Have you ever wondered why extremism seems to have been on the rise in Muslim-majority countries over the course of the last decade? Have you ever wondered how such a situation can be turned around? Have you ever looked at the Arab uprisings and thought, "How could we have predicted that?" or "How could we have better prepared for that?" Well my personal story, my personal journey, what brings me to the TED stage here today, is a demonstration of exactly what's been happening in Muslim-majority countries over the course of the last decades, at least, and beyond. I want to share some of that story with you, but also some of my ideas around change and the role of social movements in creating change in Muslim-majority societies.
你有沒有想過 為什麼在過去十年歷程在穆斯林佔多數的國家 極端主義似乎有上升? 你有沒有想過 這樣的情況如何可以翻轉? 你有沒有在看阿拉伯起義時 想著: 「我們怎樣能預測這件事情呢?」 或「我們怎麼能更充分的準備呢?」 那麼這是我個人的故事,我個人的旅程, 是為什麼我今天在TED這裡, 準確演示在在過去至少幾十年 或甚至更長時間內 穆斯林佔多數的國家發生過什麼。 我想與你分享一些故事, 並且也有一些我認為轉變的想法 及社會運動對改變 穆斯林佔多數社會的角色。
So let me begin by first of all giving a very, very brief history of time, if I may indulge. In medieval societies there were defined allegiances. An identity was defined primarily by religion. And then we moved on into an era in the 19th century with the rise of a European nation-state where identities and allegiances were defined by ethnicity. So identity was primarily defined by ethnicity, and the nation-state reflected that. In the age of globalization, we moved on. I call it the era of citizenship -- where people could be from multi-racial, multi-ethnic backgrounds, but all be equal as citizens in a state. You could be American-Italian; you could be American-Irish; you could be British-Pakistani.
如果我可以放任發揮, 讓我首先給你的一個 非常非常濃縮的歷史簡介。 在中世紀社會中忠誠是有定義的。 一個身份的定義 主要是來自宗教。 然後我們就進入在19世紀時代 歐洲民族國家的身份 和忠誠的定義 是來自種族。 因此,種族主要是界定身份, 而國家民族也反映如同。 在全球化時代,我們繼續前行。 我把它稱為公民的時代 -- 人們可以從多種族化,多民族化的背景, 但都被視為一個國家 的平等公民。 你可能是美國的意大利人,你可能是美國的愛爾蘭人, 你可能是英國巴基斯坦人。
But I believe now that we're moving into a new age, and that age The New York Times dubbed recently as "the age of behavior." How I define the age of behavior is a period of transnational allegiances, where identity is defined more so by ideas and narratives. And these ideas and narratives that bump people across borders are increasingly beginning to affect the way in which people behave. Now this is not all necessarily good news, because it's also my belief that hatred has gone global just as much as love. But actually it's my belief that the people who've been truly capitalizing on this age of behavior, up until now, up until recent times, up until the last six months, the people who have been capitalizing most on the age of behavior and the transnational allegiances, using digital activism and other sorts of borderless technologies, those who've been benefiting from this have been extremists. And that's something which I'd like to elaborate on.
但我相信現在 我們正在進入一個新的時代, 而且最近這個時代被紐約時報 稱為「 行為的時代」。 我如何定義行為的時代 是以一個跨國的忠誠準則, 其中身份的標定是指 思想和敘事。 而這些越來越多的理念和敘事 而簸動人們跨越國界開始影響 人們的行為。 這並不一定是個好消息, 因為我也相信, 仇恨跟愛一樣 已經全球化。 但實際上我是相信, 已經真正把握這種行為的人, 到現在為止,直到近代, 直到最近6個月, 最能利用 行為時代的人們 和跨國忠誠, 用激進的數據化 和其他各種無國界的技術, 那些已經從中受益的 是極端分子。 這便是我想闡述的東西。
If we look at Islamists, if we look at the phenomenon of far-right fascists, one thing they've been very good at, one thing that they've actually been exceeding in, is communicating across borders, using technologies to organize themselves, to propagate their message and to create truly global phenomena. Now I should know, because for 13 years of my life, I was involved in an extreme Islamist organization. And I was actually a potent force in spreading ideas across borders, and I witnessed the rise of Islamist extremism as distinct from Islam the faith, and the way in which it influenced my co-religionists across the world.
如果我們看一下伊斯蘭主義, 如果我們看一下 在極右翼法西斯的現象, 他們有一點已經很好, 他們實際上已經超過這一點, 是跨越國界的通信, 採用技術組織起來, 傳播他們的信息, 並建立真正的全球性現象。 現在我應該知道, 因為我13年的生活, 我是在參與一個極端的伊斯蘭組織。 而實際上我是一個在傳播 跨越國界的想法的強大力量。 我親眼目睹了伊斯蘭極端主義的興起, 顯明不同於伊斯蘭教的信仰, 和影響了我在世界各地教友 作為的和方式。
And my story, my personal story, is truly evidence for the age of behavior that I'm attempting to elaborate upon here. I was, by the way -- I'm an Essex lad, born and raised in Essex in the U.K. Anyone who's from England knows the reputation we have from Essex. But having been born in Essex, at the age of 16, I joined an organization. At the age of 17, I was recruiting people from Cambridge University to this organization. At the age of 19, I was on the national leadership of this organization in the U.K. At the age of 21, I was co-founding this organization in Pakistan. At the age of 22, I was co-founding this organization in Denmark. By the age of 24, I found myself convicted in prison in Egypt, being blacklisted from three countries in the world for attempting to overthrow their governments, being subjected to torture in Egyptian jails and sentenced to five years as a prisoner of conscience.
而我的故事,我個人的故事, 是真正的行為時代的證據, 我試圖在這裡闡述的憑證。 順帶一提我 -- 我是個埃塞克斯郡的小伙子, 在埃塞克斯郡出生和成長。 任何人如來自英格蘭 都知道我們這些來自埃塞克斯郡的聲譽。 但出生在埃塞克斯郡, 16歲, 我加入了一個組織。 在17歲,我從劍橋大學 招募人員加入這個組織。 在19歲, 我已是成為在英國的國家首領。 在21歲,我在巴基斯坦共同創辦了這個組織。 在22歲, 我在丹麥共同創辦了這個組織。 到了24歲, 我在埃及被定罪進入監獄裡, 在世界上三個國家的黑名單 被控企圖推翻他們的政府, 在埃及監獄 遭受酷刑, 並被判處為一個良心犯五年。
Now that journey, and what took me from Essex all the way across the world -- by the way, we were laughing at democratic activists. We felt they were from the age of yesteryear. We felt that they were out of date. I learned how to use email from the extremist organization that I used. I learned how to effectively communicate across borders without being detected. Eventually I was detected, of course, in Egypt. But the way in which I learned to use technology to my advantage was because I was within an extremist organization that was forced to think beyond the confines of the nation-state. The age of behavior: where ideas and narratives were increasingly defining behavior and identity and allegiances.
現在那一個旅程, 什麼把我從埃塞克斯郡帶到跨越世界-- 順便說一下,我們在嘲諷民主活動家。 我們認為那些人是從昔日的時代。 我們覺得他們是過時的。 我從極端組織 學會了如何使用電子郵件。 我學會了如何有效地跨越國界溝通, 而不被發現。 當然, 最後我被發現,在埃及。 不過,我學會了 使用技術盡用優勢, 是因為我是在極端主義組織 被迫去思考超越 民族國家的範圍內。 行為的年代:越來越多地以思想和說明 定義行為, 身份和忠誠。
So as I said, we looked to the status quo and ridiculed it. And it's not just Islamist extremists that did this. But even if you look across the mood music in Europe of late, far-right fascism is also on the rise. A form of anti-Islam rhetoric is also on the rise and it's transnational. And the consequences that this is having is that it's affecting the political climate across Europe. What's actually happening is that what were previously localized parochialisms, individual or groupings of extremists who were isolated from one another, have become interconnected in a globalized way and have thus become, or are becoming, mainstream. Because the Internet and connection technologies are connecting them across the world.
因此,正如我所說的,我們看到現狀, 而嘲笑它。 而且不只是伊斯蘭極端分子這樣做的。 但是,即使你看如今, 在歐洲極右的法西斯主義的 音樂情緒也在上升。 反伊斯蘭言論的形式 也呈上升趨勢, 和跨越國界。 這後果便是 影響了整個歐洲的 政治氣候。 實際發生的是, 以前本地化的本位主義, 個人或彼此孤立的 極端分子集團, 已在一個全球化的方式相互關聯, 並因此成為或正在成為主流。 由於互聯網連接技術, 連接世界各地。
If you look at the rise of far-right fascism across Europe of late, you will see some things that are happening that are influencing domestic politics, yet the phenomenon is transnational. In certain countries, mosque minarets are being banned. In others, headscarves are being banned. In others, kosher and halal meat are being banned, as we speak. And on the flip side, we have transnational Islamist extremists doing the same thing across their own societies. And so they are pockets of parochialism that are being connected in a way that makes them feel like they are mainstream. Now that never would have been possible before. They would have felt isolated, until these sorts of technologies came around and connected them in a way that made them feel part of a larger phenomenon.
如果你看一下現時在整個歐洲崛起的極右法西斯主義, 你會看到一些事情正在發生, 影響到國內政治, 但這種現象是跨越國界。 在某些國家,清真寺的尖塔被禁止。 在其他國家,頭巾都被禁止。 在其他國家,猶太教和 伊斯蘭教的肉正在被禁止。 而在另一面, 我們有跨國伊斯蘭極端分子 在其自己的社會做同樣的事情。 所以, 本位主義正在連接的方式 使他們覺得他們是主流。 在以前這個永遠不會有可能。 他們會感到孤立的, 直到這些技術來臨 連接了周圍, 使他們覺得是一個大現象的一部分。
Where does that leave democracy aspirants? Well I believe they're getting left far behind. And I'll give you an example here at this stage. If any of you remembers the Christmas Day bomb plot: there's a man called Anwar al-Awlaki. As an American citizen, ethnically a Yemeni, in hiding currently in Yemen, who inspired a Nigerian, son of the head of Nigeria's national bank. This Nigerian student studied in London, trained in Yemen, boarded a flight in Amsterdam to attack America. In the meanwhile, the Old mentality with a capital O, was represented by his father, the head of the Nigerian bank, warning the CIA that his own son was about to attack, and this warning fell on deaf ears. The Old mentality with a capital O, as represented by the nation-state, not yet fully into the age of behavior, not recognizing the power of transnational social movements, got left behind. And the Christmas Day bomber almost succeeded in attacking the United States of America. Again with the example of the far right: that we find, ironically, xenophobic nationalists are utilizing the benefits of globalization.
民主追求者可以去哪裡? 我相信他們遠遠被拋在後面。 我給你舉個現階段的例子。 如果你記得聖誕節炸彈陰謀: 有一個名Anwar Al-Awlaki的人。 作為一個美國公民,種族也門, 目前藏匿在也門, 他激發了一個尼日利亞人, 尼日利亞國家銀行負責人的兒子。 這個尼日利亞學生在倫敦學習,在也門訓練, 登上了在阿姆斯特丹的航班襲擊美國。 在此同時, 一個舊思維的思想, 他的父親作為代表--尼日利亞銀行的負責人, 警告中央情報局自己兒子的攻擊計劃, 但警告置若罔聞。 一個舊思維的思想, 民族國家作為代表, 尚未完全融入行為的時代, 不承認跨國社會運動的力量, 舊的思維被落後。 聖誕節轟炸機幾乎成功地 攻擊美國。 再與最右端的例子: 我們發現,具有諷刺意味的是, 仇外的民族主義者 正在利用全球化帶來的好處。
So why are they succeeding? And why are democracy aspirants falling behind? Well we need to understand the power of the social movements who understand this. And a social movement is comprised, in my view, it's comprised of four main characteristics. It's comprised of ideas and narratives and symbols and leaders. I'll talk you through one example, and that's the example that everyone here will be aware of, and that's the example of Al-Qaeda. If I asked you to think of the ideas of Al-Qaeda, that's something that comes to your mind immediately. If I ask you to think of their narratives -- the West being at war with Islam, the need to defend Islam against the West -- these narratives, they come to your mind immediately. Incidentally, the difference between ideas and narratives: the idea is the cause that one believes in; and the narrative is the way to sell that cause -- the propaganda, if you like, of the cause. So the ideas and the narratives of Al-Qaeda come to your mind immediately.
那麼,為什麼他們成功? 為什麼民主主義落後。 我們需要了解明白社會運動的力量的這一點。 社會運動,在我看來, 是由四個主要特點組成。 它是以思想, 敘事 象徵和領導組成。 讓我討論一個例子, 一個這裡的每一個人都知道的例子, 那例子便是基地組織。 如果我問你你認為基地組織的概念是什麼, 立即便有東西來到你的腦內。 如果我問你你認為他們的敘述是什麼 -- 西方在與伊斯蘭教的戰爭,伊斯蘭對西方捍衛的需要 -- 這些敘事,它們立即來到你的腦內。 順便說一說,概念和敘述之間的差異: 概念是令人相信的原因; 而敘事便是推銷原因的方式 -- 那就是, 政治宣傳原因。 因此基地組織的敘述的概念便立即來到你的腦內。
If I ask you to think of their symbols and their leaders, they come to your mind immediately. One of their leaders was killed in Pakistan recently. So these symbols and these leaders come to your mind immediately. And that's the power of social movements. They're transnational, and they bond around these ideas and narratives and these symbols and these leaders. However, if I ask your minds to focus currently on Pakistan, and I ask you to think of the symbols and the leaders for democracy in Pakistan today, you'll be hard pressed to think beyond perhaps the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Which means, by definition, that particular leader no longer exists.
如果我要你認出他們的象徵和領導人, 他們便立即來到你的腦內。 他們的領導人之一,最近在巴基斯坦被殺害。 因此,這些象徵和這些領導人 立即來到你的腦內。 這便是社會運動的力量。 它們是跨國的,它們圍繞這些理念,敘事. 這些象徵和這些領導人。 但是, 如果我我要你把重點放在目前的巴基斯坦, 要你認出 今天在民主巴基斯坦的 象徵和領導人, 你便會難於啟齒, 也許僅是想到 貝娜齊爾•布托遇刺。 這意味著,顧名思義, 即是領導者不再存在。
One of the problems we're facing is, in my view, that there are no globalized, youth-led, grassroots social movements advocating for democratic culture across Muslim-majority societies. There is no equivalent of the Al-Qaeda, without the terrorism, for democracy across Muslim-majority societies. There are no ideas and narratives and leaders and symbols advocating the democratic culture on the ground. So that begs the next question. Why is it that extremist organizations, whether of the far-right or of the Islamist extremism -- Islamism meaning those who wish to impose one version of Islam over the rest of society -- why is it that they are succeeding in organizing in a globalized way, whereas those who aspire to democratic culture are falling behind? And I believe that's for four reasons. I believe, number one, it's complacency. Because those who aspire to democratic culture are in power, or have societies that are leading globalized, powerful societies, powerful countries. And that level of complacency means they don't feel the need to advocate for that culture.
在我看來, 我們面臨的問題之一是, 沒有全球化 青年領導,基層民主文化的社會運動 倡導跨越穆斯林 佔多數的社會。 沒有相當於基地組織水平, 但沒有恐怖主義 的民主集團跨越整個穆斯林佔多數的社會。 沒有概念,敘事和領導人 在地面上提倡民主文化。 這便引出下一個問題。 為什麼極端組織, 這包括那些無論是極右或伊斯蘭極端主義的 -- 伊斯蘭教主義是指那些想 施加其餘社會對伊斯蘭教一個版本的人-- 為什麼他們在一個全球化的 舉辦方式可以成功, 而那些渴望民主文化的 便落後? 我認為有四個原因。 我相信,第一,便是自滿。 因為那些渴望期於民主文化的人 都擁有權力, 或都駐於 全球化領先的,強大的社會, 強大的國家的社會。 而該級別的自滿意味著 他們不覺得需要倡導這種文化。
The second, I believe, is political correctness. That we have a hesitation in espousing the universality of democratic culture because we are associating that -- we associate believing in the universality of our values -- with extremists. Yet actually, whenever we talk about human rights, we do say that human rights are universal. But actually going out to propagate that view is associated with either neoconservativism or with Islamist extremism. To go around saying that I believe democratic culture is the best that we've arrived at as a form of political organizing is associated with extremism.
第二,我相信, 是政治上的正確性。 我們有一個毫不猶豫地 擁護民主文化的普遍性, 因為我們是關聯着 -- 與極端分子 -- 我們贊同相信在我們對價值觀的 普遍性。 然而實際上,當我們談論人權, 我們不會說人權是普遍的。 但實際上是去宣傳這個觀點 是與新保守主義或 與伊斯蘭極端主義關聯。 繞過去說,我相信 民主文化是最好的, 作為一種政治組織形式, 與極端主義關聯。
And the third, democratic choice in Muslim-majority societies has been relegated to a political choice, meaning political parties in many of these societies ask people to vote for them as the democratic party, but then the other parties ask them to vote for them as the military party -- wanting to rule by military dictatorship. And then you have a third party saying, "Vote for us; we'll establish a theocracy." So democracy has become merely one political choice among many other forms of political choices available in those societies. And what happens as a result of this is, when those parties are elected, and inevitably they fail, or inevitably they make political mistakes, democracy takes the blame for their political mistakes. And then people say, "We've tried democracy. It doesn't really work. Let's bring the military back again."
第三, 在穆斯林佔多數的的社會中 民主選擇已經退居到一個政治選擇, 在許多這些社會 的政黨會要求人們 為他們投票 投民主黨, 但其他政黨要求他們為他們投票 投軍隊黨的 -- 希望通過軍事獨裁統治。 然後有一個第三方的說法, 「投我們票,我們將建立一個政教合一的黨」。 因此,民主只成為一個政治選擇, 在這些社會 許多其他形式的政治選擇。 而作為這樣做的結果會發生什麼情況 是,當這些黨當選, 並不可避免地失敗, 或者不可避免地犯政治錯誤, 民主主義便成為 犯政治錯誤的靶標。 人們會說,「我們已經嘗試民主,但它並沒有真正發揮作用, 讓我們帶軍方回來。」
And the fourth reason, I believe, is what I've labeled here on the slide as the ideology of resistance. What I mean by that is, if the world superpower today was a communist, it would be much easier for democracy activists to use democracy activism as a form of resistance against colonialism, than it is today with the world superpower being America, occupying certain lands and also espousing democratic ideals. So roughly these four reasons make it a lot more difficult for democratic culture to spread as a civilizational choice, not merely as a political choice.
第四個原因,我相信, 是我這裡幻燈片上標有稱為意識形態的阻力。 我是說, 如果今天的世界超級大國,是一個共產主義, 民主活動家便會更容易 使用民主的激進主義 作為反對殖民主義的阻力形式, 比它是當今世界的超級大國美國, 佔用一定的土地 但也贊成民主的理想。 所以這四個方面的原因 大致做出了不少難度,讓民主文化傳播 作為一個文明的選擇, 而不是僅僅作為一種政治選擇。
When talking about those reasons, let's break down certain preconceptions. Is it just about grievances? Is it just about a lack of education? Well statistically, the majority of those who join extremist organizations are highly educated. Statistically, they are educated, on average, above the education levels of Western society. Anecdotally, we can demonstrate that if poverty was the only factor, well Bin Laden is from one of the richest families in Saudi Arabia. His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was a pediatrician -- not an ill-educated man. International aid and development has been going on for years, but extremism in those societies, in many of those societies, has been on the rise. And what I believe is missing is genuine grassroots activism on the ground, in addition to international aid, in addition to education, in addition to health. Not exclusive to these things, but in addition to them, is propagating a genuine demand for democracy on the ground.
談到這些原因時, 讓我們打破某些先入為主的思路。 難道僅僅是怨氣嗎? 難道僅僅是缺乏教育嗎? 統計學指出, 那些加入極端組織的大多數都受過高等教育。 據統計,他們平均的教育水平 比西方社會 平均教育水平更高。 有趣的是,我們可以證明, 如果貧困是唯一因素, 那拉登在沙特阿拉伯是最富有的家庭之一。 他的副手艾曼•扎瓦希里,是一名兒科醫生 -- 不是一個沒受過教育的人。 國際援助和發展已持續多年, 但這些社會中的極端主義,在這些許多社會中, 一直在上升。 我相信真正失踪的是 激進的 地面基層, 除了國際援助, 除了教育,除了健康。 這些東西不是排他性的,但除了他們, 便是在地面上傳播民主的真正需求。
And this is where I believe neoconservatism had it upside-down. Neoconservatism had the philosophy that you go in with a supply-led approach to impose democratic values from the top down. Whereas Islamists and far-right organizations, for decades, have been building demand for their ideology on the grassroots. They've been building civilizational demand for their values on the grassroots, and we've been seeing those societies slowly transition to societies that are increasingly asking for a form of Islamism. Mass movements in Pakistan have been represented after the Arab uprisings mainly by organizations claiming for some form of theocracy, rather than for a democratic uprising. Because since pre-partition, they've been building demand for their ideology on the ground. And what's needed is a genuine transnational youth-led movement that works to actively advocate for the democratic culture -- which is necessarily more than just elections. But without freedom of speech, you can't have free and fair elections. Without human rights, you don't have the protection granted to you to campaign. Without freedom of belief, you don't have the right to join organizations.
這是我認為 新保守主義已經倒了。 新保守主義的理念, 是要你去供應一個為主導的的做法, 在從最頂部徵收民主價值。 而伊斯蘭主義和極右組織,幾十年來, 已在基層為他們的思想建設需求。 他們一直在基層建設他們對價值觀 的文明需求, 我們已經看到這些社會慢慢過渡到 正越來越多地要求 伊斯蘭教社會的形式。 由阿拉伯起義後, 在巴基斯坦已有一些聲稱表示 政教合一形式的組織 群眾運動, 而不是主要民主起義。 因為自從分區前, 他們已經為他們在地面上的意識形態的需求建設。 我們需要的是一個真正的跨國 青年為主導的運動, 積極倡導 民主文化 -- 這是必然 不只是選舉。 但是,如果沒有言論自由,你沒有自由和公正的選舉。 沒有人權,你沒有向你授予保護的競選活動。 沒有信仰自由, 你沒有參加組織的權利。
So what's needed is those organizations on the ground advocating for the democratic culture itself to create the demand on the ground for this culture. What that will do is avoid the problem I was talking about earlier, where currently we have political parties presenting democracy as merely a political choice in those societies alongside other choices such as military rule and theocracy. Whereas if we start building this demand on the ground on a civilizational level, rather than merely on a political level, a level above politics -- movements that are not political parties, but are rather creating this civilizational demand for this democratic culture. What we'll have in the end is this ideal that you see on the slide here -- the ideal that people should vote in an existing democracy, not for a democracy. But to get to that stage, where democracy builds the fabric of society and the political choices within that fabric, but are certainly not theocratic and military dictatorship -- i.e. you're voting in a democracy, in an existing democracy, and that democracy is not merely one of the choices at the ballot box. To get to that stage, we genuinely need to start building demand in those societies on the ground.
所以我們需要的是這些地面上的 組織倡導民主文化的本身 創造這種文化的需求。 那會做的是 避免我早先提到的問題, 目前我們已經呈現的政治選擇, 只是在這些社會 旁邊其他的選擇, 如軍事統治和政教合一的社會民主政黨。 而如果我們開始在地面上建立需求,在這一個文明的水平, 而不是僅僅在政治層面, 比政治更高水平 -- 不是政黨的運動, 而是創造這種文明的 民主文化需求。 我們在最後, 便會在這裡的幻燈片看到這個理想 -- 在現有的民主社會人應該的理想, 而不是一個民主國家的投票。 但要到那個階段, 要在民主基礎的社會結構, 並在該結構內縫着的政治選擇, 但肯定不是神權政治和軍事獨裁 -- 即是你在現有的民主 投票民主, 而民主不只是在投票箱中的選擇之一。 要獲得這個階段, 我們需要真正開始建設在地面上, 在這些社會的需求上開始。
Now to conclude, how does that happen? Well, Egypt is a good starting point. The Arab uprisings have demonstrated that this is already beginning. But what happened in the Arab uprisings and what happened in Egypt was particularly cathartic for me. What happened there was a political coalition gathered together for a political goal, and that was to remove the leader. We need to move one step beyond that now. We need to see how we can help those societies move from political coalitions, loosely based political coalitions, to civilizational coalitions that are working for the ideals and narratives of the democratic culture on the ground. Because it's not enough to remove a leader or ruler or dictator. That doesn't guarantee that what comes next will be a society built on democratic values.
現在結論,請問是怎麼發呢? 那麼,埃及是一個很好的起點。 阿拉伯起義已經證明,這是已經開始。 但在阿拉伯起義發生的,並在埃及發生的事情 對我來說是特別令我頓悟。 在那裡發生了一個政治聯盟 聚集在一起因為政治目標, 便是消除領導。 現在我們需要超越這一步。 我們需要看到我們如何能幫助那些社會 擺脫政治聯盟, 那些鬆散的政治聯盟, 到達在地面上工作理想 和民主文化的 文明聯盟。 因為它不僅是消除一個領導者或 統治者或獨裁者。 這並不保證,接下來將是一個 建立在民主價值觀的社會。
But generally, the trends that start in Egypt have historically spread across the MENA region, the Middle East and North Africa region. So when Arab socialism started in Egypt, it spread across the region. In the '80s and '90s when Islamism started in the region, it spread across the MENA region as a whole.
但一般來說,在埃及開始的趨勢 在歷史上會蔓延整個中東和北非地區, 中東和北非地區。 因此,在埃及的阿拉伯社會主義開始時,它在該地區蔓延。 在80年代和90年代伊斯蘭教在該地區開始, 遍布中東和北非地區整體。
And the aspiration that we have at the moment -- as young Arabs are proving today and instantly rebranding themselves as being prepared to die for more than just terrorism -- is that there is a chance that democratic culture can start in the region and spread across to the rest of the countries that are surrounding that. But that will require helping these societies transition from having merely political coalitions to building genuinely grassroots-based social movements that advocate for the democratic culture. And we've made a start for that in Pakistan with a movement called Khudi, where we are working on the ground to encourage the youth to create genuine buy-in for the democratic culture. And it's with that thought that I'll end.
在這一刻我們的願望是-- 今天作為年輕的阿拉伯人都證明到, 亦更立即為自己名 準備以死亡為不僅僅是恐怖主義 -- 而是,若有一個機會, 民主文化可以在該地區開始 和遍布到周圍其他國家。 但這需要 幫助這些社會轉型, 從單純的政治聯盟, 到真正的基層基礎建設, 社會運動,倡導民主文化。 我們已經在巴基斯坦取得了為開始, 稱為 Khudi的一個運動, 我們在地面上工作,以鼓勵青年 創造真正的民主文化的影響。 而我會便以這念頭結束我的演說。
And my time is up, and thank you for your time.
我的時間到了終止,謝謝你的時間。
(Applause)
(掌聲)