Smallpox is one of the deadliest diseases in history, but fortunately, it’s been eradicated for over 40 years. However, samples of the virus that causes smallpox still exist, leading to concern that rogue actors might try to weaponize it. This is especially worrying because older smallpox vaccines can have serious side effects, and modern antiviral drugs have never been tested against this disease. To protect against this potential threat, the US government is funding research to improve smallpox treatments and vaccines. And since it’s unethical to expose people to a highly lethal virus, labs are using humanity's closest biological relatives as research subjects. But is it right to harm these animals to protect humanity from a potential threat? Or should our closest relatives also be protected against lethal experiments? What would you do as a scientist faced with this very real scenario?
天花是历史上最致命的疾病之一, 但是幸运的是,它已经 彻底消失了四十多年。 但导致天花的病毒样本仍然存在, 这让人们担心有无底线的人 会尝试把天花武器化。 这十分值得担心, 因为早先的天花疫苗 有着强烈的副作用, 并且现代的抗病毒药从来没有 被测试用于对抗这种疾病。 为了防范这个潜在威胁, 美国政府正在投资研究 以改进天花治疗和疫苗。 由于把人暴露于高度致命的病毒中 是极其不道德的, 实验室在使用最接近人类的 生物学近亲作为研究对象。 但是为了保护人类不受潜在威胁, 而去伤害这些动物就是正确的吗? 或者我们的近亲也应该 免受致命实验的伤害? 面对这样的现实情境, 作为科学家的你会怎么做呢?
In many ways, this dilemma isn't new. Animals have been used in research aimed at improving human welfare for centuries, typically at the cost of their lives. This practice reflects the widespread belief that human lives are more valuable than non-human lives. People have different views about the ethics of animal testing and how it’s conducted. But whatever your opinion, this scenario raises an important philosophical question: how do we determine the value of a life, whether human or non-human? One tool philosophers have used to consider this question is moral status. Beings with moral status should have their needs and interests taken into consideration by those making decisions that impact them. Traditionally, moral status has been seen as binary— either a being’s interests matter for their own sake, or they don’t. And historically, many philosophers believed that humans had moral status and other animals didn’t. Some contemporary philosophers like Shelly Kagan have argued that moral status comes in degrees, but even in this model, he argues that people have the most moral status.
在很多种情况下, 这样的困境并不新鲜。 几个世纪以来,动物一直被 用于增进人类福祉的研究, 通常都以它们的生命为代价。 这样的行为反映了一个普遍理念, 就是人类的生命比人类以外的生命 更有价值。 人们对于动物实验和 如何进行实验的伦理 有着不同的观点。 但不管你的观点如何, 这样的情境提出了一个 重要的哲学问题: 我们该如何决定一个生命的价值, 不管是人类还是非人类? 哲学家用道德地位来思考这一问题。 在做出影响他们的决定时, 应该考虑到有道德地位的 生物的需求和利益。 传统上来说, 道德地位被视作非黑即白的—— 生物的利益对他们自己重要, 或者对自己不重要。 历史上许多哲学家认为 人类有道德地位, 而其他动物没有。 一些当代哲学家, 如谢利·卡根(Shelly Kagan), 声称道德地位是有程度之分的, 但是即使在这种模型下, 人类还是有最高的道德地位。
However, determining what grants any degree of moral status can be difficult. Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant thought humans have moral status because of their rational nature and ability to will their actions. A binary conception of moral status then suggests that beings with these capacities are “persons” bearing full moral status, while all other creatures are “things” without moral status. But thinkers like Christine Korsgaard have argued a Kantian view should include many non-human animals because of how they value their own good. Another line of argument, suggested by utilitarianism’s founding father Jeremy Bentham and elaborated by Peter Singer, claims that a capacity for suffering makes an entity worthy of moral consideration. These inclusive ways of thinking about moral status dramatically widen the scope of our moral responsibility, in ways some people might find unnerving.
但是,决定什么给予了 某种程度的道德地位是困难的。 启蒙哲学家伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant) 认为人类有道德地位 是因为他们的理性本质与 将意志付诸实践的能力。 一种道德地位的二元概念 便提议有这些能力的生物 才是有完全道德地位的“人”, 而其他所有的生物都是 没有道德地位的“物”。 但如克里斯汀·柯斯嘉德(Chirstine Korsgaard)的 思想家认为康德的思想 应该包含许多非人类生物, 因为它们有自己的价值。 另一种观点由功利主义的奠基者 杰里米·边沁(Jeremy Bentham)提出, 并由彼得·辛格(Peter Singer) 详细阐述为: 受苦的能力使个体 值得道德考量。 这些关于道德地位的包容性想法 大大扩大了我们的道德责任范围, 这在一些方面可能令人不安。
So where do our monkeys stand? Our closest genetic relatives have high social and intellectual capacities. They live cooperatively in complex social groups and recognize members of their community as individuals. They support and learn from one another— there’s even evidence they respond to inequality. And of course, they’re capable of suffering.
所以猴子在哪里立足呢? 我们最接近的基因亲属有 很高的社会和智力能力。 它们在复杂的社会 群体中合作生活, 并认同它们群体的成员为个体。 它们相互学习和帮助—— 甚至有证据显示它们会 对不平等做出反应。 当然,它们可以感知痛苦。
Yet despite all this, it’s still generally common opinion that a human’s life is more valuable than a monkey’s. And that while killing one human to save five others is typically wrong, killing one monkey to save five humans is regrettable, but morally acceptable. Even morally required. At some point, however, this calculation starts to feel unstable. Should we kill 100 monkeys to save five people? How about 10,000? If moral status is binary and monkeys don't have it, then theoretically, any number of monkeys could be sacrificed to save just one person. But if moral status comes in degrees and monkeys have any at all, then at some point the balance will tip.
尽管如此,人们还是普遍认为 人的生命比猴子的生命更有价值。 为了救五个人而牺牲一个人 通常是不对的, 为了救五个人而牺牲 一只猴子是令人扼腕的, 但道德上是更加可以接受的。 甚至道德上是必须的。 在某一时刻, 这个推算会变得不平衡。 我们应该为了救五个人 而牺牲一百只猴子吗? 那一万只呢? 如果道德地位是二元的, 并且猴子没有的话, 理论上来说,任何数量的猴子 都可以为了一个人而牺牲。 但如果道德地位是有程度的, 而猴子也有。 在某些时刻,这个天平就会倾斜。
The situation you're in complicates things even further. Unlike the scenarios above, there's no guarantee your work will ever save human lives. This is true of any animal experiment— the process of scientific discovery only sometimes leads to improved medical care. But in your case, it’s even trickier! While the government is worried smallpox might be weaponized, if they’re wrong the disease will remain eradicated, and your research won’t save anyone from smallpox. You could try to quantify this uncertainty to help make your decision. But how do you determine what an acceptable amount of risk is? And what if there’s so much uncertainty that your calculations are essentially wild guesses?
你所处的情况将事更加复杂化了。 与之前的情景不同, 我们没有办法确定你的研究 能够拯救人类的生命。 任何动物实验都是这样的—— 科学探索的过程并不会 一直带来更好的医疗服务。 但你的情况更加棘手! 尽管政府担心天花 可能会被武器化, 但如果他们是错的, 天花已经被根除了, 你的研究不会拯救 任何人于天花。 你可以尝试量化这种不确定性 来帮助你决定。 但你如何确定可接受的风险量? 但是如果有太大的不确定性, 以至于你的计算基本上是瞎猜, 该怎么办?
These kinds of moral mathematics get complicated fast, and some philosophers would argue they’re not even the best way to make moral decisions. But whatever you decide, your choice should be well justified.
这样的道德计算很快会复杂化, 一些哲学家辩论这根本不是 做出道德决定的好方法。 无论你如何决定, 你需要有充分的理由。