The two most likely largest inventions of our generation are the Internet and the mobile phone. They've changed the world. However, largely to our surprise, they also turned out to be the perfect tools for the surveillance state. It turned out that the capability to collect data, information and connections about basically any of us and all of us is exactly what we've been hearing throughout of the summer through revelations and leaks about Western intelligence agencies, mostly U.S. intelligence agencies, watching over the rest of the world.
Dva najvjerojatnije najveća izuma naše generacije su internet i mobilni telefon. Promijenili su svijet. No, na naše veliko iznenađenje, pokazali se se i kao savršena oruđa sustava za nadziranje. Pokazalo se da je mogućnost prikupljanja podataka, informacija i veza o ikome i svakome od nas upravo ono o čemu smo slušali tijekom ljeta kroz otkrivanja i curenja informacija o zapadnjačkim obavještajnim službama, većinom službama SAD-a, koje promatraju ostatak svijeta.
We've heard about these starting with the revelations from June 6. Edward Snowden started leaking information, top secret classified information, from the U.S. intelligence agencies, and we started learning about things like PRISM and XKeyscore and others. And these are examples of the kinds of programs U.S. intelligence agencies are running right now, against the whole rest of the world.
O tome slušamo počevši od događaja koji su se zbili 6. lipnja. Edward Snowden počeo je otkrivati informacije, označene kao strogo povjerljive informacije, iz obavještajnih službi SAD-a, i mi smo saznali da postoje programi poput Prizme (PRISM) XKeyscorea i drugih. Ovo su primjeri programa koje upravo sada provode obavještajne službe SAD-a, protiv cijelog ostatka svijeta.
And if you look back about the forecasts on surveillance by George Orwell, well it turns out that George Orwell was an optimist. (Laughter) We are right now seeing a much larger scale of tracking of individual citizens than he could have ever imagined.
Ako se osvrnete na predviđanja koja je George Orwell imao o nadziranju, ispostavilo se da je George Orwell bio optimist. (Smijeh) Sada vidimo mnogo višu razinu praćenja pojedinačnih građana nego što smo to uopće mogli zamisliti.
And this here is the infamous NSA data center in Utah. Due to be opened very soon, it will be both a supercomputing center and a data storage center. You could basically imagine it has a large hall filled with hard drives storing data they are collecting. And it's a pretty big building. How big? Well, I can give you the numbers -- 140,000 square meters -- but that doesn't really tell you very much. Maybe it's better to imagine it as a comparison. You think about the largest IKEA store you've ever been in. This is five times larger. How many hard drives can you fit in an IKEA store? Right? It's pretty big. We estimate that just the electricity bill for running this data center is going to be in the tens of millions of dollars a year. And this kind of wholesale surveillance means that they can collect our data and keep it basically forever, keep it for extended periods of time, keep it for years, keep it for decades. And this opens up completely new kinds of risks to us all. And what this is is that it is wholesale blanket surveillance on everyone.
Ovo ovdje je zloglasni NSA podatkovni centar u Uti. Planira se otvoriti vrlo skoro, i to će biti ujedno i centar sa superkompjuterom i centar za pohranu podataka. Možete zamisliti da ima veliku dvoranu prepunu hard drive pogona za pohranu podataka koje prikupljaju. A to je jako velika zgrada. Koliko velika? Pa, mogu vam iznijeti neke brojke - 140.000 kvadratnih metara -- no to vam ne govori puno. Možda je bolje da je zamislimo u nekoj usporedbi. Zamislite najveći Ikein dućan u kojem ste ikada bili. Ovo je pet puta veće. Koliko hard driva stane u Ikein dućan? Zar ne? Jako je veliko. Procjenjujemo da će samo račun za struju koja će prokretati ovaj podatkovni centar iznositi desetke milijuna dolara godišnje. Ovakva vrsta velenadziranja znači da oni mogu prikupljati naše podatke i zapravo ih čuvati zauvijek, čuvati ih na dulja vremenska razdoblja, godinama, desetljećima. To donosi posve nove vrste rizika za sve nas. Ovo je zapravo sveobuhvatno velenadziranje svih nas.
Well, not exactly everyone, because the U.S. intelligence only has a legal right to monitor foreigners. They can monitor foreigners when foreigners' data connections end up in the United States or pass through the United States. And monitoring foreigners doesn't sound too bad until you realize that I'm a foreigner and you're a foreigner. In fact, 96 percent of the planet are foreigners.
Pa, ne baš sasvim svih, budući da SAD-ovo nadziranje samo ima zakonsko pravo nadzirati strance. Mogu nadzirati strance kada podatkovne veze stranaca završe u SAD-u ili prođu kroz SAD. I nadziranje stranaca ne zvuči jako loše dok ne shvatite da sam ja stranac i da si ti stranac. Zapravu, 96 posto planeta su stranci.
(Laughter)
(Smijeh)
Right?
Zar ne?
So it is wholesale blanket surveillance of all of us, all of us who use telecommunications and the Internet.
Tako da je to sveobuhvatno velenadziranje svih nas, svih nas koji koristimo telekomunikacije i internet.
But don't get me wrong: There are actually types of surveillance that are okay. I love freedom, but even I agree that some surveillance is fine. If the law enforcement is trying to find a murderer, or they're trying to catch a drug lord or trying to prevent a school shooting, and they have leads and they have suspects, then it's perfectly fine for them to tap the suspect's phone, and to intercept his Internet communications. I'm not arguing that at all, but that's not what programs like PRISM are about. They are not about doing surveillance on people that they have reason to suspect of some wrongdoings. They're about doing surveillance on people they know are innocent.
No, nemojte me krivo shvatiti. Postoje vrste nadzora koje su uredu. Volim slobodu, no čak se i ja slažem da je neko nadziranje uredu. Ako policija pokušava pronaći ubojicu, ili pokušava uhvatiti narkobossa, ili pokušava spriječiti pucnjavu u školi, i ima informacije i osumnjičenike, onda je sasvim uredu da prisluškuju osumnjičenikov telefon i da presreću njegovu komunikaciju na internetu. Ne govorim protiv toga, no time se ne bave programi poput Prizme. Oni ne nadziru ljude za koje imaju razlog sumnjati za kriminalna djela. Oni se bave nadziranjem ljudi za koje znaju da su nedužni.
So the four main arguments supporting surveillance like this, well, the first of all is that whenever you start discussing about these revelations, there will be naysayers trying to minimize the importance of these revelations, saying that we knew all this already, we knew it was happening, there's nothing new here. And that's not true. Don't let anybody tell you that we knew this already, because we did not know this already. Our worst fears might have been something like this, but we didn't know this was happening. Now we know for a fact it's happening. We didn't know about this. We didn't know about PRISM. We didn't know about XKeyscore. We didn't know about Cybertrans. We didn't know about DoubleArrow. We did not know about Skywriter -- all these different programs run by U.S. intelligence agencies. But now we do.
Četiri glavna argumenta koji podupiru ovakvo nadziranje su: prvo, da kad god počnete raspravljati o ovakvim otkrićima pojavit će se poricatelji koji će pokušati umanjiti važnost tih otkrića, tvrdeći da smo sve to već znali, znali smo da se to događa, ništa novog. A to nije istina. Ne dajte da vam itko govori da smo to već znali, jer to nismo znali. Naši najveći strahovi su možda uključivali ovakvo nešto, no nismo znali da se to događa. Sada zaista znamo da se to događa. Nismo znali za to. Nismo znali za Prizmu. Nismo znali za XKeyscore. Nismo znali za Cybertrans. Nismo znali za DoubleArrow. Nismo znali za Skywriter -- sve ove različite programe koje provode obavještajne službe SAD-a. No sada znamo.
And we did not know that U.S. intelligence agencies go to extremes such as infiltrating standardization bodies to sabotage encryption algorithms on purpose. And what that means is that you take something which is secure, an encryption algorithm which is so secure that if you use that algorithm to encrypt one file, nobody can decrypt that file. Even if they take every single computer on the planet just to decrypt that one file, it's going to take millions of years. So that's basically perfectly safe, uncrackable. You take something which is that good and then you weaken it on purpose, making all of us less secure as an end result. A real-world equivalent would be that intelligence agencies would force some secret pin code into every single house alarm so they could get into every single house because, you know, bad people might have house alarms, but it will also make all of us less secure as an end result. Backdooring encryption algorithms just boggles the mind. But of course, these intelligence agencies are doing their job. This is what they have been told to do: do signals intelligence, monitor telecommunications, monitor Internet traffic. That's what they're trying to do, and since most, a very big part of the Internet traffic today is encrypted, they're trying to find ways around the encryption. One way is to sabotage encryption algorithms, which is a great example about how U.S. intelligence agencies are running loose. They are completely out of control, and they should be brought back under control.
Niti smo znali da obavještajne službe SAD-a idu do te krajnosti da se, na primjer, ubace u standardizacijska tijela kako bi namjerno sabotirali algoritme šifriranja. Što to znači je to da uzmete nešto što je zaštićeno, algoritam šifriranja koji je tako zaštićen da ako ga upotrijebite za šifriranje jednog dokumenta, nitko ga ne može odšifrirati. Čak i ako uzmu apsolutno svako računalo na planeti, samo da dešifriraju taj jedan dokument, za to će trebati milijuni godina. To zapravo znači savršeno sigurno, neprobojno. Uzmete nešto tako dobro i onda to namjerno oslabite, čineći sve nas manje sigurnima kao krajnji rezultat toga. Stvarni ekvivalent toga bilo bi to da obavještajne službe uvedu neku tajnu šifru u svaki kućni alarm kako bi mogle mogle ući u svaku kuću jer, znate, i zli ljudi bi mogli imati kućne alarme, no to će ujedno i sve nas učiniti manje sigurnima. Neovlašteno rukovanje algoritmima šifriranja jednostavno je zaprepašćujuće. Ali naravno, te obavještajne službe rade svoj posao. To im je rečeno da rade: prikupljati podatke putem signala, nadzirati telekomunikacije, nadzirati internetski promet. To oni pokušavaju raditi, a budući da je danas veliki dio intenetskog prometa šifriran, pokušavaju pronaći načine kako zobići šifre. Jedan od načina je da sabotiraju algoritme šifriranja, što je odličan primjer toga kako su SAD-ove obavještajne službe puštene s lanca. Potpuno su izvan kontrole, i trebalo bi ih se vratiti pod kontrolu.
So what do we actually know about the leaks? Everything is based on the files leaked by Mr. Snowden. The very first PRISM slides from the beginning of June detail a collection program where the data is collected from service providers, and they actually go and name the service providers they have access to. They even have a specific date on when the collection of data began for each of the service providers. So for example, they name the collection from Microsoft started on September 11, 2007, for Yahoo on the March 12, 2008, and then others: Google, Facebook, Skype, Apple and so on.
Što točno znamo o tom curenju tajnih podataka? Sve se temelji na dokumentima koje je otkrio g. Snowden. Prvi slajdovi Prizme s početka lipnja detaljno iznose program za prikupljanje, gdje se podaci prikupljaju od davatelja usluga, i oni zapravo imenuju davatelje usluga kojima imaju pristup. Čak imaju i točno određeni datum kada je počelo prikupljanje podataka za svaki od tih davatelja usluga. Na primjer, navode prikupljanje od Microsofta koje je započelo 11. rujna 2007, za Yahoo 12. ožujka 2008, a potom i ostale: Google, Facebook, Skype, Apple i tako dalje.
And every single one of these companies denies. They all say that this simply isn't true, that they are not giving backdoor access to their data. Yet we have these files. So is one of the parties lying, or is there some other alternative explanation? And one explanation would be that these parties, these service providers, are not cooperating. Instead, they've been hacked. That would explain it. They aren't cooperating. They've been hacked. In this case, they've been hacked by their own government. That might sound outlandish, but we already have cases where this has happened, for example, the case of the Flame malware which we strongly believe was authored by the U.S. government, and which, to spread, subverted the security of the Windows Update network, meaning here, the company was hacked by their own government. And there's more evidence supporting this theory as well. Der Spiegel, from Germany, leaked more information about the operations run by the elite hacker units operating inside these intelligence agencies. Inside NSA, the unit is called TAO, Tailored Access Operations, and inside GCHQ, which is the U.K. equivalent, it's called NAC, Network Analysis Centre. And these recent leaks of these three slides detail an operation run by this GCHQ intelligence agency from the United Kingdom targeting a telecom here in Belgium. And what this really means is that an E.U. country's intelligence agency is breaching the security of a telecom of a fellow E.U. country on purpose, and they discuss it in their slides completely casually, business as usual. Here's the primary target, here's the secondary target, here's the teaming. They probably have a team building on Thursday evening in a pub. They even use cheesy PowerPoint clip art like, you know, "Success," when they gain access to services like this. What the hell?
A svaka od tih tvrtki to poriče. Sve tvrde da to nije istina, da ne daju neovlašten pristup svojim podacima. No, svejedno imamo te dokumente. Laže li onda jedna od strana, ili postoji neko drugo objašnjenje? Jedno od objašnjenja bilo bi to da te strane, ti davatelji usluga, ne surađuju. Umjesto toga su bili hakirani. To bi sve objasnilo. Ne surađuju. Bili su hakirani. U tom slučaju, hakirala ih je vlastita vlada. To možda zvuči neobično, no već postoje slučajevi kada se to dogodilo. Na primjer, slučaj zloćudnog softvera Flame za kojeg odlučno tvrdimo da ga je stvorila vlada SAD-a, i koji je, da bi se proširio, srušio zaštitu Windows Update mreže, što znači da je tvrtku hakirala vlastita vlada. I postoji još dokaza koji potkrepljuju ovu teoriju. Njemački list Der Spiegel procurio je još informacija o aktivnostima koje vode elitni hakerski odjeli koji djeluju unutar tih obavještajnih službi. Unutar NSA odjel se zove TAO, "Tailored Access Operations" (Operacije za usklađeni pristup), a unutar GCHQ, koji je britanski ekvivalent NSA, zove se NAC, "Network Analysis Centre" (Centar za analizu mreže). Ovo nedavno razotkrivanje triju slajdova Prizme detaljno prikazuje operacije koje provodi ta obavještajna služba GCWQ iz Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva ciljajući na telekominikacije ovdje u Belgiji. Što to zaista znači je da obavještajna služba jedne članice EU probija zaštitu telekomunikacija druge članice EU namjerno, a na tim slajdovima o tome govore sasvim ležerno, ništa posebno. "Ovo je primarna meta, ovo je sekundarna meta, ovo je udruženje." Vjerojatno imaju team building četvrtom navečer u pubu. Čak koriste neukusne Power Point crteže poput "Uspjeh," kada dobiju pristup takvim uslugama. Koji vrag?
And then there's the argument that okay, yes, this might be going on, but then again, other countries are doing it as well. All countries spy. And maybe that's true. Many countries spy, not all of them, but let's take an example. Let's take, for example, Sweden. I'm speaking of Sweden because Sweden has a little bit of a similar law to the United States. When your data traffic goes through Sweden, their intelligence agency has a legal right by the law to intercept that traffic. All right, how many Swedish decisionmakers and politicians and business leaders use, every day, U.S.-based services, like, you know, run Windows or OSX, or use Facebook or LinkedIn, or store their data in clouds like iCloud or Skydrive or DropBox, or maybe use online services like Amazon web services or sales support? And the answer is, every single Swedish business leader does that every single day. And then we turn it around. How many American leaders use Swedish webmails and cloud services? And the answer is zero. So this is not balanced. It's not balanced by any means, not even close.
A tu je i argument da, uredu, to se možda događa, ali i druge države rade to isto. Sve države špijuniraju. I to je možda točno. Mnoge države špijuniraju, ne sve, no uzmimo primjer. Uzmimo, na primjer, Švedsku. Govorim o Švedskoj jer ona ima zakone slične onima u SAD-a. Kada vaš podatkovni promet prolazi kroz Švedsku, njihova obavještajna služba ima zakonsko pravo presretati taj promet. U redu, koliko švedskih donositelja odluka i političara i poslovnih vođa svakodnevno koriste usluge koje dolaze iz SAD-a, poput, Windowsa ili OSX-a, ili koriste Facebook ili LinkedIn, ili pohranjuju svoje podatke u oblacima poput iClouda ili Skydrivea ili DropBoxa, ili koriste internetske servise poput Amazona ili one za podršku prodaje? A odgovor je: svaki švedski poslovni vođa to čini svakog dana. A onda to preokrenemo. Koliko američkih vođa koriste švedske e-pošte na internetu i "cloud" usluge? Odgovor je nula. To nije usklađeno. Nema ravnoteže ni u kom pogledu. Ni približno.
And when we do have the occasional European success story, even those, then, typically end up being sold to the United States. Like, Skype used to be secure. It used to be end-to-end encrypted. Then it was sold to the United States. Today, it no longer is secure. So once again, we take something which is secure and then we make it less secure on purpose, making all of us less secure as an outcome.
A i kada se povremeno pojavi neka priča o uspjehu u Europi, čak i te priče tipično završe tako da su prodane SAD-u. Poput Skypea koji je nekoć bio siguran. Bio je potpuno šifriran. A zatim je bio prodan SAD-u. Danas više nije siguran. I tako opet, uzmemo nešto što je sigurno i zatim to namjerno učinimo manje sigurnim, čineći sve nas manje sigurnima, kao krajnji rezultat.
And then the argument that the United States is only fighting terrorists. It's the war on terror. You shouldn't worry about it. Well, it's not the war on terror. Yes, part of it is war on terror, and yes, there are terrorists, and they do kill and maim, and we should fight them, but we know through these leaks that they have used the same techniques to listen to phone calls of European leaders, to tap the email of residents of Mexico and Brazil, to read email traffic inside the United Nations Headquarters and E.U. Parliament, and I don't think they are trying to find terrorists from inside the E.U. Parliament, right? It's not the war on terror. Part of it might be, and there are terrorists, but are we really thinking about terrorists as such an existential threat that we are willing to do anything at all to fight them? Are the Americans ready to throw away the Constituion and throw it in the trash just because there are terrorists? And the same thing with the Bill of Rights and all the amendments and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the E.U. conventions on human rights and fundamental freedoms and the press freedom? Do we really think terrorism is such an existential threat, we are ready to do anything at all?
Zatim, argument da se SAD samo bori protiv terorista. Rat protiv terora. Ne biste se trebali brinuti oko toga. Pa, ne radi se o ratu protiv terora. Da, djelomice to jest rat protiv terora, i da, postoje teroristi, i oni ubijaju i sakate, i trebali bismo se boriti protiv njih, no, zbog ovih curenja informacija znamo da su iste metode koristili za prisluškivanje telefonskih poziva europskih vođa, za presretanje emailova stanovnika Meksika i Brazila, za čitanje email prometa unutar Sjedišta Ujedinjenih naroda i Europskog parlamenta, i nemojte misliti da pokušavaju pronaći teroriste unutar EU parlamenta. To nije rat protiv terorizma. Djelomično možda jest, i istina je da postoje teroristi, no gledamo li mi na teroriste kao takvu egzistencijalnu prijetnju da smo spremni učiniti bilo što kako bismo se borili protiv njih? Jesu li Amerikanci spremni odbaciti svoj ustav i baciti ga u smeće samo zbog toga što ima terorista? I ista stvar je s Poveljom o pravima i svim amandmanima i Općom deklaracijom o pravima čovjeka i europskim konvencijama o ljudskim pravima i temeljnim slobodama i slobodi tiska. Mislimo li zaista da je terorizam takva egzistencijalna prijetnja da smo spremni učiniti bilo što?
But people are scared about terrorists, and then they think that maybe that surveillance is okay because they have nothing to hide. Feel free to survey me if that helps. And whoever tells you that they have nothing to hide simply hasn't thought about this long enough.
No, ljudi se boje terorista, i zato misle da je nadziranje možda u redu jer nemaju razloga da išta skrivaju. "Slobodno me nadziri ako to pomaže." Tko god vam kaže da nema što skrivati jednostavno nije dovoljno dugo o ovome promislio.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)
Because we have this thing called privacy, and if you really think that you have nothing to hide, please make sure that's the first thing you tell me, because then I know that I should not trust you with any secrets, because obviously you can't keep a secret. But people are brutally honest with the Internet, and when these leaks started, many people were asking me about this. And I have nothing to hide. I'm not doing anything bad or anything illegal. Yet, I have nothing that I would in particular like to share with an intelligence agency, especially a foreign intelligence agency. And if we indeed need a Big Brother, I would much rather have a domestic Big Brother than a foreign Big Brother. And when the leaks started, the very first thing I tweeted about this was a comment about how, when you've been using search engines, you've been potentially leaking all that to U.S. intelligence. And two minutes later, I got a reply by somebody called Kimberly from the United States challenging me, like, why am I worried about this? What am I sending to worry about this? Am I sending naked pictures or something? And my answer to Kimberly was that what I'm sending is none of your business, and it should be none of your government's business either. Because that's what it's about. It's about privacy. Privacy is nonnegotiable. It should be built in to all the systems we use.
Jer postoji nešto što se zove privatnost, i ako zaista mislite da nemate ništa skrivati, pobrinite se da je to prvo što ćete mi reći, jer onda znam da vam ne smijem povjeriti nikakve tajne, jer očigledno ne znate čuvati tajnu. No, ljudi su brutalno iskreni s internetom, i kada su ove informacije počele curiti, mnogi su me pitali o tome. Nemam što skrivati. Ne radim ništa loše ili nezakonito. No, nemam ništa što bih posebno volio podijeliti s obavještajnom službom, posebice stranom obavještajnom službom. I ako nam je zaista potreban Veliki Brat, radije bih imao domaćeg Velikog Brata nego stranog Velikog Brata. Kada su informacije počele curiti, prva stvar o kojoj sam tweetao bila je komentar o tome kako, kada koristimo internetske tražilice, potencijalno dajemo o tome informacije obavještajcima iz SAD-a. Dvije minute nakon toga dobio sam odgovor od Kimberly iz SAD-a, koja mi se usprotivila i pitala zašto se brinem oko toga? Što ja to šaljem da se brinem oko toga? Šaljem li gole slike? Moj odgovor Kimberly bio je da ono što ja šaljem je se ne tiče, i da se ne bi trebalo ticati ni njene vlade. Jer o tome se i radi. O privatnosti. Privatnost je beskompromisna. Trebala bi biti ugrađena u sve sustave koje koristimo.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)
And one thing we should all understand is that we are brutally honest with search engines. You show me your search history, and I'll find something incriminating or something embarrassing there in five minutes. We are more honest with search engines than we are with our families. Search engines know more about you than your family members know about you. And this is all the kind of information we are giving away, we are giving away to the United States.
Jedna stvar koju bismo svi trebali razumjeti je da smo brutalno iskreni s internetskim tražilicama. Pokažite mi povijest svoje tražilice i pronaći ću nešto inkriminirajuće ili nešto sramotno u pet minuta. Iskreniji smo s tražilicama nego s našim obiteljima. Tražilice znaju više o vama nego članovi vaše obitelji. A to su sve informacije koje dajemo, dajemo ih SAD-u.
And surveillance changes history. We know this through examples of corrupt presidents like Nixon. Imagine if he would have had the kind of surveillance tools that are available today. And let me actually quote the president of Brazil, Ms. Dilma Rousseff. She was one of the targets of NSA surveillance. Her email was read, and she spoke at the United Nations Headquarters, and she said, "If there is no right to privacy, there can be no true freedom of expression and opinion, and therefore, there can be no effective democracy."
Nadziranje mijenja povijest. Znamo to kroz primjere korumpiranih predsjednika, poput Nixona. Zamislite da smo tada imali takve alate za nadziranje kakve imamo danas. Dopustite mi da citiram predsjednicu Brazila, gđu. Dilmu Rousseff. Ona je bila jedna od meta koje je nadzirala NSA. Čitali su njezinu epoštu, a ona je držala govor u Sjedištu Ujedinjenih naroda, i rekla je, "Ako ne postoji pravo na privatnost, ne može postojati niti istinska sloboda izražavanja i mišljenja i stoga ne može postojati ni djelotvorna demokracija."
That's what it's about. Privacy is the building block of our democracies. And to quote a fellow security researcher, Marcus Ranum, he said that the United States is right now treating the Internet as it would be treating one of its colonies. So we are back to the age of colonization, and we, the foreign users of the Internet, we should think about Americans as our masters.
O tome se radi. Privatnost je sastavni dio naših demokracija. Da citiram kolegu istraživača sigurnosti, Marcusa Ranuma, rekao je da se SAD odnosi prema internetu kao što bi se odnosio prema jednoj od svojih kolonija. Tako smo se vratili u doba kolonizacije, a mi, strani korisnici interneta, trebali bismo gledati na Amerikance kao na naše gospodare.
So Mr. Snowden, he's been blamed for many things. Some are blaming him for causing problems for the U.S. cloud industry and software companies with these revelations -- and blaming Snowden for causing problems for the U.S. cloud industry would be the equivalent of blaming Al Gore for causing global warming.
G. Snowdena se krivi za razne stvari. Neki ga krive za izazivanje problema za američku "cloud" industriju i softverske tvrtke s ovim otkrićima -- a kriviti Snowdena za izazivanje problema za američku "cloud" industriju bilo bi ekvivalentno tome da krivimo Ala Gorea za izazivanje globalnog zatopljenja.
(Laughter)
(Smijeh)
(Applause)
(Pljesak)
So, what is there to be done? Should we worry. No, we shouldn't worry. We should be angry, because this is wrong, and it's rude, and it should not be done. But that's not going to really change the situation. What's going to change the situation for the rest of the world is to try to steer away from systems built in the United States. And that's much easier said than done. How do you do that? A single country, any single country in Europe cannot replace and build replacements for the U.S.-made operating systems and cloud services.
I što se onda može učiniti? Bismo li se trebali brinuti? Ne, ne bismo se trebali brinuti. Trebali bismo biti ljuti, jer je ovo loše, i ružno, i ne bi se smjelo činiti. No to neće zaista promijeniti situaciju. Ono što će promijeniti situaciju za ostatak svijeta je pokušaj da se udalji od sustava izgrađenih u SAD-u. A to je mnogo lakše reći nego učiniti. Kako to napraviti? Jedna država, bilo koja pojedinačna država u Europi ne može zamijeniti i izgraditi nadomjestke za američke operacijske sustave i "cloud" usluge.
But maybe you don't have to do it alone. Maybe you can do it together with other countries. The solution is open source. By building together open, free, secure systems, we can go around such surveillance, and then one country doesn't have to solve the problem by itself. It only has to solve one little problem. And to quote a fellow security researcher, Haroon Meer, one country only has to make a small wave, but those small waves together become a tide, and the tide will lift all the boats up at the same time, and the tide we will build with secure, free, open-source systems, will become the tide that will lift all of us up and above the surveillance state.
No možda to ne mora napraviti sama. Možda to može napraviti zajedno s ostalim državama. Rješenje je otvoreni kod. Gradeći zajedno otvorene, slobodne, sigurne sustave, možemo zaobići takva nadziranja, i tada jedna država ne treba sama rješavati problem. Treba samo rješiti jedan mali problem. Da citiram kolegu istražitelja sigurnosti, Haroona Meera, jedna država treba samo napraviti maleni val, no ti maleni valovi zajedno postaju plima, a plima će istovremeno podići sve brodice, i plima koju ćemo izgraditi sa sigurnim, slobodnim sustavima otvorenog koda postat će plima koja će nas sve podići iznad sustava nadziranja.
Thank you very much.
Hvala vam najljepša.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)