Chris Anderson: Julian, welcome. It's been reported that WikiLeaks, your baby, has, in the last few years has released more classified documents than the rest of the world's media combined. Can that possibly be true?
Chris Anderson: Julian, dobrodošel. Pravijo, da je WikiLeaks, tvoj otrok, ... v zadnjih nekaj letih objavil več zaupnih dokumentov kot vsi ostali svetovni mediji skupaj. Ali je to sploh lahko res?
Julian Assange: Yeah, can it possibly be true? It's a worry -- isn't it? -- that the rest of the world's media is doing such a bad job that a little group of activists is able to release more of that type of information than the rest of the world press combined.
Julian Assange: Ja, a je to sploh lahko res? To je zaskrbljujoče -- kajne? -- da preostali svetovni mediji svoje delo opravljajo tako slabo, da je majhna skupina aktivistov sposobna objaviti več tovrstnih informacij kot preostanek svetovnega tiska skupaj.
CA: How does it work? How do people release the documents? And how do you secure their privacy?
CA: Kako deluje? Kako ljudje odstopijo dokumente? In kako zavarujete njihovo zasebnost?
JA: So these are -- as far as we can tell -- classical whistleblowers, and we have a number of ways for them to get information to us. So we use this state-of-the-art encryption to bounce stuff around the Internet, to hide trails, pass it through legal jurisdictions like Sweden and Belgium to enact those legal protections. We get information in the mail, the regular postal mail, encrypted or not, vet it like a regular news organization, format it -- which is sometimes something that's quite hard to do, when you're talking about giant databases of information -- release it to the public and then defend ourselves against the inevitable legal and political attacks.
JA: Torej, gre za -- kolikor vemo -- klasične žvižgače (whistleblowers). In za njih imamo več načinov, kako spraviti informacije do nas. Tako uporabljamo najsodobnejše kodiranje, da zadeve premetavamo po internetu, da skrijemo sledi, jih pošljemo skozi pravosodja kot sta švedsko in belgijsko, da bi uveljavljali njihovo pravno zaščito. Informacije dobimo po elektronski pošti, navadni pošti, kodirane ali ne, jih skrbno pregledamo kot običajna novičarska organizacija, jih oblikujemo -- kar je včasih nekaj, kar je zelo težko narediti, ko govorimo o velikanskih podatkovnih bazah informacij -- jih damo v javnost in se potem branimo pred neizogibnimi pravnimi in političnimi napadi.
CA: So you make an effort to ensure the documents are legitimate, but you actually almost never know who the identity of the source is?
CA: Torej se trudite zagotoviti, da so dokumenti pravi. Vendar dejansko skoraj nikoli ne veste, kakšna je identiteta vira.
JA: That's right, yeah. Very rarely do we ever know, and if we find out at some stage then we destroy that information as soon as possible. (Phone ring) God damn it.
JA: To je res, ja. Zelo redko to vemo. In če v kateri fazi vseeno izvemo, to informacijo uničimo takoj, ko je mogoče. (telefon zvoni) Prekleto.
(Laughter)
(smeh)
CA: I think that's the CIA asking what the code is for a TED membership.
CA: Mislim, da je to CIA, ki jo zanima šifra za članstvo v TED.
(Laughter)
(smeh)
So let's take [an] example, actually. This is something you leaked a few years ago. If we can have this document up ... So this was a story in Kenya a few years ago. Can you tell us what you leaked and what happened?
Torej, vzemimo dejanski primer. To je nekaj, kar ste spustili v javnost pred nekaj leti. Če lahko pokažete tale dokument Torej, to je bila zgodba v Keniji pred nekaj leti. Nam lahko poveš, kaj ste objavili in kaj se je zgodilo?
JA: So this is the Kroll Report. This was a secret intelligence report commissioned by the Kenyan government after its election in 2004. Prior to 2004, Kenya was ruled by Daniel arap Moi for about 18 years. He was a soft dictator of Kenya. And when Kibaki got into power -- through a coalition of forces that were trying to clean up corruption in Kenya -- they commissioned this report, spent about two million pounds on this and an associated report. And then the government sat on it and used it for political leverage on Moi, who was the richest man -- still is the richest man -- in Kenya. It's the Holy Grail of Kenyan journalism. So I went there in 2007, and we managed to get hold of this just prior to the election -- the national election, December 28. When we released that report, we did so three days after the new president, Kibaki, had decided to pal up with the man that he was going to clean out, Daniel arap Moi, so this report then became a dead albatross around President Kibaki's neck.
JA: Torej, to je Krollovo poročilo. To je bilo tajno obveščevalno poročilo, ki ga je naročila kenijska vlada po izvolitvi leta 2004. Pred 2004 je Keniji vladal Daniel arap Moi, in sicer okoli 18 let. Bil je blag diktator Kenije. Ko pa je na oblast prišel Kibaki -- skozi koalicijo sil, ki so poskušale odpraviti korupcijo v Keniji -- so naročili to poročilo; porabili so okoli dva milijona funtov (2,4 mio €) za to in povezano poročilo. Potem pa je vlada sedela na njem in ga uporabila kot politični vzvod proti Moi-ju, ki je bil najbogatejši človek -- še vedno je najbogatejši človek -- v Keniji. Je sveti gral kenijskega novinarstva. Tako sem šel leta 2007 tja in uspeli smo ga dobiti ravno pred volitvami -- državnimi volitvami, 28. decembra. Ko smo poročilo objavili, smo ga objavili tri dni po tem, ko se je novi predsednik, Kibaki, odločil, da se spajdaši s človekom, kateremu je želel vse pobrati, Danielom arapom Moi-jem. To poročilo je tako postalo mlinski kamen okoli vratu samega predsednika Kibakija.
CA: And -- I mean, to cut a long story short -- word of the report leaked into Kenya, not from the official media, but indirectly, and in your opinion, it actually shifted the election. JA: Yeah. So this became front page of the Guardian and was then printed in all the surrounding countries of Kenya, in Tanzanian and South African press. And so it came in from the outside. And that, after a couple of days, made the Kenyan press feel safe to talk about it. And it ran for 20 nights straight on Kenyan TV, shifted the vote by 10 percent, according to a Kenyan intelligence report, which changed the result of the election.
CA: In -- mislim, da povemo na kratko -- beseda o poročilu je pricurljala v Kenijo, ne iz uradnih medijev, temveč posredno. In po vašem mnenju je to dejansko spremenilo volitve. JA: Ja. To je pristalo na naslovnici Guardiana, potem pa so jo natisnili v vseh sosednjih državah Kenije, v tanzanijskem in južnoafriškem tisku. Tako je torej prišlo od zunaj. In to je po nekaj dneh opogumilo kenijski tisk, da je začel govoriti o tem. Na kenijski TV so o tem govorili 20 noči zaporedoma in glede na kenijsko obveščevalno poročilo je to premaknilo glasove za 10 odstotkov, kar je spremenilo rezultat volitev.
CA: Wow, so your leak really substantially changed the world?
CA: Uau, torej je vaša objava v resnici bistveno spremenila svet?
JA: Yep.
JA: Jap.
(Applause)
(aplavz)
CA: Here's -- We're going to just show a short clip from this Baghdad airstrike video. The video itself is longer, but here's a short clip. This is -- this is intense material, I should warn you.
CA: Tukaj je -- pokazali bomo samo kratek izsek iz tega video posnetka letalskega napada na Bagdad. Video sám je daljši. Ampak tukaj je kratek izsek. To je -- opozoriti vas moram, da gre za nasilno gradivo.
Radio: ... just fuckin', once you get on 'em just open 'em up. I see your element, uh, got about four Humvees, uh, out along ... You're clear. All right. Firing. Let me know when you've got them. Let's shoot. Light 'em all up. C'mon, fire! (Machine gun fire) Keep shoot 'n. Keep shoot 'n. (Machine gun fire) Keep shoot 'n. Hotel ... Bushmaster Two-Six, Bushmaster Two-Six, we need to move, time now! All right, we just engaged all eight individuals. Yeah, we see two birds [helicopters], and we're still firing. Roger. I got 'em. Two-Six, this is Two-Six, we're mobile. Oops, I'm sorry. What was going on? God damn it, Kyle. All right, hahaha. I hit 'em.
Radio: ... samo jebeno, ko boš enkrat na njih, jih samo odpri. Vidim tvoj element, ee, imamo približno štiri Humveeje, ee, zunaj ob ... Imaš dovoljenje. Prav. Streljam. Sporoči mi, ko jih boš zadel. Streljajmo. Vse jih vžgi. Daj, streljaj! (streljanje strojnice) Nadaljuj s streljanjem. Nadaljuj s streljanjem. (streljanje strojnice) Nadaljuj s streljanjem. Hotel ... Bushmaster Dva-šest, Bushmaster Dva-šest, premakniti se moramo, zdaj! Prav, pravkar smo napadli vseh osem posameznikov. Ja, vidimo dve ptici [helikopterja] in še vedno streljamo. Razumem. Zadel sem jih. Dva-šest, to je Dva-šest, premikamo se. Ups, žal mi je. Kaj se je dogajalo? Prekleto, Kyle. Prav, hahaha. Zadel sem jih.
CA: So, what was the impact of that?
CA: Torej, kakšen vtis je pustilo tole?
JA: The impact on the people who worked on it was severe. We ended up sending two people to Baghdad to further research that story. So this is just the first of three attacks that occurred in that scene.
JA: Vtis na ljudi, ki so delali na tem, je bil močan. Na koncu smo poslali dva človeka v Bagdad, da bi dodatno raziskala to zgodbo. To je samo prvi od treh napadov, ki so se zgodili na tem prizorišču.
CA: So, I mean, 11 people died in that attack, right, including two Reuters employees?
CA: Torej, mislim, 11 ljudi je umrlo v tem napadu, kajne, vključno z dvema Reutersovima zaposlenima?
JA: Yeah. Two Reuters employees, two young children were wounded. There were between 18 and 26 people killed all together.
JA: Ja. Dva Reutersova zaposlena, dva majhna otroka sta bila ranjena. Vse skupaj je bilo ubitih med 18 in 26 ljudi.
CA: And releasing this caused widespread outrage. What was the key element of this that actually caused the outrage, do you think?
CA: In objava tega je povzročila vsesplošno ogorčenje. Kaj misliš, kaj je bil tisti ključni del tega, ki je dejansko povzročil ogorčenje?
JA: I don't know. I guess people can see the gross disparity in force. You have guys walking in a relaxed way down the street, and then an Apache helicopter sitting up at one kilometer firing 30-millimeter cannon shells on everyone -- looking for any excuse to do so -- and killing people rescuing the wounded. And there was two journalists involved that clearly weren't insurgents because that's their full-time job.
JA: Ne vem, mislim, da ljudje lahko vidijo veliko nesorazmerje moči. Imate moške, ki sproščeno hodijo po ulici, in potem helikopter Apache na višini enega kilometra, ki strelja 30-milimetrske naboje na vse -- iščoč vsakršen izgovor za to -- in ubija ljudi, ki rešujejo ranjene. In udeležena sta bila dva novinarja, ki nedvomno nista bila upornika, ker je to njuna redna zaposlitev.
CA: I mean, there's been this U.S. intelligence analyst, Bradley Manning, arrested, and it's alleged that he confessed in a chat room to have leaked this video to you, along with 280,000 classified U.S. embassy cables. I mean, did he?
CA: Mislim, nek analitik ameriške obveščevalne službe, Bradley Manning, je bil aretiran. In baje je v nekem spletnem klepetu priznal, da je on spravil video do vas skupaj z 280.000 zaupnimi telegrami ameriškega veleposlaništva. Mislim, a je?
JA: We have denied receiving those cables. He has been charged, about five days ago, with obtaining 150,000 cables and releasing 50. Now, we had released, early in the year, a cable from the Reykjavik U.S. embassy, but this is not necessarily connected. I mean, I was a known visitor of that embassy.
JA: No, mi smo zanikali, da bi dobili te telegrame. Bil je obtožen pred približno petimi dnevi, da si je pridobil 150.000 telegramov in jih 50 dal na razpolago. No, mi smo v začetku leta objavili telegram iz ameriškega veleposlaništva v Reykjaviku. Ampak to ni nujno povezano. Mislim, bil sem reden obiskovalec tistega veleposlaništva.
CA: I mean, if you did receive thousands of U.S. embassy diplomatic cables ...
CA: Mislim, če ste prejeli tisoče diplomatskih telegramov ameriškega veleposlaništva ...
JA: We would have released them. (CA: You would?)
JA: Bi jih objavili. (CA: Bi jih?)
JA: Yeah. (CA: Because?)
JA: Ja. (CA: Ker?)
JA: Well, because these sort of things reveal what the true state of, say, Arab governments are like, the true human-rights abuses in those governments. If you look at declassified cables, that's the sort of material that's there.
JA: No, ker takšne stvari razkrijejo, kakšne so v resnici razmere v, recimo, arabskih vladah, resnične zlorabe človekovih pravic v teh vladah. Če pogledate v objavljene zaupne telegrame, tam najdete takšne stvari.
CA: So let's talk a little more broadly about this. I mean, in general, what's your philosophy? Why is it right to encourage leaking of secret information?
CA: Torej, pogovoriva se malo bolj na široko o tem. Mislim, na splošno, kakšna je tvoja filozofija? Zakaj je prav spodbujati izdajanje tajnih informacij?
JA: Well, there's a question as to what sort of information is important in the world, what sort of information can achieve reform. And there's a lot of information. So information that organizations are spending economic effort into concealing, that's a really good signal that when the information gets out, there's a hope of it doing some good -- because the organizations that know it best, that know it from the inside out, are spending work to conceal it. And that's what we've found in practice, and that's what the history of journalism is.
JA: No, tu je vprašanje, katera vrsta informacij je pomembna v svetu, katera vrsta informacij lahko doseže reformo. In obstaja ogromno informacij. Informacije, za katere organizacije porabljajo ekonomska sredstva, da bi jih prikrile, so zelo dober signal, da, ko bodo informacije enkrat zunaj, obstaja upanje, da bodo naredile nekaj dobrega. Ker se organizacije, ki jih najbolje poznajo, ki jih poznajo z vseh strani, trudijo, da bi jih prikrile. In to smo odkrili v praksi. In to je zgodovina novinarstva.
CA: But are there risks with that, either to the individuals concerned or indeed to society at large, where leaking can actually have an unintended consequence?
CA: Vendar, ali obstajajo tudi tveganja za vpletene posameznike, ali za družbo na splošno, kjer lahko ima izdajanje dejansko nenamerne posledice?
JA: Not that we have seen with anything we have released. I mean, we have a harm immunization policy. We have a way of dealing with information that has sort of personal -- personally identifying information in it. But there are legitimate secrets -- you know, your records with your doctor; that's a legitimate secret -- but we deal with whistleblowers that are coming forward that are really sort of well-motivated.
JA: Ne, kolikor smo videli pri čemerkoli, kar smo objavili. Mislim, imamo politiko imunizacije pred škodo. Imamo način, kako ravnamo z informacijami, ki imajo neke vrste osebno -- ki vsebujejo informacijo o osebni identiteti. Vendar pa so tudi legitimne skrivnosti -- veste, vaša kartoteka pri vašem doktorju; to je legitimna skrivnost. Vendar delamo z žvižgači, ki nam pristopijo, ki so v resnici na nek način zelo motivirani.
CA: So they are well-motivated. And what would you say to, for example, the, you know, the parent of someone whose son is out serving the U.S. military, and he says, "You know what, you've put up something that someone had an incentive to put out. It shows a U.S. soldier laughing at people dying. That gives the impression, has given the impression, to millions of people around the world that U.S. soldiers are inhuman people. Actually, they're not. My son isn't. How dare you?" What would you say to that?
CA: Torej so zelo motivirani. In kaj bi rekli, na primer, veste, staršu nekoga -- čigar sin služi v ameriški vojski in pravi, "Veste kaj, objavili ste nekaj, kar je nekomu bilo v interesu, da objavi. Prikazuje ameriškega vojaka, ki se smeji ljudem, ki umirajo. To daje vtis -- je dalo vtis milijonom ljudi po svetu, da so ameriški vojaki nehumani ljudje. Vendar v resnici niso. Moj sin ni. Kako si drznete?" Kako bi se odzvali na to?
JA: Yeah, we do get a lot of that. But remember, the people in Baghdad, the people in Iraq, the people in Afghanistan -- they don't need to see the video; they see it every day. So it's not going to change their opinion. It's not going to change their perception. That's what they see every day. It will change the perception and opinion of the people who are paying for it all, and that's our hope.
JA: Ja, to velikokrat slišimo. Vendar si zapomnite, ljudje v Bagdadu, ljudem v Iraku, ljudem v Afganistanu -- ni treba videti tega videa; to vidijo vsak dan. Tako, da to ne bo spremenilo njihovega mnenja. Ne bo spremenilo njihovega dojemanja. To je to, kar vidijo vsak dan. Spremenilo bo dojemanje in mnenje ljudi, ki vse to financirajo. To je naše upanje.
CA: So you found a way to shine light into what you see as these sort of dark secrets in companies and in government. Light is good. But do you see any irony in the fact that, in order for you to shine that light, you have to, yourself, create secrecy around your sources?
CA: Torej ste našli način, da osvetlite to, kar vidite kot neke vrste temne skrivnosti podjetij in vlade. Svetloba je dobra. Vendar, ali vidite kakšno ironijo v dejstvu, da, če želite te stvari osvetliti, morate vi sami ustvariti tajnost okoli svojih virov?
JA: Not really. I mean, we don't have any WikiLeaks dissidents yet. We don't have sources who are dissidents on other sources. Should they come forward, that would be a tricky situation for us, but we're presumably acting in such a way that people feel morally compelled to continue our mission, not to screw it up.
JA: Niti ne. Mislim, zaenkrat še nimamo kakšnih odpadnikov WikiLeaks. Nimamo virov, ki so odpadniki kakšnih drugih virov. Če bi se razkrili, bi bila za nas to kočljiva situacija. Ampak verjetno delujemo na tak način, da se ljudje čutijo moralno primorane, da dopustijo nadaljevanje našega poslanstva, ne pa, da bi ga zafrknili.
CA: I'd actually be interested, just based on what we've heard so far -- I'm curious as to the opinion in the TED audience. You know, there might be a couple of views of WikiLeaks and of Julian. You know, hero -- people's hero -- bringing this important light. Dangerous troublemaker. Who's got the hero view? Who's got the dangerous troublemaker view?
CA: V bistvu bi me zanimalo, samo na podlagi tega, kar ste slišali do zdaj -- zanima me mnenje publike TED. Veste, lahko je več pogledov na WikiLeaks in na Juliana. Saj veste, junak -- ljudski junak -- ki prinaša to pomembno svetlobo. Nevaren izzivalec nemirov. Kdo ga vidi kot junaka? Kdo ga vidi kot nevarnega izzivalca nemirov?
JA: Oh, come on. There must be some.
JA: Ah, dajte no. Nekaj jih mora biti.
CA: It's a soft crowd, Julian, a soft crowd. We have to try better. Let's show them another example. Now here's something that you haven't yet leaked, but I think for TED you are. I mean it's an intriguing story that's just happened, right? What is this?
CA: Mili gledalci so, Julian, mili gledalci. Morava se bolj potruditi. Pokaživa jim še en primer. No, tukaj je nekaj, ker še niste objavili, vendar mislim, da za TED boš. Gre za zanimivo zgodbo, ki se je pravkar pripetila, kajne? Kaj je to?
JA: So this is a sample of what we do sort of every day. So late last year -- in November last year -- there was a series of well blowouts in Albania, like the well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, but not quite as big. And we got a report -- a sort of engineering analysis into what happened -- saying that, in fact, security guards from some rival, various competing oil firms had, in fact, parked trucks there and blown them up. And part of the Albanian government was in this, etc., etc. And the engineering report had nothing on the top of it, so it was an extremely difficult document for us. We couldn't verify it because we didn't know who wrote it and knew what it was about. So we were kind of skeptical that maybe it was a competing oil firm just sort of playing the issue up. So under that basis, we put it out and said, "Look, we're skeptical about this thing. We don't know, but what can we do? The material looks good, it feels right, but we just can't verify it." And we then got a letter just this week from the company who wrote it, wanting to track down the source -- (Laughter) saying, "Hey, we want to track down the source." And we were like, "Oh, tell us more. What document is it, precisely, you're talking about? Can you show that you had legal authority over that document? Is it really yours?" So they sent us this screen shot with the author in the Microsoft Word ID. Yeah. (Applause) That's happened quite a lot though. This is like one of our methods of identifying, of verifying, what a material is, is to try and get these guys to write letters.
JA: No, to je primer tega, kar počnemo praktično vsak dan. Torej, proti koncu lanskega leta -- novembra lani -- je prišlo do vrste razlitij nafte iz vrtin v Albaniji, podobnih razlitju v Mehiškem zalivu, vendar ne tako velikih. In dobili smo poročilo -- neke vrste inženirsko analizo tega, kar se je zgodilo -- ki je trdilo, da so v resnici varnostniki od nekaj konkurenčnih naftnih družb tam parkirali tovornjake in jih razstrelili. In del albanske vlade je bil vpleten, itd., itd. In to inženirsko poročilo ni imelo na vrhu ničesar. Zato je bil to skrajno težek dokument za nas. Nismo ga mogli preveriti, ker nismo vedeli, kdo ga je napisal in za kaj sploh gre. Zato smo bili do neke mere v dvomu, da mogoče kakšna konkurenčna naftna družba samo napihuje zadevo. Na tej osnovi smo ga torej dali ven in rekli, "Glejte, skeptični smo o tej zadevi. Ne vemo, ampak, kaj lahko naredimo? Gradivo izgleda v redu, zdi se pristno, vendar ga preprosto ne moremo preveriti." In potem smo ravno ta teden dobili pismo od podjetja, ki ga je napisalo, in ki je želelo izslediti vir -- (smeh) v katerem je pisalo, "Hej, želimo izslediti vir." In smo rekli, "Oh, povejte nam več. O katerem dokumentu točno govorite? Nam lahko dokažete, da imate legalno avtoriteto nad tem dokumentom? Je res vaš?" In so nam poslali sliko zaslona z avtorjem v identifikaciji Microsoft Worda. Ja. (aplavz) V bistvu se to pogosto dogaja. To je ena od naših metod identifikacije -- preverjanja, kaj je gradivo, te ljudi poskušamo pripraviti do pisanja pisem.
CA: Yeah. Have you had information from inside BP?
CA: Ja. Ste imeli notranje informacije iz BP (British Petroleum)?
JA: Yeah, we have a lot, but I mean, at the moment, we are undergoing a sort of serious fundraising and engineering effort. So our publication rate over the past few months has been sort of minimized while we're re-engineering our back systems for the phenomenal public interest that we have. That's a problem. I mean, like any sort of growing startup organization, we are sort of overwhelmed by our growth, and that means we're getting enormous quantity of whistleblower disclosures of a very high caliber but don't have enough people to actually process and vet this information.
JA: Ja, imamo jih veliko, vendar se trenutno ukvarjamo z neke vrste pomembnim zbiranjem denarja in inženiringom. Tako je naša stopnja objavljanja v zadnjih nekaj mesecih bila nekako na minimumu, med tem ko na novo postavljamo svoj sistem za izjemen interes javnosti, ki ga imamo. To je problem. Mislim, tako kot katerakoli mlada organizacija smo rahlo preplavljeni z lastno rastjo. In to pomeni, da dobivamo gromozanske količine razkritij od žvižgačev zelo velikega kalibra, vendar nimamo dovolj ljudi, da bi sploh obdelali in preverili te informacije.
CA: So that's the key bottleneck, basically journalistic volunteers and/or the funding of journalistic salaries?
CA: To je torej ključno ozko grlo, v bistvu novinarski prostovoljci in/ali financiranje novinarskih plač?
JA: Yep. Yeah, and trusted people. I mean, we're an organization that is hard to grow very quickly because of the sort of material we deal with, so we have to restructure in order to have people who will deal with the highest national security stuff, and then lower security cases.
JA: Jap. Ja in ljudje, ki jim zaupamo. Mislim, smo organizacija, ki težko zelo hitro raste zaradi vrste materiala, s katerim imamo opravka. Torej se moramo prestrukturirati, da bomo imeli ljudi, ki se bodo ukvarjali z največjimi nacionalnimi skrivnostmi in potem s primeri nižje tajnosti.
CA: So help us understand a bit about you personally and how you came to do this. And I think I read that as a kid you went to 37 different schools. Can that be right?
CA: Pomagaj nam torej razumeti tebe osebno in kako si začel to delati. In mislim, da sem prebral, da si kot otrok obiskoval 37 različnih šol. Je to sploh lahko res?
JA: Well, my parents were in the movie business and then on the run from a cult, so the combination between the two ...
JA: No, moja starša sta bila v filmski industriji, potem pa sta bežala pred kultom, tako da kombinacija tega dvojega...
(Laughter)
(smeh)
CA: I mean, a psychologist might say that's a recipe for breeding paranoia.
CA: Mislim, psiholog bi lahko rekel, da je to recept za gojenje paranoje.
JA: What, the movie business?
JA: Kaj, filmska industrija?
(Laughter)
(smeh)
(Applause)
(aplavz)
CA: And you were also -- I mean, you were also a hacker at an early age and ran into the authorities early on. JA: Well, I was a journalist. You know, I was a very young journalist activist at an early age. I wrote a magazine, was prosecuted for it when I was a teenager. So you have to be careful with hacker. I mean there's like -- there's a method that can be deployed for various things. Unfortunately, at the moment, it's mostly deployed by the Russian mafia in order to steal your grandmother's bank accounts. So this phrase is not, not as nice as it used to be.
CA: In bil si tudi -- mislim, v mladih letih si bil tudi heker in si hitro prišel navzkriž z oblastmi. JA: No, bil sem novinar. Veš, v mladih letih sem bil mlad novinarski aktivist. Pisal sem revijo in za to so me tožili, ko sem bil najstnik. Tako da moraš paziti z besedo "heker". Mislim, obstaja -- obstaja metoda, ki se jo lahko uporabi za različne namene. Na žalost jo trenutno najbolj uporablja ruska mafija, da bi ukradla bančni račun vaše babice. Ta fraza torej ni -- ni tako lepa, kot je bila včasih.
CA: Yeah, well, I certainly don't think you're stealing anyone's grandmother's bank account, but what about your core values? Can you give us a sense of what they are and maybe some incident in your life that helped determine them?
CA: Ja, no, jaz vsekakor ne mislim, da kradeš bančne račune od nekogaršnje babice. Kako pa je s tvojimi glavnimi vrednotami? Nam lahko pojasniš, katere so in mogoče kak dogodek iz tvojega življenja, ki jih je pomagal oblikovati?
JA: I'm not sure about the incident. But the core values: well, capable, generous men do not create victims; they nurture victims. And that's something from my father and something from other capable, generous men that have been in my life.
JA: Glede dogodka ne vem. Glavne vrednote pa so: torej, sposobni, velikodušni moški ne ustvarjajo žrtev, ampak za žrtve skrbijo. In to je nekaj od mojega očeta in nekaj od drugih sposobnih, velikodušnih moških, ki so bili v mojem življenju.
CA: Capable, generous men do not create victims; they nurture victims?
CA: Sposobni, velikodušni moški ne ustvarjajo žrtev; ampak za žrtve skrbijo?
JA: Yeah. And you know, I'm a combative person, so I'm not actually so big on the nurture, but some way -- there is another way of nurturing victims, which is to police perpetrators of crime. And so that is something that has been in my character for a long time.
JA: Ja. In veš, jaz sem bojevita oseba, tako da nisem ravno za nego. Ampak na nek način -- Obstaja še en način skrbi za žrtve in to je preganjanje tistih, ki zagrešijo zločine. To je torej nekaj pomembnega, kar je v mojem značaju že zelo dolgo.
CA: So just tell us, very quickly in the last minute, the story: what happened in Iceland? You basically published something there, ran into trouble with a bank, then the news service there was injuncted from running the story. Instead, they publicized your side. That made you very high-profile in Iceland. What happened next?
CA: Torej, v zadnji minuti nam zelo na hitro povej zgodbo: Kaj se je zgodilo na Islandiji? V bistvu ste tam nekaj objavili, prišli v težave z banko, potem pa so tamkajšnji tiskovni agenciji sodno prepovedali objavo zgodbe. Namesto tega so objavili vašo stran. S tem ste v Islandiji zelo zasloveli. Kaj je sledilo?
JA: Yeah, this is a great case, you know. Iceland went through this financial crisis. It was the hardest hit of any country in the world. Its banking sector was 10 times the GDP of the rest of the economy. Anyway, so we release this report in July last year. And the national TV station was injuncted five minutes before it went on air, like out of a movie: injunction landed on the news desk, and the news reader was like, "This has never happened before. What do we do?" Well, we just show the website instead, for all that time, as a filler, and we became very famous in Iceland, went to Iceland and spoke about this issue. And there was a feeling in the community that that should never happen again, and as a result, working with Icelandic politicians and some other international legal experts, we put together a new sort of package of legislation for Iceland to sort of become an offshore haven for the free press, with the strongest journalistic protections in the world, with a new Nobel Prize for freedom of speech. Iceland's a Nordic country, so, like Norway, it's able to tap into the system. And just a month ago, this was passed by the Icelandic parliament unanimously.
JA: Ja, to je imeniten primer. Islandija je šla skozi finančno krizo. Doživela je najhujši udarec med vsemi državami na svetu. Njihov bančni sektor je predstavljal 10-krat več BDP-ja kot vse ostalo gospodarstvo skupaj. Kakorkoli, to poročilo smo objavili julija lani. In nacionalna TV postaja je dobila sodno prepoved pet minut, preden so šli v eter. Kot v filmu je sodna prepoved pristala na novinarski mizi in voditelj poročil je rekel, "To se ni še nikoli zgodilo. Kaj naj pa zdaj?" No, namesto tega smo ves ta čas kot mašilo kazali spletno stran. In na Islandiji smo postali zelo znani, šli smo tja in govorili o tej zadevi. In v družbi je bil občutek, da se to ne bi smelo nikoli več zgoditi. Kot rezultat smo v sodelovanju z nekaterimi islandskimi politiki in z nekaterimi drugimi mednarodnimi pravnimi strokovnjaki pripravili neke vrste paket zakonodaje za Islandijo, da bi postala necelinsko zavetišče svobodnega tiska z najmočnejšo pravno zaščito novinarstva na svetu z novo nobelovo nagrado za svobodo govora. Islandija je nordijska država, tako da lahko kot Norveška poseže v sistem. In ravno pred enim mesecem je to soglasno potrdil islandski parlament.
CA: Wow.
CA: Uau.
(Applause)
(aplavz)
Last question, Julian. When you think of the future then, do you think it's more likely to be Big Brother exerting more control, more secrecy, or us watching Big Brother, or it's just all to be played for either way?
Zadnje vprašanje, Julian. Ko torej pomisliš na prihodnost, misliš, da je bolj verjetno, da bo Veliki brat uveljavljal več nadzora, več tajnosti, ali bomo mi nadzirali Velikega brata, ali pa se bo v vsakem primeru to šele odigralo?
JA: I'm not sure which way it's going to go. I mean, there's enormous pressures to harmonize freedom of speech legislation and transparency legislation around the world -- within the E.U., between China and the United States. Which way is it going to go? It's hard to see. That's why it's a very interesting time to be in -- because with just a little bit of effort, we can shift it one way or the other.
JA: Nisem prepričan, v katero smer bo šlo. Mislim, ogromno pritiska je, da bi se zakonodaji o svobodi govora in transparentnosti uskladili po vsem svetu -- znotraj EU, med Kitajsko in Združenimi državami. V katero smer bo šlo? Težko je predvideti. Zato je tako zanimivo biti v tem času. Zato, ker lahko s samo malo truda premaknemo stvari v eno ali drugo smer.
CA: Well, it looks like I'm reflecting the audience's opinion to say, Julian, be careful, and all power to you.
CA: No, zgleda, da odražam mnenje publike, ko pravim, Julian, čuvaj se in z vso močjo naprej.
JA: Thank you, Chris. (CA: Thank you.)
JA: Hvala, Chris. (CA: Hvala.)
(Applause)
(aplavz)