A few weeks ago, I had a chance to go to Saudi Arabia. And the first thing I wanted to do as a Muslim was to go to Mecca and visit the Kaaba, the holiest shrine of Islam. And I did that; I put on my ritualistic dress, I went to the holy mosque, I did my prayers, I observed all the rituals. And meanwhile, besides all the spirituality, there was one mundane detail in the Kaaba that was pretty interesting for me: there was no separation of sexes. In other words, men and women were worshiping all together. They were together while doing tawāf, the circular walk around the Kaaba. They were together while praying.
Prije nekoliko tjedana, imao sam priliku posjetiti Saudijsku Arabiju. I prva stvar koju sam htio učiniti kao Musliman je otići u Mecca-u i posjetiti Kaaba-u, najsvetiji hram Islama. I učinio sam to; obukao sam svoju ritualnu odjeću; otišao sam u svetu džamiju; pomolio se; promatrao sam sve rituale. I u međuvremenu, pokraj cijele te duhovnosti, postojao je jedan trivijalan detalj u Kaaba-i koji mi se činio prilično interesantan. Nije postojala odvojenost spolova. Drugim riječima, muškarci i žene su zajedno štovali. Bili su zajedno prilikom tawaf-a, kružne šetnje oko Kaaba-e. Bili su zajedno tijekom molitve.
And if you wonder why this is interesting at all, you have to see the rest of Saudi Arabia, because this a country which is strictly divided between the sexes. In other words: as men, you are simply not supposed to be in the same physical space with women. And I noticed this in a very funny way. I left the Kaaba to eat something in downtown Mecca. I headed to the nearest Burger King restaurant. And I went there -- I noticed that there was a male section, which is carefully separated from the female section. I had to pay, order and eat in the male section. "It's funny," I said to myself, "You can mingle with the opposite sex at the holy Kaaba, but not at the Burger King?"
I ako se pitate zašto je to uopće zanimljivo, morate vidjeti ostatak Saudijske Arabije, jer je to zemlja u kojoj postoji stroga podjela među spolovima. Drugim riječima, kao muškarci, ne biste trebali biti u istom fizičkom prostoru sa ženama. I primjetio sam to na vrlo smiješan način. Napustio sam Kaaba-u kako bih pojeo nešto u centru Mecca-e. Uputio sam se prema najbližem Burger King restoranu. I otišao sam tamo -- primjetio sam kako postoji muška sekcija, koja je bila pažljivo odvojena od ženske sekcije. I morao sam platiti, naručiti i jesti u muškoj sekciji. "Smiješno je to", rekao sam sebi, "možete se družiti sa suprotnim spolom u svetoj Kaaba-i, ali ne i u Burger Kingu."
(Laughter)
Prilično ironično.
Quite, quite ironic. Ironic, and it's also, I think, quite telling, because the Kaaba and the rituals around it are relics from the earliest phase of Islam, that of prophet Muhammad. And if there was a big emphasis at the time to separate men from women, the rituals around the Kaaba could have been designed accordingly. But apparently, that was not an issue at the time. So the rituals came that way. This is also, I think, confirmed by the fact that the seclusion of women in creating a divided society is something that you also do not find in the Koran -- the very core of Islam, the divine core of Islam -- that all Muslims, equally myself, believe.
Ironično, ali ujedno, mislim, i prilično snažno. Jer su Kaaba i rituali oko nje i relikvije iz najranije faze Islama, faze proroka Muhameda. I kada bi u to vrijeme postojao veliki naglasak na odvajanju muškaraca od žena, rituali oko Kaaba-e bi bili dizajnirani sukladno tome. Ali očito u to vrijeme to nije bilo tako. Stoga su se rituali pojavili na ovaj način. To je ujedno, mislim, potvrđeno činjenicom kako odvojenost žena u stvaranju podijeljenog društva je nešto što isto tako ne možete pronaći u Kuranu, samoj srži Islama -- veličanstvenoj srži Islama u koju svi muslimani, kao i ja, vjerujemo.
And I think it's not an accident that you don't find this idea in the very origin of Islam, because many scholars who study the history of Islamic thought -- Muslim scholars or Westerners -- think that, actually, the practice of dividing men and women physically came as a later development in Islam, as Muslims adopted some preexisting cultures and traditions of the Middle East. Seclusion of women was actually a Byzantine and Persian practice, and Muslims adopted it and made it a part of their religion.
Mislim kako to nije slučajnost što ne pronalazite tu ideju u samom izvoru Islama. Jer mnogi učenjaci koji proučavaju povijest islamske misli -- muslimanski učenjaci ili zapadnjaci -- smatraju kako je zapravo praksa fizičkog razdvajanja muškaraca i žena došla kao kasniji razvoj u Islamu, kako su muslimani usvojili neke već postojeće kulture i tradicije Bliskog Istoka. Odvojenost žena je zapravo bila praksa Bizantinaca i Perzijanaca, a muslimani su to usvojili
Actually, this is just one example of a much larger phenomenon.
i učinili to dijelom svoje religije.
What we call today Islamic law, and especially Islamic culture -- and there are many Islamic cultures, actually; the one in Saudi Arabia is much different from where I come from in Istanbul or Turkey. But still, if you're going to speak about a Muslim culture, this has a core: the divine message which began the religion. But then many traditions, perceptions, practices were added on top of it. And these were traditions of the Middle East medieval traditions.
I zapravo to je samo jedan primjer mnogo većeg fenomena. Ono što danas zovemo zakonom Islama, i posebno islamska kultura -- a zapravo postoji mnogo islamskih kultura; ona u Saudijskoj Arabiji je bitno drugačija od one iz koje ja dolazim u Istanbulu ili Turskoj. Ali ipak, ako ćete pričati o muslimanskoj kulturi, ona ima jezgru, prekrasnu poruku, koja je započela religiju, ali zatim je mnogo tradicija, percepcija, mnogo praksi dodano na tu kulturu. A to su tradicije Bliskog Istoka -- srednjovjekovne tradicije.
There are two important messages, or two lessons, to take from that reality. First of all, Muslims -- pious, conservative, believing Muslims who want to be loyal to their religion -- should not cling onto everything in their culture, thinking that that's divinely mandated. Maybe some things are bad traditions and they need to be changed. On the other hand, the Westerners who look at Islamic culture and see some troubling aspects should not readily conclude that this is what Islam ordains. Maybe it's a Middle Eastern culture that became confused with Islam.
I postoje dvije važne poruke, ili dvije lekcije, koje možete uzeti iz te stvarnosti. Kao prvo, muslimani -- pobožni, konzervativni, muslimani vjernici koji žele biti odani svojoj religiji -- ne bi se trebali pridržavati svega u svojoj kulturi, misleći kako je sve prekrasno pod mandatom. Možda su neke stvari loše tradicije koje moraju biti promijenjene. S druge strane, zapadnjaci koji promatraju islamsku kulturu i vide neke problematične aspekte ne bi doista smjeli zaključivati kako je to ono što Islam naređuje. Možda je to kultura Bliskog Istoka koja je pobrkana s Islamom.
There is a practice called female circumcision. It's something terrible, horrible. It is basically an operation to deprive women of sexual pleasure. And Westerners -- Europeans or Americans -- who didn't know about this before, [saw] this practice within some of the Muslim communities who migrated from North Africa. And they've thought, "Oh, what a horrible religion that is, which ordains something like that." But when you look at female circumcision, you see that it has nothing to do with Islam; it's just a North African practice which predates Islam. It was there for thousands of years. And, quite tellingly, some Muslims do practice it -- the Muslims in North Africa, not in other places. But also the non-Muslim communities of North Africa -- the animists, some Christians and even a Jewish tribe in North Africa -- are known to practice female circumcision. So what might look like a problem within Islamic faith might turn out to be a tradition that Muslims have subscribed to.
Postoji praksa zvana žensko obrezivanje. To je nešto užasno, strašno. To je u osnovi operacija koja lišava ženu seksualnog užitka. A zapadnjaci, Europljani ili Amerikanci, koji prije nisu znali o tome suočili su se s tom praksom unutar nekih muslimanskih zajednica koje su migrirale iz sjeverne Afrike. I pomislili su, "O, kakva je to užasna religija koja naređuje nešto takvo." Ali kada zapravo promotrite žensko obrezivanje, vidjet ćete kako nema nikakve veze s Islamom, to je samo praksa sjeverne Afrike, koja je nastala prije Islama. Postojala je tisućama godina. I prilično snažno, neki muslimani to prakticiraju. Muslimani u sjevernoj Africi, ne na drugim mjestima. Ali ujedno i ne-muslimanske zajednice sjeverne Afrike -- animisti, čak i neki kršćani i čak i židovsko pleme u sjevernoj Africi je poznato po praksi ženskog obrezivanja. Dakle, ono što bi moglo izgledati kao problem unutar islamske vjere može se pretvoriti u tradiciju na koju su se muslimani pretplatili.
The same thing can be said for honor killings, which is a recurrent theme in the Western media -- and which is, of course, a horrible tradition. And we see, truly, in some Muslim communities, that tradition. But in the non-Muslim communities of the Middle East, such as some Christian communities, Eastern communities, you see the same practice. We had a tragic case of an honor killing within Turkey's Armenian community just a few months ago.
Ista stvar bi se mogla reći za ubojstva iz časti, što je ponavljajuća tema u zapadnim medijima -- a koja je, naravno, užasna tradicija. I doista vidimo tu tradiciju u nekim muslimanskim zajednicama. Ali u ne-muslimanskim zajednicama Bliskog Istoka, poput nekih kršćanskih zajednica, istočnih zajednica, vidite istu praksu. Imali smo tragičan primjer časnog ubojstva unutar armenijske zajednice u Turskoj prije samo nekoliko mjeseci.
Now, these are things about general culture, but I'm also very much interested in political culture and whether liberty and democracy is appreciated, or whether there's an authoritarian political culture in which the state is supposed to impose things on the citizens. And it is no secret that many Islamic movements in the Middle East tend to be authoritarian, and some of the so-called "Islamic regimes," such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the worst case, the Taliban in Afghanistan, they are pretty authoritarian -- no doubt about that.
Dakle, to su stvari o općoj kulturi, ali mene jako interesira i politička kultura i jesu li sloboda i demokracija cjenjene, ili postoji autoritarna politička kultura u kojoj država nameće stvari svojim građanima. I nije nikakva tajna kako mnogi islamski pokreti na Bliskom Istoku teže biti autoritativnima, a neki od takozvanih "islamskih režima" poput Saudijske Arabije, Irana i u najgorem slučaju Talibana u Afganistanu, oni su prilično autoritativni -- nema sumnje o tome.
For example, in Saudi Arabia, there is a phenomenon called the religious police. And the religious police imposes the supposed Islamic way of life on every citizen, by force -- like, women are forced to cover their heads -- wear the hijab, the Islamic head cover. Now that is pretty authoritarian, and that's something I'm very much critical of. But when I realized that the non-Muslim, or the non-Islamic-minded actors in the same geography sometimes behaved similarly, I realized that the problem maybe lies in the political culture of the whole region, not just Islam. Let me give you an example: in Turkey, where I come from, which is a very hyper-secular republic, until very recently, we used to have what I call "secularism police," which would guard the universities against veiled students. In other words, they would force students to uncover their heads. And I think forcing people to uncover their head is as tyrannical as forcing them to cover it. It should be the citizen's decision.
Na primjer, u Saudijskoj Arabiji postoji fenomen zvan religijska policija. A religijska policija nameće pretpostavljeni islamski način života na svakog građanina, silom -- kao što su žene prisiljene da pokrivaju svoje glave -- nose svoj hijab, islamsko pokrivalo za glavu. To je prilično autoritativno, i oko toga sam jako kritičan. Ali kada sam shvatio kako se ne-muslimani, ili glumci ne-islamskog uma na istom geografskom području. ponekad ponašaju slično, shvatio sam kako problem možda leži u političkoj kulturi cijele regije, ne samo Islama. Dopustite mi da vam dam primjer: u Turskoj od kuda ja dolazim, koja je jako hiper-svjetovna republika, sve do nedavno, imali smo ono što ja nazivam svjetovna policija, koja bi čuvala sveučilišta od velom pokrivenih studentica. Drugim riječima, oni bi prisilili studentice da otkriju svoje glave. I mislim kako je siliti ljude da otkriju svoju glavu jednako tiranski kao i siliti ih da je pokriju. To bi trebala biti odluka građana.
But when I saw that, I said, "Maybe the problem is just an authoritarian culture in the region, and some Muslims have been influenced by that. But the secular-minded people can be influenced by that. Maybe it's a problem of the political culture, and we have to think about how to change that political culture." Now, these are some of the questions I had in mind a few years ago when I sat down to write a book. I said, "Well, I will do research about how Islam actually came to be what it is today, and what roads were taken and what roads could have been taken." The name of the book is "Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty." And as the subtitle suggests, I looked at Islamic tradition and the history of Islamic thought from the perspective of individual liberty, and I tried to find what are the strengths with regard to individual liberty.
Ali kada sam to vidio, rekao sam, "Možda je problem samo autoritativna kultura u regiji, i neki od muslimana su bili pod njezinim utjecajem." Ali ljudi koji razmišljaju na svjetovni način mogu biti pod takvim utjecajem. Možda je to problem političke kulture, a mi moramo misliti o tome kako promijeniti tu političku kulturu. To su neke od pitanja kojih sam se dosjetio prije nekoliko godina kada sam sjeo da napišem knjigu. Rekao sam, "Pa, napravit ću istraživanje o tome kako je Islam postao ono što je danas, i kojim cestama se krenulo a kojim cestama se moglo krenuti." Ime knjige je "Islam bez ekstrema: Slučaj muslimana za slobodu." I kao što podnaslov sugerira, promatrao sam islamsku tradiciju i povijest islamske misli iz perspektive pojedinačne slobode, i pokušao sam naći snage u odnosu na individualnu slobodu.
And there are strengths in Islamic tradition. Islam, actually, as a monotheistic religion, which defined man as a responsible agent by itself, created the idea of the individual in the Middle East, and saved it from the communitarianism, the collectivism of the tribe. You can derive many ideas from that. But besides that, I also saw problems within Islamic tradition. But one thing was curious: most of those problems turn out to be problems that emerged later, not from the very divine core of Islam, the Koran, but from, again, traditions and mentalities, or the interpretations of the Koran that Muslims made in the Middle Ages. The Koran, for example, doesn't condone stoning. There is no punishment for apostasy. There is no punishment for personal sins like drinking. These things which make Islamic law, the troubling aspects of Islamic law, were developed into later interpretations of Islam.
I postoje snage u islamskoj tradiciji. Islam je zapravo, kao monoteistična religija, koja je definirala čovjeka kao odgovornog agenta samog po sebi, stvorio ideju pojedinca na Bliskom Istoku i spasio je od komunitarizma, kolektivizma plemena. Možete derivirati mnogo ideja i toga. Ali pored toga, isto tako sam vidio probleme unutar islamske tradicije. ali jedna stvar je bila zanimljiva: većina tih problema su problemi koji su se pojavili kasnije, ne iz same prekrasne srži Islama, Kurana, već iz, ponovno, tradicija i mentaliteta, ili interpretacija Kurana koje su muslimani napravili u srednjem vijeku. Kuran, na primjer, ne oprašta kamenovanje. Nema kazne za otpadništvo. Nema kazne za osobna djela poput pijenja. Te stvari koje čine islamsko pravo, problematične aspekte islamskog prava, su kasnije razvijeni u kasne interpretacije Islama.
Which means that Muslims can, today, look at those things and say, "Well, the core of our religion is here to stay with us. It's our faith, and we will be loyal to it. But we can change how it was interpreted, because it was interpreted according to the time and milieu in the Middle Ages. Now we're living in a different world, with different values and political systems." That interpretation is quite possible and feasible.
Što znači kako muslimani mogu, danas, gledati na te stvari i reći, "Pa, srž naše religije ostaje tu s nama. To je naša vjera i mi ćemo joj biti odani." Ali možemo promijeniti njezinu interpretaciju, jer je bila interpretirana prema vremenu i sredini u Srednjem vijeku. Sada živimo u drugačijem svijetu s drugačijim vrijednostima i drugačijim političkim sustavima. Ta interpretacija je prilično moguća i izvediva.
Now, if I were the only person thinking that way, we would be in trouble. But that's not the case at all. Actually, from the 19th century on, there's a whole revisionist, reformist -- whatever you call it -- tradition, a trend in Islamic thinking. These were intellectuals or statesmen of the 19th century, and later, 20th century, which looked at Europe, basically, and saw that Europe has many things to admire, like science and technology. But not just that; also democracy, parliament, the idea of representation, the idea of equal citizenship. These Muslim thinkers, intellectuals and statesmen of the 19th century, looked at Europe, saw these things, and said, "Why don't we have these things?" And they looked back at Islamic tradition, and saw that there are problematic aspects, but they're not the core of the religion, so maybe they can be re-understood, and the Koran can be reread in the modern world.
Sada, kada bih ja bio jedina osoba koja razmišlja na taj način, bili bismo u nevolji. Ali to uopće nije slučaj. Zapravo, sve od 19. stoljeća pa nadalje, postoji cijela revizionistička, reformistička -- kakogod je zvali -- tradicija, trend u islamskom razmišljanju. A to su bili intelektualci ili državnici 19. i kasnije, 20. stoljeća, koji su promatrali Europu u osnovi i vidjeli kako Europa ima mnogo stvari kojima se može diviti, poput znanosti i tehnologije. Ali ne samo to; isto tako i demokraciju, parlament, ideju zastupništva, ideju jednakog građanstva. Ti muslimanski mislioci i intelektualci i državnici 19. stoljeća kada bi promatrali Europu, vidjeli bi te stvari. Rekli su, "Zašto mi nemamo te stvari?" I pogledali su ponovno u islamsku tradiciju, i vidjeli su kako postoje problematični aspekti, ali oni nisu srž religije pa bi stoga oni mogli biti ponovno shvaćeni, a Kuran bi mogao ponovno biti pročitan u modernom svijetu.
That trend is generally called Islamic modernism, and it was advanced by intellectuals and statesmen, not just as an intellectual idea, though, but also as a political program. And that's why, actually, in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which then covered the whole Middle East, made very important reforms -- reforms like giving Christians and Jews an equal citizenship status, accepting a constitution, accepting a representative parliament, advancing the idea of freedom of religion. That's why the Ottoman Empire, in its last decades, turned into a proto-democracy, a constitutional monarchy, and freedom was a very important political value at the time.
Taj trend je generalno nazvan islamistički modernizam, i bio je unaprijeđen od strane intelektualaca i državnika, ne samo kao intelektualna ideja, već i kao politički program. I zato je zapravo u 19. stoljeću Otomansko carstvo, koje je tada prekrivalo cijeli Bliski Istok, napravilo veoma važne reforme -- reforme poput davanja kršćanima i židovima jednak građanski status, prihvaćanje ustava, prihvaćanje zastupničkog parlamenta, unapređenje ideje slobode religije. I zato se Otomansko carstvo u svojim zadnjim desetljećima pretvorilo u proto-demokraciju, ustavnu monarhiju. A sloboda je bila veoma važna politička vrednota u to vrijeme.
Similarly, in the Arab world, there was what the great Arab historian Albert Hourani defines as the Liberal Age. He has a book, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age," and the Liberal Age, he defines as 19th century and early 20th century. Quite notably, this was the dominant trend in the early 20th century among Islamic thinkers and statesmen and theologians. But there is a very curious pattern in the rest of the 20th century, because we see a sharp decline in this Islamic modernist line. And in place of that, what happens is that Islamism grows as an ideology which is authoritarian, which is quite strident, which is quite anti-Western, and which wants to shape society based on a utopian vision.
Slično, u arapskom svijetu, postojalo je ono što veliki arapski povjesničar Albert Hourani definira kao Liberalno doba. Ima knjigu, "Arapska misao u Liberalnom dobu." A Liberalno doba, on definira kao 19. stoljeće i rano 20. stoljeće. Prilično značajno, to je bio dominantan trend u ranom 20. stoljeću među islamskim misliocima i državnicima i teolozima. Ali postoji veoma zanimljiv uzorak u ostatku 20. stoljeća, jer vidimo nagli pad ove islamske modernističke linije. A na mjesto toga, ono što se događa jest da islamizam raste kao ideologija koja je autoritativna, koja je prilično oštra, koja je prilično anti-zapadnjačka, i koja želi oblikovati društvo zasnovano na utopijskoj viziji.
So Islamism is the problematic idea that really created a lot of problems in the 20th-century Islamic world. And even the very extreme forms of Islamism led to terrorism in the name of Islam -- which is actually a practice that I think is against Islam, but some, obviously, extremists, did not think that way. But there is a curious question: If Islamic modernism was so popular in the 19th and early 20th centuries, why did Islamism become so popular in the rest of the 20th century? And this is a question, I think, which needs to be discussed carefully. In my book, I went into that question as well. And actually, you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand that. Just look at the political history of the 20th century, and you see things have changed a lot. The contexts have changed.
Dakle, islamizam je problematična ideja koja je zaista kreirala dosta problema u islamskom svijetu 20. stoljeća. I čak su vrlo ekstremni oblici islamizma vodili do terorizma u ime Islama -- što je zapravo praksa koja je, po mom mišljenju, protiv Islama, ali neki, očito, ekstremisti nisu razmišljali na taj način. Ali javlja se zanimljivo pitanje: Ako je islamski modernizam bio toliko popularan u 19.-om i ranom 20. stoljeću, zašto je islamizam postao toliko popularan u ostatku 20. stoljeća? A to pitanje, mislim, se mora pažljivo raspraviti. A u mojoj knjizi, ušao sam i u to pitanje. I zapravo ne trebate biti raketni znanstvenik kako bi to razumijeli. Samo pogledajte političku povijest 20. stoljeća, i vidite kako su se stvari jako promijenile. Kontekst se promijenio.
In the 19th century, when Muslims were looking at Europe as an example, they were independent; they were more self-confident. In the early 20th century, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the whole Middle East was colonized. And when you have colonialization, what do you have? You have anti-colonialization. So Europe is not just an example now to emulate; it's an enemy to fight and to resist. So there's a very sharp decline in liberal ideas in the Muslim world, and what you see is more of a defensive, rigid, reactionary strain, which led to Arab socialism, Arab nationalism and ultimately to the Islamist ideology. And when the colonial period ended, what you had in place of that was generally secular dictators, which say they're a country, but did not bring democracy to the country, and established their own dictatorship. And I think the West, at least some powers in the West, particularly the United States, made the mistake of supporting those secular dictators, thinking that they were more helpful for their interests. But the fact that those dictators suppressed democracy in their country and suppressed Islamic groups in their country actually made the Islamists much more strident.
U 19. stoljeću, kada su muslimani gledali Europu kao primjer, oni su bili neovisni, oni su imali više samopouzdanja. Na početku 20. stoljeća, s padom Otomanskog carstva, cijeli Bliski Istok je bio koloniziran. A kada imate kolonizaciju, što imate? Imate anti-kolonizaciju. Dakle, Europa nije sada samo primjer koji treba imitirati; ona je neprijatelj protiv kojeg se treba boriti i kojem se treba oduprijeti. Dakle, dolazi do vrlo naglog pada liberalnih ideja u muslimanskom svijetu, a ono što vidite je više obrambeni, rigidni, reaktivni napor, koji je vodio do arapskog socijalizma, arapskog nacionalizma i naposljetku do islamističke ideologije. A kada je period kolonizacije završio, ono što ste na tom mjestu imali bili su, općenito, svjetovni diktatori, koji govore kako su oni država, ali nisu donijeli demokraciju u državu, već su uspostavili svoju vlastitu diktaturu. A mislim kako je zapad, bar neke moći na zapadu, naročito Sjedinjene Države, učinio pogrešku što je podupirao te svjetovne diktatore, misleći kako će oni biti više od pomoći za njihove interese. Ali činjenica kako su ti diktatori potisnuli demokraciju u svojoj zemlji i potisnuli islamske grupe u svojoj zemlji vodilo je zapravo do toga da islamisti postaju puno oštriji.
So in the 20th century, you had this vicious cycle in the Arab world, where you have a dictatorship suppressing its own people, including the Islamic pious, and they're reacting in reactionary ways. There was one country, though, which was able to escape or stay away from that vicious cycle. And that's the country where I come from, Turkey. Turkey has never been colonized, so it remained as an independent nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That's one thing to remember; it did not share the same anti-colonial hype that you can find in some other countries in the region. Secondly, and most importantly, Turkey became a democracy earlier than any of the countries we are talking about. In 1950, Turkey had the first free and fair elections, which ended the more autocratic secular regime, which was in the beginning of Turkey. And the pious Muslims in Turkey saw that they could change the political system by voting. And they realized that democracy is something compatible with Islam, compatible with their values, and they've been supportive of democracy. That's an experience that not every other Muslim nation in the Middle East had, until very recently.
Dakle, u 20. stoljeću, imali ste taj začarani krug u arapskom svijetu gdje diktatura potiskuje svoje vlastite ljude uključujući i islamsko pobožništvo, a oni su reagirali reaktivno. Postoji jedna zemlja koja je uspjela pobjeći ili izostati iz tog začaranog kruga. A to je zemlja iz koje ja dolazim; to je Turska. Turska nikad nije bila kolonizirana, pa je ostala kao neovisna nacija nakon pada Otomanskog carstva. To je jedna stvar koju treba zapamtiti. Nisu djelili jednako anti-kolonijalno ushićenje koje možete pronaći u nekim drugim zemljama u regiji. Drugo, i najvažnije, Turska je postala demokracija prije nego ijedna zemlja o kojoj pričamo. 1950. godine, Turska je imala prve slobodne i pravedne izbore, koji su okončali više autokratski svjetovni režim, koji je bio početak Turske. A pobožni muslimani u Turskoj vidjeli su kako mogu promijeniti politički sustav glasanjem. I shvaćaju kako je demokracija nešto što je kompatibilno s Islamom, kompatibilno s njihovim vrednotama, i oni su podupirali demokraciju. To je iskustvo koje nije svaka druga muslimanska nacija na Bliskom Istoku imala do nedavno.
Secondly, in the past two decades, thanks to globalization, thanks to the market economy, thanks to the rise of a middle class, we in Turkey see what I define as a rebirth of Islamic modernism. Now, there's the more urban middle-class pious Muslims who, again, look at their tradition and see that there are some problems in the tradition, and understand that they need to be changed and questioned and reformed. And they look at Europe, and see an example, again, to follow. They see an example, at least, to take some inspiration from. That's why the EU process, Turkey's effort to join the EU, has been supported inside Turkey by the Islamic pious, while some secular nationalists were against it. Well, that process has been a little bit blurred by the fact that not all Europeans are that welcoming, but that's another discussion. But the pro-EU sentiment in Turkey in the past decade has become almost an Islamic cause and supported by the Islamic liberals and the secular liberals as well, of course.
Drugo, u zadnja dva desetljeća, zahvaljujući globalizaciji, zahvaljujući tržišnoj ekonomiji, zahvaljujući usponu srednje klase, mi u Turskoj svjedočimo onome što ja nazivam preporod islamističkog modernizma. Sada, postoje urbaniji pobožni muslimani srednje klase koji, ponovno, gledaju svoju tradiciju i vide kako postoje neki problemi u tradiciji. I oni shvaćaju kako se moraju mijenjati i preispitivati i provoditi reforme. I oni se ugledaju na Europu, i vide primjer, ponovno, koji će slijediti. Vide primjer, barem, iz kojeg će crpiti inspiraciju. Zato je EU proces, napor Turske da se pridruži EU, podržan unutar Turske od strane islamističkih pobožnika, dok su neke svjetovne nacije bile protiv toga. Taj proces je bio malo zamagljen činjenicom kako nisu svi Europljani gostoprimci -- ali to je za neku drugu diskusiju. Ali pro-EU sentiment u Turskoj je u prošlom desetljeću, umalo postao islamski cilj, i podržan od islamskih liberala i svjetovnih liberala isto tako, naravno.
And thanks to that, Turkey has been able to reasonably create a success story in which Islam and the most pious understandings of Islam have become part of the democratic game, and even contributes to the democratic and economic advance of the country. And this has been an inspiring example right now for some of the Islamic movements or some of the countries in the Arab world.
I zahvaljujući tome, Turska je razumno dobro uspjela stvoriti uspješnu priču u kojoj Islam i najpobožnija shvaćanja Islama postaju dio demokratske igre, i čak doprinosi demokratskom i ekonomskom napretku zemlje. A to je bio inspirirajući primjer sada za neke od islamskih pokreta ili za neke zemlje u arapskom svijetu.
You must have all seen the Arab Spring, which began in Tunis and in Egypt. Arab masses just revolted against their dictators. They were asking for democracy; they were asking for freedom. And they did not turn out to be the Islamist boogeyman that the dictators were always using to justify their regime. They said, "We want freedom; we want democracy. We are Muslim believers, but we want to be living as free people in free societies." Of course, this is a long road. Democracy is not an overnight achievement; it's a process. But this is a promising era in the Muslim world.
Svi ste vidjeli arapsko proljeće, koje je počelo u Tunisu i Egiptu. A arapske mase su se samo pobunile protiv svojih diktatora. Oni su tražili demokraciju; oni su tražili slobodu. I nije se ispostavilo kako je to islamistički bauk koji su diktatori uvijek koristili kako bi opravdali svoj režim. Rekli su kako "mi želimo slobodu, mi želimo demokraciju. Mi smo muslimanski vjernici, ali želimo živjeti kao slobodni ljudi u slobodnim društvima." Naravno, to je dugačak put. Demokracija nije prekonoćno postignuće; to je proces. Ali to je obećavajuća era u muslimanskom svijetu.
And I believe that the Islamic modernism which began in the 19th century, but which had a setback in the 20th century because of the political troubles of the Muslim world, is having a rebirth. And I think the takeaway message from that would be that Islam, despite some of the skeptics in the West, has the potential in itself to create its own way to democracy, create its own way to liberalism, create its own way to freedom. They just should be allowed to work for that.
I vjerujem kako islamski modernizam koji je započeo u 19. stoljeću, ali koji je imao zastoj u 20. stoljeću zbog političkih poteškoća u Muslimanskom svijetu, doživljava preporod. I mislim kako bi poruka koju treba odnijeti sa sobom iz toga bila kako Islam, unatoč nekim skepticima na zapadu, ima potencijal u sebi da stvori svoj vlastiti put ka demokraciji, stvori svoj vlastiti put ka liberalizmu, stvori svoj vlastiti put ka slobodi. Jednostavno bi im trebalo biti dozvoljeno da rade za to.
Thanks so much.
Puno hvala.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)