Have you ever wondered why extremism seems to have been on the rise in Muslim-majority countries over the course of the last decade? Have you ever wondered how such a situation can be turned around? Have you ever looked at the Arab uprisings and thought, "How could we have predicted that?" or "How could we have better prepared for that?" Well my personal story, my personal journey, what brings me to the TED stage here today, is a demonstration of exactly what's been happening in Muslim-majority countries over the course of the last decades, at least, and beyond. I want to share some of that story with you, but also some of my ideas around change and the role of social movements in creating change in Muslim-majority societies.
你们是否曾想知道 为什么极端主义在穆斯林多数的国家逐渐的强大了起来 尤其是在过去的十年间? 你们是否曾想知道 这种情况如何才能被改变? 你们是否曾看着这些阿拉伯人的起义 随之想:“我们怎样才能预见到这些起义?” 或“我们怎样才能更好的为之做准备?“ 我的故事,我亲身的历程 促使我今天来到TED的讲台, 讲述在以穆斯林为主的国家 过去的十年里,甚至更久远的时候 到底发生了什么。 我想和你分享这些故事 同时也有我对于这种改变的看法 还有在创造这种变化中社会运动的作用 在以穆斯林为主的国家中。
So let me begin by first of all giving a very, very brief history of time, if I may indulge. In medieval societies there were defined allegiances. An identity was defined primarily by religion. And then we moved on into an era in the 19th century with the rise of a European nation-state where identities and allegiances were defined by ethnicity. So identity was primarily defined by ethnicity, and the nation-state reflected that. In the age of globalization, we moved on. I call it the era of citizenship -- where people could be from multi-racial, multi-ethnic backgrounds, but all be equal as citizens in a state. You could be American-Italian; you could be American-Irish; you could be British-Pakistani.
我这就开始了 在最开始,我想介绍下一段非常非常简短的历史 如果我可以的话 中世纪的社会中有非常明确的效忠对象。 身份从根本上 是由宗教决定的 随之我们来到了19世纪的一段时期 随着欧洲民族国家逐渐强大 在那里身份和效忠对象 是由种族划分决定的。 因此身份定位从根本上是由种族决定的 民族国家反映了这个事实。 在全球化的年代,我们继续发展。 我称它为国籍时代-- 在那里人们可以拥有多种族,多民族的背景, 却都是同等的公民 属于一个国家。 你可以是美籍意大利人;你可以是美籍爱尔兰人 你也可以是英籍巴基斯坦人。
But I believe now that we're moving into a new age, and that age The New York Times dubbed recently as "the age of behavior." How I define the age of behavior is a period of transnational allegiances, where identity is defined more so by ideas and narratives. And these ideas and narratives that bump people across borders are increasingly beginning to affect the way in which people behave. Now this is not all necessarily good news, because it's also my belief that hatred has gone global just as much as love. But actually it's my belief that the people who've been truly capitalizing on this age of behavior, up until now, up until recent times, up until the last six months, the people who have been capitalizing most on the age of behavior and the transnational allegiances, using digital activism and other sorts of borderless technologies, those who've been benefiting from this have been extremists. And that's something which I'd like to elaborate on.
但是现在我相信 我们正在向一个新时代前进。 这个新时代最近被纽约时报称为 ”行为时代“ 我将行为时代定义为 一个有着跨国效忠对象的时期, 身份在这里更多的是 被观点和故事所决定。 这些不分国界,冲击人们的观点和故事 正在迅速的影响 人们行为的方式。 这并不完全是好消息, 因为我也同样相信 敌意也已经遍布全球 和爱一样多。 实际上我还相信 那些真正利用这个行为时代的人们 直到现在,直到最近, 直到六个月之前, 那些人最大化的利用了 行为时代 以及跨国忠诚对象, 他们利用数码行动主义 和其他无国界的科学技术, 那些从中获益的人 都是极端主义者。 这也是我想仔细阐述的话题
If we look at Islamists, if we look at the phenomenon of far-right fascists, one thing they've been very good at, one thing that they've actually been exceeding in, is communicating across borders, using technologies to organize themselves, to propagate their message and to create truly global phenomena. Now I should know, because for 13 years of my life, I was involved in an extreme Islamist organization. And I was actually a potent force in spreading ideas across borders, and I witnessed the rise of Islamist extremism as distinct from Islam the faith, and the way in which it influenced my co-religionists across the world.
如果我们观察伊斯兰教徒 如果我们观察这种 极端右倾的法西斯主义者的现象 他们最擅长的一项技能, 他们超越了其他人的一件事, 就是跨境交流, 利用科技来组织他们的活动, 来传送他们的信息 来创造真正的世界范围的现象。 现在我了解了 因为我人生中的13年 都是在一个极端伊斯兰教组织中度过的。 我实际曾经作为一种有权势的组织力量 尤其是在跨境传播信息上。 我目睹了伊斯兰极端主义的兴起 和伊斯兰的信仰非常不同 我也目睹了它是如何影响我的同教徒 在世界范围内。
And my story, my personal story, is truly evidence for the age of behavior that I'm attempting to elaborate upon here. I was, by the way -- I'm an Essex lad, born and raised in Essex in the U.K. Anyone who's from England knows the reputation we have from Essex. But having been born in Essex, at the age of 16, I joined an organization. At the age of 17, I was recruiting people from Cambridge University to this organization. At the age of 19, I was on the national leadership of this organization in the U.K. At the age of 21, I was co-founding this organization in Pakistan. At the age of 22, I was co-founding this organization in Denmark. By the age of 24, I found myself convicted in prison in Egypt, being blacklisted from three countries in the world for attempting to overthrow their governments, being subjected to torture in Egyptian jails and sentenced to five years as a prisoner of conscience.
我的故事,我的亲身经历 是行为时代的非常好的证明 也是我现在想要详细说明的。 我是,顺便说一下,我是埃塞克斯人 在英国的埃塞克斯出生并长大。 从英国来的任何人 都知道我们在埃塞克斯的名声。 但出生于埃塞克斯, 十六岁的时候, 我加入了一个组织。 在我17岁的时候,我在剑桥大学里为组织 招募成员。 在我19岁的时候, 我成为了这个组织英国地区的领导人。 21岁的时候,我在巴基斯坦共同创立了这个组织。 22岁的时候 我在丹麦共同创立了这个组织。 24岁的时候, 我在埃及被定罪入狱, 被世界上的三个国家加入了黑名单 罪状是试图颠覆他们的政府, 我成为了被折磨的对象 在埃及的监狱里 作为政治犯被判处5年的有期徒刑。
Now that journey, and what took me from Essex all the way across the world -- by the way, we were laughing at democratic activists. We felt they were from the age of yesteryear. We felt that they were out of date. I learned how to use email from the extremist organization that I used. I learned how to effectively communicate across borders without being detected. Eventually I was detected, of course, in Egypt. But the way in which I learned to use technology to my advantage was because I was within an extremist organization that was forced to think beyond the confines of the nation-state. The age of behavior: where ideas and narratives were increasingly defining behavior and identity and allegiances.
那段时期, 带着我从埃塞克斯出发走过了全世界-- 顺便说一下,我们当时嘲笑民主激进分子。 我们觉得他们是从过去的时代来的。 我们觉得他们太过时了。 我学会了如何使用电邮 从极端分子组织的活动中。 我学会了如何有效地跨境交流 在不被发觉得情况下。 后来我还是被发觉了,当然,在埃及。 然而我学会 利用科技 是因为我属于一个极端主义组织 在那里你需要考虑更周密,超越 超越民族国家的边界。 行为时代,在这里观点和故事 迅速的决定了行为 身份以及忠诚。
So as I said, we looked to the status quo and ridiculed it. And it's not just Islamist extremists that did this. But even if you look across the mood music in Europe of late, far-right fascism is also on the rise. A form of anti-Islam rhetoric is also on the rise and it's transnational. And the consequences that this is having is that it's affecting the political climate across Europe. What's actually happening is that what were previously localized parochialisms, individual or groupings of extremists who were isolated from one another, have become interconnected in a globalized way and have thus become, or are becoming, mainstream. Because the Internet and connection technologies are connecting them across the world.
所以如我所说,我们观察现状 并嘲弄它。 并不是只有伊斯兰极端分子这样做。 但如果你纵观全局 即便是在后期欧洲舒缓的气氛音乐里, 右倾法西斯主义也在发展壮大。 一种反伊斯兰的言论 也在逐渐兴起 并且,它是跨国的。 这种现象所导致的后果 就是影响了整个欧洲 的政治气候。 实际发生的是 先前被局限于偏狭地方的 个体极端主义者或是集体极端主义者 他们曾被互相孤立 但现在以一种全球化的方式互相联系了起来 因为成为了,或即将成为,主流。 因为网络和通信技术 把他们由世界的各个角落联系在了一起。
If you look at the rise of far-right fascism across Europe of late, you will see some things that are happening that are influencing domestic politics, yet the phenomenon is transnational. In certain countries, mosque minarets are being banned. In others, headscarves are being banned. In others, kosher and halal meat are being banned, as we speak. And on the flip side, we have transnational Islamist extremists doing the same thing across their own societies. And so they are pockets of parochialism that are being connected in a way that makes them feel like they are mainstream. Now that never would have been possible before. They would have felt isolated, until these sorts of technologies came around and connected them in a way that made them feel part of a larger phenomenon.
如果你注意后期欧洲极端右倾法西斯主义的兴起 你会发现正在发生的一些东西 正在影响该国政治, 然而这个现象也是跨国境的。 在某些国家,清真寺尖塔是被禁止建造的。 在其他一些国家,头巾面纱也是被禁止的。 在还有的国家,宗教类的肉食是被禁止的, 就在此刻。 就另一方面来说, 我们也有跨国境的伊斯兰极端主义分子 在他们的社会里做着同样的事情。 这些偏隘地区的人被联系在了一起 这种联系使他们感觉他们其实才是主流。 尤其是现在,这种情况以前几乎是不可能的。 他们感到被孤立,被隔离, 直到这些先进技术的到来 把他们联系在一起 使其感觉自己是大众现象的一部分。
Where does that leave democracy aspirants? Well I believe they're getting left far behind. And I'll give you an example here at this stage. If any of you remembers the Christmas Day bomb plot: there's a man called Anwar al-Awlaki. As an American citizen, ethnically a Yemeni, in hiding currently in Yemen, who inspired a Nigerian, son of the head of Nigeria's national bank. This Nigerian student studied in London, trained in Yemen, boarded a flight in Amsterdam to attack America. In the meanwhile, the Old mentality with a capital O, was represented by his father, the head of the Nigerian bank, warning the CIA that his own son was about to attack, and this warning fell on deaf ears. The Old mentality with a capital O, as represented by the nation-state, not yet fully into the age of behavior, not recognizing the power of transnational social movements, got left behind. And the Christmas Day bomber almost succeeded in attacking the United States of America. Again with the example of the far right: that we find, ironically, xenophobic nationalists are utilizing the benefits of globalization.
这种现象给那些有抱负的民主家们留下了什么? 我相信他们被远远的落下了。 我在这里也会举个例子。 不知你们是否记得圣诞节爆炸案: 有一个人叫安瓦尔·奥拉基。 是一个美国市民,也是也门人 藏身于也门, 他激励了一个尼日利亚人, 一位尼日利亚银行领头者的儿子。 这位尼日利亚学生在伦敦上学,在也门受训, 他登上了一架起飞于阿姆斯特丹的航班,计划攻击美国。 同时, 老论派,有着陈旧的观念 是由这个学生的父亲,尼日利亚银行的领头人,所代表的 他警示了美国中央情报局说他的儿子即将袭击 然而对于这个警告,中情局充耳不闻 有着陈旧观念的老论派 正如民族国家所代表的, 没有完全踏入行为时代, 更没有意识到跨国社会运动的力量, 他们被落下了。 最后圣诞节轰炸者几乎成功的 袭击了美国。 这也是个极度右倾的例子: 很讽刺地,我们发现, 恐外的民族主义者 却在利用全球化所带来的好处。
So why are they succeeding? And why are democracy aspirants falling behind? Well we need to understand the power of the social movements who understand this. And a social movement is comprised, in my view, it's comprised of four main characteristics. It's comprised of ideas and narratives and symbols and leaders. I'll talk you through one example, and that's the example that everyone here will be aware of, and that's the example of Al-Qaeda. If I asked you to think of the ideas of Al-Qaeda, that's something that comes to your mind immediately. If I ask you to think of their narratives -- the West being at war with Islam, the need to defend Islam against the West -- these narratives, they come to your mind immediately. Incidentally, the difference between ideas and narratives: the idea is the cause that one believes in; and the narrative is the way to sell that cause -- the propaganda, if you like, of the cause. So the ideas and the narratives of Al-Qaeda come to your mind immediately.
他们为什么成功? 为什么有抱负的民主份子却被赶超? 我们首先需要了解社会运动的力量来真正了解这个问题 以我的观点,一个社会运动包含 四个主要的特征。 它是由概念,名目 象征,和领导者组成的。 我会用一个例子来详细解释, 这个例子在座的各位都耳熟能详, 就是基地组织。 如果我让你想一想基地组织的概念, 就是提到基地组织你能马上想到的。 我如果我让你考虑这个组织的名目及起事理由-- 西方国家在和伊斯兰国家斗争,需要保卫伊斯兰国家,反抗西方列强-- 你可以迅速的想到这些起事理由。 顺便说一下,概念和起事理由的区别是: 概念是一个人相信这个组织的原因; 而起事理由是一种推销这个原因的方式-- 政治宣传,如果你喜欢,可以这样说。 这样基地组织的概念和故事就马上浮现在你的脑海里。
If I ask you to think of their symbols and their leaders, they come to your mind immediately. One of their leaders was killed in Pakistan recently. So these symbols and these leaders come to your mind immediately. And that's the power of social movements. They're transnational, and they bond around these ideas and narratives and these symbols and these leaders. However, if I ask your minds to focus currently on Pakistan, and I ask you to think of the symbols and the leaders for democracy in Pakistan today, you'll be hard pressed to think beyond perhaps the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Which means, by definition, that particular leader no longer exists.
如果我问你他们的象征和他们的领导者, 你也能立刻想到。 他们领导者中之一最近在巴基斯坦被杀死了。 这些象征和领导人 你都能很快的想到。 而这就是社会运动的力量。 他们无国界,他们也和概念,名目, 象征,和领导者紧密相连。 然而, 如果我让你把注意力集中到巴基斯坦上, 并且让你思考 那些民主主义的象征和领导者 在今天的巴基斯坦, 你会觉得压力很大 尤其是当你所想超越了 被暗杀的贝布托。 它意味着,从定义上讲, 这个领导人不再存在了。
One of the problems we're facing is, in my view, that there are no globalized, youth-led, grassroots social movements advocating for democratic culture across Muslim-majority societies. There is no equivalent of the Al-Qaeda, without the terrorism, for democracy across Muslim-majority societies. There are no ideas and narratives and leaders and symbols advocating the democratic culture on the ground. So that begs the next question. Why is it that extremist organizations, whether of the far-right or of the Islamist extremism -- Islamism meaning those who wish to impose one version of Islam over the rest of society -- why is it that they are succeeding in organizing in a globalized way, whereas those who aspire to democratic culture are falling behind? And I believe that's for four reasons. I believe, number one, it's complacency. Because those who aspire to democratic culture are in power, or have societies that are leading globalized, powerful societies, powerful countries. And that level of complacency means they don't feel the need to advocate for that culture.
我们正在面对的问题之一是,以我的观点看, 目前没有全球化的 年轻人主导的,基层的社会运动 来提倡一种民主文化 尤其是在穆斯林多数的社会中。 在以穆斯林为主的社会中,没有恐怖组织,没有能和基地组织势均力敌的, 的民主组织。 更没有概念,名目,领导人,和象征 从基层起提倡民主文化。 , 为什么是极端分子组织, 不管是极度右倾,或者是伊斯兰极端分子-- 伊斯兰分子是指那些想强加一种伊斯兰教义 于社会上的其他人-- 为什么他们成功了 特别是在以一种全球化的方式组织起义上, 当那些追求民主文化的人 被远远落下? 我相信事之至此有四个原因。 第一,是自满。 因为那些追求民主文化的人 大多是掌权者, 亦或是位高权重的社团 领导着全球化的,有力度的社会, 乃至强大的国家。 这种程度的自满意味着 他们不觉得需要提倡这种文化。
The second, I believe, is political correctness. That we have a hesitation in espousing the universality of democratic culture because we are associating that -- we associate believing in the universality of our values -- with extremists. Yet actually, whenever we talk about human rights, we do say that human rights are universal. But actually going out to propagate that view is associated with either neoconservativism or with Islamist extremism. To go around saying that I believe democratic culture is the best that we've arrived at as a form of political organizing is associated with extremism.
第二点,我相信, 是有关政治的正确性。 我们一直悬而未决 在支持民主文化的普及方面, 因为我们自然地把它关联到-- 我们把相信普及我们的价值观-- 于极端主义分子,联系了起来。 然而实际上,无论何时当我们谈到人权, 我们确实说人权是全世界一致的。 但一旦设法去宣传这种观念 这种行为就被和新保守主义 或伊斯兰极端主义联系到了一起。 去四处宣传说我相信 民主文化是我们所实现的最好 以这种舆论来组织政治活动 往往被和极端主义联系起来。
And the third, democratic choice in Muslim-majority societies has been relegated to a political choice, meaning political parties in many of these societies ask people to vote for them as the democratic party, but then the other parties ask them to vote for them as the military party -- wanting to rule by military dictatorship. And then you have a third party saying, "Vote for us; we'll establish a theocracy." So democracy has become merely one political choice among many other forms of political choices available in those societies. And what happens as a result of this is, when those parties are elected, and inevitably they fail, or inevitably they make political mistakes, democracy takes the blame for their political mistakes. And then people say, "We've tried democracy. It doesn't really work. Let's bring the military back again."
第三点, 在穆斯林多数的社会,民主选择 被归入到政治选择中 这意味着,政党 在这些社会中 会让人们为他们投票 作为民主党派, 然而这时会有其他的党派让人们也为他们投票 作为军党-- 试图以军力独裁来统治。 这时又会有第三种党派站出来说, “给我们投票吧,我们会建立一个神权政体。” 正因如此,民主主义不过成为了一个政治性选择 在这个社会中诸多其他形式的 政治选择中的一个. 作为结果的是 当这些党派被选举出来 然后不可避免的失败了, 或者不可避免的犯了政治性错误, 民主主义成为了千夫所指的对象 为他们的政治错误. 然后人们就会说:“我们尝试了民主主义,它并不适合我们。” “我们还是继续用军统吧。”
And the fourth reason, I believe, is what I've labeled here on the slide as the ideology of resistance. What I mean by that is, if the world superpower today was a communist, it would be much easier for democracy activists to use democracy activism as a form of resistance against colonialism, than it is today with the world superpower being America, occupying certain lands and also espousing democratic ideals. So roughly these four reasons make it a lot more difficult for democratic culture to spread as a civilizational choice, not merely as a political choice.
第四个理由,我相信是 在此幻灯片上我称它为阻力的意识形态。 我想表达的意思是, 如果这个世界当今的超级大国是一个共产主义国家, 那么对于民主倡导者就会更容易的 使用民主激进主义 作为对抗殖民主义的阻力, 相比之下,如今世界的强国是美国, 占领了某些土地 也同时支持着民主的理想。 这样看来,粗略的说这四个理由 使民主文化的扩散变得越来越困难 尤其是作为一种文明的抉择, 而不仅仅是一种政治的选择。
When talking about those reasons, let's break down certain preconceptions. Is it just about grievances? Is it just about a lack of education? Well statistically, the majority of those who join extremist organizations are highly educated. Statistically, they are educated, on average, above the education levels of Western society. Anecdotally, we can demonstrate that if poverty was the only factor, well Bin Laden is from one of the richest families in Saudi Arabia. His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was a pediatrician -- not an ill-educated man. International aid and development has been going on for years, but extremism in those societies, in many of those societies, has been on the rise. And what I believe is missing is genuine grassroots activism on the ground, in addition to international aid, in addition to education, in addition to health. Not exclusive to these things, but in addition to them, is propagating a genuine demand for democracy on the ground.
当我们谈到这些理由时, 我们应该先打破某些先入概念。 仅仅是关于冤屈不满么? 仅仅是关于缺少教育么? 统计上表明, 大多数加入极端分子组织的人都有很高的教育程度。 统计上说,他们平均的受教育程度 要高于西方社会的 教育程度。 举例来说,我们可以证实 贫穷是否是唯一的因素, 本拉登是来自沙特阿拉伯最富有的国家之一。 他的副手,扎瓦西里,是一名儿科医生-- 而不是缺乏教育的人。 近几年国际援助和发展都在继续着, 但是在这些社会中的极端主义, 都在迅速发展。 我坚信缺少的 是真正的基层运动 尤其是在前线, 除了国际援助以外, 除了教育,除了健康。 不是独立于这些,而是和它们并存的 是宣传对基层民主主义的真正需求。
And this is where I believe neoconservatism had it upside-down. Neoconservatism had the philosophy that you go in with a supply-led approach to impose democratic values from the top down. Whereas Islamists and far-right organizations, for decades, have been building demand for their ideology on the grassroots. They've been building civilizational demand for their values on the grassroots, and we've been seeing those societies slowly transition to societies that are increasingly asking for a form of Islamism. Mass movements in Pakistan have been represented after the Arab uprisings mainly by organizations claiming for some form of theocracy, rather than for a democratic uprising. Because since pre-partition, they've been building demand for their ideology on the ground. And what's needed is a genuine transnational youth-led movement that works to actively advocate for the democratic culture -- which is necessarily more than just elections. But without freedom of speech, you can't have free and fair elections. Without human rights, you don't have the protection granted to you to campaign. Without freedom of belief, you don't have the right to join organizations.
我相信这也是 后保守主义出现本末倒置之处。 后保守主义的理念是 你由一个供给引领的途径着手 由高层到基层的施加民主价值观。 然而伊斯兰分子和极度右倾组织,历经几十年, 逐步的构建他们对基层思想意识的需求。 他们构建了对他们所崇尚价值观的文明需求 特别是在基层, 我们也看到了这些社会的缓慢转型 成为对某种伊斯兰主义逐渐需求的 社会体制。 巴基斯坦的群众运动 在阿拉伯起义后,主要由 声称要构建某种神权政体 的组织所代表, 而不是代表一种民主起义。 因为从预分割时期开始, 他们就一直致力于在基层构建对他们思想体系的需求。 其中最需要的就是一种真实的跨国境的 青年人引领的运动 能够积极的推崇 民主文化-- 必然 不仅仅是选举。 但是没有言论自由,也就不会出现自由公正的选举。 没有人权,你就不会有去竞选的保障。 没有信仰自由, 你不会有参加组织的权利。
So what's needed is those organizations on the ground advocating for the democratic culture itself to create the demand on the ground for this culture. What that will do is avoid the problem I was talking about earlier, where currently we have political parties presenting democracy as merely a political choice in those societies alongside other choices such as military rule and theocracy. Whereas if we start building this demand on the ground on a civilizational level, rather than merely on a political level, a level above politics -- movements that are not political parties, but are rather creating this civilizational demand for this democratic culture. What we'll have in the end is this ideal that you see on the slide here -- the ideal that people should vote in an existing democracy, not for a democracy. But to get to that stage, where democracy builds the fabric of society and the political choices within that fabric, but are certainly not theocratic and military dictatorship -- i.e. you're voting in a democracy, in an existing democracy, and that democracy is not merely one of the choices at the ballot box. To get to that stage, we genuinely need to start building demand in those societies on the ground.
因此,我们需要的是那些在一线的组织 推崇民主文化 从而在这些地区引起对这种文化的需求。 这样就可以 避免我先前谈到的问题, 特别是当前那些代表民主主义的政党 在那些社会里只是一种政治选择 和其他的选择一起 例如军事统治和神权政治。 然而如果我们可以从文明水平在基层极度构建这种需求, 不是仅仅从政治水平, 从一个高于政治的水平-- 不是有关政党的运动, 而是创造这种文明需求 这种民主文化的运动 我们最后会拥有的 会是你们可以在这个幻灯片上看到的理想情况 一种人们可以在民主中投票 而不是为了民主投票的理想 但是为了达到那个阶段 民主建立于社会构造 和构造中的政治选择之上, 但肯定不是神权政体和军事独裁-- 比如说,你在民主中投票, 在一个现存的民主体制中, 这种民主不仅仅是投票箱中的选择之一。 为了达到那个阶段, 我们实着需要开始构建那些基层的社会里 的需求。
Now to conclude, how does that happen? Well, Egypt is a good starting point. The Arab uprisings have demonstrated that this is already beginning. But what happened in the Arab uprisings and what happened in Egypt was particularly cathartic for me. What happened there was a political coalition gathered together for a political goal, and that was to remove the leader. We need to move one step beyond that now. We need to see how we can help those societies move from political coalitions, loosely based political coalitions, to civilizational coalitions that are working for the ideals and narratives of the democratic culture on the ground. Because it's not enough to remove a leader or ruler or dictator. That doesn't guarantee that what comes next will be a society built on democratic values.
现在总结一下,这是如何发生的? 埃及是一个很好的出发点。 阿拉伯起义证实了这一切已经开始。 但发生在阿拉伯起义和埃及的情况 却独独对我起了净化的作用。 发生在那里的情况是一场政治联合 为了一个政治目的聚集在一起, 目的是推翻领导者。 我们现在需要采取进一步的行动。 我们需要了解如何才能帮助那些社会 从政治联合, 非常松散的政治联合, 改变成文明的联合 能为基层的民主文化的 理想和名目而效力。 因为这对于推翻一名领导者 统治者,或是独裁者来说还不够。 因它无法保证接下来的 将会是一个建立于民主价值上的社会。
But generally, the trends that start in Egypt have historically spread across the MENA region, the Middle East and North Africa region. So when Arab socialism started in Egypt, it spread across the region. In the '80s and '90s when Islamism started in the region, it spread across the MENA region as a whole.
但总的来说,起始于埃及的趋势 历史性的席卷了MENA地区, 中东和北非地区。 因此当阿拉伯社会主义在埃及兴起的时候,传遍了那个地区。 在80和90年代,当伊斯兰主义在那个地区兴起的时候, 就席卷了中东北美地区全部。
And the aspiration that we have at the moment -- as young Arabs are proving today and instantly rebranding themselves as being prepared to die for more than just terrorism -- is that there is a chance that democratic culture can start in the region and spread across to the rest of the countries that are surrounding that. But that will require helping these societies transition from having merely political coalitions to building genuinely grassroots-based social movements that advocate for the democratic culture. And we've made a start for that in Pakistan with a movement called Khudi, where we are working on the ground to encourage the youth to create genuine buy-in for the democratic culture. And it's with that thought that I'll end.
我们当下渴望的是-- 就如年轻阿拉伯人今天所证实的 即刻重新定位了他们自己 准备好不仅仅是为恐怖主义捐躯-- 就是有一个机会 可以使民主文化在该地区发展壮大 传遍周边国家。 但那会需要 我们帮助这些社会从 仅仅有政治联合 过渡到创建真正的基层社会运动 来推崇民主文化。 我们已经从巴基斯坦开始开展 一项运动,称为Khudi, 在那里,我们在基层致力于鼓励年轻人 建立对民主文化的真正认同。 我将以这个想法作为结尾。
And my time is up, and thank you for your time.
今天就讲到这了,感谢各位的参与。
(Applause)
(鼓掌)