I'm going to talk about post-conflict recovery and how we might do post-conflict recovery better. The record on post-conflict recovery is not very impressive. 40 percent of all post-conflict situations, historically, have reverted back to conflict within a decade. In fact, they've accounted for half of all civil wars. Why has the record been so poor? Well, the conventional approach to post-conflict situations has rested on, on kind of, three principles.
我要谈的是关于冲突后的重建 以及怎样将重建做得更好。 这方面的记录并不是很好。 历史上,经过冲突后重建的地区, 有40%在十年内再次发生冲突。 实际上,他们占了所有内战的一半。 记录为什么这么差呢? 嗯,传统的 应对冲突后情况的方法 可以说,都是基于三个原则。
The first principle is: it's the politics that matters. So, the first thing that is prioritized is politics. Try and build a political settlement first. And then the second step is to say, "The situation is admittedly dangerous, but only for a short time." So get peacekeepers there, but get them home as soon as possible. So, short-term peacekeepers. And thirdly, what is the exit strategy for the peacekeepers? It's an election. That will produce a legitimate and accountable government.
第一个原则是:政治才是事关重要的。 所以,首先被给予优先的是政治, 即应该先试着从政治角度解决。 然后是第二步,是宣称: “情况确实很危险,但只是暂时的。” 于是就会派维和人员过去,不过要让他们尽快撤出。 因此,第二个原则就是短期维和。 第三个原则:维和人员撤出的策略是什么? 是选举, 通过选举产生一个合法负责的政府。
So that's the conventional approach. I think that approach denies reality. We see that there is no quick fix. There's certainly no quick security fix. I've tried to look at the risks of reversion to conflict, during our post-conflict decade. And the risks stay high throughout the decade. And they stay high regardless of the political innovations. Does an election produce an accountable and legitimate government? What an election produces is a winner and a loser. And the loser is unreconciled. The reality is that we need to reverse the sequence. It's not the politics first; it's actually the politics last. The politics become easier as the decade progresses if you're building on a foundation of security and economic development -- the rebuilding of prosperity.
这就是传统应对冲突后状况的方法了。 我认为这种方法是在否认现实。 我们很明白根本不可能速战速决。 根本也不可能短期就实现维和。 我试着观察,在冲突结束后的十年间, 再次发生冲突的风险。 结论是,整个十年间,这种风险都很高, 并且不因政治革新而减低。 此外,选举能产生合法可靠的政府吗? 不,选举产生的是一个赢家和一个失败者。 而失败者是不会甘心的。 实际上,我们应该调换一下顺序, 政治不应该排第一, 而应该是最后。 冲突后十年间,政治会变得更容易, 如果重建是以安定和经济发展 为基础。 重建繁荣
Why does the politics get easier? And why is it so difficult initially? Because after years of stagnation and decline, the mentality of politics is that it's a zero-sum game. If the reality is stagnation, I can only go up if you go down. And that doesn't produce a productive politics. And so the mentality has to shift from zero-sum to positive-sum before you can get a productive politics. You can only get positive, that mental shift, if the reality is that prosperity is being built. And in order to build prosperity, we need security in place. So that is what you get when you face reality. But the objective of facing reality is to change reality.
为什么政治会变的更容易呢? 还有,为什么原来那么困难? 因为经过多年的发展停滞和倒退 政客会持一种“零和”心态,即一方有所得,另一方必有所失,得失相加等于零。 现实既然停滞不动, 那么如果有人下台,就得有人上台。 以这样的心态从政,是没法有什么成果的。 因此,心态必须改变, 由“零和”变成“正和”, 这样政治才可能出成果。 要想得到好的结果,就要转变心态, 相信繁荣正在恢复。 要重建繁荣,安全措施就要到位。 这才是面对现实的好处。 不过,面对现实的目的 是为了改变现实。
And so now let me suggest two complimentary approaches to changing the reality of the situations. The first is to recognize the interdependence of three key actors, who are different actors, and at the moment are uncoordinated. The first actor is the Security Council. The Security Council typically has the responsibility for providing the peacekeepers who build the security. And that needs to be recognized, first of all, that peacekeeping works. It is a cost-effective approach. It does increase security. But it needs to be done long-term. It needs to be a decade-long approach, rather than just a couple of years. That's one actor, the Security Council.
因此,接下来我想提 两条补充办法 来改变现状。 第一条是认识到三个主要角色的相互依赖性—— 这三个因素各不相同 且目前还不能协调运作。 第一个角色是安全委员会, 它一般负责 输送维和人员 来维持安定。 这里,首先要肯定的是 维和是有用的, 是一种低成本高效率的方法, 能切实提高社会的安全度。 不过,要强调的是,维和应该是一项长期工程, 持续时间应达上十年, 而不是三两年就完事了。 这是安全委员会这个角色。
The second actor, different cast of guys, is the donors. The donors provide post-conflict aid. Typically in the past, the donors have been interested in the first couple of years, and then they got bored. They moved on to some other situation. Post-conflict economic recovery is a slow process. There are no quick processes in economics except decline. You can do that quite fast. (Laughter) So the donors have to stick with this situation for at least a decade.
第二个来自另一个阶层的角色, 是捐助者, 他们在冲突发生后提供资助。 过去经常发生的情况是, 捐助者在头几年里很热心, 可后来就失去了兴趣, 转去关注其它事件。 然而实际是,冲突后的经济复苏 是一个缓慢的过程。 经济学上没有什么是能很快就发生, 除了经济衰退, 这个发生起来可快了。 (观众笑) 所以,捐助者要坚持下去, 至少坚持捐助一个事件十年。
And then the third key actor is the post-conflict government. And there are two key things it's got to do. One is it's got to do economic reform, not fuss about the political constitution. It's got to reform economic policy. Why? Because during conflict economic policy typically deteriorates. Governments snatch short-term opportunities and, by the end of the conflict, the chickens have come home to roost.
然后是第三个重要角色, 冲突后的政府。 有两件重要的事是它必须要做的。 一是必须要经济改革, 而不是在政治格局方面争论不休。 它要做的是革新经济政策。 为什么?因为冲突发生时, 经济政策一般都会恶化。 政府只顾攫取短期利益, 到冲突结束时,就会发现害人终害己。
So this legacy of conflict is really bad economic policy. So there is a reform agenda, and there is an inclusion agenda. The inclusion agenda doesn't come from elections. Elections produce a loser, who is then excluded. So the inclusion agenda means genuinely bringing people inside the tent. So those three actors. And they are interdependent over a long term. If the Security Council doesn't commit to security over the course of a decade, you don't get the reassurance which produces private investment. If you don't get the policy reform and the aid, you don't get the economic recovery, which is the true exit strategy for the peacekeepers. So we should recognize that interdependence, by formal, mutual commitments. The United Nations actually has a language for these mutual commitments, the recognition of mutual commitments; it's called the language of compact. And so we need a post-conflict compact. The United Nations even has an agency which could broker these compacts; it's called the Peace Building Commission.
所以冲突的一个产物就是恶性经济政策。 那么就要有一个改革计划,以及一个吸纳各方力量的计划。 这个吸纳计划不是通过选举产生—— 选举产生的是失败者,要排除在外。 吸纳计划是真正 将人们集聚到同一个帐营下来。 这就是重建繁荣的三个重要角色, 他们在很长的一段时期内, 是相互依赖的。 如果安全委员会 十年内不能致力于社会安定, 就没法让人安心进行个人投资; 如果没有政策改革和捐助, 经济就不能复苏, 维和人员就没法真正撤出。 因此,对于这种相互依赖性, 应该以各方的正式承诺来相互认定。 事实上,联合国对于这种相互承诺, 有专门的表述, 叫做约定语言, 而我们需要的就是冲突后约定。 联合国甚至还有个对这类约定仲裁的机构, 叫做“和平建立委员会”。
It would be ideal to have a standard set of norms where, when we got to a post-conflict situation, there was an expectation of these mutual commitments from the three parties. So that's idea one: recognize interdependence. And now let me turn to the second approach, which is complimentary. And that is to focus on a few critical objectives. Typical post-conflict situation is a zoo of different actors with different priorities. And indeed, unfortunately, if you navigate by needs you get a very unfocused agenda, because in these situations, needs are everywhere, but the capacity to implement change is very limited. So we have to be disciplined and focus on things that are critical.
要是有一套标准就理想了, 这样不论何时何地出现冲突后事件, 人们可以期待上述三个角色 建立履行这些承诺。 以上是我的两条改变冲突后现状的补充方法之一—— 认识相互依赖性。 下面我要讲的是第二个补充办法, 即专注于实现几个关键目标。 传统的冲突后情况就像一个动物园, 里面有许多不同的角色,他们都有不同的侧重点。 如果以需求为导向,那么很不幸的, 将会有一堆杂乱、没有重点的事要办。 这是因为冲突后,需求无处不在, 而满足这些需求的能力是有限的。 所以我们应有秩序,集中解决关键的事。
And I want to suggest that in the typical post-conflict situation three things are critical. One is jobs. One is improvements in basic services -- especially health, which is a disaster during conflict. So jobs, health, and clean government. Those are the three critical priorities. So I'm going to talk a little about each of them.
我的建议是,在一般的冲突后情况下, 三件事是关键的。 一是就业, 一是改进基础服务, 尤其是卫生,冲突时根本无卫生可言。 另一个是廉洁的政府。 这三者是当务之急。 下面我会就这三者稍微分别谈论一下。
Jobs. What is a distinctive approach to generating jobs in post-conflict situations? And why are jobs so important? Jobs for whom? Especially jobs for young men. In post-conflict situations, the reason that they so often revert to conflict, is not because elderly women get upset. It's because young men get upset. And why are they upset? Because they have nothing to do. And so we need a process of generating jobs, for ordinary young men, fast. Now, that is difficult. Governments in post-conflict situation often respond by puffing up the civil service. That is not a good idea. It's not sustainable. In fact, you're building a long-term liability by inflating civil service. But getting the private sector to expand is also difficult, because any activity which is open to international trade is basically going to be uncompetitive in a post-conflict situation. These are not environments where you can build export manufacturing.
就业 什么方法是明确有效的, 能在冲突后的地区创造就业机会? 还有为什么就业如此重要? 让谁就业?首要是年轻男人。 发生过冲突的地区, 之所以日后常常再次发生冲突, 不是因为上了年纪的妇女, 而是因为年轻男人不安分。 他们为什么不安分?因为他们没事做。 正因此,要有套流程, 给普通年轻男人制作工作机会,而且要快。 而要做到这一点,是不容易的。 冲突后的政府 通常的应对方式是猛招公务员。 这不是个好方法。 它不是长久之计。 实际上,把政府部门变得臃肿, 是在欠下长期债务。 然而,要让私人行业扩张也很困难。, 因为任何国际贸易相关的业务 在冲突后情况下 基本都不会有竞争力。 这种环境下发展出口型生产是行不通的。
There's one sector which isn't exposed to international trade, and which can generate a lot of jobs, and which is, in any case, a sensible sector to expand, post-conflict, and that is the construction sector. The construction sector has a vital role, obviously, in reconstruction. But typically that sector has withered away during conflict. During conflict people are doing destruction. There isn't any construction going on. And so the sector shrivels away. And then when you try and expand it, because it's shriveled away, you encounter a lot of bottlenecks. Basically, prices soar and crooked politicians then milk the rents from the sector, but it doesn't generate any jobs. And so the policy priority is to break the bottlenecks in expanding the construction sector.
有一个行业,跟国际贸易无关, 并且能创造很多工作机会, 而且这个行业,无论怎么说, 在冲突后扩大,都是很明智的。 它就是建筑业。 建筑业很明显,在重建中, 扮演关键角色。 不过冲突过程中,它一般都萎缩掉了。 冲突时,人们是破坏建筑, 没有任何工程在建,行业也因此收缩了。 那么当想要扩张的时候, 由于行业已经收缩了, 就会碰到很多瓶颈。 基本的,价格飞涨, 不良政客还要从中牟利, 却没有新的工作岗位产生。 为此,应有政策优先打破 妨碍建筑业扩张的瓶颈。
What might the bottlenecks be? Just think what you have to do successfully to build a structure, using a lot of labor. First you need access to land. Often the legal system is broken down so you can't even get access to land. Secondly you need skills, the mundane skills of the construction sector. In post-conflict situations we don't just need Doctors Without Borders, we need Bricklayers Without Borders, to rebuild the skill set. We need firms. The firms have gone away. So we need to encourage the growth of local firms. If we do that, we not only get the jobs, we get the improvements in public infrastructure, the restoration of public infrastructure.
瓶颈有哪些? 只要设想一下有个建筑项目,要雇用大量劳动力, 有什么是要顺利完成的,就清楚了。 首先需要土地。 通常这个时候法律系统是瘫痪的, 可能根本没法得到土地。 其次需要技术, 建筑业必须的技术。 冲突后,需要的不只是无国界医生, 还需要无国界的砖瓦匠 来重新掌握技术。 另外还需要公司。原来的公司已经撤掉了, 那就要鼓励发展地方企业。 这样做,不仅能制造就业机会, 还能改善基础公共设施, 修复基础公共设施。
Let me turn from jobs to the second objective, which is improving basic social services. And to date, there has been a sort of a schizophrenia in the donor community, as to how to build basic services in post-conflict sectors. On the one hand it pays lip service to the idea of rebuild an effective state in the image of Scandinavia in the 1950s. Lets develop line ministries of this, that, and the other, that deliver these services. And it's schizophrenic because in their hearts donors know that's not a realistic agenda, and so what they also do is the total bypass: just fund NGOs.
讲了就业,下面要讲第二个目标, 即改善基础社会服务。 然而至今为止,关于冲突后情况下, 如何改善基本服务, 在捐助者群体中, 存在着一种精神分裂。 一方面,他们嘴上说的很好听, 要重建一个有效的国家, 以50年代的斯堪的纳维亚为蓝本; 设立这样那样的部 来提供这些服务。 说捐助者们精神分裂,是因为他们心里知道 这样的计划是不现实的。 所以尽管这样说,他们做的却是绕道而行, 即资助非政府组织。
Neither of those approaches is sensible. And so what I'd suggest is what I call Independent Service Authorities. It's to split the functions of a monopoly line ministry up into three. The planning function and policy function stays with the ministry; the delivery of services on the ground, you should use whatever works -- churches, NGOs, local communities, whatever works. And in between, there should be a public agency, the Independent Service Authority, which channels public money, and especially donor money, to the retail providers. So the NGOs become part of a public government system, rather than independent of it.
这些方法其实都行不通。 我的建议, 我把它叫做“独立服务权威机构”。 这个机构把原来政府一把抓的职能分成三个部分 规划和制定政策的功能仍归政府部门, 而政策服务的实地执行 要启用任何可用的力量, 包括教堂,民间组织,当地社区等, 所有的力量。 而这中间,应该有一个公共机构, 也就是我说的“地理服务权威机构”, 负责将公众的钱 特别是捐款 发放给各类服务的供应商。 这样,民间组织就变成了一个公共政府系统的一部分, 而不是独立于政府之外的。
One advantage of that is that you can allocate money coherently. Another is, you can make NGOs accountable. You can use yardstick competition, so they have to compete against each other for the resources. The good NGOs, like Oxfam, are very keen on this idea. They want to have the discipline and accountability. So that's a way to get basic services scaled up. And because the government would be funding it, it would be co-branding these services. So they wouldn't be provided thanks to the United States government and some NGO. They would be co-branded as being done by the post-conflict government, in the country. So, jobs, basic services, finally, clean government.
这样做,一个好处是可以系统地分配钱, 另外还能使民间组织对自身的行为负责。 为此,可以设立竞争的标准, 这样不同的民间组织可以互相竞争 来获取资源。 优秀的民间组织,如Oxfam,就会赞成这种做法, 他们希望有纪律性和责任制。 以上讲的就是改善基础服务的一个方法。 由于这个方法政府也要赞助, 因此可以给活动命名时加上自己的名义。 这样活动就不是 以美国政府和某个非政府组织的名义了, 而是可以加上 冲突后国家的政府的名义。 这样,就业和基础服务有了,最后还有了廉洁的政府。
Clean means follow their money. The typical post-conflict government is so short of money that it needs our money just to be on a life-support system. You can't get the basic functions of the state done unless we put money into the core budget of these countries. But, if we put money into the core budget, we know that there aren't the budget systems with integrity that mean that money will be well spent. And if all we do is put money in and close our eyes it's not just that the money is wasted -- that's the least of the problems -- it's that the money is captured. It's captured by the crooks who are at the heart of the political problem. And so inadvertently we empower the people who are the problem.
“廉洁”指的是追踪钱的去处。 一般的冲突后政府都会急缺钱, 甚至到了要靠我们的捐款 来维持生命。 如果我们不给这些国家提供核心预算的钱, 他们的政府基本职能就没法实现。 但如果我们投了钱进去, 我们知道不会有可靠的预算体系 来保证钱用的到位。 所以,如果我们只是捐钱,然后就什么都不管, 那么不只钱会被浪费, 这个问题还是最其次的, 问题是这些钱会被利用了, 被那些侵蚀政府的蛀虫给利用了, 而无意中,我们就成了这些蛀虫的帮凶。
So building clean government means, yes, provide money to the budget, but also provide a lot of scrutiny, which means a lot of technical assistance that follows the money. Paddy Ashdown, who was the grand high nabob of Bosnia to the United Nations, in his book about his experience, he said, "I realize what I needed was accountants without borders, to follow that money." So that's the -- let me wrap up, this is the package.
所以要构建廉洁的政府,的确是要 提供资金来做预算, 但同时还要提供充分的监督, 即提供了钱之后,还要提供大量的技术支持来追踪钱的去向。 帕迪·阿什唐,原联合国 波斯尼亚最高代表, 在他的书中说: “我发现在得到钱以后, 我需要的 是无国界的会计师来监督那些钱。” 所以,这就是,总结起来, 就是一个计划包。
What's the goal? If we follow this, what would we hope to achieve? That after 10 years, the focus on the construction sector would have produced both jobs and, hence, security -- because young people would have jobs -- and it would have reconstructed the infrastructure. So that's the focus on the construction sector. The focus on the basic service delivery through these independent service authorities would have rescued basic services from their catastrophic levels, and it would have given ordinary people the sense that the government was doing something useful. The emphasis on clean government would have gradually squeezed out the political crooks, because there wouldn't be any money in taking part in the politics. And so gradually the selection, the composition of politicians, would shift from the crooked to the honest. Where would that leave us? Gradually it would shift from a politics of plunder to a politics of hope. Thank you. (Applause)
它的目标? 假如遵循这个计划包,我们想达到什么目标? 目标就是经过十年, 集中发展建筑业 会带来工作机会, 以及社会安定, 应为年轻人都有了工作。 此外,还完成了基础设施的重建, 这既是集中发展建筑业想要实现的目标。 通过独立的权威服务机构, 来集中提供基础服务, 将拯救这些服务, 使它们不再是灾难的水平。 这个计划包还会使老百姓 感觉到政府是做了实事的。 对廉洁政府的强调 会逐渐把政治蛀虫清理掉, 因为从政 再没钱好捞了。 所以逐渐的选举, 或政府人员的构成 会由腐败变成诚实的。 这样会带来什么? 会逐渐的使 一个充满掠夺的政治转向 一个充满希望的政治。谢谢。 (掌声)