Prije nekoliko sedmica, imao sam priliku otići u Saudijsku Arabiju. Kao musliman, prva stvar koju sam želio uraditi jeste da odem u Meku i posjetim Kabu, najsvetije mjesto hodočašća u Islamu. Tako sam i uradio; Obukao sam nošnju; otišao u svetu džamiju, i klanjao; posmatrao sve obrede. U međuvremenu, uz svu duhovnost, postojao je jedan svjetovni detalj u Kabi veoma interesantan za mene. Nema razdvajanja na osnovi spola. Drugim riječima, muškarci i žene su se molili zajedno. Bili su zajedno za vrijeme tawafa, kruženja oko Kabe. Bili su skupa za vrijeme klanjanja.
A few weeks ago, I had a chance to go to Saudi Arabia. And the first thing I wanted to do as a Muslim was to go to Mecca and visit the Kaaba, the holiest shrine of Islam. And I did that; I put on my ritualistic dress, I went to the holy mosque, I did my prayers, I observed all the rituals. And meanwhile, besides all the spirituality, there was one mundane detail in the Kaaba that was pretty interesting for me: there was no separation of sexes. In other words, men and women were worshiping all together. They were together while doing tawāf, the circular walk around the Kaaba. They were together while praying.
Ako se pitate zašto je ovo uopšte interesantno, morate vidjeti ostatak Saudijske Arabije, jer to je zemlja koja je striktno razdvojena na osnovu spola. Drugim riječima, kao muškarci, nije predviđeno da budete u istom prostoru gdje i žene. Zanimljivo je kako sam ovo primijetio. Napustio sam Kabu da pojedem nešto u centru Meke. Otišao sam u najbliži Burger King restoran. Ušao sam -- i primijetio dio za muškarce pažljivo odvojen od dijela za žene. Morao sam platiti, naručiti i jesti u dijelu za muškarce. "Ovo je smiješno," pomislio sam, "muškarci se mogu miješati sa ženama u svetoj Kabi, ali ne u Burger Kingu."
And if you wonder why this is interesting at all, you have to see the rest of Saudi Arabia, because this a country which is strictly divided between the sexes. In other words: as men, you are simply not supposed to be in the same physical space with women. And I noticed this in a very funny way. I left the Kaaba to eat something in downtown Mecca. I headed to the nearest Burger King restaurant. And I went there -- I noticed that there was a male section, which is carefully separated from the female section. I had to pay, order and eat in the male section. "It's funny," I said to myself, "You can mingle with the opposite sex at the holy Kaaba, but not at the Burger King?"
Ironično. Ironično, ali i informativno. Kaba i obredi koji se obavljaju oko nje su tragovi najranije faze Islama, iz vremena poslanika Muhammeda. Da su se u to vrijeme željeli razdvojiti muškarci od žena, obredi oko Kabe bi bili kreirani u skladu s tim. Ali očigledno da to nije bilo sporno u to vrijeme. Tako da su obredi ostali takvi. Po mom mišljenju podaci o odvajanju žena da bi se stvorilo podijeljno društvo ne postoje u Kur'anu, u samom temelju Islama - uzvišenom temelju Islama u koje svi muslimani, kao i ja, vjeruju. Mislim da nije slučajno što nema ovoga u samom postanku Islama. Jer mnogi naučnici koji izučavaju historiju Islamske misli - muslimanski naučnici ili zapadnjaci - zapravo smatraju da praksa fizičkog razdvajanja muškaraca od žena je nastala u kasnijem razvoju Islama, kada su muslimani preuzeli neke prvobitne kulture i tradicije Srednjeg Istoka. Odvajanje žena su zapravo bile Bizantijska i Perzijska prakse, a muslimani su to preuzeli i uvrstili kao dio svoje religije.
(Laughter) Quite, quite ironic. Ironic, and it's also, I think, quite telling, because the Kaaba and the rituals around it are relics from the earliest phase of Islam, that of prophet Muhammad. And if there was a big emphasis at the time to separate men from women, the rituals around the Kaaba could have been designed accordingly. But apparently, that was not an issue at the time. So the rituals came that way. This is also, I think, confirmed by the fact that the seclusion of women in creating a divided society is something that you also do not find in the Koran -- the very core of Islam, the divine core of Islam -- that all Muslims, equally myself, believe. And I think it's not an accident that you don't find this idea in the very origin of Islam, because many scholars who study the history of Islamic thought -- Muslim scholars or Westerners -- think that, actually, the practice of dividing men and women physically came as a later development in Islam, as Muslims adopted some preexisting cultures and traditions of the Middle East. Seclusion of women was actually a Byzantine and Persian practice, and Muslims adopted it and made it a part of their religion. Actually, this is just one example of a much larger phenomenon.
Ovo je samo jedan primjer još većeg fenomena. Ono što danas zovemo islamsko pravo, a posebno islamska kultura - zapravo ima mnogo islamskih kultura; ona u Saudijskoj Arabiji je mnogo drugačija od one u Istambulu u Turskoj odakle ja dolazim. Ali ipak, ako ćete govoriti o muslimanskoj kulturi, ona ima temeljnu, uzvišenu poruku, nastalu u religiji, ali opet mnoge tradicije, shvatanja, mnoge prakse su se dodavale. To su tradicije sa Srednjeg Istoka -- srednjovjekovne tradicije.
What we call today Islamic law, and especially Islamic culture -- and there are many Islamic cultures, actually; the one in Saudi Arabia is much different from where I come from in Istanbul or Turkey. But still, if you're going to speak about a Muslim culture, this has a core: the divine message which began the religion. But then many traditions, perceptions, practices were added on top of it. And these were traditions of the Middle East medieval traditions.
Dvije važne poruke, ili dvije lekcije, treba naučiti iz stvarnosti. Prije svega, muslimani - pobožni, konzervativni vjernici odani svojoj vjeri - ne bi se trebali slijepo držati svega u svojoj kulturi, misleći da je to od Boga dato. Možda je nešto loša tradicija koja se treba promijeniti. Sa druge strane, zapadnjaci koji posmatraju islamsku kulturu i vide probleme ne bi trebali zaključivati da je to ono što Islam propisuje. Možda je to dio kulture Srednjeg Istoka koju su zamijenili za islamsku tradiciju.
There are two important messages, or two lessons, to take from that reality. First of all, Muslims -- pious, conservative, believing Muslims who want to be loyal to their religion -- should not cling onto everything in their culture, thinking that that's divinely mandated. Maybe some things are bad traditions and they need to be changed. On the other hand, the Westerners who look at Islamic culture and see some troubling aspects should not readily conclude that this is what Islam ordains. Maybe it's a Middle Eastern culture that became confused with Islam.
Postoji praksa ženskog obrezivanja. To je nešto grozno, jezovito. U osnovi to je operacija kojom se žene uskraćuju seksualnog zadovoljstva. Zapadnjaci, Evropljani ili Amerikanci koji nisu za ovo znali prije saznali su za ovu praksu od muslimanskih zajednica koje su se naselile iz zemalja sjeverne Afrike. Pomislili su, "To je grozna religija koja određuje tako nešto." Ali ako zapravo bolje istražite, žensko obrezivanje nema nikakve veze sa Islamom, to je samo praksa u zemaljama sjeverne Afrike, koja je nastala prije Islama. Postojala je hiljadama godina. Neki muslimani su usvojili tu praksu. Muslimani na sjeveru Afrike, a ne na drugim mjestima. Čak i ne-muslimanske zajednice na sjeveru Afrike - animisti, čak i neki kršćani čak i jedno jevrejsko pleme na sjeveru Afrike je poznato po ženskom obrezivanju. Ono što se smatra problem u Islamu može zapravo biti tradicija koja se prepisala muslimanima.
There is a practice called female circumcision. It's something terrible, horrible. It is basically an operation to deprive women of sexual pleasure. And Westerners -- Europeans or Americans -- who didn't know about this before, [saw] this practice within some of the Muslim communities who migrated from North Africa. And they've thought, "Oh, what a horrible religion that is, which ordains something like that." But when you look at female circumcision, you see that it has nothing to do with Islam; it's just a North African practice which predates Islam. It was there for thousands of years. And, quite tellingly, some Muslims do practice it -- the Muslims in North Africa, not in other places. But also the non-Muslim communities of North Africa -- the animists, some Christians and even a Jewish tribe in North Africa -- are known to practice female circumcision. So what might look like a problem within Islamic faith might turn out to be a tradition that Muslims have subscribed to.
Isto se može reći i za ubistva iz časti, tema koja se ponavlja u medijima na zapadu - to je naravno užasna tradicija. U nekim muslimanskim zajednicama zaista postoji ta tradicija. Ali i zajednice na Srednjem Istoku, kao što su neke kršćanske ili istočne zajednice, također imaju istu praksu. Tragičan slučaj ubistva iz časti se desio u armenskoj zajednici u Turskoj prije nekoliko mjeseci.
The same thing can be said for honor killings, which is a recurrent theme in the Western media -- and which is, of course, a horrible tradition. And we see, truly, in some Muslim communities, that tradition. But in the non-Muslim communities of the Middle East, such as some Christian communities, Eastern communities, you see the same practice. We had a tragic case of an honor killing within Turkey's Armenian community just a few months ago.
Ovo sve je dio opće kulture, ali mene interesuje i politička kultura i da li su sloboda i demokratija cijenjene, ili da li postoji autoritarna politika prema kojoj država nameće pravila građanima. I nije tajna da su mnogi islamski pokreti na Srednjem Istoku autoritarni, i neki takozvani "Islamski režimi" kao u Saudijskoj Arabiji, Iranu i najgori slučaj talibanskog režima u Afganistanu, oni su poprilično autoritarni -- bez sumnje.
Now, these are things about general culture, but I'm also very much interested in political culture and whether liberty and democracy is appreciated, or whether there's an authoritarian political culture in which the state is supposed to impose things on the citizens. And it is no secret that many Islamic movements in the Middle East tend to be authoritarian, and some of the so-called "Islamic regimes," such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the worst case, the Taliban in Afghanistan, they are pretty authoritarian -- no doubt about that.
Na primjer, u Saudijskoj Arabiji postoji fenomen nazvan vjerska policija. Vjerska policija nameće navodni islamski način života svakom građaninu, silom - kao što su žene primorane da pokriju glavu - da nose hidžab, pokrivanje glave. Ovo je prilično autoritarno, i ja to mnogo kritikujem. Ali kada sam shvatio da ne-muslimani, ili oni sa istog područja koji nisu naklonjeni Islamu, ponekad se ponašaju slično, shvatio sam da je problem u političkoj kulturi čitavog područja, ne samo u Islamu.. Evo primjera: ja dolazim iz Turske, visoko-sekularne republike, sve do nedavno imali smo, kako sam ja nazvao, policiju za sekularizam, koja je čuvala univerzitete od pokrivenih studentica. Drugim riječima, tjerali su studentice da otkrivaju glave. Mislim da je prisiljavanje žena da otkriju glave okrutno isto kao i prisiljavanje da se pokriju. To treba biti odluka građana.
For example, in Saudi Arabia, there is a phenomenon called the religious police. And the religious police imposes the supposed Islamic way of life on every citizen, by force -- like, women are forced to cover their heads -- wear the hijab, the Islamic head cover. Now that is pretty authoritarian, and that's something I'm very much critical of. But when I realized that the non-Muslim, or the non-Islamic-minded actors in the same geography sometimes behaved similarly, I realized that the problem maybe lies in the political culture of the whole region, not just Islam. Let me give you an example: in Turkey, where I come from, which is a very hyper-secular republic, until very recently, we used to have what I call "secularism police," which would guard the universities against veiled students. In other words, they would force students to uncover their heads. And I think forcing people to uncover their head is as tyrannical as forcing them to cover it. It should be the citizen's decision.
Kada sam to vidjeo, rekao sam, "Možda je problem u autoritarnoj kulturi regiona koja je utjecala na neke muslimane." Ali može utjecati i na sekularne ljude. Možda je problem političke kulture, i mi moramo razmisliti kako promijeniti tu kulturu. Evo nekoliko pitanja koja sam imao prije nekoliko godina kada sam počeo da pišem knjigu. Pomislio sam, "Napraviću istraživanje kako je Islam postao ono što je danas, kojim se putevima krenulo i kojima se trebalo krenuti." Naziv knjige je "Islam bez krajnosti: Slučaj muslimana za slobodu." Kao što podnaslov sugerira, ispitivao sam islamsku tradiciju i historiju islamske misli iz perspektive individualne slobode, pokušavao sam utvrditi koja je moć individualne slobode.
But when I saw that, I said, "Maybe the problem is just an authoritarian culture in the region, and some Muslims have been influenced by that. But the secular-minded people can be influenced by that. Maybe it's a problem of the political culture, and we have to think about how to change that political culture." Now, these are some of the questions I had in mind a few years ago when I sat down to write a book. I said, "Well, I will do research about how Islam actually came to be what it is today, and what roads were taken and what roads could have been taken." The name of the book is "Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty." And as the subtitle suggests, I looked at Islamic tradition and the history of Islamic thought from the perspective of individual liberty, and I tried to find what are the strengths with regard to individual liberty.
Postoje pozitivne strane Islamske tradicije. Kao monoteistička religija, koja je definisala čovjeka odgovornog za svoje postupke, Islam je zapravo kreirao ideju individue na Srednjem Istoku a sačuvao je od zajednice, kolektivizma plemena. Iz toga se mogu izvući mnoge ideje. Ali pored toga, ja sam uvidio i probleme unutar islamske tradicije. Ali jedno je zanimljivo: većina ovih problema se pojavila kasnije, ne iz samog uzvišenog temelja Islama, Kur'ana, već iz, opet, tradicija i mentaliteta, ili tumačenja Kur'ana koje su muslimani pravili tokom Srednjeg vijeka. Kur'an, naprimjer, ne oprašta kamenovanje. Ne postoji kazna za izdajništvo. Ne postoji kazna za privatne stvari kao što je opijanje. Ono što čini islamsko pravo, uznemirujući aspekti islamskog prava, su nastali iz kasnijih tumačenja Islama. To znači da muslimani danas mogu se osvrnuti i reći, "Pa temelj naše religije ostaje sa nama. To je naša vjera i bićemo joj odani." Ali možemo promijeniti način na koji se tumači, jer se tumačila u skladu sa vremenom i ambijentom Srednjeg vijeka. Sada živimo u drugačijem svijetu sa drugačijim vrijednostima i političkim sistemima. Tako tumačenje je sasvim moguće i izvodljivo.
And there are strengths in Islamic tradition. Islam, actually, as a monotheistic religion, which defined man as a responsible agent by itself, created the idea of the individual in the Middle East, and saved it from the communitarianism, the collectivism of the tribe. You can derive many ideas from that. But besides that, I also saw problems within Islamic tradition. But one thing was curious: most of those problems turn out to be problems that emerged later, not from the very divine core of Islam, the Koran, but from, again, traditions and mentalities, or the interpretations of the Koran that Muslims made in the Middle Ages. The Koran, for example, doesn't condone stoning. There is no punishment for apostasy. There is no punishment for personal sins like drinking. These things which make Islamic law, the troubling aspects of Islamic law, were developed into later interpretations of Islam. Which means that Muslims can, today, look at those things and say, "Well, the core of our religion is here to stay with us. It's our faith, and we will be loyal to it. But we can change how it was interpreted, because it was interpreted according to the time and milieu in the Middle Ages. Now we're living in a different world, with different values and political systems." That interpretation is quite possible and feasible.
Da sam ja jedina osoba koja tako misli, onda bismo bili u nevolji. Ali to nije slučaj. Zapravo, od 19-og stoljeća pa dalje, postoji čitava revizionistička, reformistička -- nazovite je kako god -- tradicija, pravac u islamskoj misli. Bili su to intelektualci ili državnici 19-og vijeka, i kasnije, 20-og vijeka, koji su zapravo bili okrenuti ka Evropi i divili su se onome što Evropa nudi kao što su nauka i tehnologija. Ali i demokratija, parlament, ideja o predstavništvu, jednakosti među građanima. Ovi mislioci, intelektualci i državnici 19-og vijeka vidjeli su ovo u Evropi. Rekli su, "Zašto mi nemamo ovo?" Gledajući unatrag u islamsku tradiciju, vidjeli su sporne aspekte, koji nisu temelj religije, ali možda se mogu ponovo razmotriti, Kur'an se može ponovo čitati u modernom svijetu.
Now, if I were the only person thinking that way, we would be in trouble. But that's not the case at all. Actually, from the 19th century on, there's a whole revisionist, reformist -- whatever you call it -- tradition, a trend in Islamic thinking. These were intellectuals or statesmen of the 19th century, and later, 20th century, which looked at Europe, basically, and saw that Europe has many things to admire, like science and technology. But not just that; also democracy, parliament, the idea of representation, the idea of equal citizenship. These Muslim thinkers, intellectuals and statesmen of the 19th century, looked at Europe, saw these things, and said, "Why don't we have these things?" And they looked back at Islamic tradition, and saw that there are problematic aspects, but they're not the core of the religion, so maybe they can be re-understood, and the Koran can be reread in the modern world.
Taj pravac se općenito zove "Islamski modernizam", napredovao je zahvaljujući intelektualcima i državnicima, ne samo kao ideja, već i kao politički program. Zato je u 19-om stoljeću Osmansko carstvo, koje je tada pokrivalo čitavo područje Srednjeg Istoka, učinilo značajne reforme -- kao što je pružanje jednakog statusa kršćanima i jevrejima, prihvaćanje ustava, prihvaćanje parlamenta, promoviranje ideje o slobodi religije. Zato je Osmansko carstvo u svojim posljednjim desetljećima postalo proto-demokratija, ustavna monarhija. U to vrijeme sloboda je bila veoma važna politička vrijednost.
That trend is generally called Islamic modernism, and it was advanced by intellectuals and statesmen, not just as an intellectual idea, though, but also as a political program. And that's why, actually, in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which then covered the whole Middle East, made very important reforms -- reforms like giving Christians and Jews an equal citizenship status, accepting a constitution, accepting a representative parliament, advancing the idea of freedom of religion. That's why the Ottoman Empire, in its last decades, turned into a proto-democracy, a constitutional monarchy, and freedom was a very important political value at the time.
Slično, u arapskom svijetu, postojalo je nešto što veliki arapski historičar Alber Hourani naziva "Liberalno doba". Njegova knjiga se zove "Arapska misao u liberalnom dobu." On definira liberalno doba kao 19. i 20. stoljeće. Ovo je osobito bio značajan trend u ranom 20. stoljeću među islamskim misliocima, državnicima i teolozima. Ali postoji veoma zanimljiv obrazac u ostatku 20. stoljeća, jer svjedočimo brzom gubitku modernizma u Islamu. Umjesto toga, dešava se da Islamizam raste kao autoritarna ideologija, sasvim prodorna, anti-zapadnjačka, koja oblikuje društvo na osnovu utopijske vizije.
Similarly, in the Arab world, there was what the great Arab historian Albert Hourani defines as the Liberal Age. He has a book, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age," and the Liberal Age, he defines as 19th century and early 20th century. Quite notably, this was the dominant trend in the early 20th century among Islamic thinkers and statesmen and theologians. But there is a very curious pattern in the rest of the 20th century, because we see a sharp decline in this Islamic modernist line. And in place of that, what happens is that Islamism grows as an ideology which is authoritarian, which is quite strident, which is quite anti-Western, and which wants to shape society based on a utopian vision.
Stoga, Islamizam je problematična ideja koja je zapravo kreirala mnogo problema u islamskom svijetu 20. stoljeća. Čak i veoma ekstremni oblici Islamizma su doveli do terorizma u ime Islama -- što je, po mom mišljenju, čin protiv Islama, ali, očigledno, neki ekstremisti ne misle tako. Zanimljivo je pitanje: ako je islamski modernizam bio tako popularan u 19. i ranom 20. stoljeću, zašto je Islamizam postao tako popularan u ostatku 20. stoljeća? Ovo je pitanje, po mom mišljenju, o kojem se treba pažljivo raspraviti. U svojoj knjizi, tražio sam odgovor na to pitanje. Ne morate biti naučnici da biste to razumjeli. Dovoljno je da pogledate političku historiju 20. stoljeća, i vidjećete da su se stvari mnogo promijenile. Kontekst se promijenio.
So Islamism is the problematic idea that really created a lot of problems in the 20th-century Islamic world. And even the very extreme forms of Islamism led to terrorism in the name of Islam -- which is actually a practice that I think is against Islam, but some, obviously, extremists, did not think that way. But there is a curious question: If Islamic modernism was so popular in the 19th and early 20th centuries, why did Islamism become so popular in the rest of the 20th century? And this is a question, I think, which needs to be discussed carefully. In my book, I went into that question as well. And actually, you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand that. Just look at the political history of the 20th century, and you see things have changed a lot. The contexts have changed.
U 19. stoljeću, kada su muslimani vidjeli Evropu kao primjer, bili su neovisni, više samouvjereni. Početkom 20. stoljeća, padom Osmanskog carstva, cijeli Srednji Istok bio je koloniziran. A šta dolazi sa kolonizacijom? Anti-kolonizacija. Evropa nije samo primjer koji treba oponašati; već neprijatelj protiv kojeg se treba boriti. Dolazi do veoma naglog slabljenja liberalnih ideja u muslimanskom svijetu, to je veoma odbrambeni, kruti, nazadnjački napor, koji je doveo arape do socijalizma, arapskog nacionalizma i na koncu do islamističke ideologije. Kada se kolonijalni period završio, umjesto toga uglavnom su došli sekularni diktatori, koju su govorili da vode državu, ali nisu uvodili demokratiju, već su uspostavili svoju diktaturu. Mislim da je zapad, pogotovo neke sile sa zapada, pogotovo Sjedinjene Američke Države, napravo grešku podržavajući te diktatore, misleći da odgovaraju njihovim interesima. Ali činjenica da su ti diktatori potisnuli demokratiju i islamske grupe iz svojih država je učinila islamiste još oštrijima.
In the 19th century, when Muslims were looking at Europe as an example, they were independent; they were more self-confident. In the early 20th century, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the whole Middle East was colonized. And when you have colonialization, what do you have? You have anti-colonialization. So Europe is not just an example now to emulate; it's an enemy to fight and to resist. So there's a very sharp decline in liberal ideas in the Muslim world, and what you see is more of a defensive, rigid, reactionary strain, which led to Arab socialism, Arab nationalism and ultimately to the Islamist ideology. And when the colonial period ended, what you had in place of that was generally secular dictators, which say they're a country, but did not bring democracy to the country, and established their own dictatorship. And I think the West, at least some powers in the West, particularly the United States, made the mistake of supporting those secular dictators, thinking that they were more helpful for their interests. But the fact that those dictators suppressed democracy in their country and suppressed Islamic groups in their country actually made the Islamists much more strident.
Stoga u 20. stoljeću, u arapskom svijetu postojao je začarani krug gdje je diktatura potisla vlastiti narod uključujući pobožne islamiste, koji su reagovali na nazadnjački način. Ipak bila je jedna zemlja koja je uspjela pobjeći iz tog začaranog kruga. To je zemlja iz koje ja dolazim; Turska. Turska nikada nije bila kolonizirana, ostala je kao nezavisna zemlja nakon pada Osmanskog Carstva. To treba imati na umu. Oni nisu sprovodili anti-kolonijalnu kampanju kao druge zemlje regiona. Drugo, i najvažnije, Turska je postala demokratija ranije nego bilo koje druge zemlje o kojima govorimo. Godine 1950. u Turskoj je održan prvi slobodan i pravedan izbor, koji je okončao apsolutistički sekularni režim, i koji je značio početak Turske. Pobožni muslimani u Turskoj vidjeli su da mogu promijeniti politički sistem glasanjem. Shvatili su da je demokratija u skladu sa Islamom, s njihovim vrijednostima, i oni su podržavali demokratiju. To je iskustvo koje nisu svi muslimani Srednjeg Istoka imali sve do nedavno.
So in the 20th century, you had this vicious cycle in the Arab world, where you have a dictatorship suppressing its own people, including the Islamic pious, and they're reacting in reactionary ways. There was one country, though, which was able to escape or stay away from that vicious cycle. And that's the country where I come from, Turkey. Turkey has never been colonized, so it remained as an independent nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That's one thing to remember; it did not share the same anti-colonial hype that you can find in some other countries in the region. Secondly, and most importantly, Turkey became a democracy earlier than any of the countries we are talking about. In 1950, Turkey had the first free and fair elections, which ended the more autocratic secular regime, which was in the beginning of Turkey. And the pious Muslims in Turkey saw that they could change the political system by voting. And they realized that democracy is something compatible with Islam, compatible with their values, and they've been supportive of democracy. That's an experience that not every other Muslim nation in the Middle East had, until very recently.
Drugo, u posljednje dvije decenije, zahvaljujući globalizaciji i tržišnoj ekonomiji, zahvaljujući usponu srednje klase, u Turskoj svjedočimo ponovnom rađanju islamskog modernizma. Postoji urbanija srednja klasa pobožnih muslimana koji, opet, gledaju u svoju tradiciju i vide da postoje određeni problemi. Shvataju da se moraju promijeniti, ispitati i poboljšati. Vide Evropu kao primjer koji treba slijediti. Vide barem primjer koji će ih inspirisati. Zato je E.U. proces, trud Turske da se prikljući Evropskoj Uniji, bio podržan unutar Turske od strane pobožnih vjernika, dok su neke sekularne nacije bile protiv. Taj proces je bio malo zamagljen činjenicom da nisu svi Evropljani tako gostoljubivi -- ali to je za neku drugu diskusiju. Ali naklonost ulasku Turske u E.U. u prošloj deceniji je postao skoro pa islamski cilj, i podržan od strane islamskih liberala i seukularnih liberala, također.
Secondly, in the past two decades, thanks to globalization, thanks to the market economy, thanks to the rise of a middle class, we in Turkey see what I define as a rebirth of Islamic modernism. Now, there's the more urban middle-class pious Muslims who, again, look at their tradition and see that there are some problems in the tradition, and understand that they need to be changed and questioned and reformed. And they look at Europe, and see an example, again, to follow. They see an example, at least, to take some inspiration from. That's why the EU process, Turkey's effort to join the EU, has been supported inside Turkey by the Islamic pious, while some secular nationalists were against it. Well, that process has been a little bit blurred by the fact that not all Europeans are that welcoming, but that's another discussion. But the pro-EU sentiment in Turkey in the past decade has become almost an Islamic cause and supported by the Islamic liberals and the secular liberals as well, of course.
Zahvaljujući tome, Turska je mogla napraviti uspješnu priču u kojoj su Islam i najpobožnija shvatanja Islama postali dio demokratske igre, i čak doprinelii demokratskom i ekonomskom napretku zemlje. Ovo je sada inspirativni primjer jednog islamskog pokreta ili neke od zemalja iz arapskog svijeta.
And thanks to that, Turkey has been able to reasonably create a success story in which Islam and the most pious understandings of Islam have become part of the democratic game, and even contributes to the democratic and economic advance of the country. And this has been an inspiring example right now for some of the Islamic movements or some of the countries in the Arab world.
Svi ste vidjeli arapsko proljeće, koje je počelo u Tunisu i u Egiptu. Arapske mase su se protivile svojim diktatorima. Tražili su demokratiju; tražili su slobodu. Nisu ispali islamistička strašila koje su njihovi diktatori koristili da opravdaju svoj režim. Rekli su, "Želimo slobodu, želimo demokratiju. Mi smo muslimani, ali želimo da živimo kao slobodni ljudi u slobodnim društvima." Naravno, ovo je dug put. Demokratija se ne postiže preko noći; to je proces. Ali ovo je era koja obećava u muslimanskom svijetu.
You must have all seen the Arab Spring, which began in Tunis and in Egypt. Arab masses just revolted against their dictators. They were asking for democracy; they were asking for freedom. And they did not turn out to be the Islamist boogeyman that the dictators were always using to justify their regime. They said, "We want freedom; we want democracy. We are Muslim believers, but we want to be living as free people in free societies." Of course, this is a long road. Democracy is not an overnight achievement; it's a process. But this is a promising era in the Muslim world.
Ja vjerujem da se islamski modernizam koji je počeo u 19. stoljeću, ali je nazadovao u 20. stoljeću zbog političkih teškoća u muslimanskom svijetu, sada ponovo rađa. Mislim da bi oproštajna poruka bila da Islam, uprkos nekim skepticima sa zapada, ima potencijal da stvori svoj put ka demokratiji, ka liberalizmu, da stvori svoj put ka slobodi. Samo im treba dozvoliti da to i postignu.
And I believe that the Islamic modernism which began in the 19th century, but which had a setback in the 20th century because of the political troubles of the Muslim world, is having a rebirth. And I think the takeaway message from that would be that Islam, despite some of the skeptics in the West, has the potential in itself to create its own way to democracy, create its own way to liberalism, create its own way to freedom. They just should be allowed to work for that.
Hvala.
Thanks so much.
(Aplauz)
(Applause)