Filosoffer, dramatikere, teologer har kæmpet med dette spørgsmål i århundreder: hvad får folk til at blive dårlige? Interessant nok stillede jeg dette spørgsmål, da jeg var lille. Da jeg var barn og voksede op i det sydlige Bronx' ghetto i New York, var jeg omringet af ondskab, som alle børn er, der vokser op i den indre by. Og jeg havde venner, der var virkelig gode børn, der udlevede Dr. Jekyll Mr. Hyde-scenariet -- Robert Louis Stevenson. Det vil sige, de tog stoffer, kom i problemer, kom i fængsel. Nogle blev dræbt, nogle uden stoffernes hjælp.
Philosophers, dramatists, theologians have grappled with this question for centuries: what makes people go wrong? Interestingly, I asked this question when I was a little kid. I grew up in the South Bronx, inner-city ghetto in New York, and I was surrounded by evil, as all kids are who grew up in an inner city. And I had friends who were really good kids, who lived out the Dr. Jekyll Mr. Hyde scenario -- Robert Louis Stevenson. That is, they took drugs, got in trouble, went to jail. Some got killed, and some did it without drug assistance.
Så, da jeg læste Robert Louis Stevenson, var det ikke fiktion. Det eneste spørgsmål er, hvad var i juicen? Og vigtigere, den linje mellem godt og ondt -- som priviligerede folk kan lide at tænke på som fast og uigennemtrængelig, med dem på den gode side og de andre på den dårlige side -- Jeg vidste, den linje var bevægelig og gennemtrængelig. Gode mennesker kunne forføres over den linje, og under gode og sjældne omstændigheder kunne dårlige børn komme sig med hjælp, med forbedring, med afvænning.
So when I read Robert Louis Stevenson, that wasn't fiction. The only question is, what was in the juice? And more importantly, that line between good and evil -- which privileged people like to think is fixed and impermeable, with them on the good side, the others on the bad side -- I knew that line was movable, and it was permeable. Good people could be seduced across that line, and under good and some rare circumstances, bad kids could recover with help, with reform, with rehabilitation.
Så jeg vil begynde med denne skønne illusion af [hollandske] kunstner M.C. Escher. Hvis man ser på den og fokuserer på det hvide, hvad man ser, er en verden fuld af engle. Men lad os se dybere, og som vi gør det, kommer dæmonerne, verdens djævle frem. Og det fortæller flere ting.
So I want to begin with this wonderful illusion by [Dutch] artist M.C. Escher. If you look at it and focus on the white, what you see is a world full of angels. But let's look more deeply, and as we do, what appears is the demons, the devils in the world. That tells us several things.
Ét, verden er, var, vil altid være fyldt med godt og ondt, for godt og ondt er den menneskelige tilværelses yin og yang. Det fortæller mig noget andet. Hvis I husker, var Guds yndlingsengel Lucifer. Åbenbart betyder Lucifer "Lyset." Det betyder også "morgenstjernen" i nogle tekster. Og han adlød ikke Gud, og det er den ultimative autoritetsulydighed. Og da han gjorde det, blev ærkeenglen Mikael sendt for at sparke ham ud af himlen sammen med de andre faldne engle. Og så stiger Lucifer ned i helvede, bliver Satan, bliver Djævelen, og ondskabens kraft i universet begynder.
One, the world is, was, will always be filled with good and evil, because good and evil is the yin and yang of the human condition. It tells me something else. If you remember, God's favorite angel was Lucifer. Apparently, Lucifer means "the light." It also means "the morning star," in some scripture. And apparently, he disobeyed God, and that's the ultimate disobedience to authority. And when he did, Michael, the archangel, was sent to kick him out of heaven along with the other fallen angels. And so Lucifer descends into hell, becomes Satan, becomes the devil, and the force of evil in the universe begins.
Paradoksalt nok skabte Gud helvede for at opbevare ondskab. Han var dog ikke god til at holde den der. Så denne bue af kosmisk forvandling af Guds yndlingsengel til Djævelen giver for mig sammenhængen til at forstå folk, der bliver forvandlet fra gode, normale folk til udøvere af ondskab.
Paradoxically, it was God who created hell as a place to store evil. He didn't do a good job of keeping it there though. So, this arc of the cosmic transformation of God's favorite angel into the Devil, for me, sets the context for understanding human beings who are transformed from good, ordinary people into perpetrators of evil.
Så Lucifer-effekten, selvom den fokuserer på de negative -- de negative ting, folk kan blive, ikke de negative ting, folk er -- leder mig til en psykologisk definition. Ondskab er udøvelsen af magt. Og det er nøglen: det handler om magt. Til bevidst at skade mennesker psykologisk, til at skade folk fysisk, til at ødelægge folk dødeligt, eller idéer, og til at begå forbrydelser imod menneskeheden. Hvis man googler "ondskab," et ord der sikkert er visnet nu, får man 136 millioner resultater på en tredjedel af et sekund.
So the Lucifer effect, although it focuses on the negatives -- the negatives that people can become, not the negatives that people are -- leads me to a psychological definition. Evil is the exercise of power. And that's the key: it's about power. To intentionally harm people psychologically, to hurt people physically, to destroy people mortally, or ideas, and to commit crimes against humanity. If you Google "evil," a word that should surely have withered by now, you come up with 136 million hits in a third of a second.
For et par år siden -- I blev nok alle chokerede, som jeg blev, over afsløringen af amerikanske soldater, der misbrugte fanger et mærkeligt sted i en kontroversiel krig, Abu Ghraib i Irak. Og disse var mænd og kvinder, der trak fanger igennem utrolig ydmygelse. Jeg blev chokeret, men jeg blev ikke overrasket, for jeg havde set de samme visuelle paralleller, da jeg var fængselsdirektøren i Stanford Fængselsforsøget.
A few years ago -- I am sure all of you were shocked, as I was, with the revelation of American soldiers abusing prisoners in a strange place in a controversial war, Abu Ghraib in Iraq. And these were men and women who were putting prisoners through unbelievable humiliation. I was shocked, but I wasn't surprised, because I had seen those same visual parallels when I was the prison superintendent of the Stanford Prison Study.
Straks sagde Bush-administrationens militær ... hvad? Hvad alle administrationer siger, når der er en skandale. "Giv ikke os skylden. Det er ikke systemet, men de få dårlige æblers, de få uberegnelige soldaters." Min hypotese er, amerikanske soldater er gode, som regel. Måske var det tønden, der var dårlig. Men hvordan vil jeg håndtere den hypotese?
Immediately the Bush administration military said what? What all administrations say when there's a scandal: "Don't blame us. It's not the system. It's the few bad apples, the few rogue soldiers." My hypothesis is, American soldiers are good, usually. Maybe it was the barrel that was bad. But how am I going to deal with that hypothesis?
Jeg blev ekspertvidne for en af vagterne, Sergent Chip Frederick, og i den position havde jeg adgang til alle efterforskningsrapporterne. Jeg havde ham, kunne studere ham, få ham med hjem, lære ham at kende, lave psykologisk analyse og se, var han et godt eller dårligt æble. Og for det tredje havde jeg alle 1.000 billeder, som disse soldater tog. Disse billeder er af voldelig eller seksuel natur. De kommer alle fra amerikanske soldaters kameraer. Fordi alle har et digitalt kamera eller mobiltelefonkamera, tog de billeder af alt. Mere end 1.000.
I became an expert witness for one of the guards, Sergeant Chip Frederick, and in that position, I had access to the dozen investigative reports. I had access to him. I could study him, have him come to my home, get to know him, do psychological analysis to see, was he a good apple or bad apple. And thirdly, I had access to all of the 1,000 pictures that these soldiers took. These pictures are of a violent or sexual nature. All of them come from the cameras of American soldiers. Because everybody has a digital camera or cell phone camera, they took pictures of everything, more than 1,000.
Og det, jeg har gjort, er, jeg organiserede dem under forskellige kategorier. Men disse er af det amerikanske militærpoliti, reservesoldater. De er ikke soldater, der er forberedt på denne mission overhovedet. Og det skete alt sammen et enkelt sted, Afdeling 1-A, på nattevagten. Hvorfor? Afdeling 1-A var centeret for militærefterretningsvæsnet. Det var forhørsfæstningen. CIA var der. Forhørsledere fra Titan Corp. (efterretningsfirma) og de får ingen informationer om opstanden. Så de lægger pres på disse soldater, militærpolitiet, til at krydse linjen, give dem tilladelse til at knække fjendens vilje, til at forberede dem på forhør, til at bløde dem op, til at tage fløjlshandskerne af. Disse er de pæne formuleringer, og sådan her blev det fortolket. Lad os gå ned i det fangehul.
And what I've done is I organized them into various categories. But these are by United States military police, army reservists. They are not soldiers prepared for this mission at all. And it all happened in a single place, Tier 1-A, on the night shift. Why? Tier 1-A was the center for military intelligence. It was the interrogation hold. The CIA was there. Interrogators from Titan Corporation, all there, and they're getting no information about the insurgency. So they're going to put pressure on these soldiers, military police, to cross the line, give them permission to break the will of the enemy, to prepare them for interrogation, to soften them up, to take the gloves off. Those are the euphemisms, and this is how it was interpreted. Let's go down to that dungeon.
(Kameraklik)
(Typewriting)
[Abu Ghraib Iraq Prison Abuses 2008 Military Police Guards' Photos]
[The following images include nudity and graphic depictions of violence]
(Dump lyd) (Kameraklik) (Dump lyd) (Åndedrag) (Klokker)
(Camera shutter sounds) (Thuds) (Camera shutter) (Camera shutter) (Breathing) (Bells)
(Bells end)
Så, ret rædsomt. Det er en af de visuelle illustrationer af ondskab. Og I bør have set, at grunden til, jeg placerede fangen med sine arme ude med Leonardo da Vincis hyldest til mennesket, er, at den fange var psykisk syg. Den fange dækkede sig selv med lort hver dag, og de plejede at skulle rulle ham i skidt, så han ikke stank. Men vagterne endte med at kalde ham "Lortedrengen." Hvad lavede han i det fængsel frem for på et sindssygehospital?
So, pretty horrific. That's one of the visual illustrations of evil. And it should not have escaped you that the reason I paired the prisoner with his arms out with Leonardo da Vinci's ode to humanity is that that prisoner was mentally ill. That prisoner covered himself with shit every day, they had to roll him in dirt so he wouldn't stink. But the guards ended up calling him "Shit Boy." What was he doing in that prison rather than in some mental institution?
Uanset hvad, her er tidligere Forsvarsminister Rumsfeld. Han kommer ned og siger, "Jeg vil vide, hvem er ansvarlig? Hvem er de dårlige æbler?" Altså, det er et dårligt spørgsmål. Man må omformulere det og spørge, "Hvad er ansvarligt?" For "hvad" kunne være hvem som i folk, men det kunne også være hvad som i situationen, og det tydeligvis, hvor jeg vil hen.
In any event, here's former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. He comes down and says, "I want to know, who is responsible? Who are the bad apples?" Well, that's a bad question. You have to reframe it and ask, "What is responsible?" "What" could be the who of people, but it could also be the what of the situation,
Så hvordan bærer psykologer sig ad med at forstå sådanne forvandlinger af menneskets karakter, hvis man tror på, at de var gode soldater, før de gik ned i det fangehul? Der er tre måder. Hovedmåden hedder dispositionel. Vi ser på det, der inden i personen, de dårlige æbler.
and obviously that's wrongheaded. How do psychologists try to understand such transformations of human character, if you believe that they were good soldiers before they went down to that dungeon? There are three ways. The main way is called dispositional. We look at what's inside of the person, the bad apples.
Dette er grundlaget for al samfundsvidenskab, grundlaget for religion, grundlaget for krig. Socialpsykologer som jeg kommer og siger, "Jah, folk er skuespillerne på scenen, men man skal være bevidst om, hvordan den situation er. Hvem er de medvirkende? Hvordan er udklædningen? Er der en regissør?" Og derfor er vi interesserede i, hvad er de eksterne faktorer omkring individet -- den dårlige tønde? Og samfundsforskere stopper der, og de går glip af den store pointe, som jeg opdagede, da jeg blev ekspertvidne i Abu Ghraib. Magten er i systemet. Systemet skaber situationen, der fordærver individerne, og systemet er den retslige, politiske, økonomiske, kulturelle baggrund. Og her ligger magten hos dårlige-tønder-magerne.
This is the foundation of all of social science, the foundation of religion, the foundation of war. Social psychologists like me come along and say, "Yeah, people are the actors on the stage, but you'll have to be aware of the situation. Who are the cast of characters? What's the costume? Is there a stage director?" And so we're interested in what are the external factors around the individual -- the bad barrel? Social scientists stop there and they miss the big point that I discovered when I became an expert witness for Abu Ghraib. The power is in the system. The system creates the situation that corrupts the individuals, and the system is the legal, political, economic, cultural background. And this is where the power is of the bad-barrel makers.
Så vil man ændre en person, må man ændre situationen. Hvis man vil ændre situationen, må man vide, hvor magten er i systemet. Så Lucifer-effekten involverer at forstå forvandlinger af menneskelig karakterer med disse tre faktorer. Og det er et dynamisk samspil. Hvad bringer personerne med ind i situationen? Hvad bringer situationen ud af dem? Og hvordan er systemet, der skaber og opretholder den situation?
If you want to change a person, change the situation. And to change it, you've got to know where the power is, in the system. So the Lucifer effect involves understanding human character transformations with these three factors. And it's a dynamic interplay. What do the people bring into the situation? What does the situation bring out of them? And what is the system that creates and maintains that situation?
Så min nye bog, "The Lucifer Effect," handler om, hvordan forstår man, hvordan gode personer bliver onde? Og den har en masse detaljer, om hvad jeg vil tale om i dag. Så Dr. Z.'s "Lucifer Effect," selvom den fokuserer på ondskab, er virkelig en fejring af det menneskelige sinds uendelige kapacitet til at gøre enhver rar eller grusom, omsorgsfuld eller ligeglad, kreativ eller destruktiv, og det gør nogle af os skurke. Og den gode nyhedshistorie, som jeg forhåbentlig når til til slut, er, at det gør nogle af os helte. Dette er en skøn tegning i The New Yorker, som virkelig opsummerer hele min tale: "Jeg er hverken en god eller dårlig betjent, Jerome. Som dig selv er jeg en kompleks blanding af positive og negative personlige træk, der kommer frem eller ej, afhængig af omstændighederne." (Latter)
My recent book, "The Lucifer Effect," is about, how do you understand how good people turn evil? And it has a lot of detail about what I'm going to talk about today. So Dr. Z's "Lucifer Effect," although it focuses on evil, really is a celebration of the human mind's infinite capacity to make any of us kind or cruel, caring or indifferent, creative or destructive, and it makes some of us villains. And the good news that I'm going to hopefully come to at the end is that it makes some of us heroes. This wonderful cartoon in the New Yorker summarizes my whole talk: "I'm neither a good cop nor a bad cop, Jerome. Like yourself, I'm a complex amalgam of positive and negative personality traits that emerge or not, depending on the circumstances." (Laughter)
Der er en afhandling, nogle af jer tror, I kender til, men meget få personer har nogensinde læst historien. I så filmen. Dette er Stanley Milgram, lille jødisk barn fra Bronx, og han stillede spørgsmålet, "Kunne Holocaust finde sted her, nu?" Folk siger, "Nej, det var Nazityskland, det var Hitler, du ved, det var 1939." Han sagde, "Jah, men forestil dig, Hitler spurgte dig, 'Ville du give en fremmed strøm?' 'Aldrig, jeg er en god person.' " Han sagde, "Hvorfor sætter vi ikke dig i en situation og giver dig en chance for at se, hvad du ville gøre?"
There's a study some of you think you know about, but very few people have ever read the story. You watched the movie. This is Stanley Milgram, little Jewish kid from the Bronx, and he asked the question, "Could the Holocaust happen here, now?" People say, "No, that's Nazi Germany, Hitler, you know, that's 1939." He said, "Yeah, but suppose Hitler asked you, 'Would you electrocute a stranger?' 'No way, I'm a good person.'" He said, "Why don't we put you in a situation and give you a chance to see what you would do?"
Og så, hvad han gjorde var, han testede 1.000 normale personer. 500 New Haven, Connecticut, 500 Bridgeport. Og annoncen sagde, "Psykologer vil forstå hukommelsen. Vi vil forbedre folks hukommelse, fordi hukommelsen er nøglen til succes." OK? "Vi vil give jer 30 kroner -- 20 kroner for jeres tid." Og den sagde, "Vi vil ikke have universitetsstuderende. Vi vil have mænd mellem 20 og 50." I de senere studier, brugte de kvinder. Normale mennesker: barberer, kontorfolk, funktionærer.
And so what he did was he tested 1,000 ordinary people. 500 New Haven, Connecticut, 500 Bridgeport. And the ad said, "Psychologists want to understand memory. We want to improve people's memory, because it is the key to success." OK? "We're going to give you five bucks -- four dollars for your time. We don't want college students. We want men between 20 and 50." In the later studies, they ran women. Ordinary people: barbers, clerks, white-collar people.
Så, I går ned, og en af jer skal være elev, og en af jer skal være lærer. Eleven er en venlig, midaldrende fyr. Han bliver spændt fast til chokapparatet i et andet rum. Eleven kunne være midaldrende, kunne være så ung som 20. Og en af jer får at vide af autoriteten, fyren i kitlen, "Dit job som lærer er at give denne fyr materiale at lære. Lærer han det, beløn ham. Lærer han ikke, trykker du en knap på chokkassen. Den første knap er 15 volt. Han mærker det ikke engang." Det er nøglen. Al ondskab starter ved 15 volt. Og det næste skridt er 15 volt mere. Problemet er, at i slutningen er det 450 volt. Og som man skruer op, skriger fyren, "Jeg har en hjertesygdom! Jeg vil ud herfra!"
So, you go down, one of you will be a learner, one will be a teacher. The learner's a genial, middle-aged guy. He gets tied up to the shock apparatus in another room. The learner could be middle-aged, could be as young as 20. And one of you is told by the authority, the guy in the lab coat, "Your job as teacher is to give him material to learn. Gets it right, reward. Gets it wrong, you press a button on the shock box. The first button is 15 volts. He doesn't even feel it." That's the key. All evil starts with 15 volts. And then the next step is another 15 volts. The problem is, at the end of the line, it's 450 volts. And as you go along, the guy is screaming, "I've got a heart condition! I'm out of here!"
Du er en god person. Du klager. "Sir, hvem tager ansvaret, hvis der sker noget med ham?" Forsøgslederen siger, "Bare rolig, jeg tager ansvaret. Fortsæt, lærer." Og spørgsmålet er, hvem ville skrue helt op til 450 volt? I bør bemærke her, når den når 375, siger den, "Fare. Voldsomt chok." Når den når herop, står der "XXX" -- magtens porno. (Latter)
You're a good person. You complain. "Sir, who will be responsible if something happens to him?" The experimenter says, "Don't worry, I will be responsible. Continue, teacher." And the question is, who would go all the way to 450 volts? You should notice here, when it gets up to 375, it says, "Danger. Severe Shock." When it gets up to here, there's "XXX" -- the pornography of power. So Milgram asks 40 psychiatrists,
Så Milgram spørger 40 psykiatere, "Hvor stor procentdel af amerikanske borger ville gå hele vejen?" De sagde kun én procent. Fordi det er sadistisk opførsel, og vi ved, psykiatrien ved, kun én procent af amerikanerne er sadistiske. OK. Her er dataene. De kunne ikke tage mere fejl. To tredjedele går hele vejen til 450 volt. Dette var bare ét studie. Milgram foretog mere end 16 studier. Og se på det her. I studie 16, hvor man ser nogen som sig selv gå hele vejen, går 90 procent hele vejen. I studie fem, hvis man ser folk gøre oprør, gør 90 procent oprør. Hvad med kvinder? Studie 13 -- ingen forskel fra mænd. Så Milgram kvantificerer ondskab som folks villighed til blindt at adlyde autoritet, til at gå hele vejen til 450 volt. Og det er som en knap på menneskets natur. En knap på den måde, at man kan gøre næsten enhver totalt adlydende, ned til flertallet, ned til ingen.
"What percent of American citizens would go to the end?" They said only one percent. Because that's sadistic behavior, and we know, psychiatry knows, only one percent of Americans are sadistic. OK. Here's the data. They could not be more wrong. Two thirds go all the way to 450 volts. This was just one study. Milgram did more than 16 studies. And look at this. In study 16, where you see somebody like you go all the way, 90 percent go all the way. In study five, if you see people rebel, 90 percent rebel. What about women? Study 13 -- no different than men. So Milgram is quantifying evil as the willingness of people to blindly obey authority, to go all the way to 450 volts. And it's like a dial on human nature. A dial in a sense that you can make almost everybody totally obedient, down to the majority, down to none.
Så hvilke eksterne paralleller findes? For al forskning er kunstig. Hvilken gyldighed har det i den virkelige verden? 912 amerikanske borgere begik selvmord eller blev myrdet af familie og venner i Guyanas jungle i 1978, fordi de blindt adlød denne mand, deres pastor -- ikke deres præst -- deres pastor, Pastor Jim Jones. Han overtalte dem til at begå kollektivt selvmord. Derfor er han den moderne Lucifer-effekt, en Guds mand, der bliver Dødsenglen. Milgrams studie handler om individuel autoritet til at kontrollere folk. Det meste af tiden er vi i institutioner, så Stanford Fængselsstudiet er et studie af institutioners magt til at påvirke individuel opførsel. Interessant nok var Stanley Milgram og jeg i samme gymnasieklasse i James Monroe i Bronx, 1954.
What are the external parallels? For all research is artificial. What's the validity in the real world? 912 American citizens committed suicide or were murdered by family and friends in Guyana jungle in 1978, because they were blindly obedient to this guy, their pastor -- not their priest -- their pastor, Reverend Jim Jones. He persuaded them to commit mass suicide. And so, he's the modern Lucifer effect, a man of God who becomes the Angel of Death. Milgram's study is all about individual authority to control people. Most of the time, we are in institutions, so the Stanford Prison Study is a study of the power of institutions to influence individual behavior. Interestingly, Stanley Milgram and I were in the same high school class in James Monroe in the Bronx, 1954.
Så dette studie, som jeg foretog med mine kandidatstuderende, især Craig Haney -- vi begyndte også med en annonce. Vi havde ikke penge, så vi havde en billig, lille annonce, men vi ville have universitetsstuderende til et studie af fængselsliv. 75 personer meldte sig, tog personlighedstests. Vi foretog interview. Valgte to dusin: de mest normale, de sundeste. Vi valgte tilfældigt hvem, der skulle være fange og vagt. Så på dag et vidste vi, vi havde gode æbler. Jeg vil sætte dem i en dårlig situation.
I did this study with my graduate students, especially Craig Haney -- and it also began work with an ad. We had a cheap, little ad, but we wanted college students for a study of prison life. 75 people volunteered, took personality tests. We did interviews. Picked two dozen: the most normal, the most healthy. Randomly assigned them to be prisoner and guard. So on day one, we knew we had good apples. I'm going to put them in a bad situation.
Og for det andet vidste vi, der ikke er nogen forskel på drengene, der skal være vagter, og drengene, der skal være fanger. Børnene, der skulle være fanger, vi sagde, "Vent hjemme på kollegierne. Studiet begynder på søndag." Vi fortalte dem ikke, at bypolitiet ville komme og foretage realistiske anholdelser.
And secondly, we know there's no difference between the boys who will be guards and those who will be prisoners. To the prisoners, we said, "Wait at home. The study will begin Sunday." We didn't tell them that the city police were going to come and do realistic arrests.
(Video) (Music)
(Video) Studerende: En politibil trækker op foran, og en betjent kommer til fordøren og banker og siger, han leder efter mig. Så lige der tog de mig ud af døren, de satte mine hænder mod bilen. Det var en ægte politibil, det var en ægte politimand, og der var ægte naboer på gaden, der ikke vidste, at dette var et eksperiment. Og der var kameraer og naboer over det hele. De satte mig ind i bilen, så kørte de mig rundt i Palo Alto. De tog mig til politistationen, politistationens kælder. Så satte de mig i en celle. Jeg var den første, der blev samlet op, så de satte mig en celle, der var som et rum med en dør med tremmer. Man kunne se, det ikke var et ægte fængsel. De låste mig inde i dette nedværdigende tøj. De tog dette eksperiment for seriøst.
[Day 1] Student: A police car pulls up in front, and a cop comes to the front door, and knocks, and says he's looking for me. So they, right there, you know, they took me out the door, they put my hands against the car. It was a real cop car, it was a real policeman, and there were real neighbors in the street, who didn't know that this was an experiment. And there was cameras all around and neighbors all around. They put me in the car, then they drove me around Palo Alto. They took me to the basement of the police station. Then they put me in a cell. I was the first one to be picked up, so they put me in a cell, which was just like a room with a door with bars on it. You could tell it wasn't a real jail. They locked me in there, in this degrading little outfit. They were taking this experiment too seriously.
Philip Zimbardo: Her er fangerne, der skal umenneskeliggøres. De vil blive til tal. Her er vagterne med magtens og anonymitetens symboler. Vagter får fanger til at rensetoiletkummerne med deres bare hænder, til at lave andre ydmygende opgaver. De klæder dem af. De håner dem seksuelt. De begynder at lave nedværdigende aktiviteter, som at få dem til at simulere sodomi. I så simuleret fellatio ved soldater i Abu Ghraib. Mine vagter gjorde det på fem dage. Stressreaktionen var så ekstrem, at normale børn, vi valgte, fordi de var sunde, brød sammen inden 36 timer. Studiet stoppede efter seks dage, fordi det var ude af kontrol. Fem børn havde følelsesmæssige sammenbrud.
Here are the prisoners, who are going to be dehumanized, they'll become numbers. Here are the guards with the symbols of power and anonymity. Guards get prisoners to clean the toilet bowls out with their bare hands, to do other humiliating tasks. They strip them naked. They sexually taunt them. They begin to do degrading activities, like having them simulate sodomy. You saw simulating fellatio in soldiers in Abu Ghraib. My guards did it in five days. The stress reaction was so extreme that normal kids we picked because they were healthy had breakdowns within 36 hours. The study ended after six days, because it was out of control. Five kids had emotional breakdowns.
Gør det en forskel, om krigere går i kamp og forandrer deres udseende eller ej? Gør anonymitet en forskel for måden, hvorpå de behandler deres ofre? I nogle kulturer går de i krig uden at ændre deres udseende. I andre kulturer maler de sig som i "Fluernes Herre." I nogle bærer de masker. I mange er soldaterne anonyme i uniform. So denne antropolog, John Watson, fandt 23 kulturer, der havde to dele af data. Ændrede de deres udseende? 15. Dræber, torturerer, lemlæster de? 13. Hvis de ikke ændrer deres udseende, dræber, torturerer eller lemlæster kun en ud af otte. Nøglen er i den røde zone. Hvis de ændrer deres udseende, vil 12 ud af 13 -- det er 90 procent -- dræbe, torturere, lemlæste. Og det er anonymitetens magt.
Does it make a difference if warriors go to battle changing their appearance or not? If they're anonymous, how do they treat their victims? In some cultures, they go to war without changing their appearance. In others, they paint themselves like "Lord of the Flies." In some, they wear masks. In many, soldiers are anonymous in uniform. So this anthropologist, John Watson, found 23 cultures that had two bits of data. Do they change their appearance? 15. Do they kill, torture, mutilate? 13. If they don't change their appearance, only one of eight kills, tortures or mutilates. The key is in the red zone. If they change their appearance, 12 of 13 -- that's 90 percent -- kill, torture, mutilate. And that's the power of anonymity.
Så hvilke syv sociale processer smører ondskabens glidebane? At tage det første lille skridt uden at tænke. Umenneskeliggørelse af andre. Af-individualisering af Selv'et. Spredning af personligt ansvar. Blind lydighed over for autoritet. Ukritisk tilpassethed til gruppenormer. Passiv tolerance af ondskab gennem manglende handling eller ligegyldighed.
So what are the seven social processes that grease the slippery slope of evil? Mindlessly taking the first small step. Dehumanization of others. De-individuation of self. Diffusion of personal responsibility. Blind obedience to authority. Uncritical conformity to group norms. Passive tolerance of evil through inaction, or indifference.
Og det sker, når man er i en ny eller ukendt situation. Ens vanemæssige reaktionsmønstre virker ikke. Ens personlighed og moral er frigjort. "Intet er lettere end at fordømme udøveren af ondskab; intet sværere end at forstå ham," fortæller Dostojevskij os. At forstå er ikke at undskylde. Psykologi er ikke undskyld-ologi.
And it happens when you're in a new or unfamiliar situation. Your habitual response patterns don't work. Your personality and morality are disengaged. "Nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer; nothing more difficult than understanding him," Dostoyevsky. Understanding is not excusing. Psychology is not excuse-ology.
Så social og psykologisk forskning afslører, hvordan normale, gode mennesker kan blive forvandlet uden stofferne. Man behøver dem ikke. Man behøver bare de social-psykologiske processer. Virkelige verden paralleller? Sammenlign dette med dette. James Schlessinger -- og jeg bliver nødt at slutte med dette -- siger, "Psykologer har forsøgt at forstå, hvordan og hvorfor individer og grupper, der som regel opfører sig menneskeligt, nogle gange kan opføre sig anderledes under bestemte forhold." Det er Lucifer-effekten. Og han fortsætter med at sige, "Milepælen, Stanford-studiet, fortæller en advarende fortælling til alle militære operationer." Hvis man giver folk magt uden tilsyn, er det en recept på misbrug. De vidste det, og lod det ske.
So social and psychological research reveals how ordinary, good people can be transformed without the drugs. You don't need it. You just need the social-psychological processes. Real world parallels? Compare this with this. James Schlesinger -- I'm going to end with this -- says, "Psychologists have attempted to understand how and why individuals and groups who usually act humanely can sometimes act otherwise in certain circumstances." That's the Lucifer effect. And he goes on to say, "The landmark Stanford study provides a cautionary tale for all military operations." If you give people power without oversight, it's a prescription for abuse.
Så en anden rapport, en efterforskningsrapport af General Fay,
They knew that, and let that happen.
siger, systemet er skyldigt. Og i denne rapport, siger han, det var miljøet, der skabte Abu Ghraib, ved lederskabsbrister, der bidrog til forekomsten af sådant misbrug, og det faktum, at det forblev uopdaget af højere autoriteter i lang tid. De misbrug stod på i tre måneder. Hvem holdt øje med butikken? Svaret er ingen og ingen med vilje. Han gav vagterne tilladelse til at gøre de ting, og de vidste, ingen nogensinde ville komme ned i det fangehul.
So another report, an investigative report by General Fay, says the system is guilty. In this report, he says it was the environment that created Abu Ghraib, by leadership failures that contributed to the occurrence of such abuse, and because it remained undiscovered by higher authorities for a long period of time. Those abuses went on for three months. Who was watching the store? The answer is nobody, I think on purpose. He gave the guards permission to do those things, and they knew nobody was ever going to come down to that dungeon.
Så man behøver et paradigmeskift på alle disse områder. Skiftet er væk fra den medicinske model, der kun fokuserer på individet. Skiftet er imod en folkesundhedsmodel, der erkender situations- og systemiske sygdomsvektorer. Mobning er en sygdom. Fordomsfuldhed er en sygdom. Vold er en sygdom. Og siden Inkvisitionen, har vi håndteret problemer på det individuelle niveau. Og ved I hvad? Det virker ikke. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn siger, "Linjen mellem godt og ondt skærer gennem hjertet på ethvert menneske." Det betyder, den linje ikke er derude. Det er et valg, som man må foretage. Det er noget personligt.
So you need a paradigm shift in all of these areas. The shift is away from the medical model that focuses only on the individual. The shift is toward a public health model that recognizes situational and systemic vectors of disease. Bullying is a disease. Prejudice is a disease. Violence is a disease. Since the Inquisition, we've been dealing with problems at the individual level. It doesn't work. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn says, "The line between good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being." That means that line is not out there.
Så jeg vil slutte meget hurtigt af i en positiv tone.
That's a decision that you have to make, a personal thing.
Heltemod er modgiften mod ondskab, ved at fremkalde den heltemodige fantasi, især i vores børn, i vores uddannelsessystem. Vi vil have børn til at tænke, jeg er den afventende helt, venter på den rette situation kommer, og jeg vil agere heroisk. Hele mit liv vil nu fokusere væk fra ondskab -- som jeg har været i, siden jeg var barn -- for at forstå helte.
So I want to end very quickly on a positive note. Heroism as the antidote to evil, by promoting the heroic imagination, especially in our kids, in our educational system. We want kids to think, "I'm a hero in waiting, waiting for the right situation to come along, and I will act heroically. My whole life, I'm now going to focus away from evil -- that I've been in since I was a kid -- to understanding heroes.
Heltemodets banalitet er, det er normale mennesker, der gør heroiske gerninger. Det er kontrasten til Hannah Arendts "Ondskabens Banalitet." Vores traditionelle samfundshelte er forkerte, fordi de er undtagelserne. De organiserer hele deres liv omkring dette. Det er derfor, vi kender deres navne. Og vores børns helte er også forkerte idoler, for de har overnaturlige kræfter. Vi vil have vores børn til at indse, de fleste helte er hverdagsfolk, og den heroiske gerning er usædvanlig. Dette er Joe Darby. Han var den, der stoppede de misbrug, I så, for da han så de billeder, overleverede han dem til en auditør. Han var en lavtrangerende menig, og det stoppede det. Var han en helt? Nej. Man blev nødt til at skjule ham, fordi folk ville slå ham ihjel, og så han mor og hans kone. I tre år gemte de sig.
Banality of heroism. It's ordinary people who do heroic deeds. It's the counterpoint to Hannah Arendt's "Banality of Evil." Our traditional societal heroes are wrong, because they are the exceptions. They organize their life around this. That's why we know their names. Our kids' heroes are also wrong models for them, because they have supernatural talents. We want our kids to realize most heroes are everyday people, and the heroic act is unusual. This is Joe Darby. He was the one that stopped those abuses you saw, because when he saw those images, he turned them over to a senior investigating officer. He was a low-level private, and that stopped it. Was he a hero? No. They had to put him in hiding, because people wanted to kill him, and then his mother and his wife. For three years, they were in hiding.
Dette er kvinden, der stoppede Stanford Fængselsstudiet. Da jeg sagde, det kom ud af kontrol, var jeg fængselsdirektøren. Jeg vidste ikke, det var ude af kontrol. Jeg var totalt ligeglad. Hun kom ned, så det galehus og sagde, "Ved du hvad, det er frygteligt, hvad du gør ved de drenge. De er ikke fanger, de er ikke vagter, de er drenge, og du er ansvarlig." Og jeg stoppede forsøget dagen efter. Den gode nyhed er, jeg giftede mig med hende året efter. (Latter) (Bifald) Jeg kom bare til mig selv, tydeligvis.
This is the woman who stopped the Stanford Prison Study. When I said it got out of control, I was the prison superintendent. I didn't know it was out of control. I was totally indifferent. She saw that madhouse and said, "You know what, it's terrible what you're doing to those boys. They're not prisoners nor guards, they're boys, and you are responsible." And I ended the study the next day. The good news is I married her the next year. (Laughter) (Applause) I just came to my senses, obviously.
Så situationer har magten til at gøre, gennem -- men pointen er, dette er den samme situation, der kan oppiske den fjendtlige fantasi i nogle af os, der gør os til udøvere af ondskab, kan inspirere den heroiske fantasi hos andre. Det er den samme situation. Og man er på den ene eller anden side. De fleste er skyldige i ondskab ved passivitet, fordi mor sagde, "Bland dig uden om. Pas dine egne sager." Og man må sige, "Mor, menneskeheden er mine sager."
So situations have the power to do [three things]. But the point is, this is the same situation that can inflame the hostile imagination in some of us, that makes us perpetrators of evil, can inspire the heroic imagination in others. It's the same situation and you're on one side or the other. Most people are guilty of the evil of inaction, because your mother said, "Don't get involved. Mind your own business." And you have to say, "Mama, humanity is my business."
Så heltemodets psykologi er -- vi stopper om et øjeblik -- hvordan opildner vi børn i nye heltekurser, som jeg arbejder med Matt Langdon -- han har et helteværksted -- til at udvikle denne heroiske fantasi, denne selv-markering, "Jeg er en afventende helt," og lære dem evner. For at være en helt må man lære at være afvigende, for man vil altid gå imod gruppens tilpassethed. Helte er normale mennesker, hvis sociale handlinger er usædvanlige. Som handler.
So the psychology of heroism is -- we're going to end in a moment -- how do we encourage children in new hero courses, that I'm working on with Matt Langdon -- he has a hero workshop -- to develop this heroic imagination, this self-labeling, "I am a hero in waiting," and teach them skills. To be a hero, you have to learn to be a deviant, because you're always going against the conformity of the group. Heroes are ordinary people whose social actions are extraordinary. Who act.
Nøglen til heltemod er to ting. A: man må handle, når andre folk er passive. B: man må handle socio-centreret, ikke egocentreret. Og jeg vil slutte med historien, som nogle af jer kender, om Wesley Autrey, New York undergrundshelt. Halvtreds år gamle afrikansk-amerikanske bygningsarbejder. Han står i undergrunden i New York. En hvid mand falder på skinnerne. Undergrundstoget kommer. Der er 75 personer til stede. Ved I hvad? De fryser. Han har en grund til ikke at blande sig. Han er sort, manden er hvid, og han har to små børn. I stedet giver han sine børn til en fremmed, springer på skinnerne, lægger manden mellem skinnerne, lægger sig på ham, toget kører over ham. Wesley og manden -- 52 cm høje. Togets højde er 53 cm. Halvanden cm ville have revet hovedet af ham. Og han sagde, "Jeg gjorde, hvad enhver kunne have gjort," ikke noget stort at hoppe på skinnerne.
The key to heroism is two things. You have to act when other people are passive. B: You have to act socio-centrically, not egocentrically. And I want to end with a known story about Wesley Autrey, New York subway hero. Fifty-year-old African-American construction worker standing on a subway. A white guy falls on the tracks. The subway train is coming. There's 75 people there. You know what? They freeze. He's got a reason not to get involved. He's black, the guy's white, and he's got two kids. Instead, he gives his kids to a stranger, jumps on the tracks, puts the guy between the tracks, lays on him, the subway goes over him. Wesley and the guy -- 20 and a half inches height. The train clearance is 21 inches. A half an inch would have taken his head off. And he said, "I did what anyone could do," no big deal to jump on the tracks.
Og det moralske bud er, "Jeg gjorde, hvad enhver bør gøre." Og derfor en dag vil man være i en ny situation. Tag vej ét, man bliver en udøver af ondskab. Ond, og man bliver til Arthur Andersen. Man vil snyde, eller man vil mobbe. Vej to, man bliver skyldig i ondskaben ved passiv inaktivitet. Vej tre, man bliver en helt. Pointen er, er vi klar til at tage vejen til at fejre normale helte, vente på, den rette situation kommer til at sætte heroisk fantasi til handling? Fordi det sker måske kun én gang i ens liv, og når man lader den passere, vil man altid vide, jeg kunne være blevet en helt, og jeg lod det gå forbi. Så pointen er at tænke det og så gøre det.
And the moral imperative is "I did what everyone should do." And so one day, you will be in a new situation. Take path one, you're going to be a perpetrator of evil. Evil, meaning you're going to be Arthur Andersen. You're going to cheat, or you're going to allow bullying. Path two, you become guilty of the evil of passive inaction. Path three, you become a hero. The point is, are we ready to take the path to celebrating ordinary heroes, waiting for the right situation to come along to put heroic imagination into action? Because it may only happen once in your life, and when you pass it by, you'll always know, I could have been a hero and I let it pass me by. So the point is thinking it and then doing it.
Så jeg vil takke jer. Tak. Tak. Lad os modsætte os onde systemers magt hjemme og generelt, og lad os fokusere på det positive. Tale for respekt for personlig værdighed, retfærdighed og fred, hvilket vores regering sørgeligt nok ikke har gjort. Mange tak. (Bifald)
So I want to thank you. Thank you. Let's oppose the power of evil systems at home and abroad, and let's focus on the positive. Advocate for respect of personal dignity, for justice and peace, which sadly our administration has not been doing. Thanks so much. (Applause)