I'm going to talk about post-conflict recovery and how we might do post-conflict recovery better. The record on post-conflict recovery is not very impressive. 40 percent of all post-conflict situations, historically, have reverted back to conflict within a decade. In fact, they've accounted for half of all civil wars. Why has the record been so poor? Well, the conventional approach to post-conflict situations has rested on, on kind of, three principles.
Govoriti ću o oporavku nakon sukoba i kako bi ga mogli poboljšati. Dosadašnji rezultati post-konfliktnog oporavka nisu baš impresivni. Kod 40% post-konfliktnih situacija, ako gledamo kroz povijest, unutar desetljeća ponovno dođe do sukoba A ti sukobi čine više od polovice svih građanskih ratova. Zašto su rezultati tako slabi? Pa, konvencionalni pristup kod post-konfliktnih situacija oslanja se na tri principa.
The first principle is: it's the politics that matters. So, the first thing that is prioritized is politics. Try and build a political settlement first. And then the second step is to say, "The situation is admittedly dangerous, but only for a short time." So get peacekeepers there, but get them home as soon as possible. So, short-term peacekeepers. And thirdly, what is the exit strategy for the peacekeepers? It's an election. That will produce a legitimate and accountable government.
Prvi princip: politika je najbitnija. Najveći prioritet ima politika. Prvo se nastoje izgraditi uvjeti za politiku. Zatim u drugom koraku se prizna, "Situacija je opasna, ali samo kratkoročno." Pa se dovedu mirotvorci, ali s ciljem da ih se što prije vrati kući. Dakle, radi se o kratkoročnim mirotvorcima I treće, koja je izlazna strategija za mirotvorce? Izbori. Izbori, koji će na vlast dovesti legitimnu i odgovornu vladu.
So that's the conventional approach. I think that approach denies reality. We see that there is no quick fix. There's certainly no quick security fix. I've tried to look at the risks of reversion to conflict, during our post-conflict decade. And the risks stay high throughout the decade. And they stay high regardless of the political innovations. Does an election produce an accountable and legitimate government? What an election produces is a winner and a loser. And the loser is unreconciled. The reality is that we need to reverse the sequence. It's not the politics first; it's actually the politics last. The politics become easier as the decade progresses if you're building on a foundation of security and economic development -- the rebuilding of prosperity.
To je konvencionalni pristup. Mislim da taj pristup nije u skladu sa stvarnošću. Vidimo da nema brzog rješenja. A sigurno ne postoji brzo rješenje za problem sigurnosti. Pokušao sam proučiti rizike ponovnog sukoba, unutar desteljeća nakon sukoba. I rizici ostaju visoki kroz cijelo desetljeće. I ostaju visoki bez obzira na političke inovacije. Da li izbori na vlast dovode odgovornu i legitimnu vladu? Nakon izbora dobivate pobjednika i gubitnika. A gubitnik se ne miri sa situacijom. U stvarnosti trebamo obrnuti redoslijed. Nije politika na prvom mjestu; već na zadnjem. Politika postaje lakša kako tih deset godina prolaze ukoliko gradite na temeljima sigurnosti i ekonomskog razvoja. Ponovna izgradnja blagostanja.
Why does the politics get easier? And why is it so difficult initially? Because after years of stagnation and decline, the mentality of politics is that it's a zero-sum game. If the reality is stagnation, I can only go up if you go down. And that doesn't produce a productive politics. And so the mentality has to shift from zero-sum to positive-sum before you can get a productive politics. You can only get positive, that mental shift, if the reality is that prosperity is being built. And in order to build prosperity, we need security in place. So that is what you get when you face reality. But the objective of facing reality is to change reality.
Zašto politika postaje jednostavnija? I zašto je u početku tako složena? Zbog toga što je nakon godina stagnacije i nazadovanja, prevladavajući mentalitet da je politika igra nulte sume. Ukoliko je stvarnost stagnacija, ja mogu ići gore samo ako ti ideš dolje. A to ne dovodi do produktivne politike Mentalitet se mora promijeniti iz nulte-sume u pozitivnu sumu prije nego što dođe do produktivne politike. A do pozitivnog mentalnog pomaka može doći samo ako u stvarnosti dolazi do povećanja blagostanja. A da bi izgradili blagostanje, nužno je prvo poboljšati sigurnost. To se dobije kada se suoči sa stvarnošću. Ali cilj suočavanja sa stvarnošću je njeno mijenjanje.
And so now let me suggest two complimentary approaches to changing the reality of the situations. The first is to recognize the interdependence of three key actors, who are different actors, and at the moment are uncoordinated. The first actor is the Security Council. The Security Council typically has the responsibility for providing the peacekeepers who build the security. And that needs to be recognized, first of all, that peacekeeping works. It is a cost-effective approach. It does increase security. But it needs to be done long-term. It needs to be a decade-long approach, rather than just a couple of years. That's one actor, the Security Council.
Molim vas dopustite mi da vam predložim dva komplementarna pristupa mijenjanju stvarnosti situacije. Prvi je prepoznati međusobnu ovisnost tri glavna čimbenika, tri različita čimbenika koji u ovom trenutku nisu koordinirani Prvi čimbenik je Vijeće sigurnosti. Vijeće sigurnosti obično ima odgovornost slanja mirotvoraca koji poboljšavaju sigurnost. I nužno je da to prepoznamo, kao prvo, da održavanje mira funkcionira. To je ekonomičan pristup. I stvarno poboljšava sigurnost. Ali nužno je da traje duži period vremena. Mora trajati cijelo desetljeće, umjesto samo nekoliko godina. To je jedan čimbenik, vijeće sigurnosti.
The second actor, different cast of guys, is the donors. The donors provide post-conflict aid. Typically in the past, the donors have been interested in the first couple of years, and then they got bored. They moved on to some other situation. Post-conflict economic recovery is a slow process. There are no quick processes in economics except decline. You can do that quite fast. (Laughter) So the donors have to stick with this situation for at least a decade.
Drugi čimbenik, potpuno nezavisan od prvog čimbenika, su donatori. Donatori daju pomoć u razdoblju nakon sukoba. Uobičajeno u prošlosti, donori su zainteresirani prvih nekoliko godina, a zatim im situacija dosadi. I prijeđu na neku drugu situaciju. Ekonomski oporavak u razdoblju nakon sukoba je dugotrajan i spor proces. Ne postoje brzi procesi u ekonomiji osim propadanja. To možete napraviti prilično brzo (Smijeh) Dakle, donori moraju ostati ustrajni u rješavanju situacije barem kroz jedno desetljeće.
And then the third key actor is the post-conflict government. And there are two key things it's got to do. One is it's got to do economic reform, not fuss about the political constitution. It's got to reform economic policy. Why? Because during conflict economic policy typically deteriorates. Governments snatch short-term opportunities and, by the end of the conflict, the chickens have come home to roost.
I treći ključan čimbenik je post-konfliktna vlada. Dvije su ključne stvari koje ta vlada mora napraviti. Jedna je ekonomska reforma, a ne se brinuti o političkom sastavu, Mora reformirati ekonomsku politiku. Zašto? Zbog toga što za vrijeme sukoba ekonomska politika obično nazaduje. Vlade iskorištavaju kratkotrajne prilike. I do kraja sukoba, to dođe na naplatu.
So this legacy of conflict is really bad economic policy. So there is a reform agenda, and there is an inclusion agenda. The inclusion agenda doesn't come from elections. Elections produce a loser, who is then excluded. So the inclusion agenda means genuinely bringing people inside the tent. So those three actors. And they are interdependent over a long term. If the Security Council doesn't commit to security over the course of a decade, you don't get the reassurance which produces private investment. If you don't get the policy reform and the aid, you don't get the economic recovery, which is the true exit strategy for the peacekeepers. So we should recognize that interdependence, by formal, mutual commitments. The United Nations actually has a language for these mutual commitments, the recognition of mutual commitments; it's called the language of compact. And so we need a post-conflict compact. The United Nations even has an agency which could broker these compacts; it's called the Peace Building Commission.
Dakle, nasljedstvo sukoba je loša ekonomska politika. Postoji plan reforme, ali i plan uključivanja. Uključivanje ne dolazi iz izbora. Nakon izbora imamo gubitnika, koji je isključen iz situacije. Pa uključivanja znači iskrenu suradnju političkih faktora. Dakle, ta tri ključna čimbenika. Tri međusobno povezana čimenika u duljem vremenskom razdoblju. Ukoliko se Vijeće sigurnosti ne obveže na čuvanje sigurnosti u periodu od desetljeća tada ne dolazi do razine sigurnosti koja omogućava privatno ulaganje. Ukoliko ne dođe do reforme politike i donacija tada ne dolazi do ekonomskog oporavka, koji je jedina prava izlazna strategija za mirotvorce. Trebali bi priznati tu međusobnu ovisnost, formalnim, zajedničkim ugovorima. UN ima jezik za te takve dogovore, priznanje zajedničkih obaveza. Zove se jezik ugovora. Potreban nam je post-konfliktni ugovor. UN čak ima i agenciju koja bi mogla posredovati pri tim ugovorima. Zove se "Mirovna komisija".
It would be ideal to have a standard set of norms where, when we got to a post-conflict situation, there was an expectation of these mutual commitments from the three parties. So that's idea one: recognize interdependence. And now let me turn to the second approach, which is complimentary. And that is to focus on a few critical objectives. Typical post-conflict situation is a zoo of different actors with different priorities. And indeed, unfortunately, if you navigate by needs you get a very unfocused agenda, because in these situations, needs are everywhere, but the capacity to implement change is very limited. So we have to be disciplined and focus on things that are critical.
Bilo bi idealno kada bi postojao standardni set normi koje bi, kad dođe do post-konfliktnih situacija, dovele do toga da postoji određeno očekivanje od međusobnih ugovora triju čimbenika. To je prva ideja. Prepoznati međusobnu ovisnost. A sad ću govoriti o drugom pristupu, koji je komplementaran. I koji se fokusira na nekoliko kritičnih ciljeva. Uobičajeno, situacija nakon sukoba sliči na zoološki vrt različitih čimbenika s različitim prioritetima. I, nažalost, ako ispunjavate sve potrebe dolazi do jako nefokusirane agende. Zbog toga što u ovakvim situacijama, svi imaju određene potrebe. Ali je kapacitet za provedbu promjena jako ograničen. Zbog toga moramo biti disciplinirani i fokusirani na kritične stvari.
And I want to suggest that in the typical post-conflict situation three things are critical. One is jobs. One is improvements in basic services -- especially health, which is a disaster during conflict. So jobs, health, and clean government. Those are the three critical priorities. So I'm going to talk a little about each of them.
Tvrdim da su u post-konfliktnoj situaciji tri stvari kritične. Jedna su poslovi. Druga je poboljšanje osnovnih usluga. Naročito zdravstva, koje je, nakon sukoba, obično u katastrofalnom stanju. Najvažnije stvari su: poslovi, zdravlje i "čista" vlada. To su tri kritična prioriteta. Govoriti ću malo o svakom.
Jobs. What is a distinctive approach to generating jobs in post-conflict situations? And why are jobs so important? Jobs for whom? Especially jobs for young men. In post-conflict situations, the reason that they so often revert to conflict, is not because elderly women get upset. It's because young men get upset. And why are they upset? Because they have nothing to do. And so we need a process of generating jobs, for ordinary young men, fast. Now, that is difficult. Governments in post-conflict situation often respond by puffing up the civil service. That is not a good idea. It's not sustainable. In fact, you're building a long-term liability by inflating civil service. But getting the private sector to expand is also difficult, because any activity which is open to international trade is basically going to be uncompetitive in a post-conflict situation. These are not environments where you can build export manufacturing.
Poslovi. Koji je karakterističan pristup stvaranju poslova u post-konfliktnim situacijama? I zašto su poslovi tako bitni? Poslovi za koga? Naročito za mlade muškarce. U post-konfliktnim situacijama, glavni razlog zašto tako često ponovno dođe do sukoba nije zbog toga što se uznemire starije žene. Već zbog toga što se uznemire mladi muškarci. A zašto su uznemireni? Jer nemaju što raditi. I zbog toga trebamo proces stvaranja poslova, za obične mlade muškarce, i to brzo. To je jako teško. Vlade u post-konfliktnim situacijama često reagiraju prevelikim zapošljavanjem u javnoj upravi. To nije dobra ideja. To nije održivo. U stvarnosti, na taj način se stvara dugotrajan problem prekomjernim rastom javne uprave. Teško je postići rast privatnog sektora. Zbog toga što bilo koja aktivnost koja je otvorena međunarodnoj trgovini u suštini nikad neće biti kompetitivna u post-konfliktnoj situaciji. To nisu okoline u kojima je moguće izgraditi izvozne industrije.
There's one sector which isn't exposed to international trade, and which can generate a lot of jobs, and which is, in any case, a sensible sector to expand, post-conflict, and that is the construction sector. The construction sector has a vital role, obviously, in reconstruction. But typically that sector has withered away during conflict. During conflict people are doing destruction. There isn't any construction going on. And so the sector shrivels away. And then when you try and expand it, because it's shriveled away, you encounter a lot of bottlenecks. Basically, prices soar and crooked politicians then milk the rents from the sector, but it doesn't generate any jobs. And so the policy priority is to break the bottlenecks in expanding the construction sector.
Ali postoji sektor koji nije izložen međunarodnoj trgovini, a koji može stvoriti velik broj poslova. A koji je, u svakom slučaju, razuman izbor u post-konfliktnim situacijama. Sektor graditeljstva. Građevinski sektor ima izuzetno važnu ulogu, očito je, u izgradnji. Ali obično taj sektor nazaduje za vrijeme sukoba. Za vrijeme sukoba ljudi obično uništavaju. Ne gradi se puno i zbog toga građevina propada. A kad ga pokušate proširiti, zbog toga što je gotovo propao, suočavate se s mnogo prepreka. Obično, cijene narastu a korumpirani političari potkradaju zaradu. Ne dođe do stvaranje poslova. Zbog toga prioritet treba biti rušenje prepreka jačanjem građevinskog sektora.
What might the bottlenecks be? Just think what you have to do successfully to build a structure, using a lot of labor. First you need access to land. Often the legal system is broken down so you can't even get access to land. Secondly you need skills, the mundane skills of the construction sector. In post-conflict situations we don't just need Doctors Without Borders, we need Bricklayers Without Borders, to rebuild the skill set. We need firms. The firms have gone away. So we need to encourage the growth of local firms. If we do that, we not only get the jobs, we get the improvements in public infrastructure, the restoration of public infrastructure.
Koje su prepreke? Samo zamislite što sve morate napraviti da bi uspješno izgradili građevinu, korištenjem velikog broja radnika. Prvo, potreban je pristup zemlji. Često je zakonski sustav potpuno rastrojen i ne možete dobiti vlasništvo nad zemljom. Kao drugo, potrebne su vještine, vještine građevinskog sektora. U post-konfliktnim situacijama, nisu nam samo potrebni doktori bez granica potrebni su nam postavljači opeka bez granica, da bi ponovno naučili graditelje osnovnim vještinama. Potrebne su nam tvrtke, međutim većina ih je ili propala ili otišla iz zemlje. Pa moramo poticati rast lokalnih tvrtki. Ako to uspijemo, ne samo da stvaramo poslove, već i poboljšavamo javnu infrastrukturu, obnavljamo javnu infrastrukturu.
Let me turn from jobs to the second objective, which is improving basic social services. And to date, there has been a sort of a schizophrenia in the donor community, as to how to build basic services in post-conflict sectors. On the one hand it pays lip service to the idea of rebuild an effective state in the image of Scandinavia in the 1950s. Lets develop line ministries of this, that, and the other, that deliver these services. And it's schizophrenic because in their hearts donors know that's not a realistic agenda, and so what they also do is the total bypass: just fund NGOs.
Sada ću prijeći s poslova na drugi cilj, poboljšanje osnovnih javnih usluga. I do danas, postojala je određena shizofrenija, u zajednici donatora, o načinu kako izgraditi osnovne javne usluge u post-konfliktnim sektorima. Na jednu stranu propagiraju ideju izgradnje učinkovite države po uzoru na Skandinavske zemalje u 1950-im. Razvijmo ministarstva ovoga i onoga i institucije koje će ispunjavati te usluge. A to je shizofreno, jer donori znaju da to nije realistično. Pa naprave potpuni zaobilazak. Doniraju sredstva nevladinim organizacijama.
Neither of those approaches is sensible. And so what I'd suggest is what I call Independent Service Authorities. It's to split the functions of a monopoly line ministry up into three. The planning function and policy function stays with the ministry; the delivery of services on the ground, you should use whatever works -- churches, NGOs, local communities, whatever works. And in between, there should be a public agency, the Independent Service Authority, which channels public money, and especially donor money, to the retail providers. So the NGOs become part of a public government system, rather than independent of it.
Niti jedan od ovih pristupa nije razuman. Pa ja predlažem osnivanje Nezavisnih uslužnih tijela. Treba podijeliti funkcije ministarstava na tri dijela. Funkcija planiranja i politike ostaje pri ministarstvu. A za samo ispunjavanje usluga trebaju se koristiti bilo koje institucije koje funkcioniraju crkve, nevladine organizacije, lokalne zajednice. Što god funkcionira. A između, trebala bi postojati javna agencija, Nazavisno uslužno tijelo koje usmjerava javni novac, i naročito donirani novac, u davatelje usluga. Tako nevladine organizacije postaju dio javnog vladinog sustava, tj. nisu nezavisne od vlade.
One advantage of that is that you can allocate money coherently. Another is, you can make NGOs accountable. You can use yardstick competition, so they have to compete against each other for the resources. The good NGOs, like Oxfam, are very keen on this idea. They want to have the discipline and accountability. So that's a way to get basic services scaled up. And because the government would be funding it, it would be co-branding these services. So they wouldn't be provided thanks to the United States government and some NGO. They would be co-branded as being done by the post-conflict government, in the country. So, jobs, basic services, finally, clean government.
Jedna od prednosti je mogućnost usklađene raspodjele novca. A druga je, nevladine udruge postaju odgovorne. Koristi se obična konkurencija. Moraju se međusobno natjecati za resurse. Dobre nevladine organizacije, kao npr Oxfam, su jako zainteresirane za ovu ideju. Žele imati disciplinu i odgovornost. To je način kako poboljšati osnovne usluge. I zbog toga što vlada osigurava sredstva, vlada bi oblikovala te usluge i dobivala određene zasluge. Tako da sve zasluge ne bi pripale vladi SAD-a i nekoj nevladinoj organizaciji. Već bi zasluge dijelom pripale i post-konfliktnoj vladi. Znači: poslovi, osnovne usluge i konačno čista vlada.
Clean means follow their money. The typical post-conflict government is so short of money that it needs our money just to be on a life-support system. You can't get the basic functions of the state done unless we put money into the core budget of these countries. But, if we put money into the core budget, we know that there aren't the budget systems with integrity that mean that money will be well spent. And if all we do is put money in and close our eyes it's not just that the money is wasted -- that's the least of the problems -- it's that the money is captured. It's captured by the crooks who are at the heart of the political problem. And so inadvertently we empower the people who are the problem.
Čista vlada znači transparentno upravljanje novcem. Obično, post-konfliktnoj vladi kronično nedostaje novac toliko da joj je potreban naš novac samo da se održi. Nije moguće pokrenuti osnovne funkcije države ukoliko ne damo novac direktno u proračun tih zemalja. Ali ako damo novac u proračun, znamo da to nisu sredstva s integritetom, koji znači da će naš novac biti dobro potrošen. A ako samo damo novac i zatvorimo oči ne znači samo da je naš novac bačen, to je najmanji problem, nego da je novac ukraden. Ukraden od lopova koji su središte političkog problema. I na taj način nenamjerno potičemo ljude koji su problem.
So building clean government means, yes, provide money to the budget, but also provide a lot of scrutiny, which means a lot of technical assistance that follows the money. Paddy Ashdown, who was the grand high nabob of Bosnia to the United Nations, in his book about his experience, he said, "I realize what I needed was accountants without borders, to follow that money." So that's the -- let me wrap up, this is the package.
Pa gradnja čiste vlade zahtjeva davanje novca direktno u proračun. Ali nužno je ugraditi mehanizme nadzora. Što znači poprilično tehničke podrške koja prati novac. Paddy Ashdown, koji je bio visoki predstavnik međunarodne zajednice u Bosni pri UN-u, u svojoj knjizi, kaže "Shvaćam da su mi bili potrebni računovođe bez granica, koji bi pratili taj novac." I to je - da zaključim, to je paket.
What's the goal? If we follow this, what would we hope to achieve? That after 10 years, the focus on the construction sector would have produced both jobs and, hence, security -- because young people would have jobs -- and it would have reconstructed the infrastructure. So that's the focus on the construction sector. The focus on the basic service delivery through these independent service authorities would have rescued basic services from their catastrophic levels, and it would have given ordinary people the sense that the government was doing something useful. The emphasis on clean government would have gradually squeezed out the political crooks, because there wouldn't be any money in taking part in the politics. And so gradually the selection, the composition of politicians, would shift from the crooked to the honest. Where would that leave us? Gradually it would shift from a politics of plunder to a politics of hope. Thank you. (Applause)
Koji je cilj? Ukoliko slijedimo ove upute, čemu se možemo nadati? Da nakon 10 godina, fokusiranje na građevinski sektor bi proizvelo i poslove pa tako i sigurnost. Zbog toga što bi mladi ljudi imali posao. I rekonstruirali bi infrastrukturu. To je fokus građevinskog sektora. Fokus na pružanje osnovnih usluga kroz nezavisna uslužna tijela bi spasio osnovne usluge od katastrofe. I dao bi osjećaj običnim ljudima da vlada radi nešto korisno. Naglasak na čistu vladu bi polako iskorijenio političke lopove. Zbog toga što ne bi bilo novca u bavljenju politikom. I postupno kroz selekciju, sastav političara, bi se promijenio od lopova do poštenih. I gdje bi se onda našli? Politika bi se postupno mijenjala od politike pljačke do politike nade. Hvala (Pljesak)