A few weeks ago, I had a chance to go to Saudi Arabia. And the first thing I wanted to do as a Muslim was to go to Mecca and visit the Kaaba, the holiest shrine of Islam. And I did that; I put on my ritualistic dress, I went to the holy mosque, I did my prayers, I observed all the rituals. And meanwhile, besides all the spirituality, there was one mundane detail in the Kaaba that was pretty interesting for me: there was no separation of sexes. In other words, men and women were worshiping all together. They were together while doing tawāf, the circular walk around the Kaaba. They were together while praying.
Prije nekoliko sedmica dobio sam priliku da posjetim Saudijsku Arabiju. I prvo što sam kao Musliman želio da uradim bilo je da odem u Meccu i posjetim Kaabu, najsvetiji islamski hram. I to sam i učinio; obukao sam svoju ritualnu odoru; otišao do svete džamije; obavio svoju molitvu; ispoštovao sve rituale. U međuvremenu, pored sve te duhovnosti, jedan posve običan detalj u Kaabi mi se učinio veoma zanimljivim. Nije bilo odvajanja među polovima. Drugim riječima, muškarci i žene su se svi zajedno molili. Bili su zajedno tokom hodočašća, hodanja u krug oko Kaabe. Bili su zajedno dok se se molili.
And if you wonder why this is interesting at all, you have to see the rest of Saudi Arabia, because this a country which is strictly divided between the sexes. In other words: as men, you are simply not supposed to be in the same physical space with women. And I noticed this in a very funny way. I left the Kaaba to eat something in downtown Mecca. I headed to the nearest Burger King restaurant. And I went there -- I noticed that there was a male section, which is carefully separated from the female section. I had to pay, order and eat in the male section. "It's funny," I said to myself, "You can mingle with the opposite sex at the holy Kaaba, but not at the Burger King?"
I ako se pitate zbog čega je ovo uopšte zanimljivo, morali biste vidjeti ostatak Saudijske Arabije, jer je to zemlja koja je strogo podjeljena između polova. Drugim riječima, od vas, kao muškaraca, se jednostavno ne očekuje da budete u istom fizičkom prostoru sa ženama. A to sam primijetio na jako smiješan način. Krenuo sam iz Kaabe kako bih nešto pojeo u centru Mecce. Uputio sam se ka najbližem Burger King restoranu. I ušao sam -- i primijetio da postoji dio za muškarce, koji je pažljivo odvojen od ženskog dijela. Morao sam platiti, naručiti i jesti u muškom dijelu. "Ovo je ludo", rekao sam sâm sebi, "možeš se miješati sa suprotnim polom u svetoj Kaabi, ali ne u Burger King-u."
(Laughter)
Prilično ironično.
Quite, quite ironic. Ironic, and it's also, I think, quite telling, because the Kaaba and the rituals around it are relics from the earliest phase of Islam, that of prophet Muhammad. And if there was a big emphasis at the time to separate men from women, the rituals around the Kaaba could have been designed accordingly. But apparently, that was not an issue at the time. So the rituals came that way. This is also, I think, confirmed by the fact that the seclusion of women in creating a divided society is something that you also do not find in the Koran -- the very core of Islam, the divine core of Islam -- that all Muslims, equally myself, believe.
Ironično, no mislim da istovremeno nešto i kazuje. Zbog toga što su Kaaba i rituali koji se vrše oko nje relikti iz najranije faze Islama, iz doba proroka Muhammada. I da se u to vrijeme insistiralo na odvajanju muškaraca od žena, rituali oko Kaabe bi bili osmišljeni u skladu sa time. No, očigledno je da u to vrijeme to nije bio problem. Tako su nastali i rituali. Mislim da je to također potvrđeno činjenicom da je odvajanje žena u stvaranju podijeljenog društva još jedna stvar koja se ne može naći u Kuranu, samoj srži Islama -- božanskoj srži Islama u koju svi Muslimani, kao i ja sam, vjeruju.
And I think it's not an accident that you don't find this idea in the very origin of Islam, because many scholars who study the history of Islamic thought -- Muslim scholars or Westerners -- think that, actually, the practice of dividing men and women physically came as a later development in Islam, as Muslims adopted some preexisting cultures and traditions of the Middle East. Seclusion of women was actually a Byzantine and Persian practice, and Muslims adopted it and made it a part of their religion.
I mislim da nije slučajnost da se ta ideja ne može naći u samom porijeklu Islama. Zbog toga što mnogi učeni ljudi koji izučavaju istoriju islamske misli -- Muslimani, kao i oni sa Zapada -- smatraju da je zapravo fizička podjela muškaraca i žena . postala dio prakse u kasnijem razvoju Islama, kako su Muslimani usvajali neke od postojećih kultura i tradicija Srednjeg istoka. Odvajanje žena se zapravo praktikovalo u Vizantiji i Persiji, a Muslimani su usvojili taj običaj
Actually, this is just one example of a much larger phenomenon.
i učinili ga dijelom svoje religije.
What we call today Islamic law, and especially Islamic culture -- and there are many Islamic cultures, actually; the one in Saudi Arabia is much different from where I come from in Istanbul or Turkey. But still, if you're going to speak about a Muslim culture, this has a core: the divine message which began the religion. But then many traditions, perceptions, practices were added on top of it. And these were traditions of the Middle East medieval traditions.
A ovo je zapravo tek jedan od primjera mnogo većeg fenomena. Onog koji danas nazivamo islamskim zakonom, i naročito islamskom kulturom -- iako ih zapravo ima više; islamska kultura u Saudijskoj Arabiji se značajno razlikuje od kulture u Istanbulu, odakle ja dolazim, ili u Turskoj. Pa ipak, ako ćemo govoriti o muslimanskoj kulturi, ona ima srž, božansku poruku, kojom je otpočela religija, no tada su mnoge tradicije, percepcije, kao i mnoge prakse pridodane na to. A to su bili tradicije Srednjeg istoka – srednjovjekovne tradicije.
There are two important messages, or two lessons, to take from that reality. First of all, Muslims -- pious, conservative, believing Muslims who want to be loyal to their religion -- should not cling onto everything in their culture, thinking that that's divinely mandated. Maybe some things are bad traditions and they need to be changed. On the other hand, the Westerners who look at Islamic culture and see some troubling aspects should not readily conclude that this is what Islam ordains. Maybe it's a Middle Eastern culture that became confused with Islam.
Dvije značajne poruke, ili dvije lekcije, se mogu izvući iz te realnosti . Prije svega, Muslimani -- pobožni, konzervativni, vjernici Muslimani koji žele biti odani svojoj religiji -- ne bi se trebali držati svega u svojoj kulturi, i misliti da je to određeno božanskom nakanom. Možda su neke od ovih tradicija loše i trebale bi se izmijeniti. S druge strane, Zapadnjaci koji posmatraju islamsku kulturu i u njoj vide neke zabrinjavajuće aspekte ne bi trebali da isuviše olako zaključuju da je to nešto što Islam određuje. Možda je kultura Srednjeg istoka pobrkana sa Islamom.
There is a practice called female circumcision. It's something terrible, horrible. It is basically an operation to deprive women of sexual pleasure. And Westerners -- Europeans or Americans -- who didn't know about this before, [saw] this practice within some of the Muslim communities who migrated from North Africa. And they've thought, "Oh, what a horrible religion that is, which ordains something like that." But when you look at female circumcision, you see that it has nothing to do with Islam; it's just a North African practice which predates Islam. It was there for thousands of years. And, quite tellingly, some Muslims do practice it -- the Muslims in North Africa, not in other places. But also the non-Muslim communities of North Africa -- the animists, some Christians and even a Jewish tribe in North Africa -- are known to practice female circumcision. So what might look like a problem within Islamic faith might turn out to be a tradition that Muslims have subscribed to.
Na primjer, praksa ženskog obrezivanja. To je nešto što je užasno, prestrašno. U suštini, to je operacija kojom se ženama oduzima sposobnost seksualnog užitka. Zapadnjaci, Evropljani ili Amerikanci, koji nisu znali ništa o ovome suočili su se sa tom praksom u nekima od muslimanskih zajednica koje se migrirale iz sjeverne Afrike. I pomislili su "Kakva užasna religija da propisuje nešto takvo." No, zapravo, ako razmislite o ženskom obrezivanju, vidite da ono nema nikakve veze sa Islamom, to je običaj koji se praktikovao u sjevernoj Africi, još prije Islama. Tu je praktikovan hiljadama godina. I sasvim sigurno, neki Muslimani praktikuju taj običaj. Muslimani u sjevernoj Africi, ali ne na drugim mjestima. Međutim, poznato je da čak i ne-muslimanske zajednice u sjevernoj Africi -- Animisti, pa čak i neki Hrišćani i jedno jevrejsko pleme u sjevernoj Africi vrše obrezivanje žena. Znači, moglo bi se ispostaviti da je ono što se posmatra kao problem u islamskoj vjeri zapravo tradicija koju su Muslimani prihvatili.
The same thing can be said for honor killings, which is a recurrent theme in the Western media -- and which is, of course, a horrible tradition. And we see, truly, in some Muslim communities, that tradition. But in the non-Muslim communities of the Middle East, such as some Christian communities, Eastern communities, you see the same practice. We had a tragic case of an honor killing within Turkey's Armenian community just a few months ago.
Isto bi se moglo reći i za ubistva iz časti, koja su vječna tema u Zapadnim medijima -- a koja, naravno, predstavljaju jednu strašnu tradiciju. I mi uistinu vidimo da ta tradicija postoji u nekima od muslimanskih zajednica. Ali i u ne-muslimanskim zajednicama Srednjeg istoka, kao i u nekim hrišćanskim zajednicama, istočnim zajednicama, nailazimo na istu praksu. Imali smo tragičan slučaj ubistva iz časti unutar tursko-jermenske zajednice prije svega nekoliko mjeseci.
Now, these are things about general culture, but I'm also very much interested in political culture and whether liberty and democracy is appreciated, or whether there's an authoritarian political culture in which the state is supposed to impose things on the citizens. And it is no secret that many Islamic movements in the Middle East tend to be authoritarian, and some of the so-called "Islamic regimes," such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the worst case, the Taliban in Afghanistan, they are pretty authoritarian -- no doubt about that.
No, ovo su pitanja opšte kulture, dok sam ja također veoma zainteresovan za političku kulturu i da li se sloboda i demokratija cijene, ili je prisutna autoritarna politička kultura u kojoj se od države očekuje da građanima sve nameće. Nije tajna da mnogi islamski pokreti na Srednjem istoku imaju sklonost ka autoritarizmu, a neki od takozvanih 'islamskih režima', poput Saudijske Arabije, Irana i kao najgori primjer Talibana u Afganistanu, su poprilično autoritarni – u to nema sumnje.
For example, in Saudi Arabia, there is a phenomenon called the religious police. And the religious police imposes the supposed Islamic way of life on every citizen, by force -- like, women are forced to cover their heads -- wear the hijab, the Islamic head cover. Now that is pretty authoritarian, and that's something I'm very much critical of. But when I realized that the non-Muslim, or the non-Islamic-minded actors in the same geography sometimes behaved similarly, I realized that the problem maybe lies in the political culture of the whole region, not just Islam. Let me give you an example: in Turkey, where I come from, which is a very hyper-secular republic, until very recently, we used to have what I call "secularism police," which would guard the universities against veiled students. In other words, they would force students to uncover their heads. And I think forcing people to uncover their head is as tyrannical as forcing them to cover it. It should be the citizen's decision.
Na primjer, u Saudijskoj Arabiji postoji fenomen koji se zove policija za religiju. Ta policija nameće tobožnji islamski način života, svakome građaninu, silom -- npr. žene su primorane da pokrivaju glave -- nose hidžab, islamsko pokrivalo za glavu. To je nešto što je prilično autoritarno i prema čemu sam jako kritičan. Međutim, kada sam uvidjeo da se oni koji nisu Muslimani, ili nisu istomišljenici Islama u istom geografskom okruženju, ponekad ponašaju na sličan način, shvatio sam da je problem možda u političkoj kulturi cijelog regiona, ne samo Islama. Daću vam jedan primjer: u Turskoj, odakle dolazim, koja je jedna izuzetno sekularna republika, sve donedavno smo imali nešto što ja nazivam sekularističkom policijom koja je čuvala univerzitete od pokrivenih studentkinja. Drugim riječima, oni bi primoravali studentkinje da otkriju glave. A ja smatram da je prisiljavanje žena da otkriju glave podjednako tiranski kao i prisiljavanje da ih pokriju. To bi trebala biti odluka građana.
But when I saw that, I said, "Maybe the problem is just an authoritarian culture in the region, and some Muslims have been influenced by that. But the secular-minded people can be influenced by that. Maybe it's a problem of the political culture, and we have to think about how to change that political culture." Now, these are some of the questions I had in mind a few years ago when I sat down to write a book. I said, "Well, I will do research about how Islam actually came to be what it is today, and what roads were taken and what roads could have been taken." The name of the book is "Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty." And as the subtitle suggests, I looked at Islamic tradition and the history of Islamic thought from the perspective of individual liberty, and I tried to find what are the strengths with regard to individual liberty.
No, kada sam to vidjeo, rekao sam, "Možda je problem naprosto u autoritarnoj kulturi ovog regiona, i neki Muslimani su bili pod tim uticajem." Ali i ljudi koji su po svojim ubjeđenjima sekularni se mogu naći pod tim uticajem. Možda je to problem političke kulture i mi moramo razmisliti kako da promijenimo tu političku kulturu. Ovo su neka od pitanja o kojima sam razmišljao prije nekoliko godina kada sam sjeo da napišem knjigu. Rekao sam: "Pa dobro, sprovešću istraživanje o tome kako je Islam zapravo postao ovo što je danas, kojim putevima se išlo a kojima se moglo ići." Naslov knjige je 'Islam bez ekstrema: Borba Muslimana za slobodu.' Kao što i sam podnaslov sugeriše, posmatrao sam islamsku tradiciju i istoriju islamske misli iz perspektive pojedinačne slobode, i pokušao sam utvrditi koje su snažne strane u vezi sa pojedinačnom slobodom.
And there are strengths in Islamic tradition. Islam, actually, as a monotheistic religion, which defined man as a responsible agent by itself, created the idea of the individual in the Middle East, and saved it from the communitarianism, the collectivism of the tribe. You can derive many ideas from that. But besides that, I also saw problems within Islamic tradition. But one thing was curious: most of those problems turn out to be problems that emerged later, not from the very divine core of Islam, the Koran, but from, again, traditions and mentalities, or the interpretations of the Koran that Muslims made in the Middle Ages. The Koran, for example, doesn't condone stoning. There is no punishment for apostasy. There is no punishment for personal sins like drinking. These things which make Islamic law, the troubling aspects of Islamic law, were developed into later interpretations of Islam.
Postoje jake strane u islamskoj tradiciji. Islam zapravo, kao monoteistička religija, koja definiše čovjeka kao odgovornog faktora samog po sebi, stvorila je ideju o pojedincu na Srednjem istoku i spasila ga od komunitarizma, plemenskog kolektivizma. Iz toga se može izvući mnogo ideja. No, pored toga, također sam uvidjeo probleme unutar islamske tradicije. Jedna stvar je bila neobična: ispostavilo se da većina ovih problema predstavlja probleme koji su se pojavili kasnije, i to ne iz božanske srži Islama, Kurana, već opet iz tradicija i mentaliteta ili tumačenja Kurana od strane Muslimana u srednjem vijeku. Kuran, na primjer, ne osuđuje kamenovanje. Nema kazne za izdaju. Nema kazne za stvari lične prirode, poput konzumiranja alkohola. Ove stvari koji čine islamski Zakon, zabrinjavajući aspekti islamskog Zakona, kasnije su razvijeni u naknadna tumačenja Islama.
Which means that Muslims can, today, look at those things and say, "Well, the core of our religion is here to stay with us. It's our faith, and we will be loyal to it. But we can change how it was interpreted, because it was interpreted according to the time and milieu in the Middle Ages. Now we're living in a different world, with different values and political systems." That interpretation is quite possible and feasible.
Što znači da Muslimani danas mogu pogledati na ove stvari i reći, "Pa dobro, suština naše religije će ostati nepromijenjena. To je naša vjera i mi ćemo joj biti odani." Ali mi možemo izmijeniti sâmo tumačenje, jer je vjera protumačena u skladu sa vremenom i miljeom srednjeg vijeka. Sada živimo u drugačijem svijetu sa drugačijim vrijednostima i drugačijim političkim sistemima. Takvo tumačenje je sasvim moguće i ostvarivo.
Now, if I were the only person thinking that way, we would be in trouble. But that's not the case at all. Actually, from the 19th century on, there's a whole revisionist, reformist -- whatever you call it -- tradition, a trend in Islamic thinking. These were intellectuals or statesmen of the 19th century, and later, 20th century, which looked at Europe, basically, and saw that Europe has many things to admire, like science and technology. But not just that; also democracy, parliament, the idea of representation, the idea of equal citizenship. These Muslim thinkers, intellectuals and statesmen of the 19th century, looked at Europe, saw these things, and said, "Why don't we have these things?" And they looked back at Islamic tradition, and saw that there are problematic aspects, but they're not the core of the religion, so maybe they can be re-understood, and the Koran can be reread in the modern world.
Kada bih ja bio jedina osoba koja razmišlja na takav način, imali bismo problem. Međutim, to uopšte nije slučaj. Zapravo, od 19. vijeka naovamo, postoji cijela revizionistička, reformistička -- kako god da je nazovete -- tradicija, trend u islamskoj misli. To su bili intelektualci ili državnici iz 19. vijeka, i kasnije 20. vijeka, koji su zapravo posmatrali Evropu i shvatili da Evropa ima mnogo toga za divljenje, poput nauke i tehnologije. I ne samo to; također i demokratiju, parlament , ideju o predstavljanju, ideju o jednakim pravima građana. Ti muslimanski mislioci i intelektualci i državnici iz 19. vijeka posmatrali su Evropu i vidjeli sve to. Rekli su: "Zašto mi to nemamo?" I potom su se osvrnuli na islamsku tradiciju, vidjeli su da postoje problematični aspekti, ali oni ne čine suštinu religije, što znači da se mogu iznova shvatiti, i da Kuran može da se iznova izuči u suvremenom svijetu.
That trend is generally called Islamic modernism, and it was advanced by intellectuals and statesmen, not just as an intellectual idea, though, but also as a political program. And that's why, actually, in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which then covered the whole Middle East, made very important reforms -- reforms like giving Christians and Jews an equal citizenship status, accepting a constitution, accepting a representative parliament, advancing the idea of freedom of religion. That's why the Ottoman Empire, in its last decades, turned into a proto-democracy, a constitutional monarchy, and freedom was a very important political value at the time.
Taj trend se generalno naziva islamskim modernizmom, a unaprijedili su ga intelektualci i državnici, doduše ne samo kao intelektualnu ideju, već i kao politički program. I upravo zbog toga je u 19. vijeku Otomansko carstvo, koje je u to vrijeme zauzimalo cijeli Srednji istok, sprovelo izuzetno značajne reforme -- poput onih koje su Hrišćanima i Jevrejima dale jednak status građana, prihvatanja ustava, prihvatanja reprezentativnog parlamenta, unaprjeđenje ideje slobode religije. I stoga se Otomansko carstvo u svojim poslednji decenijama pretvorilo u proto-demokratiju, ustavnu monarhiju. A sloboda je u to vrijeme imala izuzetno značajnu političku vrijednost.
Similarly, in the Arab world, there was what the great Arab historian Albert Hourani defines as the Liberal Age. He has a book, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age," and the Liberal Age, he defines as 19th century and early 20th century. Quite notably, this was the dominant trend in the early 20th century among Islamic thinkers and statesmen and theologians. But there is a very curious pattern in the rest of the 20th century, because we see a sharp decline in this Islamic modernist line. And in place of that, what happens is that Islamism grows as an ideology which is authoritarian, which is quite strident, which is quite anti-Western, and which wants to shape society based on a utopian vision.
Slično tome, u arapskom svijetu je nastupilo ono što čuveni arapski istoričar Albert Hourani definiše kao liberalno doba. On je napisao knjigu "Arapska misao u liberalnom dobu". A kao liberalno doba on definiše 19. vijek i početak 20. vijeka. Sasvim primjetno, ovo je bio trend koji je prevladavao s početka 20. vijeka među islamskim misliocima, državnicima i teolozima. . Međutim, postoji jako zanimljiv obrazac tokom ostatka 20. vijeka, gdje vidimo snažan pad u toj islamskoj modernističkoj liniji. Umjesto toga, došlo je do jačanja Islamizma kao autoritarne ideologije, koja je prilično prodorna, prilično anti-zapadna i koja želi oblikovati društvo na osnovu utopističke vizije.
So Islamism is the problematic idea that really created a lot of problems in the 20th-century Islamic world. And even the very extreme forms of Islamism led to terrorism in the name of Islam -- which is actually a practice that I think is against Islam, but some, obviously, extremists, did not think that way. But there is a curious question: If Islamic modernism was so popular in the 19th and early 20th centuries, why did Islamism become so popular in the rest of the 20th century? And this is a question, I think, which needs to be discussed carefully. In my book, I went into that question as well. And actually, you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand that. Just look at the political history of the 20th century, and you see things have changed a lot. The contexts have changed.
Znači, Islamizam je problematična ideja koja je zapravo stvorila mnogo problema u islamskom svijetu 20. vijeka. Čak su i veoma ekstremni vidovi Islamizma doveli do terorizma u ime Islama -- koji je zapravo praksa za koju smatram da je protiv Islama, međutim neki očigledno ekstremisti nisu mislili na isti način. No, javlja se zanimljivo pitanje: ako je islamski modernizam bio toliko popularan u 19. i početkom 20. vijeka, zašto je Islamizam postao tako popularan kasnije tokom ostatka 20. vijeka? Ovo je pitanje o kojem je, smatram, potrebno pažljivo razgovarati. U svojoj knjizi sam se takođe bavio tim pitanjem. Zapravo ne morate biti pretjerano pametni da biste to shvatili. Pogledajte samo političku istoriju 20. vijeka i vidjećete da se mnogo toga jako promijenilo. Kontekst je izmijenjen.
In the 19th century, when Muslims were looking at Europe as an example, they were independent; they were more self-confident. In the early 20th century, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the whole Middle East was colonized. And when you have colonialization, what do you have? You have anti-colonialization. So Europe is not just an example now to emulate; it's an enemy to fight and to resist. So there's a very sharp decline in liberal ideas in the Muslim world, and what you see is more of a defensive, rigid, reactionary strain, which led to Arab socialism, Arab nationalism and ultimately to the Islamist ideology. And when the colonial period ended, what you had in place of that was generally secular dictators, which say they're a country, but did not bring democracy to the country, and established their own dictatorship. And I think the West, at least some powers in the West, particularly the United States, made the mistake of supporting those secular dictators, thinking that they were more helpful for their interests. But the fact that those dictators suppressed democracy in their country and suppressed Islamic groups in their country actually made the Islamists much more strident.
U 19. vijeku, kada su se Muslimani ugledali na Evropu kao primjer, bili su nezavisni i imali su mnogo više samopouzdanja. Početkom 20. vijeka, padom Otomanskog carstva, cijeli Srednji istok je bio kolonizovan. A kada imate kolonizaciju, šta se dešava? Tada imate anti-kolonizaciju. Znači, Evropa više nije uzor koji treba oponašati; već je neprijatelj protiv kojeg se treba boriti i kojemu se treba oduprijeti. Došlo je do izuzetno oštrog opadanja liberalne ideje u muslimanskom svijetu, i ono što se vidi je defanzivnija, kruća, reakcionistička crta, koji je dovela do arapskog socijalizma, arapskog nacionalizma i na koncu do islamske ideologije. Kada je kolonijalno doba okončalo, njega su zamijenili uglavnom sekularni diktatori, koji kažu da su oni zemlja, ali koji nisu donijeli demokratiju u zemlju, već su uspostavili sopstveno diktatorstvo. Mislim da je Zapad, ili barem neke zapadne sile, naročito Sjedinjene Države, pogriješile time što su dale podršku tim sekularnim diktatorima, misleći da će oni biti od veće pomoći njihovim interesima. No, činjenica da su ti diktatori gušenjem demokratije u svojim zemljama i gušenjem islamskih grupa zapravo učinili da Islamisti postanu mnogo glasniji.
So in the 20th century, you had this vicious cycle in the Arab world, where you have a dictatorship suppressing its own people, including the Islamic pious, and they're reacting in reactionary ways. There was one country, though, which was able to escape or stay away from that vicious cycle. And that's the country where I come from, Turkey. Turkey has never been colonized, so it remained as an independent nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That's one thing to remember; it did not share the same anti-colonial hype that you can find in some other countries in the region. Secondly, and most importantly, Turkey became a democracy earlier than any of the countries we are talking about. In 1950, Turkey had the first free and fair elections, which ended the more autocratic secular regime, which was in the beginning of Turkey. And the pious Muslims in Turkey saw that they could change the political system by voting. And they realized that democracy is something compatible with Islam, compatible with their values, and they've been supportive of democracy. That's an experience that not every other Muslim nation in the Middle East had, until very recently.
Tako smo u 20. vijeku imali ovaj začarani krug u arapskom svijetu gdje su diktatorski režimi tlačili sopstveni narod, uključujući i one pobožne, koji reaguju reakcionistički. Doduše, samo jedna zemlja je mogla pobjeći ili ostati izvan tog začararanog kruga. To je zemlja iz koje dolazim, Turska. Turska nikada nije bila kolonizirana, tako da se održala kao nezavisna nacija nakon pada Otomanskog carstva. To je jedna stvar koju treba upamtiti. Oni nisu imali isto anti-kolonijalno ludilo koje možete naći u nekima od zemalja tog regiona. Kao drugo, i još značajnije, Turska je postala demokratijom prije svih ovih zemalja o kojima smo govorili. Turska je 1950. godine imala prve slobodne i pravedne izbore kojima je okončan sekularni režim koji je bio više autokratski, što je označilo početak Turske. Pobožni Muslimani u Turskoj su vidjeli da glasanjem mogu izmijeniti politički sistem. I uvidjeli su da je demokratija nešto što je kompatibilno sa Islamom, kompatibilno sa njihovim vrijednostima i stoga su snažno podržali demokratiju. To je iskustvo koje muslimanske zemlje Srednjeg istoka nisu imale sve do nedavno.
Secondly, in the past two decades, thanks to globalization, thanks to the market economy, thanks to the rise of a middle class, we in Turkey see what I define as a rebirth of Islamic modernism. Now, there's the more urban middle-class pious Muslims who, again, look at their tradition and see that there are some problems in the tradition, and understand that they need to be changed and questioned and reformed. And they look at Europe, and see an example, again, to follow. They see an example, at least, to take some inspiration from. That's why the EU process, Turkey's effort to join the EU, has been supported inside Turkey by the Islamic pious, while some secular nationalists were against it. Well, that process has been a little bit blurred by the fact that not all Europeans are that welcoming, but that's another discussion. But the pro-EU sentiment in Turkey in the past decade has become almost an Islamic cause and supported by the Islamic liberals and the secular liberals as well, of course.
Kao drugo, tokom poslednje dvije decenije, zahvaljujući globalizaciji, zahvaljujući tržišnoj ekonomiji, zahvaljujući usponu srednje klase, mi u Turskoj vidimo ono što ja nazivam ponovnim rođenjem islamskog modernizma. Sada postoji urbanija srednja klasa pobožnih Muslimana koji, ponovo, posmatraju svoju tradiciju i vide da u njoj postoje izvjesni problemi. I oni shvataju da se isto moraju promijeniti, moraju se dovoditi u pitanje i reformirati. A kada pogledaju Evropu, i opet vide primjer koji bi trebali slijediti. Vide primjer iz kojeg, barem, mogu izvući neku inspiraciju. Zbog toga proces EU, napor Turske da se pridruži EU, u Turskoj ima podršku tih pobožnih sljedbenika Islama, dok su neke od sekularnih nacija protiv toga. No, taj proces je malo zamagljen činjenicom da ni svi Evropljani ne pozdravljaju ulazak novih zemalja -- no to je tema za drugu diskusiju. Ali pro-EU osjećanja u Turskoj su u poslednjoj deceniji postala gotovo islamski slučaj, koji podržavaju islamski liberali, kao i sekularni liberali, naravno.
And thanks to that, Turkey has been able to reasonably create a success story in which Islam and the most pious understandings of Islam have become part of the democratic game, and even contributes to the democratic and economic advance of the country. And this has been an inspiring example right now for some of the Islamic movements or some of the countries in the Arab world.
I zahvaljujući tome, Turska je je uspjela da na razuman način izgradi uspješnu priču u kojoj su Islam i najpobožnija razumijevanja Islama postali dijelom demokratske igre, i čak doprinose demokratskom i ekonomskom napretku zemlje. I to je sada nadahnjujući primjer za neke od islamskih pokreta ili neke od zemalja arapskog svijeta.
You must have all seen the Arab Spring, which began in Tunis and in Egypt. Arab masses just revolted against their dictators. They were asking for democracy; they were asking for freedom. And they did not turn out to be the Islamist boogeyman that the dictators were always using to justify their regime. They said, "We want freedom; we want democracy. We are Muslim believers, but we want to be living as free people in free societies." Of course, this is a long road. Democracy is not an overnight achievement; it's a process. But this is a promising era in the Muslim world.
Svi ste morali vidjeti arapsko proljeće koje je otpočelo u Tunisu i Egiptu. I arapske mase koje su se pobunile protiv svojih diktatora. koje su se pobunile protiv svojih diktatora. Tražili su demokratiju, tražili su slobodu. I nisu se pretvorili u islamske babaroge koje su diktatori koristili kako bi opravdali svoje režime. Rekli su „mi želimo slobodu, želimo demokratiju. Mi smo muslimanski vjernici, ali želimo živjeti kao slobodni ljudi u slobodnim društvima.“ Naravno, put će biti dug. Demokratija nije ostvarenje do kojeg se dolazi preko noći; . ona je proces. No, ovo je epoha koja obećava u muslimanskom svijetu.
And I believe that the Islamic modernism which began in the 19th century, but which had a setback in the 20th century because of the political troubles of the Muslim world, is having a rebirth. And I think the takeaway message from that would be that Islam, despite some of the skeptics in the West, has the potential in itself to create its own way to democracy, create its own way to liberalism, create its own way to freedom. They just should be allowed to work for that.
I ja vjerujem da islamski modernizam koji je otpočeo u 19. vijeku, ali koji je doživjeo zastoj u 20. vijeku usljed političkih nevolja u muslimanskom svijetu, sada doživljava preporod. I mislim da je poruka koja proizilazi iz toga da Islam, uprkos nekim zapadnim skepticima, ima potencijal u sebi da stvori sopstveni put ka demokratiji, da stvori sopstveni put ka liberalizmu, sopstveni put ka slobodi. Samo im treba dopustiti da to i urade.
Thanks so much.
Hvala Vam mnogo.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)