Velkommen Julian! Det forlyder at WikiLeaks, din baby, i løbet af de sidste få år har offentliggjort flere fortrolige dokumenter end resten af verdens medier samlet set. Kan det virkeligt være sandt?
Chris Anderson: Julian, welcome. It's been reported that WikiLeaks, your baby, has, in the last few years has released more classified documents than the rest of the world's media combined. Can that possibly be true?
Jeps, kan det virkeligt være sandt? Det er bekymrende, ikke? At resten af verdens medier laver så dårligt et arbejde, at en lille gruppe aktivister er i stand til at offentliggøre mere af den type information, end resten af den samlede verdenspresse.
Julian Assange: Yeah, can it possibly be true? It's a worry -- isn't it? -- that the rest of the world's media is doing such a bad job that a little group of activists is able to release more of that type of information than the rest of the world press combined.
Hvordan foregår det? Hvordan offentliggør folk dokumenterne? Og hvordan sikrer I jer deres anonymitet?
CA: How does it work? How do people release the documents? And how do you secure their privacy?
Disse folk er, så vidt vi kan se, klassiske fløjteblæsere. Og vi har flere muligheder for dem til at give information til os. Så vi benytter kun den ypperste kryptering til at sende ting rundt på internettet, til at skjule spor, kører dem igennem jurisdiktioner som Sverige eller Belgien for at retsbeskyttelse træder i kraft. Vi får information i posten, den almindelige post, krypteret eller ikke verificerer den, ligesom et almindeligt nyhedsbureau, hvilket nogen gange er noget, der er ret svært at gøre, når man snakker om gigantiske databaser med informationer, offentliggør den og forsvarer så os selv imod de uundgåelige retslige og politiske angreb.
JA: So these are -- as far as we can tell -- classical whistleblowers, and we have a number of ways for them to get information to us. So we use this state-of-the-art encryption to bounce stuff around the Internet, to hide trails, pass it through legal jurisdictions like Sweden and Belgium to enact those legal protections. We get information in the mail, the regular postal mail, encrypted or not, vet it like a regular news organization, format it -- which is sometimes something that's quite hard to do, when you're talking about giant databases of information -- release it to the public and then defend ourselves against the inevitable legal and political attacks.
Så I forsøger at sikre, at dokumenterne er ægte. Men I kender faktisk næsten aldrig kildens identitet.
CA: So you make an effort to ensure the documents are legitimate, but you actually almost never know who the identity of the source is?
Det er rigtigt jeps. Det er meget sjældent vi kender den. Og hvis vi på et tidspunkt finder ud af det, så tilintetgør vi den information hurtigst muligt. (Telefon ringer) Fandens også!
JA: That's right, yeah. Very rarely do we ever know, and if we find out at some stage then we destroy that information as soon as possible. (Phone ring) God damn it.
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Jeg tror, det er CIA, der vil vide, hvad koden er til et TED medlemsskab.
CA: I think that's the CIA asking what the code is for a TED membership.
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Så lad os tage et egentligt eksempel. Det her er noget, I lækkede for nogle få år siden. Hvis vi kan få dokumentet vist... Det her var en sag i Kenya for nogle få år siden. Vil du fortælle os, hvad I lækkede og hvad der skete?
So let's take [an] example, actually. This is something you leaked a few years ago. If we can have this document up ... So this was a story in Kenya a few years ago. Can you tell us what you leaked and what happened?
Det her er Kroll Rapporten. Det var en hemmelig efterretningsrapport, bestilt af den kenyanske regering efter dens valg i 2004. Før 2004 blev Kenya regeret af Daniel arap Moi i omkring 18 år. Han var en blød diktator i Kenya. Og da Kibaki fik magten gennem en magtkoalition, der prøvede at rydde op i korruptionen i Kenya, bestilte de denne rapport, brugte omkring 2 millioner pund på dén og en associeret rapport. Og så forvarede regeringen den og brugte den til politisk indflydelse på Moi, som var den rigeste mand, stadig er den rigeste mand, i Kenya. Den er kenyansk journalistiks hellige gral. Så jeg rejste derned i 2007, og vi klarede at få fat i den lige før valget; regeringsvalget den 28. december. Da vi offentliggjorde rapporten, det gjorde vi 3 dage efter, at den nye præsident Kibaki havde besluttet at blive venner med manden, han ville blanke af, Daniel arap Moi. Så denne rapport blev en klods om benet på præsident Kibaki.
JA: So this is the Kroll Report. This was a secret intelligence report commissioned by the Kenyan government after its election in 2004. Prior to 2004, Kenya was ruled by Daniel arap Moi for about 18 years. He was a soft dictator of Kenya. And when Kibaki got into power -- through a coalition of forces that were trying to clean up corruption in Kenya -- they commissioned this report, spent about two million pounds on this and an associated report. And then the government sat on it and used it for political leverage on Moi, who was the richest man -- still is the richest man -- in Kenya. It's the Holy Grail of Kenyan journalism. So I went there in 2007, and we managed to get hold of this just prior to the election -- the national election, December 28. When we released that report, we did so three days after the new president, Kibaki, had decided to pal up with the man that he was going to clean out, Daniel arap Moi, so this report then became a dead albatross around President Kibaki's neck.
Og jeg mener, for at gøre en lang historie kort, at rygter om rapporten lækkede ind i Kenya, ikke via de officielle medier, men indirekte. Og efter din mening ændrede det faktisk valgresultatet. Jeps! Det blev forsidestof i the Guardian og blev derefter trykt i alle Kenyas nabolande, i Tanzania og i den sydafrikanske presse. Og sådan kom det ind udefra. Og det gjorde, efter et par dage, at den kenyanske presse følte sig trygge ved at tale om det. Det kørte 20 aftener i træk på kenyansk tv, flyttede 10 procent af stemmerne, ifølge en kenyansk efterretningsrapport, hvilket ændrede valgresultatet.
CA: And -- I mean, to cut a long story short -- word of the report leaked into Kenya, not from the official media, but indirectly, and in your opinion, it actually shifted the election. JA: Yeah. So this became front page of the Guardian and was then printed in all the surrounding countries of Kenya, in Tanzanian and South African press. And so it came in from the outside. And that, after a couple of days, made the Kenyan press feel safe to talk about it. And it ran for 20 nights straight on Kenyan TV, shifted the vote by 10 percent, according to a Kenyan intelligence report, which changed the result of the election.
Wauw, så jeres lækage ændrede faktisk verden væsenligt?
CA: Wow, so your leak really substantially changed the world?
Jep!
JA: Yep.
(Bifald)
(Applause)
Her er... Vi viser blot et kort klip fra denne video af et luftangreb på Bagdad. Videoen er længere. Men her er et kort klip. Jeg bør advare jer om, at det er voldsomme scener.
CA: Here's -- We're going to just show a short clip from this Baghdad airstrike video. The video itself is longer, but here's a short clip. This is -- this is intense material, I should warn you.
...bare fucking. Når først du har dem, så bare åben dem op. Jeg kan se dit mål, uh, har omkring 4 Humvee'er, uh, ude ved... Du er fri. All right. Skyd. Sig til, når du har fået dem. Lad os skyde. Sæt ild på dem. Kom så, fyr! (Salve fra maskingevær) Bliv ved at skyde. Bliv ved at skyde. (Salve fra maskingevær) Bliv ved at skyde. Hotel... Bushmaster 2-6, Bushmaster 2-6, vi er nødt til at rykke videre, nu! All right, vi angreb lige alle 8 individer. Jeps, vi kan se to fugle og vi skyder stadig. Roger. Jeg fik dem. 2-6, dette er 2-6, vi er mobile. Ups, jeg beklager. Hvad skete der? For fanden da Kyle. All right. (Latter) Jeg fik dem.
Radio: ... just fuckin', once you get on 'em just open 'em up. I see your element, uh, got about four Humvees, uh, out along ... You're clear. All right. Firing. Let me know when you've got them. Let's shoot. Light 'em all up. C'mon, fire! (Machine gun fire) Keep shoot 'n. Keep shoot 'n. (Machine gun fire) Keep shoot 'n. Hotel ... Bushmaster Two-Six, Bushmaster Two-Six, we need to move, time now! All right, we just engaged all eight individuals. Yeah, we see two birds [helicopters], and we're still firing. Roger. I got 'em. Two-Six, this is Two-Six, we're mobile. Oops, I'm sorry. What was going on? God damn it, Kyle. All right, hahaha. I hit 'em.
Så hvilken indvirkning fik det?
CA: So, what was the impact of that?
Indvirkningen på de mennesker, der arbejdede med det, var voldsom. Vi endte med at sende to folk til Bagdad for at researche videre på den historie. Dette er blot det første af tre angreb, der forekommer i den scene.
JA: The impact on the people who worked on it was severe. We ended up sending two people to Baghdad to further research that story. So this is just the first of three attacks that occurred in that scene.
Så jeg mener, 11 mennesker døde i det angreb, ikke? Inklusiv to Reuters ansatte?
CA: So, I mean, 11 people died in that attack, right, including two Reuters employees?
Jeps! To Reuters ansatte, to små børn blev sårede. Der blev dræbt mellem 18 og 26 mennesker i alt.
JA: Yeah. Two Reuters employees, two young children were wounded. There were between 18 and 26 people killed all together.
Og at offentliggøre dette forårsagede stor skandale. Hvad var det centrale element i dette, det der egentligt forårsagede skandalen, tror du?
CA: And releasing this caused widespread outrage. What was the key element of this that actually caused the outrage, do you think?
Det ved jeg ikke, jeg tror, folk kan se den voldsomme ulighed i magt. Man har nogle fyre, der på en afslappet måde går ned ad gaden og så en Apache helikopter, der hænger i en kilometers højde og fyrer 30mm-projektiler af mod alle - de bruger enhver undskyldning - og slår folk ihjel, der hjælper de sårede. Og to journalister, der åbenlyst ikke var oprører, blev involverede.
JA: I don't know. I guess people can see the gross disparity in force. You have guys walking in a relaxed way down the street, and then an Apache helicopter sitting up at one kilometer firing 30-millimeter cannon shells on everyone -- looking for any excuse to do so -- and killing people rescuing the wounded. And there was two journalists involved that clearly weren't insurgents because that's their full-time job.
Jeg mener, denne her USA efterretningsanalytiker Bradley Manning er blevet arresteret. Og det påstås, at han i et chatrum indrømmede at have lækket denne video til jer sammen med 280.000 fortrolige telegrammer fra amerikanske ambassader. Jeg mener; gjorde han det?
CA: I mean, there's been this U.S. intelligence analyst, Bradley Manning, arrested, and it's alleged that he confessed in a chat room to have leaked this video to you, along with 280,000 classified U.S. embassy cables. I mean, did he?
Altså, vi har nægtet at have modtaget de telegrammer. Han er blevet anklaget, for omkring 5 dage siden, for at have fået fat i 150.000 telegrammer og offentliggøre 50. Se, vi offentliggjorde, tidligt på året, et telegram fra den amerikanske ambassade i Reykjavik. Men der er ikke nødvendigvis nogen sammenhæng. Jeg mener, jeg var en kendt gæst på den ambassade.
JA: We have denied receiving those cables. He has been charged, about five days ago, with obtaining 150,000 cables and releasing 50. Now, we had released, early in the year, a cable from the Reykjavik U.S. embassy, but this is not necessarily connected. I mean, I was a known visitor of that embassy.
Jeg mener, hvis I havde modtaget tusinder af diplomat-telegrammer fra amerikanske ambassader...
CA: I mean, if you did receive thousands of U.S. embassy diplomatic cables ...
Så ville vi have offentliggjort dem. Ville I?
JA: We would have released them. (CA: You would?)
Jeps! Fordi?
JA: Yeah. (CA: Because?)
Altså, fordi den slags ting afslører sandheden om f.eks. arabiske regeringer; sandheden om menneskerettighedskrænkelser i disse styrer. Hvis du ser på frigivne telegrammer, så er det den slags, man ser.
JA: Well, because these sort of things reveal what the true state of, say, Arab governments are like, the true human-rights abuses in those governments. If you look at declassified cables, that's the sort of material that's there.
Lad os tale lidt bredere om dette. Jeg mener - generelt - hvad er jeres filosofi? Hvorfor er det rigtigt, at opmuntre til at lække hemmelig information?
CA: So let's talk a little more broadly about this. I mean, in general, what's your philosophy? Why is it right to encourage leaking of secret information?
Altså, det er et spørgsmål om, hvilken type information, der er vigtig for Verden, hvilken type information, der kan forårsage reformer. Og der er masser af information. Så information, som organisationer bruger økonomisk anstrengelse på at skjule, det er et rigtigt godt signal på, at når den information kommer frem, er der håb for, at den vil forårsage noget godt. Fordi, de organisationer, der kender den bedst, der kender den ud og ind, bruger arbejde på at skjule den. Og det er, hvad vi oplever i praksis. Og det er det, der er historien om journalistik.
JA: Well, there's a question as to what sort of information is important in the world, what sort of information can achieve reform. And there's a lot of information. So information that organizations are spending economic effort into concealing, that's a really good signal that when the information gets out, there's a hope of it doing some good -- because the organizations that know it best, that know it from the inside out, are spending work to conceal it. And that's what we've found in practice, and that's what the history of journalism is.
Men er der risici ved det, enten for de enkelte involverede eller endda for hele samfundet, hvor lækage faktisk kan have en utilsigtet konsekvens?
CA: But are there risks with that, either to the individuals concerned or indeed to society at large, where leaking can actually have an unintended consequence?
Ikke så vidt vi har set med noget, vi har offentliggjort. Jeg mener, vi har en "skade-immun"-politik. Vi har en måde at omgås informationer, der har en slags personlig - personidentitetsinformation i sig. Men der er legitime hemmeligheder, du ved, din lægejournal, det er en legitim hemmelighed. Men vi har at gøre med fløjteblæsere, der egentlig har gode motiver.
JA: Not that we have seen with anything we have released. I mean, we have a harm immunization policy. We have a way of dealing with information that has sort of personal -- personally identifying information in it. But there are legitimate secrets -- you know, your records with your doctor; that's a legitimate secret -- but we deal with whistleblowers that are coming forward that are really sort of well-motivated.
Så de har gode motiver. Og hvad ville du sige til, for eksempel, du ved, en forælder, hvis søn er udstationeret med det amerikanske militær, og han siger: "Ved du hvad, du har offentliggjort noget, nogen havde bagtanker med at få offentliggjort. Det viser en amerikansk soldat, der ler af døende mennesker. Det giver det indtryk - har givet det indtryk til millioner af folk verden over, at amerikanske soldater er umenneskelige. Det er de faktisk ikke. Min søn er ikke. Hvor vover du?" Hvad ville du sige til det?
CA: So they are well-motivated. And what would you say to, for example, the, you know, the parent of someone whose son is out serving the U.S. military, and he says, "You know what, you've put up something that someone had an incentive to put out. It shows a U.S. soldier laughing at people dying. That gives the impression, has given the impression, to millions of people around the world that U.S. soldiers are inhuman people. Actually, they're not. My son isn't. How dare you?" What would you say to that?
Jeps, det får vi meget af. Men husk at folk i Bagdad, folk i Irak, folk i Afghanistan, de behøver ikke at se videoen; de ser det hver dag. Så det ændrer ikke på deres mening. Det forandrer ikke deres opfattelse. Det er, hvad de ser hver dag. Det vil ændre opfattelsen og meningen hos de folk, der betaler for det hele. Og det er vores håb.
JA: Yeah, we do get a lot of that. But remember, the people in Baghdad, the people in Iraq, the people in Afghanistan -- they don't need to see the video; they see it every day. So it's not going to change their opinion. It's not going to change their perception. That's what they see every day. It will change the perception and opinion of the people who are paying for it all, and that's our hope.
Så I fandt en måde at belyse, hvad I ser som en slags mørke hemmeligheder i firmaer og regeringer. Lys er godt. Men ser du noget ironisk i det faktum, at for at I kan belyse hemmelighederne, så er I selv nødt til at være hemmelige med hensyn til jeres kilder?
CA: So you found a way to shine light into what you see as these sort of dark secrets in companies and in government. Light is good. But do you see any irony in the fact that, in order for you to shine that light, you have to, yourself, create secrecy around your sources?
Ikke rigtigt! Jeg mener, vi har ingen WikiLeaks dissenter endnu. Vi har ingen kilder, der er dissenter på andre kilder. Skulle det komme, vil det være en tricky situation for os. Men formentlig agerer vi på en sådan måde, at folk føler sig moralsk tvunget til at fortsætte vores mission, ikke at ødelægge den.
JA: Not really. I mean, we don't have any WikiLeaks dissidents yet. We don't have sources who are dissidents on other sources. Should they come forward, that would be a tricky situation for us, but we're presumably acting in such a way that people feel morally compelled to continue our mission, not to screw it up.
Jeg ville faktisk være interesseret, bare baseret på hvad vi har hørt indtil videre - Jeg er nysgerrig efter at høre TED-publikummets mening. Du ved, måske er der et par meninger om WikiLeaks og om Julian. Du ved, helt - folkehelt - der belyser det vigtige. Farlig ballademager. Hvem mener helt? Hvem mener farlig ballademager?
CA: I'd actually be interested, just based on what we've heard so far -- I'm curious as to the opinion in the TED audience. You know, there might be a couple of views of WikiLeaks and of Julian. You know, hero -- people's hero -- bringing this important light. Dangerous troublemaker. Who's got the hero view? Who's got the dangerous troublemaker view?
Åh, come on! Der må være nogen.
JA: Oh, come on. There must be some.
Det er en blød hob Julian, en blød hob. Vi må gøre et bedre forsøg. Lad os vise dem et andet eksempel. Se, her er noget, I endnu ikke har lækket, men jeg tror, du har til TED. Jeg mener, det er en fascinerende historie, der lige er sket, ikke? Hvad er det?
CA: It's a soft crowd, Julian, a soft crowd. We have to try better. Let's show them another example. Now here's something that you haven't yet leaked, but I think for TED you are. I mean it's an intriguing story that's just happened, right? What is this?
Ja, dette er et eksempel på, hvad vi gør omtrent hver dag. Altså, sent sidste år - i november sidste år - var der en række eksplosioner af oliebrønde i Albanien ligesom eksplosionen af oliebrønden i den Mexikanske Golf men ikke helt ligeså store. Og vi fik en rapport, en slags ingeniørredegørelse over hvad, der skete. Der stod faktisk, at sikkerhedsvagter fra forskellige rivaliserende konkurrerende oliefirmaer havde parkeret lastvogne der og sprængt dem i luften. Og dele af den albanske regering var med i det, osv., osv. Og ingeniørrapporten havde ingen forside. Så det var et ekstremt svært dokument for os. Vi kunne ikke verificere det, for vi vidste ikke hvem, der havde skrevet det og kendte til dets indhold. Så vi var noget skeptiske. Måske var det et konkurrerende oliefirma, der ville blæse sagen op. Så på den basis lagde vi det ud og sagde: "Hør her, vi er skeptiske omkring det her. Vi er ikke sikre, men hvad kan vi gøre? Materialet ser godt ud, det føles rigtigt, men vi kan bare ikke verificere det." Og så modtager vi et brev netop i denne uge fra firmaet, der skrev den og gerne vil opspore kilden... (Latter) og siger: "Hey, vi vil gerne opspore kilden." Og vi var sådan: "Åh, fortæl os mere. Præcis hvilket dokument er det, I snakker om? Kan I bevise, I har de legale rettigheder over det dokument? Er det virkelig jeres?" Så sendte de os et screen shot med forfatteren og hans Microsoft Word ID. Jeps! (Bifald) Det er faktisk sket ret ofte. Det er en af vore metoder til identifikation - til verificering af materiale, at prøve at få folk til at skrive breve.
JA: So this is a sample of what we do sort of every day. So late last year -- in November last year -- there was a series of well blowouts in Albania, like the well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, but not quite as big. And we got a report -- a sort of engineering analysis into what happened -- saying that, in fact, security guards from some rival, various competing oil firms had, in fact, parked trucks there and blown them up. And part of the Albanian government was in this, etc., etc. And the engineering report had nothing on the top of it, so it was an extremely difficult document for us. We couldn't verify it because we didn't know who wrote it and knew what it was about. So we were kind of skeptical that maybe it was a competing oil firm just sort of playing the issue up. So under that basis, we put it out and said, "Look, we're skeptical about this thing. We don't know, but what can we do? The material looks good, it feels right, but we just can't verify it." And we then got a letter just this week from the company who wrote it, wanting to track down the source -- (Laughter) saying, "Hey, we want to track down the source." And we were like, "Oh, tell us more. What document is it, precisely, you're talking about? Can you show that you had legal authority over that document? Is it really yours?" So they sent us this screen shot with the author in the Microsoft Word ID. Yeah. (Applause) That's happened quite a lot though. This is like one of our methods of identifying, of verifying, what a material is, is to try and get these guys to write letters.
Jeps. Har I fået insiderinformation fra BP?
CA: Yeah. Have you had information from inside BP?
Jeps, vi har masser, men jeg mener, i øjeblikket er vi igang med et seriøs fundraising og teknisk arbejde. Så vores publikationsrate har i løbet af de sidste få måneder, været lidt minimeret, mens vi reorganiserer vores backingsystemer til den fænomenale offentlige interesse, vi har modtaget. Det er et problem. Ligesom enhver form for voksende begynderorganisation er vi en form for overvældede af vores vækst. Og det betyder, at vi fra fløjteblæsere får en enorm mængde afsløringer af en meget høj kaliber, men ikke har nok folk til egentlig at bearbejde og undersøge denne information.
JA: Yeah, we have a lot, but I mean, at the moment, we are undergoing a sort of serious fundraising and engineering effort. So our publication rate over the past few months has been sort of minimized while we're re-engineering our back systems for the phenomenal public interest that we have. That's a problem. I mean, like any sort of growing startup organization, we are sort of overwhelmed by our growth, and that means we're getting enormous quantity of whistleblower disclosures of a very high caliber but don't have enough people to actually process and vet this information.
Så det er den væsentligste flaskehals, dybest set - frivillige journalister og/eller finansieringen af journalistlønninger?
CA: So that's the key bottleneck, basically journalistic volunteers and/or the funding of journalistic salaries?
Jep! Jeps, og betroede folk. Jeg mener, vi er en organisation, det er svær at lade vokse meget hurtig, pga. den slags materiale vi håndterer. Så vi må omstrukturere for at få folk, der vil håndtere det højeste nationale sikkerhedsstof og også lavere sikkerhedssager.
JA: Yep. Yeah, and trusted people. I mean, we're an organization that is hard to grow very quickly because of the sort of material we deal with, so we have to restructure in order to have people who will deal with the highest national security stuff, and then lower security cases.
Så hjælp os til at forstå dig personligt og hvordan du begyndte at gøre det her. Jeg tror, jeg læste, at som barn gik du på 37 forskellige skoler. Kan det være rigtigt?
CA: So help us understand a bit about you personally and how you came to do this. And I think I read that as a kid you went to 37 different schools. Can that be right?
Altså, mine forældre var i filmbranchen og på flugt fra en kult, så kombinationen af de to ting...
JA: Well, my parents were in the movie business and then on the run from a cult, so the combination between the two ...
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Jeg mener, en psykolog ville måske sige, det er en opskrift på avl af paranoia.
CA: I mean, a psychologist might say that's a recipe for breeding paranoia.
Hvad, filmbranchen?
JA: What, the movie business?
(Latter)
(Laughter)
(Bifald)
(Applause)
Og du var også - jeg mener, du var også hacker i en tidlig alder og rendte tidligt ind i autoriteterne. Altså, jeg var journalist. Du ved, jeg var en meget ung journalist-aktivist i en tidlig alder. Jeg skrev et blad, blev retsforfulgt for det, da jeg var teenager. Så man skal være forsigtig med at hacke. Jeg mener, der er sådan - der er en metode, der kan anvendes til forskellige ting. Desværre bliver den i øjeblikket mest anvendt af den russiske mafia til at stjæle din bedstmors bankkonti. Så den sætning er ikke - ikke så rar, som den har været.
CA: And you were also -- I mean, you were also a hacker at an early age and ran into the authorities early on. JA: Well, I was a journalist. You know, I was a very young journalist activist at an early age. I wrote a magazine, was prosecuted for it when I was a teenager. So you have to be careful with hacker. I mean there's like -- there's a method that can be deployed for various things. Unfortunately, at the moment, it's mostly deployed by the Russian mafia in order to steal your grandmother's bank accounts. So this phrase is not, not as nice as it used to be.
Jeps, altså, jeg tror bestemt ikke, du stjæler nogens bedstemors bankkonto. Men hvad med dine kerneværdier? Kan du give os en fornemmelse af, hvad de er og måske en episode i dit liv, der hjalp til at definere dem?
CA: Yeah, well, I certainly don't think you're stealing anyone's grandmother's bank account, but what about your core values? Can you give us a sense of what they are and maybe some incident in your life that helped determine them?
Jeg er ikke sikker omkring episoden. Men kerneværdierne: Altså, kompetente generøse mænd skaber ikke ofre; de hjælper ofre. Og det er noget fra min far og noget fra andre kompetente generøse mænd, der har været i mit liv.
JA: I'm not sure about the incident. But the core values: well, capable, generous men do not create victims; they nurture victims. And that's something from my father and something from other capable, generous men that have been in my life.
Kompetente generøse mænd skaber ikke ofre; de hjælper ofre?
CA: Capable, generous men do not create victims; they nurture victims?
Jeps, og ved du hvad, jeg er en kamplysten person, så jeg er faktisk ikke den store hjælper. Men på en måde - Der er en anden måde at hjælpe ofre på, det er at holde øje med kriminelle gerningsmænd. Så det er noget, der har været i min personlighed i lang tid.
JA: Yeah. And you know, I'm a combative person, so I'm not actually so big on the nurture, but some way -- there is another way of nurturing victims, which is to police perpetrators of crime. And so that is something that has been in my character for a long time.
Så fortæl os lige, her hurtigt til sidst, denne historie: Hvad skete der i Island? I hovedtræk offentliggjorde du noget der, løb ind i problemer med en bank og så overtog nyhedstjenesten der og ændrede i sin historie. I stedet for, publicerede de din side. Det gjorde dig meget højprofileret i Island. Hvad skete der så?
CA: So just tell us, very quickly in the last minute, the story: what happened in Iceland? You basically published something there, ran into trouble with a bank, then the news service there was injuncted from running the story. Instead, they publicized your side. That made you very high-profile in Iceland. What happened next?
Jeps du ved, det er en fantastisk sag. Island gennemgik en finansiel krise. Den tog virkelig kegler der i forhold til resten af verden. Deres banksektor var 10 gange større end BNI'et for resten af økonomien. Men altså, vi offentliggjorde denne rapport i juli sidste år. Og den nationale TV-station ændrede i sin historie fem minutter før, de gik i luften. Ligesom i en film, ændringen landede på nyhedsskrivebordet og nyhedsoplæreren var sådan: "Det her er aldrig sket før. Hvad skal vi gøre?" Altså, vi viser bare websitet i stedet, hele tiden, som fyld. Og vi blev meget berømte i Island, rejste til Island og talte om dette emne. Og i samfundet var der en følelse af, at det skulle aldrig ske igen. Og som resultat af at arbejde med nogle islandske politikere og nogle andre internationale juridiske eksperter sammensatte vi en ny slags lovpakke for Island for at blive en slags tilflugtskyst for den frie presse, med den stærkeste journalistiske beskyttelse i verden, med en ny Nobel-pris for ytringsfrihed. Island er et nordisk land så, ligesom Norge, er det i stand til at udnytte systemet. Og for blot en måned siden blev den enstemmig vedtaget af det islandske parlament.
JA: Yeah, this is a great case, you know. Iceland went through this financial crisis. It was the hardest hit of any country in the world. Its banking sector was 10 times the GDP of the rest of the economy. Anyway, so we release this report in July last year. And the national TV station was injuncted five minutes before it went on air, like out of a movie: injunction landed on the news desk, and the news reader was like, "This has never happened before. What do we do?" Well, we just show the website instead, for all that time, as a filler, and we became very famous in Iceland, went to Iceland and spoke about this issue. And there was a feeling in the community that that should never happen again, and as a result, working with Icelandic politicians and some other international legal experts, we put together a new sort of package of legislation for Iceland to sort of become an offshore haven for the free press, with the strongest journalistic protections in the world, with a new Nobel Prize for freedom of speech. Iceland's a Nordic country, so, like Norway, it's able to tap into the system. And just a month ago, this was passed by the Icelandic parliament unanimously.
Wauv!
CA: Wow.
(Bifald)
(Applause)
Sidste spørgsmål Julian. Når du så tænker på fremtiden, tror du, det er mere sandsynligt, at det bliver Big Brother, der udøver kontrol, mere hemmelighedskræmmeri eller os der våger over Big Brother? eller kommer det hele til at svinge fra side til side?
Last question, Julian. When you think of the future then, do you think it's more likely to be Big Brother exerting more control, more secrecy, or us watching Big Brother, or it's just all to be played for either way?
Jeg er ikke sikker på, til hvilken side det kommer til at hælde. Jeg mener, der er et enormt pres for at harmonisere love om ytringsfrihed og gennemsigtig lovgivning rundt om i verden og indenfor EU, mellem Kina og USA. Hvilken vej vil det gå? Det er svært at se. Det er derfor, vores tid er meget interessant. Fordi med blot en lille indsats kan vi dreje det i den ene eller anden retning.
JA: I'm not sure which way it's going to go. I mean, there's enormous pressures to harmonize freedom of speech legislation and transparency legislation around the world -- within the E.U., between China and the United States. Which way is it going to go? It's hard to see. That's why it's a very interesting time to be in -- because with just a little bit of effort, we can shift it one way or the other.
Altså, det lader til, jeg reflekterer publikums mening, når jeg siger: Julian, vær forsigtig og al magt til dig.
CA: Well, it looks like I'm reflecting the audience's opinion to say, Julian, be careful, and all power to you.
Tak Chris. Selv tak.
JA: Thank you, Chris. (CA: Thank you.)
(Bifald)
(Applause)