Let's talk about billions. Let's talk about past and future billions. We know that about 106 billion people have ever lived. And we know that most of them are dead. And we also know that most of them live or lived in Asia. And we also know that most of them were or are very poor -- did not live for very long. Let's talk about billions. Let's talk about the 195,000 billion dollars of wealth in the world today. We know that most of that wealth was made after the year 1800. And we know that most of it is currently owned by people we might call Westerners: Europeans, North Americans, Australasians. 19 percent of the world's population today, Westerners own two-thirds of its wealth.
Hitz egin dezagun mila milioiei buruz. Hitz egin dezagun iraganaldiko eta gaurko mila milioiei buruz. Jakin badakigu 106 mila milioi pertsona inguruan bizi egin direla. Eta badakigu horietako gehienak hilda daudela. Eta badakigu ere bai horietako gehienak Asian bizi direla edo zirela. Eta badakigu ere bai horietako gehienak oso txiroak direla edo zirela -- ez zirela luzaroan bizi. Hitz egin dezagun mila milioiei buruz. Hitz egin dezagun aberastasunaren 195.000 mila milioi dolarrei buruz gaurko munduan. Jakin badakigu aberastasuna horien gehiengoa 1800. urtetik aurrera egin zela. Eta badakigu kantitate horien gehiena, gaur egun, Mendebaldarren eskuetan dagoela. Europarrak, Ipar Amerikarrak, Australasiarrak. Munduko populazioaren %19a gaur egun. Mendebaldarrek aberastasun horren bi heren dute.
Economic historians call this "The Great Divergence." And this slide here is the best simplification of the Great Divergence story I can offer you. It's basically two ratios of per capita GDP, per capita gross domestic product, so average income. One, the red line, is the ratio of British to Indian per capita income. And the blue line is the ratio of American to Chinese. And this chart goes back to 1500. And you can see here that there's an exponential Great Divergence. They start off pretty close together. In fact, in 1500, the average Chinese was richer than the average North American. When you get to the 1970s, which is where this chart ends, the average Briton is more than 10 times richer than the average Indian. And that's allowing for differences in the cost of living. It's based on purchasing power parity. The average American is nearly 20 times richer than the average Chinese by the 1970s.
Historialari ekonomikoek egoera horri "Dibergentzia Handia" esaten diote. Eta diapositiba hau Dibergentzia Handia-ren sinplifikazio hoberena da. Nik zuei eskain diezazuekedala. Funtsezkoan bi ratio dira biztanle bakoitzeko BPG-rena, hain zuzen ere, biztanle bakoitzeko barne produktu gordina, batezbesteko diru-sartzea. Bata, lerro gorria, britaniarren eta indiarren artean diru-sartzearen ratioa da. Bestea, lerro urdina amerikarren eta txinatarren arteko ratioa da. Eta grafiko honek 1500. urte arte barne hartzen du. Eta hemen ikus dezakezue Divergentzia Handi esponentzial bat dagoela. Hasieran, lerroak elkarren ondoan zeuden. Izan ere, 1500. urtean batezbesteko txinatarra batezbesteko iparamerikarra baino aberatsagoa zen. 1970eko hamarkadara heltzean non grafikoa amaitu zen, batezbesteko britanairra 10 aldiz aberatsagoa da batezbesteko indiar batekin konparatuz. Eta desberdintasun horren zergatia da bizi-kosturen desberdintasunak. Eta hori erosteko gaitasunaren parekotasunean datza. Batezbesteko amerikarra 20 aldiz aberatsagoa da batezbesteko txinatarrekin konparatuta 1970. hamarkadan.
So why? This wasn't just an economic story. If you take the 10 countries that went on to become the Western empires, in 1500 they were really quite tiny -- five percent of the world's land surface, 16 percent of its population, maybe 20 percent of its income. By 1913, these 10 countries, plus the United States, controlled vast global empires -- 58 percent of the world's territory, about the same percentage of its population, and a really huge, nearly three-quarters share of global economic output. And notice, most of that went to the motherland, to the imperial metropoles, not to their colonial possessions.
Zergatik? Hau ez da istorio ekonomiko bat soilik. 10 herri horiek hartzen badituzue zeintzuk bihurtu ziren Mendebaldeko inperio 1500. urtean oso herri txikiak ziren -- mundu-azalerako %5a, munduko populazioaren %16a, eta agian aberastasunaren %20a. 1913. urtean 10 herri horiek, gehi Estatu Batuak mundu osoko inperio zabalak kontrolatzen zituzten mundu-azalerako %58a populazioaren ehuneko berbera eta oso zati handia, ia munduko ekoizpenaren hiru laurden. Eta, adi, etekin horien gehiengoa jatorrizko herrietara joan zen, inperioaren hiriburuetara, eta ez jabetza kolonialetara
Now you can't just blame this on imperialism -- though many people have tried to do so -- for two reasons. One, empire was the least original thing that the West did after 1500. Everybody did empire. They beat preexisting Oriental empires like the Mughals and the Ottomans. So it really doesn't look like empire is a great explanation for the Great Divergence. In any case, as you may remember, the Great Divergence reaches its zenith in the 1970s, some considerable time after decolonization. This is not a new question.
Baina, inperialismoa ez da erruduna -- pertsona asko egiten saiatu diren arren bi arrazoirengatik. Bata, inperioa haiek egindako originaltasun gutxiagoko gauza zen Mendebaldeak, hain zuzen ere, 1500. urtetik aurrera. Herri guztiek egin zituzten inperioak. Ekialdeko aurretiko inperioak garaitu zituzten mongoliarrak eta otomandarrak, adibidez. Orduan ez dirudi inperioa oso adierazpen handia denik Dibergentzia Handia ulertzeko. Nolanahi ere, gogora ezazue, Dibergentzia Handia 1970. hamarkadan bere maila gorenera heldu zela, deskolonizazioa gertatu ostean, urte dexente gainera. Hau ez da galdera berri bat.
Samuel Johnson, the great lexicographer, [posed] it through his character Rasselas in his novel "Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia," published in 1759. "By what means are the Europeans thus powerful; or why, since they can so easily visit Asia and Africa for trade or conquest, cannot the Asiaticks and Africans invade their coasts, plant colonies in their ports, and give laws to their natural princes? The same wind that carries them back would bring us thither?"
Samuel Johnson, lexikografiko nagusia, bere pertsonaiaren zehar, Rasselas, kontrajartzen zuen bere eleberrian "Rasselas, Abisiniako printzea" 1759. urtean argitaratuta. "Zeren bidez dira Europarrak hain boteretsuak; edo, zergatik haiek Afrika eta Asia erraz bisita dezaketen salerosteko edo menderatzeko, eta afrikarrek eta asiarrek ezin dute europarren kostaldeak indarrez hartu, euren portuetan koloniak jarri eta euren jatorrizko printzeei legeak eman? Haiek itzultzen dituen haize berberak hara eraman ahal izango gaitugu?"
That's a great question. And you know what, it was also being asked at roughly the same time by the Resterners -- by the people in the rest of the world -- like Ibrahim Muteferrika, an Ottoman official, the man who introduced printing, very belatedly, to the Ottoman Empire -- who said in a book published in 1731, "Why do Christian nations which were so weak in the past compared with Muslim nations begin to dominate so many lands in modern times and even defeat the once victorious Ottoman armies?" Unlike Rasselas, Muteferrika had an answer to that question, which was correct. He said it was "because they have laws and rules invented by reason." It's not geography.
Hori da gakoa. Eta jakin behar duzue, galdera berbera egin zutela gainerakoek ere -- munduaren gainerakoan bizi direnek -- Ibrahim Muteferrika bezala, ofizial otomandar bat, inprenta sartu zuen gizonak, nahiko berandu, Otomandar Inperioan -- zeinek 1731. urtean argitaratutako liburu batean esan zuen, "Zergatik iraganean hain ahul ziren herri kristauak herri musulmanekin konparatuta hasi dira menperatzen hainbeste lur garai modernoetan baita aurreko garaipenak lortutako armada otomandarrari irabazi ere?" Rasselas ez bezala, Muteferrika-k bazuen erantzuna galdera horretarako, zuzena zen erantzuna. Berak zioen "haiek badauzkatelako legeak eta eskubideak arrazoian oinarrituta." Hau ez da geografia.
You may think we can explain the Great Divergence in terms of geography. We know that's wrong, because we conducted two great natural experiments in the 20th century to see if geography mattered more than institutions. We took all the Germans, we divided them roughly in two, and we gave the ones in the East communism, and you see the result. Within an incredibly short period of time, people living in the German Democratic Republic produced Trabants, the Trabbi, one of the world's worst ever cars, while people in the West produced the Mercedes Benz. If you still don't believe me, we conducted the experiment also in the Korean Peninsula. And we decided we'd take Koreans in roughly the same geographical place with, notice, the same basic traditional culture, and we divided them in two, and we gave the Northerners communism. And the result is an even bigger divergence in a very short space of time than happened in Germany. Not a big divergence in terms of uniform design for border guards admittedly, but in almost every other respect, it's a huge divergence. Which leads me to think that neither geography nor national character, popular explanations for this kind of thing, are really significant.
Norbaitek pentsa dezake Dibergentzia Handia azal dezakegula geografikoki. Badakigu hori gaizki dagoela, guk XX. mendean bi esperimentu natural nagusi gauzatu genituelako geografiak erakundeak baino garrantzi handiagoa duenentz ikusteko. Guk alemaniar guztiak hartu genituen, gutxi gorabehera bi zatitan banandu, eta ekialdean bizi zirenei komunismoa eman genien, eta ondorioa ikus dezakezue. Oso denboraldi laburrean, Alemaniako Errepublika Demokratikoan bizi zirenek Trabants ekoiztu zituzten, Trabbi-a, munduko auto txarrenetariko bat, Mendebaldeko biztanleek, halere, Mercedes Benz ekoiztu zuten. Oraindik ez banauzue sinesten, guk Koreako Penintsulan ere gauzatu genuen esperimentua. Eta erabaki genuen korear batzuk hartuko genituzkeela gutxi gorabehera leku berekoak eta, adi, funtsezko kultura tradizional berarekin, eta bi zatitan banandu genituen, eta iparraldekoei komunismoa eman genien. Eta ondorioa da are dibergentzia handiagoa oso denboraldi laburrean Alemaniarekin konparatuta. Ez da oso dibergentzia handia mugen soldaduen jantzia kontuan hartuta, baina oso handia beste esparruetan, benetazko dibergentzia handia. Horrek pentsatuarazten dit ez geografia ez izaera nazionala, oso azalpen hedatuak gai honetarako izan arren, azalpen adierazgarriak ez direla.
It's the ideas. It's the institutions. This must be true because a Scotsman said it. And I think I'm the only Scotsman here at the Edinburgh TED. So let me just explain to you that the smartest man ever was a Scotsman. He was Adam Smith -- not Billy Connolly, not Sean Connery -- though he is very smart indeed. (Laughter) Smith -- and I want you to go and bow down before his statue in the Royal Mile; it's a wonderful statue -- Smith, in the "Wealth of Nations" published in 1776 -- that's the most important thing that happened that year ... (Laughter) You bet. There was a little local difficulty in some of our minor colonies, but ...
Ideiak dira. Erakundeak dira. Hau egia izan behar da eskoziar batek esan zuelako. Eta uste dut eskoziar bakarra naizela hemen Edinburgh TED saioan. Orduan azalduko dizuet mundu osoko gizaki argiena eskoziarra zela. Adam Smith -- ez Billy Connolly, ez Sean Connery -- oso argia izan arren benetan. (Algarak) Smith -- eta nik nahi dut zuek joatea eta agurtzea bere estatuaren aurrean Royal Mile-n; oso estatua bikaina da-- Smith, bere liburuan "Herrien aberastasuna" 1776. urtean argitaratuta -- urte hartako gertakaera garrantzitsuena, hain zuzen ere ... (Algarak) Baietz izan. Gure kolonia txikiaren batean arazoak sortu ziren, baina ...
(Laughter)
(Algarak)
"China seems to have been long stationary, and probably long ago acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and situation might admit of." That is so right and so cool. And he said it such a long time ago.
"Badirudi Txina oso denbora luzaroan geldirik egon dela, eta seguraski orain dela denbora dexente oparitasun asko hartu zituela eta horrek badu zerikusirik bere legeen eta erakundeen naturarekin. Baina laudorio hau askoz txikiago izan liteke beste batekin konparatuta, beste lege eta erakunde batzuekin, bere lurzoruaren, klimaren eta kokapenaren natura eskura litekeela." Bai zuzena eta originala dela. Eta orain dela denbora asko esan zuen.
But you know, this is a TED audience, and if I keep talking about institutions, you're going to turn off. So I'm going to translate this into language that you can understand. Let's call them the killer apps. I want to explain to you that there were six killer apps that set the West apart from the rest. And they're kind of like the apps on your phone, in the sense that they look quite simple. They're just icons; you click on them. But behind the icon, there's complex code. It's the same with institutions. There are six which I think explain the Great Divergence. One, competition. Two, the scientific revolution. Three, property rights. Four, modern medicine. Five, the consumer society. And six, the work ethic. You can play a game and try and think of one I've missed at, or try and boil it down to just four, but you'll lose.
Baina, badakizue, hau da TED entzunaldia, eta erakundeei buruz hitz egiten jarraitzen badut, loak hartuko zaituzte. Orduan hau dena itzuliko dut zuek uler dezakezuen hizkuntza batera. Dei dezagun erabilpen hiltzaileak. Nik azaldu nahi dizuet bazirela 6 eralbilpen hiltzailek zeintzuk Mendelbadea munduaren gainerakoengandik bereizten zuten. Eta zuen sakelako telefonoetako antzekoak dira, oso sinpleak direlako. Ikonoak dira; klikatu besterik ez duzu egin behar. Baina ikonoaren atzetik, oso kode konplexua dago. Gauza bera gertatzen da erakundeekin. Sei dira nik pentsatzen dut sei horiek Dibergentzia Handia azaltzen dutela. Bat, lehia. Bi, iraultza zientifikoa. Hiru, jabetza-eskubideak. Lau, medikuntza modernoa. Bost, kontsumo-gizartea. Eta sei, lanerako etika. Jokua jolas dezakezue ea erabilpenaren bat ahaztu zaidan edo lau erabiletan soilik laburbiltzea baina galduko duzue.
(Laughter)
(Algarak)
Let me very briefly tell you what I mean by this, synthesizing the work of many economic historians in the process. Competition means, not only were there a hundred different political units in Europe in 1500, but within each of these units, there was competition between corporations as well as sovereigns. The ancestor of the modern corporation, the City of London Corporation, existed in the 12th century. Nothing like this existed in China, where there was one monolithic state covering a fifth of humanity, and anyone with any ambition had to pass one standardized examination, which took three days and was very difficult and involved memorizing vast numbers of characters and very complex Confucian essay writing.
Saiatuko naiz azaltzen epe laburrean zer adierazi nahi dudan, historialari ekonomiko askoren lana laburbiltzen prozesuan. Lehiak esan nahi du, Europan mila unitate politikoak egon ez ezik 1500. urtean baita unitate horien barruan ere, lehia bat zegoen bai korporazioen artean, bai erregeen artean. Korporazio modernoen arbasoa, Londongo City-aren Korporazia, XII. mendean bazegoen. Hori bezalakoa ez zen Txinan existitzen, non estatu monolitiko bat zegoen gizateriaren bostena osatzen, eta handinahiek azterketa estandarizatua gainditu behar izan zuten, zeinek 3 egun iraun egiten zuen eta oso zaila zen eta karaktere zenbaki handiak buruz ikasi zekarren eta idazlana, Konfuziok idatzitako erara, benetan zaila.
The scientific revolution was different from the science that had been achieved in the Oriental world in a number of crucial ways, the most important being that, through the experimental method, it gave men control over nature in a way that had not been possible before. Example: Benjamin Robins's extraordinary application of Newtonian physics to ballistics. Once you do that, your artillery becomes accurate. Think of what that means. That really was a killer application. (Laughter) Meanwhile, there's no scientific revolution anywhere else. The Ottoman Empire's not that far from Europe, but there's no scientific revolution there. In fact, they demolish Taqi al-Din's observatory, because it's considered blasphemous to inquire into the mind of God.
Iraultza zientifikoa desberdina zen Ekialdean lortutako zientziarekin konparatuta modu erabakigarri batzuetan, garrantzitsuena zen metodo esperimentalaren bidez berak gizakiei naturaren kontrola eskaini zien lehen gertatuko ez zen bezala Adibidez: Benjamin Robins-en erabilera ikaragarria balistikaren fisika newtoniarrena. Hau egin eta gero, artilleria bihurtzen da zehatz. Pentsa ezazue zer esan nahi duen horrek Benetako erabilera hiltzailea zen. (Algarak) Bitartean, ez zen iraultza zientifikorik inon ez. Inperio otomandarra ez zegoen Europatik hain urrun, baina ez zegoen iraultza zientifikorik han. Izan ere, haiek Taqi al-Din-aren behatokia lurreratu zuten, arnegua iruditzen zitzaielako Jaungoikoaren adimena ikertzea.
Property rights: It's not the democracy, folks; it's having the rule of law based on private property rights. That's what makes the difference between North America and South America. You could turn up in North America having signed a deed of indenture saying, "I'll work for nothing for five years. You just have to feed me." But at the end of it, you've got a hundred acres of land. That's the land grant on the bottom half of the slide. That's not possible in Latin America where land is held onto by a tiny elite descended from the conquistadors. And you can see here the huge divergence that happens in property ownership between North and South. Most people in rural North America owned some land by 1900. Hardly anyone in South America did. That's another killer app.
Jabetza eskubideak: aizue, hau ez da demokrazia; hots, legearen araua jabetza pribatu eskubideetan oinarritzen da. Hori da desberdintasuna Ipar eta Hego Amerikaren artean. Ipar Amerikan agertzen bada norbait eskritura publikoaren ondasun-titulua sinatu izan ondoren esaten, "Lan egingo dut doan bost urteren zehar, Zuk jaten besterik ez didazu eman behar," Baina, denboraldia amaitzean, 40 hektarearen jabe bihurtuko zara. Hori da lur-emaitza diapositibaren beheko zatian agertzen dena. Hori ez da posible Hego Amerikan non lurraren jabetasuna esku gutxitan dago elite txikiren eskuetan, konkistatzaileen ondorengoak, hain zuzen ere. Eta hemen Dibergentzia Handia ikus daiteke ondasunen jabetzan gertatzen dena Ipar eta Hego Amerikaren artean Ipar Amerikako landa-populazio gehienek lurra zuten 1900. urterako. Ia inork Hego Amerikan. Hori beste erabilera hiltzaile bat da.
Modern medicine in the late 19th century began to make major breakthroughs against the infectious diseases that killed a lot of people. And this was another killer app -- the very opposite of a killer, because it doubled, and then more than doubled, human life expectancy. It even did that in the European empires. Even in places like Senegal, beginning in the early 20th century, there were major breakthroughs in public health, and life expectancy began to rise. It doesn't rise any faster after these countries become independent. The empires weren't all bad.
Medikuntza modernoa XIX. mendearen hondarrean hasi zen aurreratzeak lortzen gaixo infekziosoen aurka, zeintzuek pertsona asko hil egiten zituzten. Eta hau beste erabilera hiltzaile bat zen -- aurkako hiltzailea, berak gizakieen bizi-itxaropena bikoiztu egin zuelako eta, sarritan, are gehiago. Hori ere gertatu zen Europako inperioetan. Senegal bezalako lekueetan ere bai, XX. mendearen lehenengo urteetan hasita, osasun publikoan aurreratze galantak suertatu ziren, eta bizi-itxaropena hasi zen igotzen. Eta ez zen gehiago igo herri horien independentzia lortu eta gero. Inperio guzti-guztiak ez ziren txarrak.
The consumer society is what you need for the Industrial Revolution to have a point. You need people to want to wear tons of clothes. You've all bought an article of clothing in the last month; I guarantee it. That's the consumer society, and it propels economic growth more than even technological change itself. Japan was the first non-Western society to embrace it. The alternative, which was proposed by Mahatma Gandhi, was to institutionalize and make poverty permanent. Very few Indians today wish that India had gone down Mahatma Gandhi's road.
Kontsumo-gizartea beharrezkoa da, Industri-Iraultzak helburua izan dezan. Milaka pertsona beharrezkoak dira arropa-tonak janzteko Zuek arroparen bat erosi duzue aurreko hilabetean; Ziurtatzen dut. Hori da kontsumo-gizartea. eta garapen ekonomikoa gehiago sustatzen du aldaketa teknologikoa bera baino. Japonia zen lehenengo ez-Mendabeldeko gizarteak aldaketa hartu zuena. Alternatiba, Mahatma Gandhi-k proposatu zuena zen, txirotasun iraunkorra mantentzea eta instituzionalizatzea. Gaur egungo indiar gutxik desideratzen dute Indiak hartutako bidea Mahatma Gandhi-ren bidea, hain zuzen ere.
Finally, the work ethic. Max Weber thought that was peculiarly Protestant. He was wrong. Any culture can get the work ethic if the institutions are there to create the incentive to work. We know this because today the work ethic is no longer a Protestant, Western phenomenon. In fact, the West has lost its work ethic. Today, the average Korean works a thousand hours more a year than the average German -- a thousand. And this is part of a really extraordinary phenomenon, and that is the end of the Great Divergence.
Azkenik, lanerako etika. Max Weberrek pentsatu zuen ohiko protestanteen jarrera zela. Okerra zen. Edozein kulturak lanerako etika eskura dezake erakundeak badaude lanerako pizgarria sortzeko. Jakin badakigu hau zeren eta gaurko lanerako etika ez den aurrerago protestantea edo Mendebaldeko gertakaria. Izan ere, mendebaldarrek euren lanerako etica galdu dute. Gaur egun, batezbesteko korearrak urtero mila ordu gehiago lan egiten du batezbesteko alemaniarrarekin konparatuta -- mila ordu. Eta hau zati bat besterik ez da gertakari ikaragarri baten zatia, eta hau da Dibergentzia Handiaren amaiera.
Who's got the work ethic now? Take a look at mathematical attainment by 15 year-olds. At the top of the international league table according to the latest PISA study, is the Shanghai district of China. The gap between Shanghai and the United Kingdom and the United States is as big as the gap between the U.K. and the U.S. and Albania and Tunisia. You probably assume that because the iPhone was designed in California but assembled in China that the West still leads in terms of technological innovation. You're wrong. In terms of patents, there's no question that the East is ahead. Not only has Japan been ahead for some time, South Korea has gone into third place, and China is just about to overtake Germany. Why? Because the killer apps can be downloaded. It's open source. Any society can adopt these institutions, and when they do, they achieve what the West achieved after 1500 -- only faster.
Nork du lanerako etika orain? Begira ezazue matematika ezaguera 15 urtetako nerabeena. Nazioarteko ligaren goiko partean azkenengo PISA ikerketaren arabera, Txinaren Shanghai barrutia dago. Shanghairen eta Britain Handiaren eta Estatu Batuen hutsunea U.K.-rena eta U.S.-rena bezain handia da. eta Albania eta Tunisia. Demazuen haiek iPhone-a Kalifornian diseinatu zutela baina Txinan mihiztatuta eta hori dela eta Mendebaldea oraindik lehena da berrikuntza teknologiko esparruan. Oker zarete. Patenteen kopurua kontuan hartuta, ez dago zalantzarik, Ekialdea aurretik doa. Japonia denboraldi batean aurretik joan ez ezik, Hegoaldeko Korea ere hirugarren postura heldu da. eta Txina Alemania gainditzeko zorian dago. Zergatik? Erabilera hiltzaileak deskarga daitezkeelako. Kode zabala da. Edozein gizartek erakunde horiek har ditzake, eta egiten dutenean, haiek lortzen dute mendebaldarrek lortutakoa 1500. urtetik aurrera -- baina azkarrago.
This is the Great Reconvergence, and it's the biggest story of your lifetime. Because it's on your watch that this is happening. It's our generation that is witnessing the end of Western predominance. The average American used to be more than 20 times richer than the average Chinese. Now it's just five times, and soon it will be 2.5 times.
Hau da Birkonbergentzia Handia, eta zuen bizitzen istorio handiena da. Zeren eta nola suertatu ikusten ari zareten. Gure belaunaldia mendebaldarren lehentasunaren amaieraren lekukoa da. Batezbesteko amerikarra 20 aldiz aberatsagoa zen batezbesteko txinatarrarekin konparatuta. Oraintxe bertan 5 aldiz soilik, eta laster 2,5 aldiz.
So I want to end with three questions for the future billions, just ahead of 2016, when the United States will lose its place as number one economy to China. The first is, can you delete these apps, and are we in the process of doing so in the Western world? The second question is, does the sequencing of the download matter? And could Africa get that sequencing wrong? One obvious implication of modern economic history is that it's quite hard to transition to democracy before you've established secure private property rights. Warning: that may not work. And third, can China do without killer app number three? That's the one that John Locke systematized when he said that freedom was rooted in private property rights and the protection of law. That's the basis for the Western model of representative government. Now this picture shows the demolition of the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei's studio in Shanghai earlier this year. He's now free again, having been detained, as you know, for some time. But I don't think his studio has been rebuilt.
Orduan 3 galderarekin amaitu nahi dut gerorako mila milioientzat, 2016. urtearen inguruan, noiz Estatu Batuak bere lehentasuna galduko duen lehentasun ekonomikoa Txinaren alde. Lehenengoa da, posiblea da erabilera horiek suntsitzea, eta hori egiteko prozesuan gaude Mendebaldean? Bigarrena, deskargaren sekuentzia garrantzitsua da? Eta agian Afrikak sekuentzia okerra izan liteke? Histori ekonomiko modernoaren ondorio nabaria demokraziarako trantsizioa nahiko gogorra dela jabetza-pribatuen eskubide ziurrak ezarri baino lehen. Kontuz: hori ez liteke ibil. Eta hirugarrena, Txina arrakastatsua izan liteke erabilera hiltzaile hirugarrena jarri ezean? Hori da John Locke-k sistematizatu zuena askatasuna jabetza-pribatuen eskubideetan oinarritzen zela esan zuenean eta legearen babesean ere bai. Hori da oinarria mendebaldeko eredurako gobernu adierazgarriarena, hain zuzen ere. Orain, argazki honek Ai Weiewei artista txinatarraren estudioaren suntsipena aurkezten du Shanghai-n urte honetako hasieran. Berriro aske dago, atxilotu izan ondoren denboraldi batean. Baina ez dut uste berak estudioa berreraiki egin duenik.
Winston Churchill once defined civilization in a lecture he gave in the fateful year of 1938. And I think these words really nail it: "It means a society based upon the opinion of civilians. It means that violence, the rule of warriors and despotic chiefs, the conditions of camps and warfare, of riot and tyranny, give place to parliaments where laws are made, and independent courts of justice in which over long periods those laws are maintained. That is civilization -- and in its soil grow continually freedom, comfort and culture," what all TEDsters care about most. "When civilization reigns in any country, a wider and less harassed life is afforded to the masses of the people." That's so true.
Winston Churchill-ek behin zibilizazioa definitu zuen berak emandako hitzaldi batean zorigaiztoko 1938. urtean. Eta uste dut bete-betean asmatzen zuela: "(Zibilizazioak) esan nahi du gizarte bat zibilen iritzian oinarritzen dela. Berak esan nahi du bortizkeria, gudari eta buruzagi despotikoen arauak, gudaren eta kanpamentuen baldintzak, iskanbilak eta tirania, gauza guzti horiek bidea ematen diote parlamentuei non legeak egiten diren, eta menpekotasunik gabeko justizia auzitegietara zeinetan luzaroan lege horiek mantentzen diren. Hori da zibilizazioa -- eta bere lurzoruan hazten da etengabe askatasuna, erosotasuna eta kultura," TED saioetan partehartzaileei gehien interesatzen zaiena. "Zibilizazioa herri batean nagusia denean, berak askoz zabalago eta neketsuago den bizitza eskaintzen die giza-taldeei." Hori guztiz egia da.
I don't think the decline of Western civilization is inevitable, because I don't think history operates in this kind of life-cycle model, beautifully illustrated by Thomas Cole's "Course of Empire" paintings. That's not the way history works. That's not the way the West rose, and I don't think it's the way the West will fall. The West may collapse very suddenly. Complex civilizations do that, because they operate, most of the time, on the edge of chaos. That's one of the most profound insights to come out of the historical study of complex institutions like civilizations. No, we may hang on, despite the huge burdens of debt that we've accumulated, despite the evidence that we've lost our work ethic and other parts of our historical mojo. But one thing is for sure, the Great Divergence is over, folks.
Nik ez dut uste mendebaldeko zibilizazioaren beherakada saihestezina denik, historia modu horretan dabilenik uste ez dudalako ziklo-bizi eredu honetan, Thomas Cole-k modu ikaragarrian irudiztatu egin zituen "Inperioaren ibilera" margolanak. Historia ez da horrela. Mendebaldea ez zen horrela igo, eta ez dut uste hori izango denik Mendebaldeko beherakada. Mendebaldeak bat-batean kolapsa liteke, Zibilizazio konplexuek horrela egiten dute, gehienetan, horrela gertatzen delako, kaosaren ertzean. Hori hausnarketa sakonetariko bat da erakunde konplexuen ikerketa historikoaren ondorioz zibilizazioak bezala. Ez, geldi gintezke, nahiz eta zorren zama handia metatu, nahiz eta nabarmen den lanerako etika galdu dugula baita gure xarma historikoa ere. Baina gauza bat argi dago, Aizue, Dibergentzia Handia amaitu egin da.
Thanks very much.
Mila esker
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Bruno Giussani: Niall, I am just curious about your take on the other region of the world that's booming, which is Latin America. What's your view on that?
Bruno Giussani, Niall Jakin nahi dut altxatzen ari den gure munduaren beste zati bati buruz, hots, Hego Amerika. Zein da zure iritzia?
Niall Ferguson: Well I really am not just talking about the rise of the East; I'm talking about the rise of the Rest, and that includes South America. I once asked one of my colleagues at Harvard, "Hey, is South America part of the West?" He was an expert in Latin American history. He said, "I don't know; I'll have to think about that." That tells you something really important. I think if you look at what is happening in Brazil in particular, but also Chile, which was in many ways the one that led the way in transforming the institutions of economic life, there's a very bright future indeed. So my story really is as much about that convergence in the Americas as it's a convergence story in Eurasia.
Niall Ferguson: Ondo nik besterik ez dut hitz egiten Ekialdearen agerraldiari buruz; gainarekoen agerraldiari buruz hitz egiten dut, eta han Hego Amerika barnean sartuta dago. Nik behin nire kide bati Harvard-en galdetu nion, "Aizu, Hego Amerika Mendebaldearen zatia al da?" Bera Hego Amerikaren historiaren aditua zen, Erantzun zuen, "Ez dakit, horretaz hausnartu behar izango dut." Horrek zerbait garrantzitsua esaten dizu. Nik uste dut bereziki Brasil ikusten baduzu, baita Txile ere esparru askotan bidea buru zen bizitza ekonomikoaren erakundeak eraldatzeko, gero distiratsua daukatela, benetan. Beraz nire istorioa da Ameriketan gertatutako konbergentziari buruz baita Eurasian ere.
BG: And there is this impression that North America and Europe are not really paying attention to these trends. Mostly they're worried about each other. The Americans think that the European model is going to crumble tomorrow. The Europeans think that the American budget is going to explode tomorrow. And that's all we seem to be caring about recently.
BG: Eta badago iritzia Ipar Amerika eta Europa ez dutela jaramonik egiten joera horietara. Haiek elkarren kezka daukate. Amerikarrek uste dute Europaren ereduak laster desegingo dela. Europarrek, ordea, uste dute amerikarrek laster eztanda egingo dutela. Eta badirudi horretaz kezkatzen garela soilik.
NF: I think the fiscal crisis that we see in the developed World right now -- both sides of the Atlantic -- is essentially the same thing taking different forms in terms of political culture. And it's a crisis that has its structural facet -- it's partly to do with demographics. But it's also, of course, to do with the massive crisis that followed excessive leverage, excessive borrowing in the private sector. That crisis, which has been the focus of so much attention, including by me, I think is an epiphenomenon. The financial crisis is really a relatively small historic phenomenon, which has just accelerated this huge shift, which ends half a millennium of Western ascendancy. I think that's its real importance.
NF: Nik uste dut zerga-krisia Mundu Garatuan oraintxe bertan ikusten duguna -- Atlantikoaren bi aldeetan -- gauza bera dela funtsean modu desberdinak hartu arren kultura politiko desberdinetan oinarrituta. Eta krisi horrek badu bere ikuspegi estrukturala -- eta hein batean demografiarekin badu zerikusirik baita krisi masiboarekin ere, jakina zein palankaz jasotze gehiegiren atzetik zihoala sektor pribatuaren gehiegizko maileguak. Krisi hori arreta handiagoaren fokua izan dena, nirea barne. Nik uste dut epifenomenoa dela. Finantza-krisia, egia esanda, oso fenomeno historiko txikia da. zeinek azkartu egin duen aldaketa nabari hau. Horrek milurteko erdiko mendebaldarren igoera bukatuarazten du. Nik uste dut hori garrantzi handikoa dela.
BG: Niall, thank you. (NF: Thank you very much, Bruno.)
BG: Niall, mila esker. (NF: MIla esker, Bruno.)
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