to take such bold -- I won't say "reckless" -- bold, well thought-through decisions.
RH: Sí, absolutament. Teníem un avantatge, que és que vàrem nàixer en DVD i sabíem que allò seria una cosa temporal. Ningú pensava que enviaríem discs durant 100 anys. Llavors t’entra la paranoia sobre el que vindrà després, i part de la filosofia fundacional, és preocupar-se de què vindrà a continuació. És un avantatge. I en termes de cultura, hi ha una gran llibertat i responsabilitat. M'enorgulleixo de prendre el mínim de decisions en un trimestre. I cada vegada som millors en aquest aspecte. De vegades, hi ha trimestres que no prenc cap decisió.
RH: Yeah, absolutely. We did have one advantage, which is we were born on DVD, and we knew that that was going to be temporary. No one thought we'd be mailing discs for 100 years. So then you have a lot of paranoia about what's coming next, and that's part of the founding ethos, is really worrying about what's coming next. So that's an advantage. And then in terms of the culture, it's very big on freedom and responsibility. I pride myself on making as few decisions as possible in a quarter. And we're getting better and better at that. There are some times I can go a whole quarter without making any decisions.
(Riures)
(Laughter)
(Aplaudiments)
(Applause)
CA: Però hi ha coses realment sorprenents sobre la teva gent. Per exemple, he llegit una enquesta en què els treballadors de Netflix, en comparació a la competència, són els més ben pagats en feines equivalents. I és menys probable que vulguin marxar. Si mireu a Google la presentació sobre la cultura de Netflix, veureu una llista d’advertències prou sorprenents als seus treballadors. Explica'm-ho una mica.
CA: But there are some really surprising things about your people. For example, I looked at one survey. It looks like Netflix employees, compared to your peers', are basically the highest paid for equivalent jobs. And the least likely to want to leave. And if you Google the Netflix culture deck, you see this list of quite surprising admonitions to your employees. Talk about a few of them.
RH: Bé, a la meva primera empresa estàvem molt obsessionats amb el procés. Això va ser a la dècada dels 90. I cada vegada que algú cometia un error, vam intentar establir un procés per assegurar-nos que aquell error no es repetís, per tant, una orientació semiconduïda. I el problema és que estàvem intentant fer-lo a prova de ximples. Al final, només els ximples hi volien treballar. Llavors, òbviament, el mercat va canviar, va passar de C++ a Java. Però sempre hi ha algun canvi. I la companyia no era capaç d’adaptar-se, va ser adquirida pel nostre competidor més gran. Amb Netflix, vaig insistir moltíssim en no treballar amb processos, sense arribar al caos. Per fer-ho, vam desenvolupar molts mecanismes: persones amb grans talents, posicionament, parlar obertament, compartir informació, la gent se sorprèn de la gran quantitat d’informació, totes les estratègies centrals, etc. Som com els “anti-Apple”, on compartimenten. Fem tot el contrari: tothom té accés a tota la informació. El que estem intentant fer és crear un sentit de responsabilitat i que puguin escollir què fer. Ara descobreixo grans decisions que es fan contínuament i que mai havia sentit, cosa que és genial. I generalment, van bé.
RH: Well, you know, my first company -- we were very process obsessed. This was in the 1990s. And every time someone made a mistake, we tried to put a process in place to make sure that mistake didn't happen again -- so, very semiconductor-yield orientation. And the problem is, we were trying to dummy-proof the system. And then, eventually, only dummies wanted to work there. Then, of course, the market shifted -- in that case, it was C++ to Java. But you know, there's always some shift. And the company was unable to adapt, and it got acquired by our largest competitor. And so with Netflix, I was super focused on how to run with no process but not have chaos. And so then we've developed all these mechanisms, super high-talented people, alignment, talking openly, sharing information -- internally, people are stunned at how much information -- all the core strategies, etc. We're like the "anti-Apple" -- you know how they compartmentalize? We do the opposite, which is: everybody gets all the information. So what we're trying to do is build a sense of responsibility in people and the ability to do things. I find out about big decisions now that are made all the time, I've never even heard about it, which is great. And mostly, they go well.
CA: I tu et despertes i les llegeixes a Internet.
CA: So you just wake up and read them on the internet.
RH: De vegades.
RH: Sometimes.
CA: "Vaja! Hem arribat a la Xina!"
CA: "Oh, we just entered China!"
RH: Bé, aquesta seria una gran decisió.
RH: Yeah, well that would be a big one.
CA: Però permeteu als vostres treballadors que escullin les vacances. És...
CA: But you allow employees to set their own vacation time, and ... There's just --
RH: Clar, les vacances són simbòliques, perquè molta gent, a la pràctica, en fan. Però sí, hi ha molta llibertat.
RH: Sure, that's a big symbolic one, vacation, because most people, in practice, do that, anyway. But yeah, there's a whole lot of that freedom.
CA: I creus que el coratge és un valor fonamental.
CA: And courage, you ask for as a fundamental value.
RH: Sí, volem que la gent digui la veritat. I sovint diem que discrepar en silenci és deslleial. No està bé que es prengui una decisió sense donar l'opinió i que ni estigui escrita. Estem molt enfocats en intentar prendre bones decisions mitjançant un debat habitual. I intentem no fer-ho gaire intens, sense crits. Res d’això. És la curiositat la que fa parlar a la gent.
RH: Yeah, we want people to speak the truth. And we say, "To disagree silently is disloyal." It's not OK to let some decision go through without saying your piece, and typically, writing it down. And so we're very focused on trying to get to good decisions through the debate that always happens. And we try not to make it intense, like yelling at each other -- nothing like that. You know, it's really curiosity drawing people out.
CA: Sembla que teniu aquesta altra arma secreta amb Netflix que consisteix en un cúmul de dades, un tema del qual ja hem sentit a parlar aquesta setmana. Normalment has pres posicions sorprenents quant als d’algoritmes intel·ligents a Netflix. Abans, treies a la llum el teu algoritme i deies: “Algú pot millorar aquestes recomanacions que tenim? Si pots, et paguem un milió de dòlars”. I has pagat un milió de dòlars perquè fos només un 10% més efectiu.
CA: You've got this other secret weapon at Netflix, it seems, which is this vast trove of data, a word we've heard a certain amount about this week. You've often taken really surprising stances towards building smart algorithms at Netflix. Back in the day, you opened up your algorithm to the world and said, "Hey, can anyone do better than this recommendation we've got? If so, we'll pay you a million dollars." You paid someone a million dollars, because it was like 10 percent better than yours.
RH: Exacte.
RH: That's right.
CA: Va ser una bona decisió? Ho faries un altre cop?
CA: Was that a good decision? Would you do that again?
RH: Sí, va ser fascinant en aquell temps, per allà el 2007. Però no ho hem tornat a fer. És una eina molt especialitzada. Pensa-ho com un cop de sort en el moment oportú i no en un marc general. Hem invertit molt en els algoritmes per poder portar el contingut adequat a les persones, però que sigui fàcil i divertit a l’hora d’explorar.
RH: Yeah, it was super exciting at the time; this was about 2007. But you know, we haven't done it again. So clearly, it's a very specialized tool. And so think of that as a lucky break of good timing, rather than a general framework. So what we've done is invest a lot on the algorithms, so that we feature the right content to the right people and try to make it fun and easy to explore.
CA: Fa uns anys vas fer el que sembla un gir interessant. Preguntaves “Aquí tens 10 pel·lícules. Què en penses? Quines són les millors?” I intentaves relacionar les pel·lícules amb les recomanacions. Llavors vas canviar el sistema. Podries parlar sobre això?
CA: And you made this, what seems like a really interesting shift, a few years ago. You used to ask people, "Here are 10 movies. What do you think? Which ones of these are your best movies?" And then tried to match those movies with recommendations for what was coming. And then you changed away from that. Talk about that.
RH: Clar. Tothom donaria 5 estrelles a la "Llista de Schindler" i 3 a la pel·lícula d’Adam Sandler, "The Do-Over". Però, de fet, si et fixes en el que es mira més és quasi sempre l’Adam Sandler. Així que el que passa és que quan valorem i som metacognitius sobre la qualitat som el nostre “jo” amb aspiració. I funciona molt millor complaure a les persones segons les seves eleccions i preferències sobre simples plaers.
RH: Sure. Everyone would rate "Schindler's List" five stars, and then they'd rate Adam Sandler, "The Do-Over" three stars. But, in fact, when you looked at what they watched, it was almost always Adam Sandler. And so what happens is, when we rate and we're metacognitive about quality, that's sort of our aspirational self. And it works out much better to please people to look at the actual choices that they make, their revealed preferences by how much they enjoy simple pleasures.
CA: Voldria parlar sobre això durant un parell de minuts, perquè em sorprèn com tema general, no només amb Netflix, també per Internet. La diferència entre els valors als quals s’aspiren i valors aconseguits. Tu, de forma brillant, no vas parar gaire atenció al que la gent deia, sinó que et fixaves en el que miraven i després trobaves coses com “Mai hagués imaginat que m’agradaria un programa de receptes horribles anomenat “Nailed it!””
CA: OK, I want to talk for a couple of minutes about this, because this strikes me as a huge deal, not just for Netflix, for the internet as a whole. The difference between aspirational values and revealed values. You, brilliantly, didn't pay too much attention to what people said, you watched what they did, and then found the stuff that, "Oh my God, I never knew I would like a show about making horrible recipes, called 'Nailed It!'"
RH: “Nailed it!”, és veritat.
RH: Called "Nailed It!" Right.
CA: És molt graciós. Mai se m’hauria ocorregut. Però això no comporta riscs, seguir l'estratègia de tenir en compte els valors revelats fins a l’extrem?
CA: It's hilarious. I would never have even thought of that. But aren't there risks with this, if this go-only-with-revealed-values approach is taken too far?
RH: Gaudim molt de fer a la gent feliç. A vegades només vols relaxar-te i mirar un programa com “Nailed it!”. I és divertit, no comporta estrès. Altres cops la gent prefereix veure una pel·lícula més intensa. "Mudbound” va ser nominada als Oscars. És molt bona i molt intensa. Hem tingut més de 20 milions d’hores en reproduccions de la pel·lícula, que són moltes més de les que hauria tingut als cinemes o altres formes de distribució. I seguint aquest fil, tenim tants caramels com bròquil. Si ho saps combinar, pots aconseguir una dieta sana.
RH: Well, we get a lot of joy from making people happy, Sometimes you just want to relax and watch a show like "Nailed It!" And it's fun, and it's not stressful. Other times, people want to watch very intensive film. "Mudbound" was Oscar-nominated, it's a great, very intensive film. And you know, we've had over 20 million hours of viewing on "Mudbound," which is dramatically bigger than it would have been in the theaters or any other distribution. And so, we have some candy, too, but we have lots of broccoli. And you know, if you have the good mix, you get to a healthy diet.
CA: Però... Sí, és clar. Però els algoritmes tendeixen a apuntar menys cap als bròquils i més cap als caramels, si no prens cura? Acabem de parlar sobre com, a Youtube, els algoritmes, sent més intel·ligents, tendeixen a portar els usuaris cap a un contingut més radical o específic. Seria fàcil imaginar com, amb els algoritmes de Netflix, en valors revelats farien que gradualment...
CA: But -- yes, indeed. But isn't it the case that algorithms tend to point you away from the broccoli and towards the candy, if you're not careful? We just had a talk about how, on YouTube, somehow algorithms tend to, just by actually being smarter, tend to drive people towards more radical or specific content. It'd be easy to imagine that Netflix algorithms, just going on revealed values, would gradually --
RH: Toquéssim fons.
RH: Right, get too base --
CA: Tots acabaríem mirant pornografia violenta o quelcom similar. O alguna gent ho acabaria fent. Però...
CA: We'd all be watching violent pornography or something. Or some people would, you know. But, how --
(Riures)
(Laughter)
Jo no! Sóc fill de missioner, mai penso en aquestes coses. Però...
Not me! I'm the child of a missionary, I don't even think about these things. But --
(Riures)
(Laughter)
Però, vull dir, és possible, no?
But I mean, it's possible, right?
RH: A la pràctica, tens raó en què no es pot confiar en algoritmes. És una mescla de judici i del que fem, proveïm un servei curat no com Facebook o YouTube, així que els temes són més senzills: Quines són les pel·lícules i sèries que adquirim? Llavors l’algoritme es converteix en una eina.
RH: In practice, you're right that you can't just rely on algorithms. It's a mix of judgment and what we carry, and we're a curated service versus a platform like Facebook and YouTube, so we have an easier set of issues, which is: What are these great films and series that we acquire? But then within that, the algorithm is a tool.
CA: John Doerr acaba de parlar sobre el que importa. En els negocis, el que crec que importa és fonamentalment augmentar els subscriptors. Vull dir que aquest és l'únic avantatge. Els subscriptors solen augmentar quan més temps passen mirant Netflix, això farà que es tornin a subscriure? O és més qüestió de tenir programes que potser no s'han mirat tant com tota la temporada de "Nailed It!", per exemple? Però la gent s'hi enganxa més, només pensen: "Ha estat enriquidor, extraordinari, estic tan content de veure-ho amb la família". No hi ha una versió del model de negoci que tingui menys contingut però més impressionant, possiblement un contingut encara més inspirador?
CA: But how -- John Doerr just talked about measuring what matters. As a business, what matters, I presume, is fundamentally just growing subscribers. I mean, that's your unique advantage. Are subscribers grown only by the more time they spend watching Netflix, that is what will make them re-subscribe? Or is it even more about having shows that might not have been so much time as watching the whole season of "Nailed It!" or whatever? But just get into them more; they just think, "That was nourishing, that was extraordinary, I'm so glad I watched that with my family." Isn't there a version of the business model that would be less content but more awesome content, possibly even more uplifting content?
RH: La gent escull el contingut inspirador. Crec que tens raó, quan la gent parla de Netflix, parlen dels programes que els captiven: "13 Reasons Why" o "The Crown". I això és un impacte molt desproporcionat i positiu, també per al creixement de subscriptors que has dit, d’aquells programes memorables. Però el que volem és oferir varietat. No es vol veure el mateix cada nit, per molt que t'agradi; vols provar coses diferents. I el que no hem vist és, per exemple, aquesta corrent cap als exemples tipus la pornografia violenta. En lloc d'això, hem vist molta visualització amb molt abast: "Black Mirror", estem filmant la cinquena temporada ara. I aquesta va ser una sèrie de poc èxit quan estava a la BBC. I amb la distribució sota demanda, es poden fer sèries molt més grans.
RH: And people choose that uplifting content. I think you're right, which is, when people talk about Netflix, they talk about the shows that move them: "13 Reasons Why" or "The Crown." And that is way disproportionate and positive impact, even for the subscriber growth that you talked about is those couple big, memorable shows. But what we want to do is offer a variety. You don't want to watch the same thing every night, as much as you like it; you want to try different things. And what we haven't seen is this, say, race to the bottom of your violent pornography kind of examples. Instead, we've seen great viewing across a whole range -- "Black Mirror" -- we're filming season five now. And that was a struggling show when it was only in the BBC. And with the distribution of on-demand, you can make these much bigger shows.
CA: Vols dir que els humans poden ser addictes tant pels seus àngels com pels seus dimonis.
CA: You're telling me humans can get addicted by their angels as well as their demons.
RH: Sí, però intentem no parlar-ne en termes d'addicció. En parlem en termes de: Què faràs en el teu temps o quan et vulguis relaxar? Pots mirar la televisió, jugar a videojocs, mirar YouTube o pots mirar Netflix. I si ho fem el millor possible, i podem aconseguir molts estats d'ànim, més sovint la gent ens escollirà.
RH: Yeah, and again, we try not to think about it in addiction terms, we think about it as, you know: What are you going to do with your time and when you want to relax? You can watch linear TV, you can do video games, you can do YouTube, or you can watch Netflix. And if we're as great as we can be, and we have a variety of moods, then more often, people will choose us.
CA: Però teniu persones de l'organització que busquen regularment els impactes reals d'aquests algoritmes brillants que heu creat. Per comprovar si ho feu bé. "Estem segurs que aquesta és la direcció que volem?".
CA: But you have people in the organization who are looking regularly at the actual impacts of these brilliant algorithms that you've created. Just for reality check, just, "Are we sure that this is the direction we want to go?"
RH: Crec que n'aprenem. I s’ha de ser humil i dir: "No hi ha cap eina perfecta". L’algoritme és una de les parts, la forma en què encarreguem el contingut, les nostres relacions amb les societats. Ho hem de mirar des de molts punts de vista. Per tant, si només ens centrem en augmentar la visualització o en augmentar els subscriptors, probablement no podríem créixer i ser la gran empresa que volem ser. Així que es pot pensar que son múltiples mesures d'èxit.
RH: You know, I think we learn. And you have to be humble and sort of say, "Look, there's no perfect tool." The algorithm’s one part, the way we commission the content, our relationships with societies. So there's a lot of ways that we have to look at it. So if you get too stuck in "Let's just increase viewing" or "Just increase subscribers," you're unlikely to be able to grow and be the great company you want to be. So think of it as this multiple measures of success.
CA: Per tant, parlant d'algoritmes que han donat lloc a preguntes: estaves a la junta de Facebook, i crec que Mark Zuckerberg... heu fet alguna assessoria amb ell. Què saps d’en Mark Zuckerberg que la gent no sap?
CA: So, speaking of algorithms that have raised questions: You were on the board of Facebook, and I think Mark Zuckerberg -- you've done some mentoring for him. What should we know about Mark Zuckerberg that people don't know?
RH: Molts el coneixeu o l’heu vist. És una persona extraordinària. De les millors persones. I social: aquestes plataformes, ja sigui YouTube o Facebook, estan clarament intentant créixer ràpidament. I veiem que ho fan amb les noves tecnologies. Ahir parlàvem de l'ADN imprès, i podria ser fantàstic o horrible. Ja ho sabeu, totes les noves tecnologies... quan la televisió va ser popular als anys seixanta als EUA, va ser anomenada un "vast desert", i deien que podriria la ment de tothom. Resulta que la ment de tothom està bé. Hi va haver alguns ajustaments, però penseu que, o, jo considero que... Les tecnologies tenen avantatges i inconvenients. I en termes socials, estem descobrint-ho.
RH: Well, many of you know him or have seen him. I mean, he's a fantastic human being. Really first-class. And social -- these platforms, whether that's YouTube or Facebook, are clearly trying to grow up quickly. And we see that with all new technologies. I mean, yesterday we were talking about printed DNA, and it's like: could be fantastic or could be horrific. And you know, all new technologies -- when television was first popular in the 1960s in the US, it was called a "vast wasteland," and that television was going to rot the minds of everybody. It turns out everybody's minds were fine. And there were some adjustments, but think of it as -- or, I think of it as -- all new technologies have pros and cons. And in social, we're just figuring that out.
CA: Quina prioritat té la junta de Facebook per abordar alguns d’aquests problemes? O és la creença que l'empresa ha estat criticada injustament?
CA: How much of a priority is it for the board of Facebook to really address some of the issues? Or is the belief that, actually, the company has been completely unfairly criticized?
RH: No és completament injust. I en Mark s'està encarregant d'arreglar Facebook. I és molt apassionat per a aquestes coses.
RH: Oh, it's not completely unfairly. And Mark's leading the charge on fixing Facebook. And he's very passionate about that.
CA: Reed, et vull preguntar per una altra passió teva. Ho has fet increïblement bé amb Netflix, ets multimilionari, i inverteixes molt de temps i, de fet, diners, en educació.
CA: Reed, I want to look at another passion of yours. I mean, you've done incredibly well with Netflix, you're a billionaire, and you spend a lot of time and indeed, money, on education.
RH: Sí.
RH: Yep.
CA: Per què és una passió i què n'estàs fent al respecte?
CA: Why is this a passion, and what are you doing about it?
RH: Després de la uni, era professor de matemàtiques de secundària. Quan vaig entrar en el món dels negocis, em vaig convertir en filàntrop. Crec que he gravitat cap a l'educació i he intentat marcar-hi una diferència. I del que més m'he adonat és que els educadors volen treballar amb grans educadors i crear molts entorns únics per als nens. I necessitem molta més varietat en el sistema, i també tenim moltes més organitzacions centrades en l'educació. I el que és difícil és que ara mateix als Estats Units la majoria de les escoles estan dirigides per una junta escolar local. I ha de satisfer totes les necessitats de la comunitat i, de fet, el que necessitem és molta més varietat. Als Estats Units hi ha un tipus d'escola pública, l'escola subvencionada, amb organitzacions sense ànim de lucre. I això és un gran èmfasi per a mi, tenir escoles amb organitzacions sense ànim de lucre, són més centrades en el procés educatiu, donen suport als educadors. Estic a la junta d'escoles subvencionades KIPP, que és una de les xarxes més grans. I hi ha 30.000 nens cada any que reben una educació molt estimulant.
RH: Sure. Right out of college, I was a high school math teacher. So when I later went into business and became a philanthropist, I think I gravitated towards education and trying to make a difference there. And the main thing I noticed is, you know, educators want to work with other great educators and to create many unique environments for kids. And we need a lot more variety in the system than we have, and a lot more educator-centric organizations. And so the tricky thing is, right now in the US, most schools are run by a local school board. And it has to meet all needs in the community, and, in fact, what we need is a lot more variety. So in the US there's a form of public school called charter public schools, that are run by nonprofits. And that's the big emphasis for me, is if you can have schools run by nonprofits, they are more mission-focused, they support the educators well. I'm on the board of KIPP charter schools, which is one of the larger networks. And, you know, it's 30,000 kids a year getting very stimulating education.
CA: Dóna’m un exemple de com hauria de ser una escola. RH: Depèn del nen. Amb diversos nens, hi ha moltes necessitats diferents que cal satisfer, no hi ha un únic model. I tu vols triar depenent del nen i del que creus que necessita. Haurien de ser centrades en l’educador, promoure la curiositat i l’estimulació i aquestes coses. I tota aquesta idea de 30 nens de cinquè, tots aprenent el mateix al mateix temps, és clarament un retrocés a l'era industrial. Però, canviar això, amb l'estructura governamental actual, és molt difícil. El que fan aquestes escoles innovadores, sense ànim de lucre és portar-ho al límit, deixant que els nens provin coses noves. És com una reforma governamental, amb escoles no lucratives, per permetre els canvis educatius.
CA: Paint me a picture of what a school should look like. RH: It depends on the kid. Think about it as: with multiple kids, there's all different needs that need to be met, so there's not any one model. And you want to be able to choose, depending on your kid and what you think they need. But they should be very educator-centric and curious and stimulating and all of those things. And this whole idea of 30 kids in fifth grade, all learning the same thing at the same time, you know, is clearly an industrial throwback. But changing that, given the current government structure, is super hard. But what these innovative, nonprofit schools are doing is pushing the bounds, letting kids try new things. And so think of it as the governance reform, that is, the nonprofit, to allow the educational changes.
CA: De vegades es critica que les escoles subvencionades, intencionadament o involuntària, retiren recursos del sistema escolar públic. Ens n'hem de preocupar?
CA: And sometimes the criticism is put that charter schools, intentionally or unintentionally, suck resources away from the public school system. Should we be concerned about that?
RH: Bé, són escoles públiques. Hi ha molts tipus d'escoles públiques. I si observes les escoles en el seu conjunt, fan bé a nens amb baixos recursos. Si els nens amb alts recursos tenen problemes, els pares els enviaran a una escola privada o es traslladaran de barri. I les famílies de baixos recursos no tenen aquestes opcions. A KIPP un 80% són nens amb baixos recursos i dinar gratuït o reduït. Les admissions a l'universitat a KIPP són fantàstiques.
RH: Well, they are public schools. I mean, there's these multiple types of public schools. And if you look at charters as a whole, they serve low-income kids. Because if high-income kids get in trouble, the parents will send them to a private school or they move neighborhoods. And low-income families generally don't have those choices. Like KIPP -- it's 80 percent low-income kids, free and reduced lunch. And the college admissions for KIPP is fantastic.
CA: Vas signar fa uns anys la campanya Giving Pledge, estàs compromès a lliurar més de la meitat de la teva fortuna durant tota la teva vida. Et puc preguntar quant has invertit en educació en els últims anys?
CA: Reed, you signed the Giving Pledge a few years ago, you're committed to giving away more than half of your fortune during your lifetime. Can I cheekily ask how much you've invested in education in the last few years?
RH: Sobre un parell de centenars de milions, no ho sé ben bé, però continuem invertint i...
RH: It's a couple hundred million, I don't know exactly how many hundreds, but we're continuing to invest and --
(Aplaudiments)
(Applause)
Gràcies a tots.
thank you all --
(Aplaudiments)
(Applause)
La veritat és que durant una temporada vaig intentar ser polític a temps complet, treballant per a John Doerr. I m'agradava treballar per a ell, però no vaig prosperar en la política. M'encanten els negocis, m'encanta competir. M'encanta competir contra Disney i HBO.
You know, honestly, for a little while I tried to do politics full-time, working for John Doerr. And while I loved working for John, I just didn't thrive on politics. I love business, I love competing. I love going up against Disney and HBO.
(Riures)
(Laughter)
És el que em fa feliç. I ara ho faig per augmentar el valor de Netflix, que em permet invertir més en aquestes escoles. I, ara per ara, és la vida perfecta.
That's what gets me going. And now I do that to really increase Netflix's value, which allows me to write more checks to schools. And so for now, it's the perfect life.
CA: Ets una persona excepcional, has canviat totes les nostres vides i la vida de molts nens.
CA: Reed, you're a remarkable person, you've changed all of our lives and the lives of many kids.
Moltes gràcies per venir a TED.
Thank you so much for coming to TED.
(Aplaudiments)
(Applause)