Have you ever asked yourselves why it is that companies, the really cool companies, the innovative ones, the creative, new economy-type companies -- Apple, Google, Facebook -- are coming out of one particular country, the United States of America? Usually when I say this, someone says, "Spotify! That's Europe." But, yeah. It has not had the impact that these other companies have had.
Jeste li se ikada zapitali kako to da kompanije, zaista kul kompanije, one inovativne, kreativne, kompanije za nove ekonomije - Epl, Gugl, Fejsbuk - dolaze iz jedne određene države, Sjedinjenih Američkih Država? Obično kada to kažem, neko kaže: "Spotifaj! To je Evropa." Ali, da. Nije imala takav uticaj kao ove navedene kompanije.
Now what I do is I'm an economist, and I actually study the relationship between innovation and economic growth at the level of the company, the industry and the nation, and I work with policymakers worldwide, especially in the European Commission, but recently also in interesting places like China, and I can tell you that that question is on the tip of all of their tongues: Where are the European Googles? What is the secret behind the Silicon Valley growth model, which they understand is different from this old economy growth model? And what is interesting is that often, even if we're in the 21st century, we kind of come down in the end to these ideas of market versus state. It's talked about in these modern ways, but the idea is that somehow, behind places like Silicon Valley, the secret have been different types of market-making mechanisms, the private initiative, whether this be about a dynamic venture capital sector that's actually able to provide that high-risk finance to these innovative companies, the gazelles as we often call them, which traditional banks are scared of, or different types of really successful commercialization policies which actually allow these companies to bring these great inventions, their products, to the market and actually get over this really scary Death Valley period in which many companies instead fail.
Ja sam ekonomista i zapravo proučavam odnos između inovacije i ekonomskog rasta i veličine kompanije, industrije i nacije, i radim sa kreatorima politika globalno, pogotovo u Evropskoj komisiji, ali odnedavno i u interesantnim mestima poput Kine, i mogu vam reći da im je to pitanje svima na vrh jezika: Gde su evropski Guglovi? Gde je tajna iza modela rasta Silicijumske doline, za koji oni razumeju da je drugačiji od modela rasta stare ekonomije? I interesantno je da često, čak iako smo u 21. veku, na kraju nekako dođemo do tih ideja o tržištu nasuprot države. O tome se govori na moderan način, ali ideja je da nekako, iza tih mesta kao što je Silikonska dolina tajna je u različitim tipovima mehanizama pravljenja tržišta, privatnoj inicijativi, bilo da je to sektor dinamičnog investicionog kapitala koji je zapravo u stanju da obezbedi finansiranje visoko rizičnih poduhvata ovim inovativnim kompanijama, gazelama, kako ih često zovemo, kojih se tradicionalne banke plaše, ili se radi o drugim tipovima zaista uspešne politike komercijalizacije koja zapravo dopušta tim kompanijama da iznesu te velike inovacije, svoje proizvode, na tržište i zaista prevaziđu taj stvarno strašni period "Doline smrti" tokom kojeg mnoge kompanije zapravo propadnu.
But what really interests me, especially nowadays and because of what's happening politically around the world, is the language that's used, the narrative, the discourse, the images, the actual words. So we often are presented with the kind of words like that the private sector is also much more innovative because it's able to think out of the box. They are more dynamic. Think of Steve Jobs' really inspirational speech to the 2005 graduating class at Stanford, where he said to be innovative, you've got to stay hungry, stay foolish. Right? So these guys are kind of the hungry and foolish and colorful guys, right? And in places like Europe, it might be more equitable, we might even be a bit better dressed and eat better than the U.S., but the problem is this damn public sector. It's a bit too big, and it hasn't actually allowed these things like dynamic venture capital and commercialization to actually be able to really be as fruitful as it could. And even really respectable newspapers, some that I'm actually subscribed to, the words they use are, you know, the state as this Leviathan. Right? This monster with big tentacles. They're very explicit in these editorials. They say, "You know, the state, it's necessary to fix these little market failures when you have public goods or different types of negative externalities like pollution, but you know what, what is the next big revolution going to be after the Internet? We all hope it might be something green, or all of this nanotech stuff, and in order for that stuff to happen," they say -- this was a special issue on the next industrial revolution -- they say, "the state, just stick to the basics, right? Fund the infrastructure. Fund the schools. Even fund the basic research, because this is popularly recognized, in fact, as a big public good which private companies don't want to invest in, do that, but you know what? Leave the rest to the revolutionaries." Those colorful, out-of-the-box kind of thinkers. They're often called garage tinkerers, because some of them actually did some things in garages, even though that's partly a myth. And so what I want to do with you in, oh God, only 10 minutes, is to really think again this juxtaposition, because it actually has massive, massive implications beyond innovation policy, which just happens to be the area that I often talk with with policymakers. It has huge implications, even with this whole notion that we have on where, when and why we should actually be cutting back on public spending and different types of public services which, of course, as we know, are increasingly being outsourced because of this juxtaposition. Right? I mean, the reason that we need to maybe have free schools or charter schools is in order to make them more innovative without being emburdened by this heavy hand of the state curriculum, or something. So these kind of words are constantly, these juxtapositions come up everywhere, not just with innovation policy.
Ali ono što me stvarno zanima, naročito ovih dana i zbog onoga što se događa u politici širom sveta, je jezik koji se koristi, narativ, diskurs, slike, stvarne reči. Obično nam predstavljaju reči poput onih da je privatni sektor takođe mnogo inovativniji jer je u stanju da razmišlja otvoreno. Oni su dinamičniji. Pomislite na zaista inspirativan govor Stiva Džobsa klasi diplomaca 2005. na Stenfordu, gde je rekao da biti inovitivan, znači ostati gladan, ostati luckast. Tako je? Dakle, ti momci su nekako gladni i luckasti i šareni momci, je li? A u mestima poput Evrope, možda je pravednije, možda se tamo bolje oblači i bolje jede nego u SAD, ali problem je taj prokleti javni sektor. Malo je prevelik, i zapravo nije dozvolio stvarima kao što su dinamični preduzetnički kapital i komercijalizacija da istinski budu u stanju da stvarno budu plodni koliko bi mogli. I čak i veoma ugledne novine, neke na koje sam čak i pretplaćena, koriste reči kao što su, znate ono "država kao ovaj Levijatan". Zar ne? Ovi monstrumi sa velikim pipcima, oni su veoma eksplicitni u ovim uredničkim komentarima. Kažu: "Znate, država je neophodna radi popravljanja malih kvarova tržišta kada imate javna dobra, ili druge tipove negativnih spoljnih uticaja kao što je zagađenje. Ali, znate šta? Šta će činiti sledeću veliku revoluciju nakon Interneta? Svi se nadamo nečemu "zelenom", ili onim nanotehnološkim stvarima, i da bi se te stvari dogodile, kažu, a to je bila posebna priča kod sledeće industrijske revolucije, kažu: "Državo, drži se osnovnih stvari." Zar ne? "Finansiraj infrastrukturu. Finansiraj škole." Čak: "Finansiraj i bazična istraživanja, jer to je u narodu prepoznato, zapravo, kao veliko javno dobro u koje privatne kompanije ne žele da investiraju. Radi tako, ali znaš šta? Ostalo prepusti revolucionarima." Onim raznobojnim, otvorenim misliocima, oni se često nazivaju majstorima iz garaža, jer neki od njih su zaista iz garaža napravili neke stvari, iako je to delom i mit. Ono što ja želim da uradim sa vama u, o bože, samo 10 minuta, je da stvarno razmislimo o tim predrasudama, jer to zaista ima ogromne, ogromne implikacije van politike inovativnosti, koja je igrom slučaja oblast o kojoj ja često pričam sa kreatorima politika. To ima ogromne implikacije, čak i uz tu veliku konstataciju koju imamo o tome gde, kada i zašto treba zapravo da krešemo javnu potrošnju i različite vrste javnih usluga koje, naravno, kao što znamo, su povećano ustupljene drugima zbog tih pretpostavki. Zar ne? Mislim, razlog zašto treba da imamo slobodne škole ili iznajmljene škole jeste da bismo ih učinili inovativnijim bez da ih učinimo opterećujućim tom teškom rukom državnog nastavnog plana ili čime već. Tako da su te reči konstantno, te predrasude su prisutne svuda, ne samo kod politika inovativnosti.
And so to think again, there's no reason that you should believe me, so just think of some of the smartest revolutionary things that you have in your pockets and do not turn it on, but you might want to take it out, your iPhone. Ask who actually funded the really cool, revolutionary thinking-out-of-the-box things in the iPhone. What actually makes your phone a smartphone, basically, instead of a stupid phone? So the Internet, which you can surf the web anywhere you are in the world; GPS, where you can actually know where you are anywhere in the world; the touchscreen display, which makes it also a really easy-to-use phone for anybody. These are the very smart, revolutionary bits about the iPhone, and they're all government-funded. And the point is that the Internet was funded by DARPA, U.S. Department of Defense. GPS was funded by the military's Navstar program. Even Siri was actually funded by DARPA. The touchscreen display was funded by two public grants by the CIA and the NSF to two public university researchers at the University of Delaware. Now, you might be thinking, "Well, she's just said the word 'defense' and 'military' an awful lot," but what's really interesting is that this is actually true in sector after sector and department after department. So the pharmaceutical industry, which I am personally very interested in because I've actually had the fortune to study it in quite some depth, is wonderful to be asking this question about the revolutionary versus non-revolutionary bits, because each and every medicine can actually be divided up on whether it really is revolutionary or incremental. So the new molecular entities with priority rating are the revolutionary new drugs, whereas the slight variations of existing drugs -- Viagra, different color, different dosage -- are the less revolutionary ones. And it turns out that a full 75 percent of the new molecular entities with priority rating are actually funded in boring, Kafka-ian public sector labs. This doesn't mean that Big Pharma is not spending on innovation. They do. They spend on the marketing part. They spend on the D part of R&D. They spend an awful lot on buying back their stock, which is quite problematic. In fact, companies like Pfizer and Amgen recently have spent more money in buying back their shares to boost their stock price than on R&D, but that's a whole different TED Talk which one day I'd be fascinated to tell you about.
I kada ponovo razmislimo, nema razloga da mi verujete, pa pomislite na neke od najpametnijih revolucionarnih stvari koje imate u svojim džepovima i nemojte ih uključivati, već ih možda samo izvadite, vaš Ajfon. Zapitajte ko je zapravo finansirao stvarno kul, revolucionarne, otvoreno smišljene stvari u Ajfonu. Šta vaš telefon zapravo čini pametnim, u suštini, a ne glupim telefonom? Dakle, internet, kojim surfujete po internetu bilo gde da ste na svetu, GPS, kojim zapravo saznajete gde ste bilo gde u svetu, ekran na dodir, koji telefon čini lako upotrebljivim za svakoga. To su istinski pametne, revolucionarne sitnice kod Ajfona i njih je sve vlada finansirala. I suština je u tome da je i internet finansirala DARPA, Ministarstva odbrane SAD. GPS je finansirao vojni Navstar program. Čak i Siri je zapravo finansirala DARPA. Ekran na dodir su finansirala dva javna giganta, CIA i NSF (Nacionalna fondacija za nauku) za dva istraživača sa nacionalnog Univerziteta u Delaveru. Možete pomisliti: "Ma, ona je samo izgovorila reči "odbrana" i "vojska" i još štošta", ali ono što je stvarno zanimljivo je da je to istina od sektora do sektora i odeljenja do odeljenja. Tako da farmaceutska industrija, koja mene lično veoma zanima, jer sam zapravo imala sreću da je detaljno izučavam, je divna za postavljanje ovih pitanja o revolucionarnosti nasuprot nerevolucionarnog jer svaki lek se zapravo može podeliti po tome da li je zapravo revolucionaran ili postepen. Tako da dva nova molekularna entiteta sa prioritetnim rangiranjem su revolucionarni novi lekovi, dok su male varijacije postojećih lekova - Vijagra, drugačije boje, drugačije doze - manje revolucionarne. I ispada da celih 75% novih molekularnih entiteta sa prioritetnim rangiranjem je finansirano u dosadnim, kafkijanskim laboratorijama javnog sektora. To ne znači da veliki farmaceuti ne troše na inovacije. Troše. Troše na marketinški deo. Oni troše na razvojni deo istraživanja i razvoja. Oni troše strašno mnogo na otkup sopstvenih akcija što je prilično problematično. Zapravo, kompanije kao Fajzer i Amdžen nedavno su potrošile više novca na otkup sopstvenih akcija kako bi podigli cenu svojih akcija nego na razvoj i istraživanje, ali to je tema za sasvim drugu TED priču za koju bih bila oduševljena da vam je jednog dana ispričam.
Now, what's interesting in all of this is the state, in all these examples, was doing so much more than just fixing market failures. It was actually shaping and creating markets. It was funding not only the basic research, which again is a typical public good, but even the applied research. It was even, God forbid, being a venture capitalist. So these SBIR and SDTR programs, which give small companies early-stage finance have not only been extremely important compared to private venture capital, but also have become increasingly important. Why? Because, as many of us know, V.C. is actually quite short-term. They want their returns in three to five years. Innovation takes a much longer time than that, 15 to 20 years. And so this whole notion -- I mean, this is the point, right? Who's actually funding the hard stuff? Of course, it's not just the state. The private sector does a lot. But the narrative that we've always been told is the state is important for the basics, but not really providing that sort of high-risk, revolutionary thinking out of the box. In all these sectors, from funding the Internet to doing the spending, but also the envisioning, the strategic vision, for these investments, it was actually coming within the state. The nanotechnology sector is actually fascinating to study this, because the word itself, nanotechnology, came from within government.
Ono što je u svemu ovome interesantno jeste da je država, u svim tim primerima, činila toliko više od prostog popravljanja tržišnih grešaka. Ona je zapravo oblikovala i stvarala tržišta. Ona nije finansirala samo bazična istraživanja, što je opet tipično javno dobro, već i primenjena istraživanja. Čak je, ne dao bog, bila i investitor. Tako da ti SBIR i SDTR programi, koji malim kompanijama daju početna finansiranja u ranoj fazi razvoja, ne samo da su bili ekstremno važni u poređenju sa investicionim kapitalom iz privatnog sektora, već su takođe postali još važniji. Zašto? Zato što, kao što mnogi od nas znaju investicioni kapital je prilično kratkoročan. Oni svoj povrat žele u periodu od tri do pet godina. Inovacija zahteva mnogo više vremena od toga, 15 do 20 godina. I tako cela ta konstatacija, mislim u tome je suština, zar ne? Ko zapravo finansira teške stvari? Naravno, nije to samo država. Privatni sektor to takođe puno radi. Ali priča koja nam je stalno govorena kaže da je država važna za osnove, ali da zapravo ne obezbeđuje visoko rizično revolucionarno razmišljanje izvan okvira. U svim tim sektorima, od finansiranja interneta do trošenja, ali i do predviđanja, strateških vizija, za te investicije, to je zapravo dolazilo od države. Sektor nanotehnologija je zapravo fascinantan za izučavanje, jer sama reč, nanotehnologija, je potekla iz vlade.
And so there's huge implications of this. First of all, of course I'm not someone, this old-fashioned person, market versus state. What we all know in dynamic capitalism is that what we actually need are public-private partnerships. But the point is, by constantly depicting the state part as necessary but actually -- pffff -- a bit boring and often a bit dangerous kind of Leviathan, I think we've actually really stunted the possibility to build these public-private partnerships in a really dynamic way. Even the words that we often use to justify the "P" part, the public part -- well, they're both P's -- with public-private partnerships is in terms of de-risking. What the public sector did in all these examples I just gave you, and there's many more, which myself and other colleagues have been looking at, is doing much more than de-risking. It's kind of been taking on that risk. Bring it on. It's actually been the one thinking out of the box. But also, I'm sure you all have had experience with local, regional, national governments, and you're kind of like, "You know what, that Kafka-ian bureaucrat, I've met him." That whole juxtaposition thing, it's kind of there. Well, there's a self-fulfilling prophecy. By talking about the state as kind of irrelevant, boring, it's sometimes that we actually create those organizations in that way. So what we have to actually do is build these entrepreneurial state organizations. DARPA, that funded the Internet and Siri, actually thought really hard about this, how to welcome failure, because you will fail. You will fail when you innovative. One out of 10 experiments has any success. And the V.C. guys know this, and they're able to actually fund the other losses from that one success.
I otuda velike implikacije. Pre svega, naravno ja nisam neko, neka staromodna osoba, tržište nasuprot države. Ono što svi znamo u dinamičnom kapitalizmu jeste da su nam zapravo potrebna javno-privatna partnerstva. Ali suština je u tome da stalnim ukazivanjem da je država neophodna, ali zapravo - pffff - malo dosadna, i često pomalo opasna vrsta Levijatana, mislim da smo zaista zapravo zaustavili mogućnost da napravimo ta javno-privatna partnerstva na istinski dinamičan način. Čak i reči koje često koristimo da opravdamo "J" deo, javni deo - zapravo oba su na isto slovo u javno-privatnim partnerstvima su u smislu smanjenja rizika. Ono što je javni sektor uradio u svim ovim primerima koje sam vam upravo dala, i toga ima mnogo više, što smo ja i ostale kolege posmatrali, je mnogo više od smanjivanja rizika. To je i nekakvo preuzimanje rizika. Samo navalite. To je zapravo jedno razmišljanje izvan okvira. Ali istovremeno, sigurna sam da ste svi imali iskustvo sa lokalnim, regionalnim, nacionalnim vladama, i mislite: "Znate šta, kafkijanski birokrata, upoznala sam ga." Cela ta pozicija nekako je prisutna. Pa, to je proročanstvo koje se samo ispunjava. Pričajući o državi kao o nekako nevažnoj, dosadnoj, tako ponekad zapravo kreiramo te organizacije kao takve. Tako da ono što zapravo treba da uradimo jeste da izgradimo preduzetničke državne organizacije. DARPA, koja je finansirala internet i Siri, zapravo je zaista dosta razmišljala o tome kako da prihvati neuspeh, jer imaćete ga. Imaćete neuspeh kada inovirate. Jedan od 10 eksperimenata ima nekakav uspeh. I momci iz investicionog kapitala to znaju, i oni su zapravo u stanju da finansiraju ostale gubitke iz tog jednog uspeha.
And this brings me, actually, probably, to the biggest implication, and this has huge implications beyond innovation. If the state is more than just a market fixer, if it actually is a market shaper, and in doing that has had to take on this massive risk, what happened to the reward? We all know, if you've ever taken a finance course, the first thing you're taught is sort of the risk-reward relationship, and so some people are foolish enough or probably smart enough if they have time to wait, to actually invest in stocks, because they're higher risk which over time will make a greater reward than bonds, that whole risk-reward thing. Well, where's the reward for the state of having taken on these massive risks and actually been foolish enough to have done the Internet? The Internet was crazy. It really was. I mean, the probability of failure was massive. You had to be completely nuts to do it, and luckily, they were. Now, we don't even get to this question about rewards unless you actually depict the state as this risk-taker. And the problem is that economists often think, well, there is a reward back to the state. It's tax. You know, the companies will pay tax, the jobs they create will create growth so people who get those jobs and their incomes rise will come back to the state through the tax mechanism. Well, unfortunately, that's not true. Okay, it's not true because many of the jobs that are created go abroad. Globalization, and that's fine. We shouldn't be nationalistic. Let the jobs go where they have to go, perhaps. I mean, one can take a position on that. But also these companies that have actually had this massive benefit from the state -- Apple's a great example. They even got the first -- well, not the first, but 500,000 dollars actually went to Apple, the company, through this SBIC program, which predated the SBIR program, as well as, as I said before, all the technologies behind the iPhone. And yet we know they legally, as many other companies, pay very little tax back.
I to me zapravo dovodi verovatno do najveće implikacije i to ima velike implikacije iznad inovativnosti. Ako je država više od popravljača tržišta, ako ona zapravo oblikuje tržište, i ako je radeći to morala da preuzme masivne rizike, šta je sa nagradom? Svi znamo, ako ste ikada išli na kurs iz finansija, najpre vas nauče o vrsti veze između rizika i nagrade, i tako neki ljudi su dovoljno ludi ili verovatno dovoljno pametni ako imaju vremena da čekaju da zapravo investiraju u akcije, jer one nose veći rizik koji će im vremenom doneti i veću dobit nego obveznice, u celoj toj stvari u vezi sa rizikom i nagradom. Pa, gde je nagrada za državu za preuzimanje tih masivnih rizika i što je zapravo bila dovoljno luda da napravi internet? Internet je bio ludnica. Zaista. Mislim, verovatnoća neuspeha je bila ogromna. Morali ste biti potpuno ludi da to radite i na sreću, bili su. Ne dolazimo čak ni do tog pitanja kao što je nagrada ukoliko zaista ne uočite državu kao nosioca rizika. I problem je što ekonomisti često misle: "Pa tu je nagrada za državu. To je porez." Znate, kompanije će platiti porez, radna mesta koja oni stvariju će stvoriti rast, pa ljudi koji će dobiti te poslove i kojima će prihodi rasti će državi vratiti kroz poreski sistem. Na žalost, to nije istinito, U redu, nije istinito jer mnoga od tih kreiranih radnih mesta odu u inostranstvo. Globalizacija, i to je uredu. Ne treba da budemo nacionalisti. Neka radna mesta idu gde moraju, recimo. Mislim, možete zauzeti stav o tome. Ali istovremeno te kompanije koje su imale tu veliku korist od države - Epl je sjajan primer, oni su čak dobili prvih - zapravo, ne prvih, ali 500.000 dolara je zapravo otišlo kompaniji Epl kroz SBIC program, koji je prethodio SBIR programu, kao i sve ostale tehnologije iza Ajfona, kako sam rekla. A ipak znamo da one zakonito, kao i mnoge druge kompanije, plaćaju veoma malo poreza.
So what we really need to actually rethink is should there perhaps be a return-generating mechanism that's much more direct than tax. Why not? It could happen perhaps through equity. This, by the way, in the countries that are actually thinking about this strategically, countries like Finland in Scandinavia, but also in China and Brazil, they're retaining equity in these investments. Sitra funded Nokia, kept equity, made a lot of money, it's a public funding agency in Finland, which then funded the next round of Nokias. The Brazilian Development Bank, which is providing huge amounts of funds today to clean technology, they just announced a $56 billion program for the future on this, is retaining equity in these investments. So to put it provocatively, had the U.S. government thought about this, and maybe just brought back just something called an innovation fund, you can bet that, you know, if even just .05 percent of the profits from what the Internet produced had come back to that innovation fund, there would be so much more money to spend today on green technology. Instead, many of the state budgets which in theory are trying to do that are being constrained. But perhaps even more important, we heard before about the one percent, the 99 percent. If the state is thought about in this more strategic way, as one of the lead players in the value creation mechanism, because that's what we're talking about, right? Who are the different players in creating value in the economy, and is the state's role, has it been sort of dismissed as being a backseat player? If we can actually have a broader theory of value creation and allow us to actually admit what the state has been doing and reap something back, it might just be that in the next round, and I hope that we all hope that the next big revolution will in fact be green, that that period of growth will not only be smart, innovation-led, not only green, but also more inclusive, so that the public schools in places like Silicon Valley can actually also benefit from that growth, because they have not.
Tako da ono o čemu stvarno treba ponovo da razmislimo je trebaju li postojati povratni mehanizmi koji su mnogo direktniji od poreza. Zašto da ne? To bi se moglo napraviti možda kroz kapital. Uzgred, u zemljama koje istinski o tome razmišljaju strateški, zemljama kao Finska u Skandinaviji, ali takođe i u Kini i Brazilu, oni zadržavaju vlasnički udeo u tim investicijama, Sitra je finansirala Nokiju, zadržala vlasnički udeo, zaradila mnogo novca, a to je javna agencija za finansiranje u Finskoj, koja je onda finansirala i sledeću rundu Nokija. Brazilska razvojna banka, koja obezbeđuje velike količine sredstava danas za čiste tehnologije, koja je upravo objavila program vredan 56 milijardi dolara za budućnost ovoga, zadržava vlasnički udeo u tim investicijama. Pa da kažem to provokativno, da je vlada SAD-a mislila o tome i možda samo povratila samo nešto zvano inovacioni fond, mogli biste se kladiti da je samo 0,5% tog profita od onoga što je internet napravio došlo nazad u inovacioni fond, bilo bi toliko dodatnog novca da se utroši danas na zelene tehnologije. Umesto toga, mnogi državni budžeti koji u teoriji pokušavaju to da urade bivaju ograničeni. Ali, možda još važnije, čuli smo ranije za jedan procenat, 99%. Da se o državi mislilo na više strateški način, kao o jednom od vodećih igrača u mehanizmu stvaranja vrednosti, jer to je ono o čemu govorimo, zar ne? Ko su različiti igrači u stvaranju vrednosti u ekonomiji, i da li je država nekako oslobođena uloge i sedi na klupi za rezerve? Ako bismo zapravo mogli imati širu teoriju o kreiranju vrednosti i ako bismo dozvolili sebi da priznamo šta je država radila i ubrala nazad, moglo bi se desiti da sledeći put, i nadam se da se svi nadamo da će sledeća velika revolucija zapravo biti zelena, da taj period rasta neće biti samo pametan, vođen inovacijom, ne samo zelen, već i inkluzivan, tako da će državne škole u mestima kao što je Silicijumska dolina zapravo moći takođe da imaju korist od tog rasta, jer do sada nisu.
Thank you.
Hvala Vam.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)