I'm here to talk to you about how globalized we are, how globalized we aren't, and why it's important to actually be accurate in making those kinds of assessments. And the leading point of view on this, whether measured by number of books sold, mentions in media, or surveys that I've run with groups ranging from my students to delegates to the World Trade Organization, is this view that national borders really don't matter very much anymore, cross-border integration is close to complete, and we live in one world. And what's interesting about this view is, again, it's a view that's held by pro-globalizers like Tom Friedman, from whose book this quote is obviously excerpted, but it's also held by anti-globalizers, who see this giant globalization tsunami that's about to wreck all our lives if it hasn't already done so.
我今天来到这里,是想谈论全球化的程度有多深, 或者全球化有多么遥远, 以及,为什么全球化程度的精确评估 是如此的重要。 现今对全球化主流的看法,不论源于 对书籍销售量,媒体提及次数的统计, 或者来自我调查,调查对象包括下至我的学生 上至世界贸易组织代表, 持这种观点的人认为国界的限制 已经不再是那么显著了, 跨国界的完全融合已指日可待, 所有人都会生活在地球村里。 尤为有趣的是, “全球化已经趋于完成”这一观点不仅被支持全球化的人认同 比如托马斯·弗里德曼,他的书就引述此观点(《世界是平的》) 同时也同样得到了反对全球化的人的认同,他们普遍认为 全球化将如洪水猛兽般冲毁我们的生活 即便目前还没达到,但终将来临。
The other thing I would add is that this is not a new view. I'm a little bit of an amateur historian, so I've spent some time going back, trying to see the first mention of this kind of thing. And the best, earliest quote that I could find was one from David Livingstone, writing in the 1850s about how the railroad, the steam ship, and the telegraph were integrating East Africa perfectly with the rest of the world. Now clearly, David Livingstone was a little bit ahead of his time, but it does seem useful to ask ourselves, "Just how global are we?" before we think about where we go from here.
此外,我得说“全球化已经快要完成”这不是最近的观点。 我或多或少是个业余历史学家,所以花了些时间 去追溯前人对全球化程度的评估,看看是谁首次 提出这种论调。我所找到最早的完整表述 是来自于大卫·利文斯顿(David Livingstone), 写于1850年,谈论铁路、蒸汽船、 以及电报机,正完美地将东非 以及世界其它地方融合在一起。 现在看来,大卫·利文斯顿 显然是略领先于他所处的时代, 但是,我们似乎应该首先问自己 “我们究竟有多么全球化?” 然后再去思考在此基础上我们未来要走向何方。
So the best way I've found of trying to get people to take seriously the idea that the world may not be flat, may not even be close to flat, is with some data. So one of the things I've been doing over the last few years is really compiling data on things that could either happen within national borders or across national borders, and I've looked at the cross-border component as a percentage of the total. I'm not going to present all the data that I have here today, but let me just give you a few data points. I'm going to talk a little bit about one kind of information flow, one kind of flow of people, one kind of flow of capital, and, of course, trade in products and services.
所以我发现要说服大家, 看清世界并没有我们想象中那么全球化, 甚至并没有接近全球化,我们就得用数据说话。 我在过去几年所做的 实际上是收集那些相关数据, 既有国内的也有国际的, 再计算那些跨越国界的部分 占总量的百分比。 我并没有打算在今天展示所有的数据, 只是向大家分享一些数据的, 我将要谈论一些信息流, 人口的流动,资本的流通, 当然,还包括产品与服务的贸易往来。
So let's start off with plain old telephone service. Of all the voice-calling minutes in the world last year, what percentage do you think were accounted for by cross-border phone calls? Pick a percentage in your own mind. The answer turns out to be two percent. If you include Internet telephony, you might be able to push this number up to six or seven percent, but it's nowhere near what people tend to estimate.
好,那么让我们以普通老式电话业务作为开始。 去年全球的语音通话时间中, 你们认为有百分之多少 会是来自跨国电话? 你们可以心中默想一个数据。 真实的数据是2%。 如果再将互联网电话业务包含其中,这个数值 可能被推高到6%或7%, 但这显然远低于我们心中的预估值。
Or let's turn to people moving across borders. One particular thing we might look at, in terms of long-term flows of people, is what percentage of the world's population is accounted for by first-generation immigrants? Again, please pick a percentage. Turns out to be a little bit higher. It's actually about three percent.
好,我们再来看看跨国的人口流动。 我们要特别关注的是, 考虑长期的人口流动, 在全球所有人口中 第一代移民占了多少百分比呢? 一样,请大家心中默想一个数据。 结果比上一个答案要略高一点, 是大约3%。
Or think of investment. Take all the real investment that went on in the world in 2010. What percentage of that was accounted for by foreign direct investment? Not quite ten percent.
我们再来看看投资。将所有2010年开始并持续的 产权投资计算在内。 究竟有多少百分比, 是由外商直接投资的呢? 不足10%。
And then finally, the one statistic that I suspect many of the people in this room have seen: the export-to-GDP ratio. If you look at the official statistics, they typically indicate a little bit above 30 percent. However, there's a big problem with the official statistics, in that if, for instance, a Japanese component supplier ships something to China to be put into an iPod, and then the iPod gets shipped to the U.S., that component ends up getting counted multiple times. So nobody knows how bad this bias with the official statistics actually is, so I thought I would ask the person who's spearheading the effort to generate data on this, Pascal Lamy, the Director of the World Trade Organization, what his best guess would be of exports as a percentage of GDP, without the double- and triple-counting, and it's actually probably a bit under 20 percent, rather than the 30 percent-plus numbers that we're talking about.
最后,是一个统计指标 相信在座的各位已经耳熟能详: “出口占国内生产总值的比例” 如果你去看看官方的统计,他们通常给出 超过30%的结果。 然而,在官方统计中存在巨大的漏洞, 举例来说,如果一个日本电子元件供应商 将产品运到中国加工成一个iPod, 再运输到美国, 那么这个元件将被重复统计。 所以没有人能够知道官方统计与实际情况 之间的误差究竟有多大,所以我认为 我应该咨询那些率先生成这方面数据的专家 帕斯卡尔·拉米 世界贸易组织的总干事 他认为最佳的估计 “出口占国内生产总值的比例”, 在去除双重或三重计算后, 实际上可能略低于20%,而不是 我们日常谈论的超过30%。
So it's very clear that if you look at these numbers or all the other numbers that I talk about in my book, "World 3.0," that we're very, very far from the no-border effect benchmark, which would imply internationalization levels of the order of 85, 90, 95 percent. So clearly, apocalyptically-minded authors have overstated the case. But it's not just the apocalyptics, as I think of them, who are prone to this kind of overstatement. I've also spent some time surveying audiences in different parts of the world on what they actually guess these numbers to be. Let me share with you the results of a survey that Harvard Business Review was kind enough to run of its readership as to what people's guesses along these dimensions actually were.
所以很明显,当你看到这些数据 或者通过我写的书, 《World 3.0》,我们远远未能达到 那些由无国界效应标准所意味的 85%、90%甚至95%量级的国际化水平。 这样就很清楚了,那些怀着末日心态的作家 实际上是夸大其辞了。 然而,并非仅仅是那些带有末日心态的人 才有这种夸大叙述的倾向。 我也花时间去做过问卷调查 在世界各地进行取样 让他们猜测这些数据可能会有多少。 让我在这与大家分享调查的结果。 利用期刊《哈佛商业评论》的 读者群做为样本, 进行这些方面数据的读者猜测。
So a couple of observations stand out for me from this slide. First of all, there is a suggestion of some error. Okay. (Laughter) Second, these are pretty large errors. For four quantities whose average value is less than 10 percent, you have people guessing three, four times that level. Even though I'm an economist, I find that a pretty large error. And third, this is not just confined to the readers of the Harvard Business Review. I've run several dozen such surveys in different parts of the world, and in all cases except one, where a group actually underestimated the trade-to-GDP ratio, people have this tendency towards overestimation, and so I thought it important to give a name to this, and that's what I refer to as globaloney, the difference between the dark blue bars and the light gray bars.
结果如图。(白色为真值,蓝色为猜测) 首先,两者之间似乎有那么一丁点儿差距。 好吧。(笑声) 其次,大家对这四个指标的猜测都错得很离谱。 真实值的平均数量在10%以下, 但有很多人猜想值高于实际值三倍甚至四倍。 即使我是一个经济学家,我也能看出 这是一个相当大的误差。 第三点,不仅仅局限于 《哈佛商业评论》的读者群。 我也在世界其他的地方进行多次 类似的调查,只有一项指标 会出现群体性低估,那就是 “贸易占国内生产总值的比例”,而剩下指标 人们倾向于过高估计,所以我认为很有必要 给这种群体性特征进行命名, 称它为“全球胡话”,参考这深蓝色 与浅灰色之间的差距。
Especially because, I suspect, some of you may still be a little bit skeptical of the claims, I think it's important to just spend a little bit of time thinking about why we might be prone to globaloney. A couple of different reasons come to mind. First of all, there's a real dearth of data in the debate. Let me give you an example. When I first published some of these data a few years ago in a magazine called Foreign Policy, one of the people who wrote in, not entirely in agreement, was Tom Friedman. And since my article was titled "Why the World Isn't Flat," that wasn't too surprising. (Laughter) What was very surprising to me was Tom's critique, which was, "Ghemawat's data are narrow." And this caused me to scratch my head, because as I went back through his several-hundred-page book, I couldn't find a single figure, chart, table, reference or footnote. So my point is, I haven't presented a lot of data here to convince you that I'm right, but I would urge you to go away and look for your own data to try and actually assess whether some of these hand-me-down insights that we've been bombarded with actually are correct. So dearth of data in the debate is one reason.
我想,你们中可能仍然有一些人 对我的说法持怀疑态度,我认为这非常重要 去花一点点时间来思考 为什么我们会倾向于迷信这种“全球胡话”。 一系列理由从我的脑海中浮现, 首先,是在这一议题上,相关数据的严重匮乏。 我来给大家一个例子。当我在几年前 在一个叫《外交政策》的杂志上 第一次公布这些数据时, 有一位人物来信,对此持不同意见, 他就是托马斯·弗里德曼。他的反对是必然的, 因为文章标题是《为何世界不是“平”的》。(笑声) 让我非常惊讶的是汤姆的批评内容, 他说,“沃特使用的数据面太窄。” 这使我疑惑不解,因为 我翻了他数百页的书, 竟然找不到一张图表, 连脚注和参考文献都没有。 所以我的观点是,我引用的数据 可能还不足以让你信服,但是我需要提醒你 回去找找你自己的数据 试着用精确的评估方式来看看 这些我们一直被灌输的观点 是否真的正确。 好了,相关数据的匮乏是第一个原因。
A second reason has to do with peer pressure. I remember, I decided to write my "Why the World Isn't Flat" article, because I was being interviewed on TV in Mumbai, and the interviewer's first question to me was, "Professor Ghemawat, why do you still believe that the world is round?" And I started laughing, because I hadn't come across that formulation before. (Laughter) And as I was laughing, I was thinking, I really need a more coherent response, especially on national TV. I'd better write something about this. (Laughter) But what I can't quite capture for you was the pity and disbelief with which the interviewer asked her question. The perspective was, here is this poor professor. He's clearly been in a cave for the last 20,000 years. He really has no idea as to what's actually going on in the world. So try this out with your friends and acquaintances, if you like. You'll find that it's very cool to talk about the world being one, etc. If you raise questions about that formulation, you really are considered a bit of an antique.
第二个原因是来自于同行的压力。 我记得,当我决定去写 《为何世界不是“平”的》,是因为 我在孟买电视台接受采访, 主持人问我的第一个问题就是, “沃特教授,为什么你坚持相信, 这个世界是圆的呢?”我忍不住笑了, 因为我以前还没有想过这种说法。(笑声) 我在笑的同时,也陷入了沉思, 面对这个问题我确实需要更多的回应,特别是 全国播放的电视媒体上。我最好为此写些回应文章。(笑声) 但我无法让你们了解的 就是主持人提问时那怜悯和怀疑的态度。 就是主持人提问时那怜悯和怀疑的态度。 好像在说,这儿站着一个可怜的教授。 他已经在山顶洞里住了两万年, 他根本就不知道 当今世界正在发生着什么。 如果你们愿意,也可以尝试和亲朋好友做这样的交流, 你会发现当谈论的话题 是世界一家时,那将会很酷。 然而对这种说法提出质疑时, 你就会被视为老古董。
And then the final reason, which I mention, especially to a TED audience, with some trepidation, has to do with what I call "techno-trances." If you listen to techno music for long periods of time, it does things to your brainwave activity. (Laughter) Something similar seems to happen with exaggerated conceptions of how technology is going to overpower in the very immediate run all cultural barriers, all political barriers, all geographic barriers, because at this point I know you aren't allowed to ask me questions, but when I get to this point in my lecture with my students, hands go up, and people ask me, "Yeah, but what about Facebook?" And I got this question often enough that I thought I'd better do some research on Facebook. Because, in some sense, it's the ideal kind of technology to think about. Theoretically, it makes it as easy to form friendships halfway around the world as opposed to right next door. What percentage of people's friends on Facebook are actually located in countries other than where people we're analyzing are based? The answer is probably somewhere between 10 to 15 percent. Non-negligible, so we don't live in an entirely local or national world, but very, very far from the 95 percent level that you would expect, and the reason's very simple. We don't, or I hope we don't, form friendships at random on Facebook. The technology is overlaid on a pre-existing matrix of relationships that we have, and those relationships are what the technology doesn't quite displace. Those relationships are why we get far fewer than 95 percent of our friends being located in countries other than where we are.
接下来,我要提一下最后的原因, 尤其是面对TED的观众,我诚惶诚恐, 来介绍所谓的“电音入迷” 就是你长时间聆听动感强烈的电子音乐, 它就会干扰你的脑波活动。(笑声) 那些与此现象类似的 以夸张的概念来描述科技是如何 在短时间内以势不可挡之势 冲破一切文化藩篱、政治界限、 以及地理天堑,对于“电音入迷”这一提法 我知道现场不允许你们向我提问, 但是我准备了一些来自课堂上学生的提问 他们举起手来,然后质问我, “好吧,那你是怎么看脸书 (Facebook)?” 对于这个问题,我已经胸有成竹 我也对Facebook做了不少研究。 因为,从某种角度说,它是一种需要研究的理想科技 理论上说,它使得 跨地球两端交朋友 变得仿佛就住在隔壁一样。 那么,究竟有多少百分比,在Facebook上的朋友 是来自于另一个国家的呢? 这些人在我分析了人群中占比多少呢? 这个答案大概是在 10%到15%之间。 不可否认,我们已经不再是生活于完全本地本国的 孤立的世界中,但是,仍然离全球化程度达到95% 的期望值很遥远,而这一现象的原因很简单。 因为我们不会,至少我希望我们不会, 在Facebook上 随便乱交朋友。科技虽然覆盖了 我们早就形成的人际关系, 但这些人际关系恰恰是科技 所无法替代的。正是这些既有的人际关系 我们才没有高达95%的朋友 是来自异邦。
So does all this matter? Or is globaloney just a harmless way of getting people to pay more attention to globalization-related issues? I want to suggest that actually, globaloney can be very harmful to your health. First of all, recognizing that the glass is only 10 to 20 percent full is critical to seeing that there might be potential for additional gains from additional integration, whereas if we thought we were already there, there would be no particular point to pushing harder. It's a little bit like, we wouldn't be having a conference on radical openness if we already thought we were totally open to all the kinds of influences that are being talked about at this conference. So being accurate about how limited globalization levels are is critical to even being able to notice that there might be room for something more, something that would contribute further to global welfare.
我的这一发现是否重要?或者“全球胡话” 只是用一种无害的方式,来让我们更多的去关注 全球化相关的议题? 我不得不确切的指出, “全球胡话”的观点是非常有害的。 首先,就好比有一个玻璃杯 它只被装填了十分之一左右 那么它就可能有潜力额外装得更多的东西。 那么它就可能有潜力额外装得更多的东西。 然而如果我们认为它已经被盛满, 我们就没有理由去做更多的努力。 就像如果我们真的认为 我们已经很开放了 我们就不会有任何会议 来探讨积极开放的话题。 所以正确看待全球化程度的有限性 可以让我们更深刻的认识到 仍然有大量进步的空间, 可以对全球福址有进一步的贡献。
Which brings me to my second point. Avoiding overstatement is also very helpful because it reduces and in some cases even reverses some of the fears that people have about globalization. So I actually spend most of my "World 3.0" book working through a litany of market failures and fears that people have that they worry globalization is going to exacerbate. I'm obviously not going to be able to do that for you today, so let me just present to you two headlines as an illustration of what I have in mind. Think of France and the current debate about immigration. When you ask people in France what percentage of the French population is immigrants, the answer is about 24 percent. That's their guess. Maybe realizing that the number is just eight percent might help cool some of the superheated rhetoric that we see around the immigration issue. Or to take an even more striking example, when the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations did a survey of Americans, asking them to guess what percentage of the federal budget went to foreign aid, the guess was 30 percent, which is slightly in excess of the actual level — ("actually about ... 1%") (Laughter) — of U.S. governmental commitments to federal aid. The reassuring thing about this particular survey was, when it was pointed out to people how far their estimates were from the actual data, some of them — not all of them — seemed to become more willing to consider increases in foreign aid.
这就牵连到我的第二个观点。 避免过高评价全球化是有好处的 因为它降低了,甚至扭转了那些 反对全球化的人心中怀有的恐惧。 所以我在《World 3.0》中花了大量篇幅 来处理一连串的市场失效和担忧 人们非常担心全球化可能对市场带来的恶化。 我显然已经无法在今天向大家展示这些, 所以就让我以两个标题 来陈述我的论点。 想想目前法国针对移民的议题。 当你询问在法国人口中 到底有多少百分比是移民, 将得到他们猜测的数字,大概是24%。 如果意识到实际量只有8% 那可能会让那些充斥在移民议题中的 过激言论冷却。 或者,再举一个突出的例子, 当芝加哥对外关系委员会 作了一份调查,让美国人猜猜 联邦的预算中占有多少比例是用在国际援助上, 猜测的普遍值是30%,这确实略微超过了实际水平—— (真实值只有1%)。(笑声) 略微超过美国政府承诺的联邦政府补贴。 这一调查让我们可以宽心, 当我们向民众指出 估算值和实际数据相距甚远时, 我相信会有一些人,会变得 更加愿意去增加对外援助。
So foreign aid is actually a great way of sort of wrapping up here, because if you think about it, what I've been talking about today is this notion -- very uncontroversial amongst economists -- that most things are very home-biased. "Foreign aid is the most aid to poor people," is about the most home-biased thing you can find. If you look at the OECD countries and how much they spend per domestic poor person, and compare it with how much they spend per poor person in poor countries, the ratio — Branko Milanovic at the World Bank did the calculations — turns out to be about 30,000 to one. Now of course, some of us, if we truly are cosmopolitan, would like to see that ratio being brought down to one-is-to-one. I'd like to make the suggestion that we don't need to aim for that to make substantial progress from where we are. If we simply brought that ratio down to 15,000 to one, we would be meeting those aid targets that were agreed at the Rio Summit 20 years ago that the summit that ended last week made no further progress on.
国际援助事实上很适合 用来做今天的收尾,因为 如果你回想一下,今天我一直在谈的 这个经济学家都同意的概念: 许多事情都是存在着本土偏重。 “国际援助是对穷人的最大帮助” 就是你能想到最本土偏重的事情。 观察一下那些经济合作组织的成员国 将他们花在一个本国穷人身上的经费, 比上他们花费在 那些穷困国家的穷人身上的金额的比值, 这一比率——世界银行的米兰诺维奇作了计算 是大约30000:1。 现在当然,如果我们真是四海一家, 我们希望看到那个比例会降到 1:1。 我的建议是,并不需要朝着这个目标前进, 只需从目前所处的状态出发,去取得实质性进展。 我们只要将比率改善成15000:1, 就可以实现那些在20年前 里约峰会上所制定的援助目标 这一目标即便在上周的高峰会议中,仍无进展。
So in summary, while radical openness is great, given how closed we are, even incremental openness could make things dramatically better. Thank you very much. (Applause) (Applause)
所以总而言之,激进的开放主义是非常好的, 它能让我们更加靠近彼此, 甚至渐进式的增加开放也会使事情得到 显著的改善。谢谢大家!(掌声) (掌声)