There's a poem written by a very famous English poet at the end of the 19th century. It was said to echo in Churchill's brain in the 1930s. And the poem goes: "On the idle hill of summer, lazy with the flow of streams, hark I hear a distant drummer, drumming like a sound in dreams, far and near and low and louder on the roads of earth go by, dear to friend and food to powder, soldiers marching, soon to die." Those who are interested in poetry, the poem is "A Shropshire Lad" written by A.E. Housman.
有一首詩這麼寫道 這是一位很有名的英國詩人 在十九世紀末寫的 聽說邱吉爾對這首詩也念念不忘 在1930年那個時候 這首詩是這麼寫的: 「夏日的慵懶之丘上 厭倦了小河細流 聽,我聽到了遠方的鼓聲 就像在夢裡聽到似的 遠的、近的、低沉的、高亢的,在路上迴盪著 從愛人到朋友,從食物到麵粉 士兵踏著步 快步地走向死亡。」 想知道這首詩名的人 這是豪斯曼的詩集《舒洛普郡少年》
But what Housman understood, and you hear it in the symphonies of Nielsen too, was that the long, hot, silvan summers of stability of the 19th century were coming to a close, and that we were about to move into one of those terrifying periods of history when power changes. And these are always periods, ladies and gentlemen, accompanied by turbulence, and all too often by blood.
不過,豪斯曼所知道的 你也在尼爾森交響曲中聽過 就是十九世紀那漫長,炎熱,遍地林木的夏天 一切都很平和的夏天 即將走向終點 當時,我們正要踏入 歷史上最令人恐懼的一段日子 因為權力將要轉移 各位先生女士 這些日子總是伴隨著騷動 偶爾也有血腥的暴力
And my message for you is that I believe we are condemned, if you like, to live at just one of those moments in history when the gimbals upon which the established order of power is beginning to change and the new look of the world, the new powers that exist in the world, are beginning to take form. And these are -- and we see it very clearly today -- nearly always highly turbulent times, highly difficult times, and all too often very bloody times. By the way, it happens about once every century.
告訴你們 我認為,我們無一倖免 都活在歷史上的那些日子 當那些已經建立的秩序 發生劇變 也從新的角度來看這世界 存在這世界上的新權力 正在慢慢成形 我們也曉得是哪些新權力 就是那些非常動亂、極為艱困的時代 偶爾也參雜著血腥暴力 順便一提,這種事每個世紀都會發生一次
You might argue that the last time it happened -- and that's what Housman felt coming and what Churchill felt too -- was that when power passed from the old nations, the old powers of Europe, across the Atlantic to the new emerging power of the United States of America -- the beginning of the American century. And of course, into the vacuum where the too-old European powers used to be were played the two bloody catastrophes of the last century -- the one in the first part and the one in the second part: the two great World Wars. Mao Zedong used to refer to them as the European civil wars, and it's probably a more accurate way of describing them.
你或許會辯駁我說,最後一次發生的時間 也就是豪斯曼和邱吉爾覺得有事即將發生的時候 是權力從衰落的國家 像是歐洲的舊權 越過大西洋,到了新興權力崛起的國家 美利堅合眾國 也正是美國開始強盛的世紀 當然,在那個時候 歐洲人過時的權力 被人用來挑起兩場血腥的災難 就在那最後一個世紀 兩場災難分別是兩次的世界大戰 毛澤東說那是歐洲人的內戰 這麼說也真的比較貼切
Well, ladies and gentlemen, we live at one of those times. But for us, I want to talk about three factors today. And the first of these, the first two of these, is about a shift in power. And the second is about some new dimension which I want to refer to, which has never quite happened in the way it's happening now. But let's talk about the shifts of power that are occurring to the world. And what is happening today is, in one sense, frightening because it's never happened before. We have seen lateral shifts of power -- the power of Greece passed to Rome and the power shifts that occurred during the European civilizations -- but we are seeing something slightly different. For power is not just moving laterally from nation to nation. It's also moving vertically.
各位 我們現在也生活在那些過去的日子 我今天就是要談三個因素 這三個因素中的第一個 就是權力移轉 第二個因素,我想要講一塊新領域 過去從來沒有像現在這樣發生過 不過,先來談談現今世上的權力移轉吧 現在世上的權力移轉 從某種層面來看,相當震懾人心 因為過去從沒發生過 我們曾見過幾次橫向的權力移轉 像是希臘轉到羅馬 還有發生在歐洲社會的 權力移轉 但現在發生的權力移轉,有些微的不同 因為權力不只是國與國之間的 橫向移轉 也有直向移轉
What's happening today is that the power that was encased, held to accountability, held to the rule of law, within the institution of the nation state has now migrated in very large measure onto the global stage. The globalization of power -- we talk about the globalization of markets, but actually it's the globalization of real power. And where, at the nation state level that power is held to accountability subject to the rule of law, on the international stage it is not. The international stage and the global stage where power now resides: the power of the Internet, the power of the satellite broadcasters, the power of the money changers -- this vast money-go-round that circulates now 32 times the amount of money necessary for the trade it's supposed to be there to finance -- the money changers, if you like, the financial speculators that have brought us all to our knees quite recently, the power of the multinational corporations now developing budgets often bigger than medium-sized countries. These live in a global space which is largely unregulated, not subject to the rule of law, and in which people may act free of constraint.
現今所存在的權力,受到責任的牽制 也受到法律的牽制 越來越多的民族國家的機構 開始浮上國際檯面 全球化的權力 雖然我們說是全球化市場 但事實上,卻是全球化權力 從民族國家的角度來看 受到責任、法律 所牽制的權力 在國際舞台上則否 當今存在於國際舞台上的權力有 網路的權力,衛星廣播的權力 貨幣兌換的權力 兌換大筆金錢 數目是過去財政所需的 三十二倍 負責貨幣兌換的人 或是叫他們金融投機客 他們最近確實讓些活動停止下來 多國企業所擁有的權力 正在發展預算 有的預算數目比許多中型國家還要大筆 那些人住在一個全球化的空間 幾乎沒有人來管 也沒有法律的牽制 人們想做什麼就做什麼
Now that suits the powerful up to a moment. It's always suitable for those who have the most power to operate in spaces without constraint, but the lesson of history is that, sooner or later, unregulated space -- space not subject to the rule of law -- becomes populated, not just by the things you wanted -- international trade, the Internet, etc. -- but also by the things you don't want -- international criminality, international terrorism. The revelation of 9/11 is that even if you are the most powerful nation on earth, nevertheless, those who inhabit that space can attack you even in your most iconic of cities one bright September morning. It's said that something like 60 percent of the four million dollars that was taken to fund 9/11 actually passed through the institutions of the Twin Towers which 9/11 destroyed. You see, our enemies also use this space -- the space of mass travel, the Internet, satellite broadcasters -- to be able to get around their poison, which is about destroying our systems and our ways.
到目前為止 那些都是強權人士想要的 那些情況,總是適合掌有大多數權力的人 他們不受限制的束縛 然而,那些無人管制的地方 歷史給他們的教訓 那些不受法律牽制的地方 人口會變多,也有你樂見的情 像是國際貿易、網路‧‧‧等等 當然,也有一些你不願看到的 像是國際犯罪、跨國恐怖組織 從911就可以知道 就算你住在世界上最強勢的國家 儘管如此 那些空間的人還是可以攻擊你 甚至在九月的一個早晨中 攻擊你國家最具代表性的象徵 聽說四百萬塊中 大約有百分之六十拿去資助911恐怖攻擊 那次恐怖攻擊的飛機穿透雙子星大樓 那也是911摧毀的建築 瞧,我們的敵人用這樣的空間 涵蓋如此多人的旅遊、網路、衛星廣播的空間 來達成他們的恐怖理念 也就是雖毀我們的組織系統
Sooner or later, sooner or later, the rule of history is that where power goes governance must follow. And if it is therefore the case, as I believe it is, that one of the phenomenon of our time is the globalization of power, then it follows that one of the challenges of our time is to bring governance to the global space. And I believe that the decades ahead of us now will be to a greater or lesser extent turbulent the more or less we are able to achieve that aim: to bring governance to the global space.
早晚 早晚都會發生的 歷史告訴我們 無論權力到哪裡 統治者就得跟著權力走 而我相信也是因為如此 成就了現今社會 權力全球化的現象 我們這世代所面對的挑戰 就是把統治者帶上國際舞台 我覺得在往後的幾十年 會有些騷動,程度或大或小 不管怎麼樣,我們有能力達到那目標 把統治者帶上國際舞台
Now notice, I'm not talking about government. I'm not talking about setting up some global democratic institution. My own view, by the way, ladies and gentlemen, is that this is unlikely to be done by spawning more U.N. institutions. If we didn't have the U.N., we'd have to invent it. The world needs an international forum. It needs a means by which you can legitimize international action. But when it comes to governance of the global space, my guess is this won't happen through the creation of more U.N. institutions. It will actually happen by the powerful coming together and making treaty-based systems, treaty-based agreements, to govern that global space.
注意,我不是在討論統治者 也不是討論該如何建立 什麼全球化民主機構 對了各位,順便一提 我覺得建立再多像是聯合國這類的機構 對這件事情並不會有什麼幫助 我們要是沒有聯合國,我們就生一個出來就好了 這世界需要的是一個國際論壇 藉由國際論壇,國際行動因而得以合法化 但是,一談到國際舞台該由誰來統治 我覺得再多的聯合國 都沒有辦法解決這問題 當強權聚在一起時,這個問題就會產生 他們因而建立用合約作為基礎的一套系統 或是協定 來統管這個國際舞台
And if you look, you can see them happening, already beginning to emerge. The World Trade Organization: treaty-based organization, entirely treaty-based, and yet, powerful enough to hold even the most powerful, the United States, to account if necessary. Kyoto: the beginnings of struggling to create a treaty-based organization. The G20: we know now that we have to put together an institution which is capable of bringing governance to that financial space for financial speculation. And that's what the G20 is, a treaty-based institution.
要是你仔細點看,你會發現這類的事情正慢慢發生 世界貿易組織,就是個合約為底的組織 完全用合約來統治 這些合約強勢到能夠控制當今最強的國家,像是美國 必要的話,甚至可以摧毀美國 京都議定書:努力奮鬥 去制定了此一合約為底的組織 二十國集團 現在,我們知道得組一個 能夠把統治權帶到金融空間的機構 為了那些金融活動 這就是二十國集團因而建立的原因
Now there's a problem there, and we'll come back to it in a minute, which is that if you bring the most powerful together to make the rules in treaty-based institutions, to fill that governance space, then what happens to the weak who are left out? And that's a big problem, and we'll return to it in just a second.
現在有個問題了 我等一下會回到剛剛講的地方 就是你把強權給聚在一塊 要他們在綁合約的機構訂定規則 好填補統治權這一個空缺 我要說的問題,是那些沒有參與的弱國怎麼辦? 這是一個嚴重的問題 我很快會回到這問題上
So there's my first message, that if you are to pass through these turbulent times more or less turbulently, then our success in doing that will in large measure depend on our capacity to bring sensible governance to the global space. And watch that beginning to happen. My second point is, and I know I don't have to talk to an audience like this about such a thing, but power is not just shifting vertically, it's also shifting horizontally.
所以我首先要告訴你們 如果你正經歷這些騷動 無論騷動程度大小 如果想把事情給做好 關鍵在於我們把公正的統治權 帶上國際舞台 的能力 以及是否注意到事情已發生 接著,我要說的第二點 我知道和觀眾談這件事時 我不必這樣說話 然而,權力不只是直向移轉 權力也會橫向移轉
You might argue that the story, the history of civilizations, has been civilizations gathered around seas -- with the first ones around the Mediterranean, the more recent ones in the ascendents of Western power around the Atlantic. Well it seems to me that we're now seeing a fundamental shift of power, broadly speaking, away from nations gathered around the Atlantic [seaboard] to the nations gathered around the Pacific rim. Now that begins with economic power, but that's the way it always begins. You already begin to see the development of foreign policies, the augmentation of military budgets occurring in the other growing powers in the world. I think actually this is not so much a shift from the West to the East; something different is happening.
你或許會反駁我說,從文明社會的歷史來看 文明社會都聚集在海洋四周 最先到達的,就在地中海 之後到達的西方後裔,就聚在大西洋 但就我看來,廣義而言 我們所看到的只是權力移轉的基本面 至不過是那些聚集在大西洋岸邊的民族 搬到太平洋岸邊而已 然而,現在卻有了經濟權 經濟權就是這樣開始的 你會看到世界上漸漸茁壯的國家 他們的外交開始發展 軍事預算也增加 然而,我覺得 權力並非只是從西方移轉到東方 反而有些不同
My guess is, for what it's worth, is that the United States will remain the most powerful nation on earth for the next 10 years, 15, but the context in which she holds her power has now radically altered; it has radically changed. We are coming out of 50 years, most unusual years, of history in which we have had a totally mono-polar world, in which every compass needle for or against has to be referenced by its position to Washington -- a world bestrode by a single colossus. But that's not a usual case in history. In fact, what's now emerging is the much more normal case of history. You're beginning to see the emergence of a multi-polar world.
我個人的猜測 無論美國是否保持在 全球最強的國家 在接下來的十年,十五年 美國所身處的這個環境 已經徹徹底底的改變了 過去這五十年 是由史以來最不尋常的五十年 過去我們在世界上只有一個強權國家 其餘的國家 無論認同與否 都必須朝向那國家的所在地,華盛頓 這個世界僅由一個強國來統治 然而這在歷史上卻不常見 事實上,現在所發生的事 反倒較常在歷史上看過 你將會看到這世界上,有許多強國 開始崛起
Up until now, the United States has been the dominant feature of our world. They will remain the most powerful nation, but they will be the most powerful nation in an increasingly multi-polar world. And you begin to see the alternative centers of power building up -- in China, of course, though my own guess is that China's ascent to greatness is not smooth. It's going to be quite grumpy as China begins to democratize her society after liberalizing her economy. But that's a subject of a different discussion. You see India, you see Brazil. You see increasingly that the world now looks actually, for us Europeans, much more like Europe in the 19th century.
目前為止 美國還是這世界的主導角色 他們在未來也會是最強權的國家 然而,這世界上卻會有越來越多的強國 美國在這所扮演的強權角色,就顯得有趣了 你將會看到其他的強權國家建立起來 像是中國 雖然我覺得中國要成為強權,並不容易 相反地,是有些困難 因為中國在自由經濟後 將他們的社會民主化 不過,這又是另一個主題了 你會看到印度、巴西 事實上,對我們歐洲人而言 這世界看起來越來越像 十九世紀的歐洲
Europe in the 19th century: a great British foreign secretary, Lord Canning, used to describe it as the "European concert of powers." There was a balance, a five-sided balance. Britain always played to the balance. If Paris got together with Berlin, Britain got together with Vienna and Rome to provide a counterbalance. Now notice, in a period which is dominated by a mono-polar world, you have fixed alliances -- NATO, the Warsaw Pact. A fixed polarity of power means fixed alliances. But a multiple polarity of power means shifting and changing alliances. And that's the world we're coming into, in which we will increasingly see that our alliances are not fixed. Canning, the great British foreign secretary once said, "Britain has a common interest, but no common allies." And we will see increasingly that even we in the West will reach out, have to reach out, beyond the cozy circle of the Atlantic powers to make alliances with others if we want to get things done in the world.
當時的歐洲 坎寧閣下,也就是英國的外交大臣 將歐洲描述成「歐洲人的權力協調」 當時是五個國家相互制衡 英國也利用著這樣的平衡 舉例來說,若巴黎和柏林合作 英國就和維也納、羅馬合作,來抗衡巴黎和柏林 你瞧 這個世界如果只由單一強國統治 會有相互合作的同盟國出現 像是北約組織、華約組織 把兩方不同的權力組織起來 就是相互合作的同盟國 但是,如果有三方不同的權力 這便意味著同盟國的改變 也就是我們即將跨入的世界 我們會看到越來越多的同盟國 其成員並不是固定不變的 傑出的英國外交大臣坎寧曾說過 「英國和大家有相同的利益 卻沒有相同的盟國。」 縱使我們身處西方 我們終究還是 得踏出我們大西洋的舒適圈 去和他國交涉 和他國結盟 否則我們在這世上會一事無成
Note, that when we went into Libya, it was not good enough for the West to do it alone; we had to bring others in. We had to bring, in this case, the Arab League in. My guess is Iraq and Afghanistan are the last times when the West has tried to do it themselves, and we haven't succeeded. My guess is that we're reaching the beginning of the end of 400 years -- I say 400 years because it's the end of the Ottoman Empire -- of the hegemony of Western power, Western institutions and Western values. You know, up until now, if the West got its act together, it could propose and dispose in every corner of the world. But that's no longer true. Take the last financial crisis after the Second World War. The West got together -- the Bretton Woods Institution, World Bank, International Monetary Fund -- the problem solved. Now we have to call in others. Now we have to create the G20. Now we have to reach beyond the cozy circle of our Western friends.
像是我們要進入利比亞 我們若要隻身進入的話,就顯得不夠聰明 我們得找其他人 像是去找阿拉伯聯盟 我們最近幾次試著靠自己的力量 進入伊拉克、阿富汗 不過並沒有成功 我個人推測 過去四百年的鄂圖曼帝國已漸漸步入終點 鄂圖曼帝國的結束意味著 西方國家的霸權結束了 西方的強權機構、西方的價值觀,也都結束了 你知道嗎?在過去,如果西方國家能更有組織點 他們是有辦法控管 世上的每一個角落 不過,為時已晚 就拿最近二次大戰後 發生的經濟恐慌當作例子 如果西方國家合作點 像是,布雷頓森林機構、世界銀行、國際貨幣基金組織...等組織 問題就能解決 現在,我們得靠別人的幫忙 像是創立了二十國集團 我們還得跨出我們在西方的 舒適圈
Let me make a prediction for you, which is probably even more startling. I suspect we are now reaching the end of 400 years when Western power was enough. People say to me, "The Chinese, of course, they'll never get themselves involved in peace-making, multilateral peace-making around the world." Oh yes? Why not? How many Chinese troops are serving under the blue beret, serving under the blue flag, serving under the U.N. command in the world today? 3,700. How many Americans? 11. What is the largest naval contingent tackling the issue of Somali pirates? The Chinese naval contingent. Of course they are, they are a mercantilist nation. They want to keep the sea lanes open. Increasingly, we are going to have to do business with people with whom we do not share values, but with whom, for the moment, we share common interests. It's a whole new different way of looking at the world that is now emerging.
我個人預測 這答案可能會讓你嚇一跳 我認為我們正接近過去四百年 鄂圖曼帝國的終點 當時,西方的權力足以控制世界 有人對我說 「中國絕對不會參與 什麼在世界上建立和平的活動。」 這是為什麼呢? 你知道世界上有多少中國軍隊 戴著藍色貝雷帽、揮舞著藍色旗幟 在聯合國的指令下做事呢? 三千七百隊 美國呢?十一隊 世界上對付索馬利亞海盜 最大的海軍艦隊在哪裡? 在中國 你們會覺得理所當然,因為中國是重商主義者 他們想要維持航道的開放 那些和我們沒有相同利益的人 我們得越來越常和他們經商 不過,現在誰和我們有共同的利益呢? 這是個全新的角度 來看這個正在改變的世界
And here's the third factor, which is totally different. Today in our modern world, because of the Internet, because of the kinds of things people have been talking about here, everything is connected to everything. We are now interdependent. We are now interlocked, as nations, as individuals, in a way which has never been the case before, never been the case before. The interrelationship of nations, well it's always existed. Diplomacy is about managing the interrelationship of nations. But now we are intimately locked together. You get swine flu in Mexico, it's a problem for Charles de Gaulle Airport 24 hours later. Lehman Brothers goes down, the whole lot collapses. There are fires in the steppes of Russia, food riots in Africa.
接下來是第三個因素 和先前的完全不同 現在這個世界之所以這麼進步 是因為網路 因為人們可以談論各式各樣的話題 每一件事都息息相關 我們彼此也就相互依賴 相互連結 無論是國家,還是個人 這可是在以前都沒看過 沒有發生過 國與國之間的相關關係 一直都存在 外交就是管理國家之間的相互關係 而我們現在比以前還更加緊密的連結 舉例來說,你在墨西哥得到禽流感 二十四小時後,法國戴高樂機場 就得處理這個問題 雷曼兄弟倒閉,全球經濟也被拖垮 俄羅斯的大草原發生火災 非洲因為食物而發生暴動
We are all now deeply, deeply, deeply interconnected. And what that means is the idea of a nation state acting alone, not connected with others, not working with others, is no longer a viable proposition. Because the actions of a nation state are neither confined to itself, nor is it sufficient for the nation state itself to control its own territory, because the effects outside the nation state are now beginning to affect what happens inside them.
我們彼此間都有深深的關聯 這也就是說 一個國家想要獨立獨行 不和其他人來往 不和其他人合作 這已經不是個實際的想法 要是一個國家這麼做 這不僅是鎖國 這國家也沒有辦法 去掌管自己的國土 現在,這樣的一個國家 已經開始受到國外的影響了
I was a young soldier in the last of the small empire wars of Britain. At that time, the defense of my country was about one thing and one thing only: how strong was our army, how strong was our air force, how strong was our navy and how strong were our allies. That was when the enemy was outside the walls. Now the enemy is inside the walls. Now if I want to talk about the defense of my country, I have to speak to the Minister of Health because pandemic disease is a threat to my security, I have to speak to the Minister of Agriculture because food security is a threat to my security, I have to speak to the Minister of Industry because the fragility of our hi-tech infrastructure is now a point of attack for our enemies -- as we see from cyber warfare -- I have to speak to the Minister of Home Affairs because who has entered my country, who lives in that terraced house in that inner city has a direct effect on what happens in my country -- as we in London saw in the 7/7 bombings. It's no longer the case that the security of a country is simply a matter for its soldiers and its ministry of defense. It's its capacity to lock together its institutions.
我年輕的時候 曾在大英帝國戰爭時當過兵 那時,我的國家要讓大家知道的 就只是這幾件事而已 我們的軍隊多強,我們的空軍多厲害 我們的艦隊多強,我們同盟國多厲害 敵人都在城牆外 現在敵人卻在城牆內 現在,若問我,我的國家想向大家說什麼 我得和衛生署談談 因為傳染疾病對我們的健康造成威脅 我得和農業局談談 因為食物安全對我們的飲食造成威脅 我得和工業部談談 因為高科技公共設施很脆弱 容易成為我們敵人的攻擊目標 正如我們從網路戰爭上所看到的 我得和內政部談談 因為那些已經進入我們國家的人 住在我們的都市,我們的房子的人 對發生在我們國家的事,都有直接的影響 就像倫敦七七驚爆一樣 一個國家的安全 不再只和軍人和國防有關 也和一個國家整合自身機構的能力有關
And this tells you something very important. It tells you that, in fact, our governments, vertically constructed, constructed on the economic model of the Industrial Revolution -- vertical hierarchy, specialization of tasks, command structures -- have got the wrong structures completely. You in business know that the paradigm structure of our time, ladies and gentlemen, is the network. It's your capacity to network that matters, both within your governments and externally.
從這裡你就可以看出一件很重要的事情 事實上 我們垂直架構的政府 建立在工業革命那時的經濟模式 縱向層級制度,分工作業 由上對下發號施令 這套系統整個就是錯的 在座的各位,如果你從事經商 你會知道我們現階段的架構 就是連絡網 組織聯絡網的能力很重要 無論是對政府內部還是外部的聯絡網
So here is Ashdown's third law. By the way, don't ask me about Ashdown's first law and second law because I haven't invented those yet; it always sounds better if there's a third law, doesn't it? Ashdown's third law is that in the modern age, where everything is connected to everything, the most important thing about what you can do is what you can do with others. The most important bit about your structure -- whether you're a government, whether you're an army regiment, whether you're a business -- is your docking points, your interconnectors, your capacity to network with others. You understand that in industry; governments don't.
而這就是我的第三個法則 對了,別問我第一還第二個法則是什麼 因為我還沒發明出來 不過,第三法則總是比較好聽,對吧? 我的第三法則就是 科技進步的今日,所有事情都有關連 最重要的是,就是你能 和別人做什麼事情 在你這個人當中 無論你是政府人員,還是軍人 或者是商人 重要的是你和別人的連接點 你和別人相處的能力 在工業中,你能瞭解此一重要性 政府卻不懂
But now one final thing. If it is the case, ladies and gentlemen -- and it is -- that we are now locked together in a way that has never been quite the same before, then it's also the case that we share a destiny with each other. Suddenly and for the very first time, collective defense, the thing that has dominated us as the concept of securing our nations, is no longer enough. It used to be the case that if my tribe was more powerful than their tribe, I was safe; if my country was more powerful than their country, I was safe; my alliance, like NATO, was more powerful than their alliance, I was safe. It is no longer the case. The advent of the interconnectedness and of the weapons of mass destruction means that, increasingly, I share a destiny with my enemy.
現在,最後一件事 如果 如果我們彼此連結 而過去從來沒有發生過 這就是說,我們和彼此有著相同的命運 這很突然,還是第一次 我們國家主要的安全理念 如果只靠集合型防禦 已經不夠了 過去是這樣 如果我的族群比你的強,我就安全了 如果我的國家比你的強,我就安全了 我的盟國,像是北約組織,如果比其他人還強,我就安全了 然而,現在卻不是這樣 我們彼此之間越來越有關係 強大的毀滅性武器問世 這都意味著 我們和敵人面對著同樣的命運
When I was a diplomat negotiating the disarmament treaties with the Soviet Union in Geneva in the 1970s, we succeeded because we understood we shared a destiny with them. Collective security is not enough. Peace has come to Northern Ireland because both sides realized that the zero-sum game couldn't work. They shared a destiny with their enemies. One of the great barriers to peace in the Middle East is that both sides, both Israel and, I think, the Palestinians, do not understand that they share a collective destiny. And so suddenly, ladies and gentlemen, what has been the proposition of visionaries and poets down the ages becomes something we have to take seriously as a matter of public policy.
一九七零年,我還是外交官時 我在日內瓦和蘇聯爭論 要求其削減武器 當時,我們兩方都達成共識 因為我們知道我們共享命運 集合型安全是不夠的 和平也來到北愛爾蘭 因為雙方了解,零和遊戲是沒有用的 他們和敵人有著相同的命運 阻礙著中東和平的其中一項要素是 以色列及巴勒斯坦 他們雙方都不瞭解 他們和對方有著同樣的命運 各位,從以前到現在 無論是有夢想的人 還是詩人所提出的建言 都成了我們得重視的 公共政策
I started with a poem, I'll end with one. The great poem of John Donne's. "Send not for whom the bell tolls." The poem is called "No Man is an Island." And it goes: "Every man's death affected me, for I am involved in mankind, send not to ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee." For John Donne, a recommendation of morality. For us, I think, part of the equation for our survival.
我用首詩作為開頭,現在也用一首來結尾 這是多恩的偉大詩作 「莫問鐘聲為誰響」 這首詩叫做「沒有人是孤島」 多恩如此寫道 「每一個人逝去,都影響著我 因我亦同生而為人 莫問 鐘聲為誰響 它為你我。」 多恩讚頌道德 而我覺得 每個人的存在都是等式中的一部分
Thank you very much.
謝謝
(Applause)
(掌聲)