I'm going to talk about post-conflict recovery and how we might do post-conflict recovery better. The record on post-conflict recovery is not very impressive. 40 percent of all post-conflict situations, historically, have reverted back to conflict within a decade. In fact, they've accounted for half of all civil wars. Why has the record been so poor? Well, the conventional approach to post-conflict situations has rested on, on kind of, three principles.
Govoriću vam o post-konfliktnom oporavku i kako možemo poboljšati post-konfliktni oporavak. Zapisi o post-konfliktnom oporavku nisu baš impresivni. 40 posto svih post-konfliktnih situacija, istorijski, ponovo su postale konfliktne u toku jedne decenije. Zapravo, polovina se ubraja u građanske ratove. Zašto su zapisi tako siromašni? Konvencionalni pristup post-konfliktnim situacijama se zasnivao na tri principa.
The first principle is: it's the politics that matters. So, the first thing that is prioritized is politics. Try and build a political settlement first. And then the second step is to say, "The situation is admittedly dangerous, but only for a short time." So get peacekeepers there, but get them home as soon as possible. So, short-term peacekeepers. And thirdly, what is the exit strategy for the peacekeepers? It's an election. That will produce a legitimate and accountable government.
Prvi princip je: politika je ono što je važno. Tako da prva stvar koja ima prioritet je politika. Pokušajte prvo da napravite političko poravnanje. Zatim sledeći korak je da kažete: "Ova situacija je zaista opasna, ali samo za kratko vreme." Dovedite tamo mirotvorce, ali ih vratite kući što je pre moguće. Dakle, kratkotrajne mirotvorce. I treće, koja je izlazna strategija za mirotvorce? To su izbori. To će proizvesti legitimnu i odgovornu vlast.
So that's the conventional approach. I think that approach denies reality. We see that there is no quick fix. There's certainly no quick security fix. I've tried to look at the risks of reversion to conflict, during our post-conflict decade. And the risks stay high throughout the decade. And they stay high regardless of the political innovations. Does an election produce an accountable and legitimate government? What an election produces is a winner and a loser. And the loser is unreconciled. The reality is that we need to reverse the sequence. It's not the politics first; it's actually the politics last. The politics become easier as the decade progresses if you're building on a foundation of security and economic development -- the rebuilding of prosperity.
Dakle, ovo je konvenconalni pristup. Smatram da ovaj pristup negira stvarnost. Vidimo da nema brzog rešenja. Sigurno ne postoji brzo bezbednosno rešenje. Pokušao sam da uočim rizike vraćanja na sukob, tokom naše post-konfliktne decenije. I rizici ostaju visoki tokom cele decenije. I ostaju visoki bez obzira na političke inovacije. Da li izbori proizvode odgovornu i legitimnu vlast? Ono što izbori proizvode su pobednici i gubitnici. A gubitnik je neprilagođen. Realnost je da moramo da preokrenemo redosled. Politika nije na prvom mestu; politika je zapravo poslednja. Politika je sve lakša kako decenija odmiče ako gradite na temelju bezbednosnog i ekonomskog razvoja - ponovna izgradnja prosperiteta.
Why does the politics get easier? And why is it so difficult initially? Because after years of stagnation and decline, the mentality of politics is that it's a zero-sum game. If the reality is stagnation, I can only go up if you go down. And that doesn't produce a productive politics. And so the mentality has to shift from zero-sum to positive-sum before you can get a productive politics. You can only get positive, that mental shift, if the reality is that prosperity is being built. And in order to build prosperity, we need security in place. So that is what you get when you face reality. But the objective of facing reality is to change reality.
Zašto politika postaje lakša? Zašto je tako teška na početku? Zato što posle više godina stagnacije i opadanja, mentalitet politike je takav da je to igra nulte sume (strogo kompetitivna). Ako je stagnacija stvarnost, mogu jedino da idem gore ako vi idete dole. A to ne proizvodi produktivnu politiku. Tako da način razmišljanja mora da se promeni od nulte na pozitivnu sumu pre no što dobijete produktivnu politiku. Možete jedino dobiti pozitivan rezultat, taj mentalni pomak, ako je realnost takva da se gradi prosperitet. A da bi mogao da se izgradi prosperitet, treba nam bezbednost. To je ono što dobijate kada se suočite sa realnošću. Ali cilj suočavanja sa realnošću je da se promeni realnost.
And so now let me suggest two complimentary approaches to changing the reality of the situations. The first is to recognize the interdependence of three key actors, who are different actors, and at the moment are uncoordinated. The first actor is the Security Council. The Security Council typically has the responsibility for providing the peacekeepers who build the security. And that needs to be recognized, first of all, that peacekeeping works. It is a cost-effective approach. It does increase security. But it needs to be done long-term. It needs to be a decade-long approach, rather than just a couple of years. That's one actor, the Security Council.
Dozvolite mi sada da predložim dva komplementarna pristupa za izmenu realnosti situacije. Prvi je da prepoznamo međuzavisnost tri ključna različita učesnika, koji su trenutno nekoordinisani. Prvi učesnik je Savet bezbednosti. Savet bezbednosti standardno ima odgovornost za pripremu mirotvoraca koji grade bezbednost. To treba da bude prepoznato, pre svega, da očuvanje mira funkcioniše. To je isplativ pristup. On zaista povećava bezbednost. Ali mora da se izvodi na duže staze. To mora da bude decenijski pristup, a ne tek na par godina. To je jedan učesnik, Savet bezbednosti.
The second actor, different cast of guys, is the donors. The donors provide post-conflict aid. Typically in the past, the donors have been interested in the first couple of years, and then they got bored. They moved on to some other situation. Post-conflict economic recovery is a slow process. There are no quick processes in economics except decline. You can do that quite fast. (Laughter) So the donors have to stick with this situation for at least a decade.
Drugi učesnik, drugačiji skup ljudi, su donatori. Donatori omogućavaju post-konfliktnu pomoć. Uobičajeno u prošlosti, donatori su bili zainteresovani u prvih nekoliko godina, a zatim im je postalo dosadno. Orijentisali su se na neku drugu situaciju. Post-konfliktni ekonomski oporavak je spor proces. Ne postoje brzi procesi u ekonomiji osim pada. To možete da izvedete prilično brzo. (Smeh) Stoga donatori moraju da se drže ove situacije bar jednu deceniju.
And then the third key actor is the post-conflict government. And there are two key things it's got to do. One is it's got to do economic reform, not fuss about the political constitution. It's got to reform economic policy. Why? Because during conflict economic policy typically deteriorates. Governments snatch short-term opportunities and, by the end of the conflict, the chickens have come home to roost.
A zatim treći ključni učesnik je post-konfliktna vlada. Postoje dve ključne stvari koje ona treba da uradi. Prvo, mora da sprovede ekonomsku reformu, a ne da zamajava galamom o političkoj upravi. Mora da reformiše ekonomsku politiku. Zašto? Zato što se tokom konflikta ekonomska politika po običaju pogoršava. Vlade grabe kratkoročne mogućnosti i po završetku konflikta, kokoške se vraćaju u kokošinjac.
So this legacy of conflict is really bad economic policy. So there is a reform agenda, and there is an inclusion agenda. The inclusion agenda doesn't come from elections. Elections produce a loser, who is then excluded. So the inclusion agenda means genuinely bringing people inside the tent. So those three actors. And they are interdependent over a long term. If the Security Council doesn't commit to security over the course of a decade, you don't get the reassurance which produces private investment. If you don't get the policy reform and the aid, you don't get the economic recovery, which is the true exit strategy for the peacekeepers. So we should recognize that interdependence, by formal, mutual commitments. The United Nations actually has a language for these mutual commitments, the recognition of mutual commitments; it's called the language of compact. And so we need a post-conflict compact. The United Nations even has an agency which could broker these compacts; it's called the Peace Building Commission.
Dakle, konflikt ostavlja u nasleđe lošu ekonomsku politiku. Tako da postoji program reforme i postoji program inkluzije. Program inkluzije ne dolazi od izbora. Izbori proizvode gubitnika, koji je tada isključen. Zato program inkluzije u suštini podrazumeva uvođenje ljudi u šator. To su tri aktera. Oni su međuzavisni tokom dužeg vremena. Ukoliko se Savet bezbednosti ne posveti bezbednosti u toku decenije, nemate sigurnost koja proizvodi privatne investicije. Ako nemate reformu politike i pomoć, nemate ekonomski oporavak, koji je prava izlazna strategija za mirotvorce. Zato bi trebalo da prepoznamo tu međuzavisnost kroz formalne, zajedničke obaveze. Ujedinjene nacije zapravo imaju jezik za ove zajedničke obaveze, prepoznavanje zajedničkih obaveza; koji zovu jezik sporazuma. Stoga nam treba post-konfliktni sporazum. Ujedinjene nacije čak imaju agenciju koja može da posreduje u ovim sporazumima. Zove se Komisija za izgradnju mira.
It would be ideal to have a standard set of norms where, when we got to a post-conflict situation, there was an expectation of these mutual commitments from the three parties. So that's idea one: recognize interdependence. And now let me turn to the second approach, which is complimentary. And that is to focus on a few critical objectives. Typical post-conflict situation is a zoo of different actors with different priorities. And indeed, unfortunately, if you navigate by needs you get a very unfocused agenda, because in these situations, needs are everywhere, but the capacity to implement change is very limited. So we have to be disciplined and focus on things that are critical.
Bilo bi idealno da imamo standardnu grupu normi gde, kada dođemo do post-konfliktne situacije, postoje očekivanja ovih zajedničkih obaveza ova tri učesnika. Dakle, prva ideja je: prepoznati međuzavisnost. Sada, dozvolite mi da se usredsredim na drugi pristup, koji je laskav. A to je da se fokusiramo na nekoliko kritičnih ciljeva. Tipična post-konfliktna situacija je zbrka različitih aktera sa različitim prioritetima. Zaista, na žalost, ako se orijentišete prema potrebama dobijate vrlo nefokusiran program, jer u ovim situacijama, potrebe postoje svuda, ali mogućnost da se implementira promena je veoma ograničena. Zato moramo biti disciplinovani i fokusirani na stvari koje su kritične.
And I want to suggest that in the typical post-conflict situation three things are critical. One is jobs. One is improvements in basic services -- especially health, which is a disaster during conflict. So jobs, health, and clean government. Those are the three critical priorities. So I'm going to talk a little about each of them.
Želim da dodam da u tipičnoj post-konfliktnoj situaciji tri stvari su kritične. Jedna su poslovi. Jedna su poboljšanja u osnovnim uslugama - posebno u zdravstvu, koje je katastrofalno u toku konflikata. Dakle, poslovi, zdravlje i čista vlada. To su tri kritična prioriteta. Tako da ću da govorim malo o svakom od njih.
Jobs. What is a distinctive approach to generating jobs in post-conflict situations? And why are jobs so important? Jobs for whom? Especially jobs for young men. In post-conflict situations, the reason that they so often revert to conflict, is not because elderly women get upset. It's because young men get upset. And why are they upset? Because they have nothing to do. And so we need a process of generating jobs, for ordinary young men, fast. Now, that is difficult. Governments in post-conflict situation often respond by puffing up the civil service. That is not a good idea. It's not sustainable. In fact, you're building a long-term liability by inflating civil service. But getting the private sector to expand is also difficult, because any activity which is open to international trade is basically going to be uncompetitive in a post-conflict situation. These are not environments where you can build export manufacturing.
Poslovi. Šta je prepoznatljiv način stvaranja radnih mesta u post-konfliktnim situacijama? I zašto su poslovi tako važni? Poslovi za koga? Posebno poslovi za mlade muškarce. U post-konfliktnim situacijama, razlog zbog kog se oni tako često uključuju u konflikt, nije zato što starije žene bivaju uznemirene. Već zato što mladi ljudi bivaju uznemireni. A zašto su uznemireni? Zato što nemaju šta da rade. Stoga nam treba proces stvaranja radnih mesta, za obične mlade ljude i to brzo. E sad, to je teško. Vlade u post-konfliktnim situacijama često odgovore tako što uvećaju državnu upravu. To nije dobra ideja. Nije održiva. Zapravo, stvarate dugoročnu obavezu naduvavanjem državne uprave. Ali proširiti privatni sektor je takođe teško, jer bilo koja aktivnost koja je otvorena prema međunarodnoj trgovini će u suštini biti nekonkurentna u post-konfliktnoj situaciji. To nisu uslovi u kojima možete izgraditi proizvodnju za izvoz.
There's one sector which isn't exposed to international trade, and which can generate a lot of jobs, and which is, in any case, a sensible sector to expand, post-conflict, and that is the construction sector. The construction sector has a vital role, obviously, in reconstruction. But typically that sector has withered away during conflict. During conflict people are doing destruction. There isn't any construction going on. And so the sector shrivels away. And then when you try and expand it, because it's shriveled away, you encounter a lot of bottlenecks. Basically, prices soar and crooked politicians then milk the rents from the sector, but it doesn't generate any jobs. And so the policy priority is to break the bottlenecks in expanding the construction sector.
Postoji jedan sektor koji nije izložen međunarodnoj trgovini, a koji može da generiše mnogo radnih mesta, i koji je, u svakom slučaju, osetljiv sektor za proširenje, post-konfliktno, a to je građevinski sektor. Građevinski sektor ima ključnu ulogu, očigledno, u rekonstrukciji. Ali tipično, ovaj sektor presuši tokom sukoba. Tokom sukoba ljudi uništavaju. Nikakva gradnja se ne dešava. I tako se ovaj sektor umanjuje. A kada pokušate da ga proširite, jer se smanjio, naiđete na mnogo uskih grla. U osnovi, cene skaču, a korumpirani političari izvuku zakupnine iz sektora, a ne stvaraju nikakva radna mesta. Tako da je prioritet politike da razbije ta uska grla proširivanjem građevinskog sektora.
What might the bottlenecks be? Just think what you have to do successfully to build a structure, using a lot of labor. First you need access to land. Often the legal system is broken down so you can't even get access to land. Secondly you need skills, the mundane skills of the construction sector. In post-conflict situations we don't just need Doctors Without Borders, we need Bricklayers Without Borders, to rebuild the skill set. We need firms. The firms have gone away. So we need to encourage the growth of local firms. If we do that, we not only get the jobs, we get the improvements in public infrastructure, the restoration of public infrastructure.
Šta mogu biti ta uska grla? Samo zamislite šta morate da radite uspešno da biste sagradili građevinu, koristeći mnogo rada. Prvo vam treba pristup terenu. Često je pravni sistem razbijen tako da ne možete dobiti čak ni pristup terenu. Drugo, trebaju vam određene veštine, svetske veštine građevinskog sektora. U post-konfliktnim situacijama ne trebaju nam samo Lekari bez granica trebaju nam i Zidari bez granica, da bismo obnovili skup veština. Trebaju nam firme. Firme su otišle. Zato treba da podstičemo razvoj lokalnih firmi. Ako to učinimo, ne samo da dobijamo radna mesta, već dobijamo i poboljšanja u javnoj infrastrukturi, obnovu javne infrastrukture.
Let me turn from jobs to the second objective, which is improving basic social services. And to date, there has been a sort of a schizophrenia in the donor community, as to how to build basic services in post-conflict sectors. On the one hand it pays lip service to the idea of rebuild an effective state in the image of Scandinavia in the 1950s. Lets develop line ministries of this, that, and the other, that deliver these services. And it's schizophrenic because in their hearts donors know that's not a realistic agenda, and so what they also do is the total bypass: just fund NGOs.
Dozvolite mi da se prebacim sa radnih mesta na drugi cilj, odnosno na poboljšanje osnovnih socijalnih službi. Do sada, bila je neka vrsta šizofrenije u donatorskoj zajednici, o tome kako da izgradimo osnovne službe u post-konfliktnom sektoru. S jedne strane deklarativno se isplati ideja obnove efikasne države po uzoru na Skandinaviju 1950-ih. Hajde da osnujemo resorna ministarstva ovoga, onoga i nečeg drugog, koji pružaju te usluge. To je šizofreno jer duboko u sebi donatori znaju da to nije realističan program, tako da ono što oni takođe rade je potpuno premošćavanje: samo osnivaju nevladine organizacije.
Neither of those approaches is sensible. And so what I'd suggest is what I call Independent Service Authorities. It's to split the functions of a monopoly line ministry up into three. The planning function and policy function stays with the ministry; the delivery of services on the ground, you should use whatever works -- churches, NGOs, local communities, whatever works. And in between, there should be a public agency, the Independent Service Authority, which channels public money, and especially donor money, to the retail providers. So the NGOs become part of a public government system, rather than independent of it.
Nijedan od tih pristupa nije razuman. Ono što bih ja predložio je nešto što zovem servis nezavisne vlasti. To je da bi se podelile funkcije monopola resornih ministara na tri dela. Funkcija planiranja i politička funkcija ostaju uz ministarstvo; pružanje usluga na terenu, možete upotrebiti šta god funkcioniše - crkve, nevladine organizacije, lokalne zajednice, šta god funkcioniše. A između toga, treba da postoji javna služba, servis nezavisne vlasti, koji prosleđuje javna sredstva, posebno novac donatora, do maloprodajnih usluga. Tako nevladine organizacije postaju deo javnog sistema vlasti, ne postoje nezavisno od njega.
One advantage of that is that you can allocate money coherently. Another is, you can make NGOs accountable. You can use yardstick competition, so they have to compete against each other for the resources. The good NGOs, like Oxfam, are very keen on this idea. They want to have the discipline and accountability. So that's a way to get basic services scaled up. And because the government would be funding it, it would be co-branding these services. So they wouldn't be provided thanks to the United States government and some NGO. They would be co-branded as being done by the post-conflict government, in the country. So, jobs, basic services, finally, clean government.
Prednost ovoga je što možete razumno da izdvojite novac. Druga je, možete da učinite nevladine organizacije odgovornijim. Možete da uvedete merenja radi podsticanja konkurencije, tako da one moraju da se takmiče jedne protiv drugih za sredstva. Dobre nevladine organizacije, kao Oxfam, su veoma zainteresovane za ovu ideju. Žele da imaju disciplinu i odgovornost. Dakle, to je način da prilagodite osnovne službe. A pošto bi ih vlada finansirala, to bi bilo ko-brendiranje ovih službi. Tako da ne bi bile snabdevane zahvaljujući Sjedinjenim Državama i nekim nevladinim organizacijama. Bile bi ko-brendirane kao da je to uradila post-konfliktna vlast u zemlji. Tako da, radna mesta, osnovne službe, konačno, čista vlada.
Clean means follow their money. The typical post-conflict government is so short of money that it needs our money just to be on a life-support system. You can't get the basic functions of the state done unless we put money into the core budget of these countries. But, if we put money into the core budget, we know that there aren't the budget systems with integrity that mean that money will be well spent. And if all we do is put money in and close our eyes it's not just that the money is wasted -- that's the least of the problems -- it's that the money is captured. It's captured by the crooks who are at the heart of the political problem. And so inadvertently we empower the people who are the problem.
Čisto znači praćenje njihovog novca. Uobičajena post-konfliktna vlada je toliko u manjku sa novcem da joj treba naš novac samo da bi bila na sistemu za održavanje života. Ne možete omogućiti da osnovne funkcije države rade ukoliko ne stavimo novac u osnovni budžet tih država. Ali, ako stavimo novac u osnovni budžet znamo da tamo ne postoji budžetski sistem sa integritetom koji bi garantovao da će novac biti dobro utrošen. A ako sve što uradimo je da uložimo novac i zatvorimo oči ne samo da će novac biti protraćen - to je najmanji problem - već će biti zarobljen. Zarobiće ga pokvarenjaci koji su u središtu političkih problema. Na taj način nehotice osnažujemo ljude koji su problem.
So building clean government means, yes, provide money to the budget, but also provide a lot of scrutiny, which means a lot of technical assistance that follows the money. Paddy Ashdown, who was the grand high nabob of Bosnia to the United Nations, in his book about his experience, he said, "I realize what I needed was accountants without borders, to follow that money." So that's the -- let me wrap up, this is the package.
Tako da stvaranje čistih vlada znači, obezbeđivanje novca za budžet, ali i omogućavanje dosta kontrole, što podrazumeva mnogo tehničke podrške koja prati novac. Pedi Ešdaun, koji je bio visoki predstavnik Bosne u Ujedinjenim nacijama, u svojim memoarima je rekao: "Ja shvatam da su mi trebale računovođe bez granica da prate taj novac." Tako da je - dozvolite mi da završim, ovo je taj paket.
What's the goal? If we follow this, what would we hope to achieve? That after 10 years, the focus on the construction sector would have produced both jobs and, hence, security -- because young people would have jobs -- and it would have reconstructed the infrastructure. So that's the focus on the construction sector. The focus on the basic service delivery through these independent service authorities would have rescued basic services from their catastrophic levels, and it would have given ordinary people the sense that the government was doing something useful. The emphasis on clean government would have gradually squeezed out the political crooks, because there wouldn't be any money in taking part in the politics. And so gradually the selection, the composition of politicians, would shift from the crooked to the honest. Where would that leave us? Gradually it would shift from a politics of plunder to a politics of hope. Thank you. (Applause)
Šta je cilj? Ako pratimo ovo, kojim postignućima se možemo nadati? Da će nakon 10 godina fokus na građevinskom sektoru proizvesti i radna mesta a samim tim i sigurnost - jer bi mladi ljudi imali poslove - i time bi se rekonstruisala infrastruktura. To je fokus na građevinskom sektoru. Fokus na osnovnim uslugama kroz ove nezavisne organe bi spasio osnovne službe njihovih katastrofalnih stanja i dalo bi običnom narodu osećaj da vlada radi nešto korisno. Naglasak na čistoj vladi bi postepeno istisnuo korumpirane političare jer ne bi bilo više novca za učestvovanje u politici. I postepeno izbor, garnitura političara, bi se promenila od korumpiranih na poštene. Gde bi smo tada bili? Postepeno to bi se promenilo sa politike pljačke na politiku nade. Hvala vam. (Aplauz)