Let's say you despise Western democracy. Democracy, in all its trappings, free elections, town halls, endless debates about the proper role of government. Too messy, too unpredictable, too constraining for your taste. And the way these democracies band together and lecture everyone else about individual rights and freedoms -- it gets under your skin.
Recimo da prezirete zapadnu demokratiju. Demokratiju i sve što ide uz nju, slobodne izbore, gradske skupštine, beskrajne debate o adekvatnoj ulozi vlasti. Previše haotično, previše nepredvidivo, suviše ograničavajuće za vaš ukus. Još i način na koji se ove demokratije udružuju i drže predavanja svima ostalima o individualnim pravima i slobodama - izluđuje vas.
So what to do about it? You can call out the hypocrisy and failures of Western democracies and explain how your way is better, but that's never really worked for you. What if you could get the people whose support is the very foundation of these democracies to start questioning the system? Make the idea occur in their own minds that democracy and its institutions are failing them, their elite are corrupt puppet masters and the country they knew is in free fall. To do that, you'll need to infiltrate the information spheres of these democracies. You'll need to turn their most powerful asset -- an open mind -- into their greatest vulnerability. You'll need people to question the truth.
Pa, šta učiniti u vezi sa time? Možete ukazivati na licemerje i neuspehe u zapadnim demokratijama i objašnjavati kako je vaš način bolji, ali to vam nikad nije baš uspevalo. Šta ako biste ubedili ljude čija podrška predstavlja samu osnovu ovih demokratija da počnu da preispituju sistem? Ako biste im stvorili ideju u glavi da ih demokratija i njene institucije izneveravaju, da njenu elitu čine korumpirani ljudi koji povlače konce i da država kakvom je poznaju strmoglavo pada. Da biste to postigli, moraćete da se infiltrirate u sfere informacija ovih demokratija. Moraćete da preokrenete njihovu najsnažniju prednost - otvoreni um - u njihovu najveću slabost. Biće vam potrebno da ljudi dovode u pitanje istinu.
Now, you'll be familiar of hacking and leaks that happened in 2016. One was the Democratic National Committee's networks, and the personal email accounts of its staff, later released on WikiLeaks. After that, various online personas, like a supposed Romanian cybercriminal who didn't speak Romanian, aggressively pushed news of these leaks to journalists. The media took the bait. They were consumed by how much the DNC hated Bernie. At the time, it was that narrative that far outshined the news that a group of Russian government sponsored hackers who we called "Advanced Persistent Threat 28," or "APT28" for short, was carrying out these operations against the US.
Upoznati ste sa hakovanjima i curenjem informacija iz 2016. godine. Jedno se dogodilo mrežama Demokratskog nacionalnog komiteta i ličnim nalozima za imejl njegovih zaposlenih, što je kasnije objavljeno na Vikiliksu. Nakon toga su razne ličnosti na internetu, poput navodnog rumunskog sajber kriminalca koji ne govori rumunski, agresivno novinarima poturile vesti o ovim curenjima. Mediji su zagrizli udicu. Bili su obuzeti time koliko Demokratski nacionalni komitet mrzi Bernija. U to vreme, bio je to narativ koji je znatno zasenio vesti da je grupa hakera koje je sponzorisala ruska vlada, a koje smo nazvali „Napredna trajna pretnja 28“ ili skraćeno „NTP28“, sprovodila ove operacije protiv SAD-a.
And there was no shortage of evidence. This group of Russian government hackers hadn't just appeared out of nowhere in 2016. We had started tracking this group back in 2014. And the tools that APT28 used to compromise its victims' networks demonstrated a thoughtful, well-resourced effort that had taken place for now over a decade in Moscow's time zone from about 9 am to 6 pm. APT28 loved to prey on the emails and contacts of journalists in Chechnya, the Georgian government, eastern European defense attachés -- all targets with an undeniable interest to the Russian government.
Dokaza nije manjkalo. Grupa hakera ruske vlade nije se tek tako pojavila niotkuda 2016. godine. Počeli smo da pratimo ovu grupu još 2014. godine. Sredstva koja je NTP28 koristila da bi kompromitovala mreže svojih žrtava ukazala su na promišljene, dobro opremljene aktivnosti koje su se više od decenije odvijale po moskovskoj vremenskoj zoni od 9 sati pre podne do 6 sati po podne. NTP28 je obožavala da lovi imejlove i kontakte novinara u Čečeniji, gruzijske vlade, istočnoevropskih vojnih izaslanika - što su sve mete od nespornog interesa za rusku vladu.
We weren't the only ones onto this. Governments, research teams across the world, were coming to similar conclusions and observing the same types of operations. But what Russia was doing in 2016 went far beyond espionage. The DNC hack was just one of many where stolen data was posted online accompanied by a sensational narrative, then amplified in social media for lightning-speed adoption by the media. This didn't ring the alarm bells that a nation-state was trying to interfere with the credibility of another's internal affairs.
Nismo bili jedini koji su bili na tragu ovome. Vlade i istraživački timovi širom sveta dolazili su do sličnih zaključaka i osmatrali iste vrste operacija. Ali, ono što je Rusija radila 2016. godine daleko je prevazilazilo špijunažu. Hakovanje Demokratskog nacionalnog komiteta bilo je samo jedno od mnogih gde su ukradeni podaci objavljeni na internetu uz senzacionalni narativ, zatim rašireni na društvenim mrežama da bi ih mediji prihvatili munjevitom brzinom. To nije pokrenulo uzbunu da nacionalna država pokušava da ometa kredibilitet unutrašnjih pitanja druge države.
So why, collectively, did we not see this coming? Why did it take months before Americans understood that they were under a state-sponsored information attack? The easy answer is politics. The Obama Administration was caught in a perfect catch-22. By raising the specter that the Russian government was interfering in the US presidential campaign, the Administration risked appearing to meddle in the campaign itself. But the better answer, I think, is that the US and the West were utterly unequipped to recognize and respond to a modern information operation, despite the fact that the US had wielded information with devastating success in an era not so long ago.
Pa zašto, svi zajedno, nismo ovo predvideli? Zašto je trebalo da prođu meseci pre nego što su Amerikanci shvatili da su pod informacionim napadom koji finansira druga država? Jednostavan odgovor je politika. Obamina administracija se uplela u savršenu „kvaku 22“. Stvaranjem zabrinutosti time da se ruska vlada meša u predsedničku kampanju SAD-a, administracija je rizikovala da će delovati da se i sama meša u kampanju. Ipak, bolji odgovor je, prema mom mišljenju, da su SAD i Zapad bili potpuno neopremljeni da prepoznaju i reaguju na savremenu informacionu operaciju uprkos činjenici da su SAD rukovale informacijama sa izuzetnim uspehom nedavno.
Look, so while the US and the West spent the last 20 years caught up in cybersecurity -- what networks to harden, which infrastructure to deem critical, how to set up armies of cyber warriors and cyber commands -- Russia was thinking in far more consequential terms. Before the first iPhone even hit the shelf, the Russian government understood the risks and the opportunity that technology provided and the inter-communication and instant communication it provided us.
Vidite, dok su SAD i Zapad proveli proteklih 20 godina upleteni u sajber bezbednost - koje mreže da učvrste, koje infrastrukture da razmatraju kao kritične, kako da uspostave vojsku sajber ratnika i sajber komandi - Rusija je razmišljala u mnogo dalekosežnijem pogledu. Čak i pre nego što je prvi Ajfon bio dostupan u prodaji, ruska vlada je razumela rizike i mogućnosti koje pruža tehnologija, kao i međusobnu i brzu komunikaciju koju nam je omogućila.
As our realities are increasingly based on the information that we're consuming at the palm of our hand and from the news feeds that we're scanning and the hashtags and stories that we see trending, the Russian government was the first to recognize how this evolution had turned your mind into the most exploitable device on the planet. And your mind is particularly exploitable if you're accustomed to an unfettered flow of information, now increasingly curated to your own tastes. This panorama of information that's so interesting to you gives a state, or anyone for that matter, a perfect back door into your mind.
Kako se naša stvarnost sve više zasniva na informacijama koje koristimo iz izvora na stalnom raspolaganju, na najnovijim objavljenim sadržajima kroz koje prelećemo, haštagovima i pričama koje vidimo da su popularne, ruska vlada je prva prepoznala kako je ovaj razvoj pretvorio naš um u sredstvo koje se najbolje može iskoristiti na planeti. A vaš um se naročito može iskoristiti ako ste navikli na slobodni protok informacija koje su sada sve više probrane u skladu sa vašim ukusom. Ova panorama informacija koja vam je toliko zanimljiva pruža državi, kao i bilo kome drugom, savršen sporedni ulaz u vaš um.
It's this new brand of state-sponsored information operations that can be that much more successful, more insidious, and harder for the target audience -- that includes the media -- to decipher and characterize. If you can get a hashtag trending on Twitter, or chum the waters with fake news directed to audiences primed to receive it, or drive journalists to dissect terabytes of email for a cent of impropriety -- all tactics used in Russian operations -- then you've got a shot at effectively camouflaging your operations in the mind of your target. This is what Russia's long called "reflexive control." It's the ability to use information on someone else so that they make a decision on their own accord that's favorable to you. This is nation-state-grade image control and perception management, and it's conducted by any means, with any tools, network-based or otherwise, that will achieve it.
To je novi brend informacionih operacija koje finansira država koje mogu biti toliko uspešnije, lukavije i teže da ih odgonetne i prepozna ciljna grupa, što podrazumeva medije. Ako uspete da vam hešteg postane popularan na Tviteru ili da zamutite vodu lažnim vestima upućenim publici koja je spremna da ih primi, ili da podstaknete novinare da analiziraju terabajte imejlova da bi našli mrvicu nepravilnosti - što su sve taktike korišćene u ruskim operacijama - onda imate priliku da efikasno maskirate svoje operacije u glavi svoje mete. To je ono što Rusija dugo naziva „povratna kontrola“. To je mogućnost korišćenja informacija o nekome tako da ta osoba svojevoljno donese odluku koja vam odgovara. Ovo je kontrola imidža i upravljanje percepcijom na nivou nacionalne države i sprovodi se na sve načine, bilo kojim sredstvima, na bazi mreže ili ne, kojima se može ostvariti.
Take this for another example. In early February 2014, a few weeks before Russia would invade Crimea, a phone call is posted on YouTube. In it, there's two US diplomats. They sound like they're playing kingmaker in Ukraine, and worse, they curse the EU for its lack of speed and leadership in resolving the crisis. The media covers the phone call, and then the ensuing diplomatic backlash leaves Washington and Europe reeling. And it creates a fissured response and a feckless attitude towards Russia's land grab in Ukraine. Mission accomplished.
Uzmite ovo kao još jedan primer. Početkom februara 2014. godine, nekoliko nedelja pre nego što će Rusija napasti Krim, na Jutjubu je objavljen telefonski razgovor. U njemu su dve diplomate SAD-a. Zvuče kao da vrše uticaj na ostvarivanje pobede u Ukrajini i, što je još gore, psuju EU zbog nedostatka brzine i rukovodstva u rešavanju krize. Mediji su preneli telefonski poziv, a zatim je posledična diplomatska reakcija poljuljala Vašington i Evropu i stvorila podeljene odgovore i slab odnos prema ruskom otimanju zemlje u Ukrajini. Misija ispunjena.
So while hacked phone calls and emails and networks keep grabbing the headlines, the real operations are the ones that are influencing the decisions you make and the opinions you hold, all in the service of a nation-state's strategic interest. This is power in the information age. And this information is all that much more seductive, all that much easier to take at face value and pass on, when it's authentic. Who's not interested in the truth that's presented in phone calls and emails that were never intended for public consumption? But how meaningful is that truth if you don't know why it's being revealed to you?
Dakle, dok su hakovani telefonski pozivi, imejlovi i mreže uporno osvajali naslovnice, prave operacije su one koje utiču na odluke koje donosite i mišljenja kojih se pridržavate, sve u službi strateškog interesa nacionalne države. To je moć informacionog doba. Ove informacije su utoliko zavodljivije, utoliko lakše da se prihvate kao istinite i proslede dalje, kada su autentične. Koga ne zanima istina prikazana u telefonskim pozivima i imejlovima koji nikad nisu bili predviđeni za javnu upotrebu? Međutim, koliko ima značaja ta istina ako ne znate zašto vam je razotkrivena?
We must recognize that this place where we're increasingly living, which we've quaintly termed "cyberspace," isn't defined by ones and zeroes, but by information and the people behind it. This is far more than a network of computers and devices. This is a network composed of minds interacting with computers and devices.
Moramo prihvatiti da to mesto na kome sve više obitavamo, koje smo neobično nazvali „sajber prostor“, ne definišu jedinice i nule, već informacije i ljudi koje stoje iza njih. Ovo podrazumeva mnogo više od mreže kompjutera i uređaja. Ovo je mreža sačinjena od umova u interakciji sa kompjuterima i uređajima.
And for this network, there's no encryption, there's no firewall, no two-factor authentication, no password complex enough to protect you. What you have for defense is far stronger, it's more adaptable, it's always running the latest version. It's the ability to think critically: call out falsehood, press for the facts. And above all, you must have the courage to unflinchingly pursue the truth.
A u slučaju ove mreže nema enkripcije, nema zaštitnog zida, nema dvofaktorske autentifikacije, nema dovoljno složene šifre da bi vas zaštitila. Ono što imate kao odbranu mnogo je jače, prilagodljivije i uvek koristi najnoviju verziju. To je sposobnost kritičkog razmišljanja: glasno obznanite neistine, vršite pritisak da biste dobili činjenice. A pre svega morate imati hrabrosti da nepokolebljivo tragate za istinom.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)